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TOPIC: FSB LOGISTICS TRAINING AT THE CTC
AND HOME STATION

CTC rotations demonstrate the requirement for tough, realistic, and fully integrated combat service support training, a requirement not likely to dissipate with Force XXI changes. FSB commanders need dedicated and structured home-station training time to exercise all brigade support area units/organizations in CSS and force protection operations. This requirement not only supports regular CTC performance-based training. More importantly, it builds the knowledge base to respond to no-notice joint task force operations.

DISCUSSION. "The CTC mission is to provide an advanced level of tactical training focused on a brigade task force with special emphasis on squads and platoons."

"Home-station training is where you ought to allocate the resources so that the commander with his unit can train to standard - in other words, redo it if you don't meet the standard. Here at the CTC, we are tasked to provide a continuum."

"Our training at home station ought to be structured so that on any given day somebody can give you a no-notice alert to go to the CTC, and you will perform admirably."

"We really have not trained in counter-ambush truck-mounted operations. We need to have a live-fire exercise that replicates those conditions."

"It would be really good if we could take some of the other combat elements and have them participate in live fire, even a MP or truck platoon, to the point where they could do the counter-ambush, which is a task common to all under force protection. It is not only just a live fire, go in and attack violently, you have to make decisions based upon the rules of engagement."

"Division commanders really struggle with force protection and key resource protection issues, to the point where they go to a maneuver brigade and strip a fairly large protection force specifically assigned to protect Q-36/37 radars, or MLRS, and provide perimeter defense for Apaches. Maybe that is a conscious recognition that our center of gravity is moving away from the armor and the infantry maneuver forces into aviation and artillery forces, realizing that to win the battle you have to keep those aviation and artillery assets alive and well so you have to put some protection with them."

"The challenge for the FSB (it gets back to how the FSB commander sees the battlefield) is the synchronization of the CSS. If he isn't anticipating, doesn't have his head in the game, doesn't keep a pulse beat on what's going on, and he can't, back there in the brigade rear, see the battlefield forward, then he is not going to get the supplies to the right place at the right time."

"Digitization is going to be tremendous, to where back at the ALOC and within the FSB TOC the S1/S4 or support operations officer can push a button and get a display on what is the status of the armor/mech team."

"I go back to my separate brigade days. We had a support battalion; we worked together. The support battalion commander was not in a greater or bigger framework or organization called a DISCOM; he was there to support the brigade."

CURRENT ASSESSMENT. The CTC training experience is too often the only time diverse CS and CSS units are fully integrated into brigade operations. Since fundamental integration tasks are not rehearsed at home station, valuable training opportunities at the CTCs cannot be fully realized. We should acknowledge and correct shortcomings in the areas of force protection, supply information, CSS rehearsals, and home-station training.

• Force Protection. Many FSB commanders do not understand their role as combat commanders. They frequently err in deciding level II or III threat conditions. FSB S2/3s are not well versed in the intelligence collection analysis, and MTOE/ODP are not supported by MEL4 qualified officers. Also, the link between the brigade S2 and the FSB is weak. The IPB does not cover BSA threats, and templates are not developed for the rear area. Rear area reconnaissance and surveillance plans are insufficiently developed and poorly executed. Inadequate training and the conflicting missions of providing simultaneous support to the brigade while protecting the brigade rear area are main contributors to this problem. Furthermore, current rear battle doctrine does not assign specific mission requirements to BCT units or personnel, resulting in an ad/hoc rear protection organization. In some cases, OPFOR activity at the CTCs is handled/orchestrated by CSS O/Cs and not planned by the OPFOR as part of their independent intelligence collection program. This creates an inconsistent playing field and hinders BCT intelligence collection opportunities.
• Supply Information. The FSB commander cannot anticipate brigade requirements with untimely or inaccurate supply information. The brigade ALOC and FSB TOC continue to have problems with retrieving timely status reports on fuel and ammunition levels, as well as maintenance status of supported unit combat, CS, and CSS systems. Insufficient range and quantity of communications equipment magnify this problem. Further, many FSB commanders fail to go forward and, therefore, cannot visualize the battlefield. They do not see their CSS functions in operation and are not directing critical operations, such as execution of decision matrix trigger points as well as casualty and material evacuation.
• CSS Rehearsals. CSS rehearsals at the CTCs, if done at all, are conducted without key players present and often do not follow the brigade combined arms rehearsal. Consequently, they do not benefit from the use of the brigade terrain model, scheme of maneuver plan, fire support plan, and latest IPB. Additionally, many units arrive at the CTCs without a CSS rehearsal SOP, thereby, almost ensuring the poor synchronization of CSS (man, arm, fuel, fix, move, and sustain) functions. Trigger points are frequently not established in the decision matrix for logistics support, thus forfeiting opportunities to support forward in a timely manner.
• Home-Station Training. Home-station training needs to be comprehensive and METL focused. Sergeants' time training and a few small unstructured FTXs are insufficient preparation for the rigors of a CTC rotation, let alone a combat deployment. The BCT is not training at home station as a combined arms team, which is a primary cause of poor synchronization of the CSS BOS at the CTCs.

The CTCs have improved CSS training. However, we are not to the point where brigades leave the training centers with a full appreciation of the impact of the support functions on the success or failure of the overall operation. A unit that shows up at the CTC at an inadequate level of proficiency finds it difficult to reach a sustained level of excellence--they often never understand what "right" looks like. CTCs offer an intense training experience, but they are not meant to be the only time we train to standards in combined operations.

FUTURE IMPLICATIONS. There is no substitute for training together. It is time we considered reorganizing the BCT as separate brigades or regiments. Such a relationship would improve synchronization, energize the human dimension of battle command, and focus home-station training toward combined arms operations. We need to improve force protection capabilities, particularly in the areas of training, doctrine, equipment, personnel, and simulation models. Home-station training needs to be synchronized and comprehensive, and we should take advantage of current technology to improve timeliness and accuracy of supply information.

• Force Protection. Personnel resources are not sufficient to handle the dispersed area of rear operations and enemy rear areathreat capabilities. FSB S2/3s should be filled by CGSC graduates and the sergeant intelligence position should be upgraded. Our doctrine needs to assign missions to BCT rear area units and commanders, so we can evolve beyond current ad/hoc organizations. Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, as well as commanders during BCTP rotations, provided security forces to assist in FSB and critical brigade resource protection, diluting the forward combat power. Maybe it is time to consider placing mortars, other heavier weapons, and dedicated security forces under FSB command and control. Perhaps, an organic security force should be assigned to the FSB.

  With or without the addition of security forces, we need to add more realism to our training at the CTCs by insertion of OPFOR in the rear area to disrupt supply lines and command and control nodes. We need to destroy critical bridges and crater main supply routes that will require engineer repair. We need to establish live-fire ambush reaction courses and live-fire rear battle exercises. We should establish the CSS equivalent of Bradley and Abrams Tables VIII and XII as gates before CTC rotation. All CSS vehicles and soldiers should be equipped with MILES. Critical C2, resupply, and casualty evacuation vehicles need to be equipped with MILES II. Additionally, simulation models need to include the expansion and contraction of the BSA as corps and division troops come and go. This will require the FSB commander to adjust the rear area protection plan. First-destination release points, MP escorts, and traffic control points are all part of the necessary organization for effective BSA command and control. They should be included in CSS simulation models as well. We need battle realism on both ends of the fight, FLOT and rear area.

• Home-Station Training. BSA unit training schedules must be synchronized and comprehensive to give the FSB commander the opportunity to focus pre-rotation training and battle command skills. Like his maneuver counterparts, the FSB commander must have the benefit of trained observer-assisted exercises at home station. This reinforces the standard, ensures objectivity, and provides valuable insights into techniques, tactics, and procedures. O/C-supported home-station training is another way to improve unit proficiency and enhance the unit's CTC experience. All CSS commanders should spend one week at a CTC in the right seat program before command. This will help them visualize the battlefield during their rotation, understand CTC requirements, better assess subordinate unit training programs, develop a holistic unit training program, and mentor junior leadership.
• Technology. Advancements in Digitization technology have the potential to significantly improve current shortfalls in submission and collection of timely and accurate supply information. Automatic retrieval of timely status reports coupled with bringing FSB commanders forward to visualize the battlefield will greatly enhance predictive supply and services to the BCT. This same technology can also enhance brigade ALOC and FSB TOC battletracking and help to ensure that resupply and medical evacuation convoys deliver supplies and casualties to optimal locations. Moreover, computer models can assist in projecting supply usage rates and mean time before failure analysis.

by LTC D. LYLE HOHNSTINE, QM

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Topic: Leader Development
Topic: Joint Training