CHAPTER
III
Abbreviating the MDMP
The abbreviated technique is the planning process that units will most often use in a tactical environment. This process is most commonly used when one or more of the following situations occur:
- Less time is available as compared to the deliberate MDMP.
- Staff is relatively new and inexperienced.
- Commander's access to his staff is somewhat limited.
This process is very similar to the deliberate MDMP, but employs slightly different techniques to save time. The following issues, discussions, techniques, and procedures are presented to provide specific ways to abbreviate the planning process. Chart 5 outlines the abbreviated form of the MDMP. The major difference between the deliberate and abbreviated form are the level of involvement of the commander and the nature of the guidance that the commander issues. The abbreviated form will normally result in the development of an operations order.
ISSUE: Typically, most delays during the mission analysis can be traced to the S2. The S2 must have his enemy situational templates (SITEMPs) as complete as possible prior to the mission analysis briefing.
DISCUSSION: This is no easy task. To accomplish this effort in a timely manner, the S2 must ensure that he constantly updates the IPB. The IPB process is not a one-time effort. It is a process that requires constant attention and updating as the situation changes. This requires the G2/S2 of the next higher headquarters to provide all intelligence products to subordinate units as soon as possible. An experienced liaison officer (LO) can make significant contributions in this area by providing warning orders to the unit and passing all intelligence products as soon as they become available. (For additional information on LO operations see CALL Newsletter 95-7, May 95, Tactical Operations Center (TOC), and the May-Jun 96 Edition of News From the Front.) Under most circumstances, the higher headquarters G2/S2 should have most of his intelligence products near completion prior to the orders brief. O/Cs report observing some brigade-level staffs who have refused to release any products until after the brigade order. This technique severely hinders the parallel planning of subordinate units. Commanders, G2s, and S2s must realize the significance of releasing any and all products immediately as they become available. Commanders must ruthlessly support and enforce this concept. If parallel planning is to occur, and the planning process is to be IPB-driven, this is the only way it can be conducted in a timely fashion. Once the SITEMPs are developed, they must be constantly updated and adjusted as new information or intelligence becomes available.
Additionally, S2s must conduct their own prior preparation. This includes the following:
- Conducting terrain analysis.
- Developing enemy doctrinal templates.
- Preparing blown-up sketches of critical terrain.
These items can be prepared with little more information than what is included in a good warning order. Finally, the S2 section must be trained to conduct current and future operations simultaneously for a limited amount of time. This is perhaps the most difficult task for the S2 section to accomplish based on current manning levels and organizational structure.
The TF S2 is typically the youngest and most inexperienced officer on the staff. He can not be expected to carry the entire load of the IPB process himself. The IPB process is a commander's responsibility and the responsibility of each staff officer, not just the S2s. Other staff officers must assist the S2 in developing the enemy SITEMPs within their own area of expertise.
Additionally, the S2 must have his initial IPB done to facilitate early deployment of reconnaissance assets. Reconnaissance assets must be deployed as soon as possible to facilitate information collection that may result in making adjustments to the initial plan.
TECHNIQUES:
- Higher headquarters must provide subordinate S2s any and all products as they become available. Use your LO and multiple warning orders to facilitate this.
- The S2 section must prepare ahead of time blown-up sketches of critical areas (objectives, engagement areas etc.), terrain analysis (modified combined obstacles overlay), doctrinal templates, and other tools as necessary.
- Other staff officers should assist the S2 as he develops the enemy SITEMPs.
- The entire S2 section must be actively involved in assisting the S2 as he develops his intelligence estimate. The development of the intelligence estimate cannot be conducted by the S2 alone. He must receive assistance from his subordinates. The G2 and S2 must ensure that home-station training is focused on developing the skills of individual soldiers within each S2 section. (See Chapter VI, Home-Station Training, for ideas on IPB training.)
ISSUE: The mission analysis process often takes longer than necessary due to poor preparation and anticipation by the staff.
DISCUSSION: When time is limited, the key to success is anticipation and preparation by the staff. Staff officers must constantly update unit status reports to determine amounts of CL III, IV, V, equipment maintenance status, and other critical information (facts). These facts allow staff officers to develop assumptions that are critical to the planning process. Reporting of this information must be a push system versus a pull system. Subordinate units must rapidly update their reports as the situation changes. Good reporting SOPs must be developed and enforced. When necessary, the staff must be aggressive in attaining this information. The mission analysis briefing should not develop into a unit readiness briefing. The staff officer must know the status of each subordinate unit, and brief relevant information as it applies to the situation. Charts are typically used to consolidate this information and ultimately reduce briefing times when used to provide situational updates to the commander.
For additional information regarding charts and other tools, see CALL Newsletter 95-7. If properly trained, RTOs and NCOs can easily accomplish this function, thus relieving the staff officer from this time-consuming task.
TECHNIQUES:
- The staff must anticipate and prepare for the mission analysis. Staff officers and NCOs must have statuses on all classes of supply and other pertinent information prior to the mission analysis process.
- Refine, practice, and enforce your reporting procedures. Subordinate units must constantly update their reports as the situation changes.
- Develop standardized charts to monitor this type of data and to assist the commander in obtaining a quick snapshot of his unit.
- Staff officers should develop a generic list of issues for particular types of missions to consider during the mission analysis. This list will assist them in preparing for the mission analysis process. See Appendix B for examples.
ISSUE: Staffs are often slow to assemble prior to the mission analysis process.
DISCUSSION: The assembly of appropriate staff officers periodically hinders the mission analysis process. We have all seen or experienced situations where the staff is assembled and waiting for another staff officer to arrive at the TOC. Once again the staff must anticipate the mission analysis and quickly assemble at the TOC. Unit SOPs must identify who is to attend, who the alternates are, when they should assemble, and what information or products they are required to bring such as IPB products, friendly graphics, and those critical facts and assumptions that are pertinent to the operation. Attached units who are not typically assigned to the unit must understand what is expected and the importance of being prompt and prepared. The XO plays a key role in coordinating the activities of the staff and must take the lead in getting the staff prepared for the planning process.
TECHNIQUES:
- The battle captain/NCO should issue a warning order to the staff alerting them of the pending planning process.
- Staff officers must once again anticipate the mission analysis. They must be prompt and prepared. The staff should begin to prepare for the mission analysis immediately upon receipt of a warning order.
- Ensure elements that are not habitually attached to your unit understand the requirement and its importance. Provide them a copy of your TSOP to familiarize them with your internal operating procedures.
- Identify the orders group in your warning orders.
ISSUE: Staffs periodically misinterpret the higher headquarters mission, intent, and guidance.
DISCUSSION: Staffs have been observed spending hours developing plans, only to determine that they misinterpreted guidance from higher headquarters. This results in significant amounts of time being wasted, forcing the staffs to retrace their efforts.
TECHNIQUES:
- If confused by guidance and instructions from higher headquarters, seek clarification immediately.
- Conduct confirmation briefings with subordinates immediately following order issue to ensure they understand the commander's intent and concept.
- LOs who are familiar with the plan of the higher headquarters can assist by attending and participating in the planning process.
Finally, conduct as formal of a mission analysis brief as time permits. This is often the only time the entire staff is present, and presents the only opportunity to ensure that all staff members are starting from a common reference point. The mission analysis brief should not be a brief just to the commander as he sits in his HWMMV. This brief should be considered as a brief from the staff to the staff. Once again, the mission analysis is critical to ensure that you thoroughly understand the task. This sounds rather elementary in nature, but if the mission is not clearly understood, the results can be devastating.
Products that result from the mission analysis include:
- Modified combined obstacle overlay/avenue of approach overlay
- Enemy SITEMPs
- Initial event template
- R/S concept
- Specified/implied task list
- Constraints
- Detailed integrated timeline
- Risk analysis
- Movement plan (if necessary)
- Proposed CCIR
- Restated mission
- Warning order
ISSUE: The commander must provide specific planning guidance to the staff so it can continue to develop its staff estimates and develop courses of action.
DISCUSSION: When using the abbreviated technique, the commander's guidance is very similar to the guidance he provides his staff when using the deliberate technique. He issues his guidance to the staff upon approving the restated mission. However, when using the abbreviated technique, his guidance must be more specific and directive in nature. The elements of the commander's guidance presented in the previous chapter is still applicable, but the commander's guidance must be more detailed and directive in a time-constrained environment. He must specifically tell his staff what COAs he wants developed. He should include tentative task organization and scheme of maneuver. He must also determine which enemy SITEMPs he wants the COAs war-gamed against and what branch plans he wants incorporated within each COA. The staff will probably not have time to conduct a detailed wargame session with numerous friendly and enemy COAs. By providing this type of guidance, the commander has slightly limited his staff's flexibility and initiative in effort to save time. This technique will result in providing the staff more time to synchronize the COA during the wargame session.
One staff was observed spending significant amounts of time developing and war-gaming two COAs based on vague commander's guidance. The commander responded during the decision brief by saying, "I don't like either COA; here is what we are going to do." This situation resulted in significant amounts of time being wasted. To assist in developing guidance, some commanders have developed a generic SOP containing typical guidance to the staff that they can use as a guide when time is limited.
TECHNIQUES:
- When using the abbreviated technique, the commander's guidance must be specific and direct.
- Develop an SOP that identifies what type of guidance staff officers require from the commander. See Appendix C for examples.
ISSUE: The commander and staff must be trained to rapidly develop courses of action.
DISCUSSION: The COA development step of the MDMP is the first step of the process where significant amounts of time can be saved if required. At this point in the process, the staff has conducted the mission analysis brief, and the commander should have issued his guidance to the staff. Now the staff and commander should be prepared to develop the COAs.
Developing a COA using the abbreviated technique is more difficult due to time constraints and other factors (as outlined in chart 2) that may affect the planning process. The key to using this planning process is the commander's guidance. Prior to COA development, the commander's guidance should have been very specific and directive. The commander should have provided details to the staff (such as a sketch) outlining what he expects or does not expect in each COA. Now the staff should begin to use the same COA development process as outlined in the deliberate technique. The only difference between the two processes, besides time available, are the level of detail provided in the commander's guidance, and the latitude and flexibility of the staff. The abbreviated technique is characterized by detailed guidance by the commander, and only one or two COAs developed by the staff based on the commander's guidance. One COA that facilitates flexibility is better than three that do not.
A technique that O/Cs have observed some units use at the CTCs involves conducting a hasty wargame once the COAs are developed. This hasty wargame is conducted by the commander and a select group of staff officers (S2, S3, and FSO) based on the mission. The intent of this wargame is to continue to develop and mature the COA prior to the formal wargame effort conducted by the staff. This technique provides the commander an opportunity to refine his COA and make any necessary adjustments prior to the detailed wargame. The key difference between the hasty wargame and the detailed wargame is in the purpose of each. The purpose of the hasty wargame is to refine and mature the COA. The purpose of the detailed wargame is to synchronize the COA. (See Chart 5.)
If developing multiple friendly COAs, the hasty wargame technique presents the commander with an opportunity to make an early decision. If the commander participates during the hasty wargame sessions, he may suddenly determine that he favors one COA versus another. If this occurs, he can immediately make this decision. If the commander cannot be present during the hasty wargame sessions, and he is unable to make a decision, conduct a COA backbrief to the commander after the hasty wargame session. This technique facilitates an early decision by the commander, allowing his staff to focus on the selected COA instead of multiple COAs (saving time).
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
- The commander should be very specific as he provides guidance to his staff. This guidance should include detailed information outlining the COAs as well as any branches or contingency plans that he expects his staff to develop.
- Consider using the hasty wargame technique. This will assist in maturing your COA and will also increase the effectiveness of the formal wargame session. This technique will allow you to concentrate on synchronizing the COA as opposed to continuing to develop the COA during the formal wargame session.
ISSUE: The S2's enemy SITEMPs are often times not used when developing COAs.
DISCUSSION: When the enemy SITEMPs are not used, the result is a plan that is not being driven by the IPB process. Without the SITEMPs, the analysis of relative combat power and the arraying of initial forces as described in FM 101-5 (DRAG Edition, 12 Feb 97) cannot be conducted. As previously discussed, the S2 should develop large, detailed, and accurate sketches with the enemy SITEMPs applied. These large sketches allow the entire staff to easily see and provide input.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
- The S2's SITEMPs must be present and used during COA development.
- The S2 must actively participate, providing assistance in analyzing force ratios, threat weapon capabilities and as much intelligence and information about the enemy as possible.
- Other battlefield operating systems (BOSs) representatives should assist the S2 in analyzing the enemy situation within their area of expertise.
Once the COAs are developed, the products produced during this step of the process should be:
- COA sketch and statement for each COA developed.
- Task and purpose for each subordinate unit (including supporting units).
- Basic graphic control measures.
- Generic task organization.
Do not allow your lack of organization and prior planning to be an excuse to omit these products. They are very useful when incorporated into the process.
The COA analysis step is the most difficult and time-consuming step of the planning process, but it is also another step where specific techniques and procedures can be applied to save significant amounts of time.
ISSUE: The commander and staff must war-game the COAs in a detailed fashion to ensure all battlefield operating systems are fully integrated and synchronized.
DISCUSSION: Wargaming while using the abbreviated technique is slightly different. Under ideal circumstances, this process may include war-gaming only one or two friendly COAs against the enemy COAs. These wargame sessions may only cover one or two selected critical events. The commander and staff must identify and prioritize which critical events they want analyzed. The commander plays a critical role during this process. The commander should attend the wargame session and be prepared to make decisions as required, provide guidance, negate unwanted concepts, and assist in keeping the staff focused. If the commander is present during the wargaming of multiple COAs, it is likely that he will rapidly identify which COA he favors. If this occurs, the commander can quickly decide to discard unwanted COAs, allocating more time to refine the selected COA. This technique saves significant amounts of time when applied. (See Chart 5.)
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
- Determine how much time you can commit to the wargame process, and ensure this timeline is followed.
- Identify and prioritize critical events. These critical events might include: actions on the objective, actions in the EA, actions on the PZ/LZ/DZ, and passage of lines. These critical events can be identified by analyzing your specified and implied tasks. Conduct the wargame session according to the prioritized list of critical events. War-game as many critical events as possible in the allotted amount of time; however, stick to your timeline.
- War-game critical events using the box or belt technique. If time permits, war-game multiple boxes or belts.
- The commander should attend the wargame session to provide input to the staff and make decisions as needed. Participation by the commander during the COA analysis process can prevent the need for a decision brief later (saving time).
ISSUE: Many units were observed taking significant amounts of time (over one hour) to compare multiple COAs.
DISCUSSION: If developing multiple COAs, the last step of the COA analysis is the COA comparison. During this step of the process, the staff compares the COAs using the evaluation criteria identified earlier in the process. This process sometimes results in emotional and heated discussions by the staff officers who are defending the COA they personally developed. This heated discussion often wastes valuable time.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
- Ensure your evaluation criteria are specifically defined before you begin the wargame process. Example: The term "massing of fires" is commonly used to compare COAs. As is, the term is very vague and does not mean much. Quantify your evaluation criteria. Example: How many tank platoons can engage and mass direct fires on the objective? Phrased as such, it specifically quantifies the term used to compare the COAs.
- Limit your evaluation criteria to the four or five most important. These can be determined by analyzing the mission statement, commander's intent, and commander's guidance. Do not use a laundry list of 20 different terms that are insignificant. This only increases the amount of time the staff must take to compare each COA.
- Staff officers must not get emotional and attempt to defend their COA. There is not time for it. They must remain unemotional and unbiased in effort to speed the process.
ADDITIONAL TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
- Select your wargame technique (belt, box, or avenues in depth) based on the amount of available time. If time is short, do not select the avenue-in-depth technique. Otherwise, you may war-game crossing the LD and movement to the objective, but run out of time before you discuss actions at the objective. If required, war-game multiple boxes or belts. The belts or boxes are the quickest techniques to apply.
- The TOC must be prepared and configured to conduct the wargame session. Charts and boards must be cleaned and prepared for use. The blown-up terrain sketch and enemy SITEMPs must be prepared and present for the wargame session. Anticipate this event and prepare for it. Trained NCOs and soldiers can play a significant role in accomplishing these tasks.
- Use recorders throughout the process. These recorders should be trained to capture coordinating instructions and sub-unit instructions during the process. If this occurs, a portion of the order will be written before the planning process is complete.
During the wargame process, the following products should be developed or finalized:
- Operational graphics.
- Synchronization matrix/wargame worksheet.
- Decision support template.
- Reconnaissance and surveillance plan.
- Fire support plan/graphics.
- Engineer support plan/graphics.
- Air defense plan/graphics.
- CSS plan/graphics.
The staff has now developed, analyzed, and compared each COA. The staff is now prepared to make a recommendation to the commander.
ISSUE: Conducting the decision brief often takes much longer than necessary.
DISCUSSION: The commander and staff must incorporate techniques that will either reduce or completely eliminate the need for a decision brief. When implementing the deliberate technique, this is normally not an issue; however, when using the abbreviated technique, this can be a significant problem. The key to solving this problem is the commander. If the commander has observed and participated in the planning process, the decision may be rapidly apparent. When this occurs, the commander should make an on-the-spot decision. This will completely eliminate the need for a lengthy decision brief, and provide the staff more time to refine the selected COA or begin to prepare orders and instructions. If the commander cannot be present during the planning process, the staff must quickly brief the commander, and make a recommendation to him. Most units use COA comparison charts to facilitate the commander's decision. Charts work well when used effectively. Limit and clearly define your evaluation criteria as discussed previously.
TECHNIQUES:
- Ensure COA sketches are present during the decision brief. This will assist the commander in visualizing and distinguishing between each COA.
- Ensure your COA or COAs are complete with tentative task organization, COA statement, and task and purpose for each subordinate unit.
- Use COA comparison charts to present to the commander. This will reduce the amount of time required to conduct the decision brief.
- When possible, the commander should participate in the planning process. This technique can potentially eliminate the need for the comparison and decision brief.
The abbreviated technique is characterized by more specific and directive guidance provided by the commander, and increased involvement of the commander.
The advantages of the abbreviated technique are:
- Requires less time to conduct than the deliberate technique.
- Based on more specific and directive guidance, the staff efforts are more focused.
The disadvantages are:
- Slightly limits staff flexibility and initiative.
- Does not explore all available options when developing friendly COAs.
Chapter
II - The Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)
Chapter
IV - Accelerating the Decision-Making Process
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