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Discussion:

Situation: A mechanized infantry battalion task force received an OPORD from the brigade with the mission to occupy a UN-designated zone of separation to conduct Peace Enforcement operations. Specified tasks included clearing the main supply routes to the zone and occupation of two different lodgement areas. One of the implied tasks was to conduct a tactical road march.

The battalion was task-organized by brigade with one tank company, two mechanized companies, an engineer platoon with a CEV and ACEs, an ADA platoon, an MP platoon, an NBC reconnaissance section, a PSYOP team, and a Civil Affairs team.

Brigade controlled elements were to be integrated into the movement to the lodgement areas.

Problem: The brigade S2 produced an IPB overlay indicating the presence of many known (marked) and unknown (unmarked) minefields throughout the area of operations. The minefields spanned the planned routes into the lodgement areas. The tank platoons did not have mine rollers.

Identify the Hazards: The battalion staff was committed to supervising STX lanes training when the OPORD was delivered and briefed by the brigade. Key members of the staff were not available for preparation of the battalion OPORD. The battalion commander had to prepare the order with limited assistance from the staff.

The staff members participating in the orders preparation were not experienced with the integration of the risk management process in the tactical decisionmaking process. They did not identify hazards within their BOS during the mission analysis and course-of-action development. The battalion commander completed the risk management process on his own.

The brigade staff did not do a complete job of integrating risk management into their tactical decisionmaking process because they also were not familiar with the technique. The minefield hazard was identified, but control measures were left out. Mine rollers with the tank company team or ACEs in all advanced guards to assist in clearing would have been proper control measures.

Neither the battalion commander nor the task force engineer identified the needed control measures to counter the minefield hazard. The battalion safety officer was the S1 and, therefore, was not part of the battle staff. He was not able to assist the S3 (in this case, the assistant S3 because the S3 was committed to STX supervision) by identifying the hazard.

The tank company commander was not available during the battalion OPORD preparation because of the STX. Parallel planning that might have surfaced the hazard based on company-level planning was not completed. He did not identify the appropriate controls for this hazard during the order preparation which followed the battalion OPORD briefing.

Assess the Hazards: The brigade had assessed the presence of unknown and unmarked minefields throughout the area of operations as high risk. The battalion commander also assessed the minefields as high risk hazards. The tank company commander and all other subordinate leaders agreed that the minefields were a significant hazard.

Identify Control Options and Make Decisions: The brigade provided only one control measure for the minefield hazard: It task-organized the TF engineers with mine detectors. The brigade commander and his staff did not identify mine roller-equipped tanks or ACEs well forward in the advanced guards as possible control measures.

The battalion commander and his staff accepted the control measure provided by the brigade without additional analysis. The commander did not surface the need for mine rollers to the brigade commander for a decision. He did not identify the ACEs as a potential mine-clearing asset. He organized his company teams in a manner that spread the engineer mine detectors across the battalion task force. Each element responsible for clearing a route to the zone of separation would have mine detectors available.

The tank company team commander was assigned the mission of clearing the main supply route through the zone of separation. He was provided the mine detectors and ACEs. He did not think to ask about mine rollers. He organized the convoy with the ACEs about one third of the way back in the main body. His advance guard consisted of scouts with M113-mounted engineers and some infantry (BFV) support.

The tank commander intended for his advance guard to clear and mark mines encountered enroute to his objective.

Implement Control Options: The tank company team executed the tactical road march as planned. The scouts, engineers, and infantry of the advance guard were well forward and conducting visual searches for mines. The plan broke down after two hours of movement when the advance guard encountered the first buried minefield on the route. An engineer vehicle was destroyed, and all on board were killed when the M113 hit a landmine.

The movement of the main body ground to a halt. Infantry dismounts were brought forward to assist the scouts in probing and marking a route through the minefield by hand. Neither the battalion commander, the tank company team commander, nor the task force engineer thought to move the ACEs forward to assist in clearing a passage through the minefield. Mine rollers were not requested.

Supervise: The engineers supervised the implementation of the control measures (hand-held mine detectors and visual search) until they died in the minefield. The scout and infantry squad leaders in the advance guard supervised the clearing of the route for the remainder of the movement.

The brigade and battalion XOs missed the opportunity to train and supervise the staffs in the integration of risk management in the tactical decisionmaking process. The commanders at each level from the brigade through the tank company commander failed to identify the hazard and appropriate control measures in their mission analysis and course-of-action development and selection.

The task force failed to accomplish the specified task of occupying the lodgement area before nightfall because the hazards were not properly controlled. Proper integration of risk management may have contributed significantly to the success of the mission and preservation of manpower and equipment.

Lesson(s): Good supervision of a bad plan will not ensure success. Proper integration of risk management in the tactical decisionmaking process may have only identified the hazard (minefields) and the risk (high), but may have also identified the proper control measures (mine rollers and/or ACEs forward) for implementation.

In this example, the IPB identified both identified and unidentified minefields in the area of operations. The entire chain of command agreed that it presented a high risk and, therefore, was one of the top hazards that would be faced. Because the planning procedures did not include proper risk management procedures, parallel planning, and proper rehearsals, to include feedback, a high risk hazard was overlooked. When high risk hazards are identified, leaders and staffs must focus on them to ensure the proper controls are implemented.

Risk Management Procedures--Training