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BRIGADE REAR OPERATIONS
A Force Protection Dilemma

by LTC Douglas B. Blake, United States Army War College

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CAN WE WIN THE NEXT WAR?

Many would say there is an easy answer to that impertinent question. Yes, of course we can; we are the most powerful military force on the face of the earth. No potential adversary can match the United States in training, doctrine, or equipment. Our Army is on the brink of the Information Age. The Force XXI Army promises a level of technological capability that is beyond the wildest dreams of most of the world's armies. The stronger force will always defeat a weaker opponent. That's right, isn't it?

Unfortunately, we know that history has not always been kind to the side with the stronger force. To win a conflict, one does not have to defeat an adversary's strength; it is usually better to attack and defeat a weakness. We understand this, and so do our potential enemies. So what weaknesses do we have today that an enemy can successfully exploit?

In my experience, one weakness we demonstrate is a vulnerability to attack in our brigade rear areas and along lines of communication that support brigade operations. If my observations are accurate, not only are we in danger of losing continuity of future operations because of a disruption in logistical support, but, more importantly, we stand to lose the lives of soldiers unnecessarily. In the context of lost lives, rear operations become an issue of force protection, an inherent command responsibility.

Loss of American lives may be the one constant center of gravity that must be considered in all future U.S. military operations. While loss of life in war is a given, our experience since the Vietnam War has been that public support for a conflict is closely tied to the number of U.S. casualties. We need to look no further than the aftermath of the October 1993 street battle in Mogadishu to see an example of a conflict terminated because of the perception that lives of American soldiers were needlessly squandered.

My purpose in discussing rear operations is to emphasize an aspect of Battle Command that does not receive the attention it deserves. I believe our vulnerability lies in the failure of brigade commanders and their staffs to effectively plan and execute rear area protection in every operation. In reviewing recent performance of heavy brigades at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and at Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) warfighter exercises, we begin to discover two main reasons for that problem. First, many units do not recognize the need for rear operations planning at brigade level; therefore, they have little experience in integrating it into the planning process. Secondly, our training centers do not sufficiently stress brigades with a realistic rear area threat as a way to reinforce the appropriate lessons. In addition to describing the problem, I will suggest some changes in training and doctrine to guide commanders in their approach to rear operations. The basis of this discussion is my experience with heavy brigades, although I believe the recommendations are equally relevant to light forces.

The lessons of World War II still form the basis of our rear operations doctrine. From that conflict, we learned the functions of rear operations are to sustain the force, control movement and terrain, secure rear area units, and control damage.

The overarching doctrinal guidance for rear operations is FM 90-14, Rear Battle, published in 1985 as a companion to AirLand Battle doctrine. New versions of FM 90-14 and FM 71-100, Division Operations, updating rear operations doctrine, are now pending publication. For the heavy brigade commander, further rear operations doctrine is contained in FM 71-3, Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade, (May 1988) also pending an update.Because of the disjointed way the subject of rear operations is presented, a brigade commander's understanding of how to approach the issue must begin with a careful review of these documents. These documents create the impression that rear operations are separate from the close fight. For instance, to find rear operations in FM 71-3, one must look in chapter 5, under "Other Tactical Operations." The doctrine is correct as far as it goes, but it is packaged in a way that makes it hard to visualize the interdependence between the close and rear fight. Too much is left to the commander's imagination or interpretation.

FM 100-5, Operations, June 1993, provides the most current definition of rear operations.

"Rear operations assist in providing freedom of action and continuity of operation, logistics, and battle command. Their primary purposes are to sustain the current close and deep fights and to posture the force for future operations....At the tactical level, (the rear operation) enhances the commanders's ability to influence the tempo of combat, helping him take advantage of any opportunity without delay." --FM 100-5

This definition is helpful in explaining the linkage among deep, close, and rear operations. FM 100-5 is also effective in advancing the ideas of battlefield organization and framework. Both concepts are important to understanding how rear operations fit into development and execution of operational plans.

The following principles are extracted from FM 90-14, Rear Battle:

Economy of Force: Units operating in the rear provide some degree of self protection, using both passive and active defensive measures.

Unity of Effort: The maneuver commander integrates defense of the rear with the deep and close fight.

Responsiveness: An attack in the rear requires rapid employment of sufficient combat power to defeat the enemy force.

With doctrine in mind, let us look at what happens to many brigades that train at a CTC or with BCTP. Typically, the opposing force can successfully attack units operating in the brigade rear area. The attack succeeds because the opposing force has the element of surprise and the rear area units lack adequate preparations to defeat an attack. There is no timely response to the attack from brigade level because there is no plan for that contingency. The brigade plan did not set conditions necessary to protect the force. The resulting chaos includes a high number of casualties and a disruption of logistics operations.

For the brigade commander, this means he has to turn his attention away from the main effort to eliminate the threat and clean up the damage that resulted from the attack. Depending on the extent of the damage, the commander may be concerned with reconstituting enough logistical structure to support the brigade during another operation. From the enemy's perspective, attacking the brigade's sustainment capability in the rear is a quick and effective means of seizing the initiative and controlling the tempo of the battle. The question that remains for the afteraction review is, could the attack have been prevented or successfully repulsed with minimal damage? The answer can only be yes if rear operations were properly integrated into the brigade plan from the beginning.

As an observer/controller with BCTP, I was always fascinated watching brigade commanders and their staffs receive the division order and begin their planning. The staff usually understood and followed the orders process, perhaps with some lack of detail. As I listened to the analysis and briefing that followed, seldom did I hear a word about a possible rear threat or what to do about it. When I would ask hard questions about the threat, the initial response was, "The forward support battalion (FSB) commander will defend the brigade support area (BSA) against whatever comes his way; we're accepting risk in the rear." Clearly the focus of everyone in the organization was mission accomplishment, how to take an objective or defend the terrain. While I would never argue with that focus, I would add that successful rear operations are critical to the accomplishment of any mission. For units I observed "accepting risk" in the rear usually meant that was the first and last thought anyone at brigade level had on the subject of rear operations. The answer, "Let the FSB commander handle it," may sometimes be correct, but the brigade commander and staff cannot know this unless they have spent some time on a METT-T analysis of the situation. As in all aspects of battle, it takes the commander and staff to set conditions for success.

Now understanding the problem, you may be wondering how to solve it. You may be concerned about having to divert a lot of combat power to defend the rear. There is not enough combat power to go around for most missions, so slicing off any significant portion of it for rear area defense is usually not a feasible solution. There is the dilemma: how do you accomplish the mission while protecting the rear area? The place to start is by thinking through the problem and by looking for ways to synchronize and integrate rear operations. The brigade commander must fight throughout the depth of the battlefield.

One key to integrating rear operations is to remember that the brigade rear area is part of the commander's battle space. As stated in FM 100-5, "Commanders seek to dominate the enemy in a given battle space." Said another way, enemy actions anywhere within that space can influence the success of the mission. It is essential to understand that the brigade rear area includes all terrain from the battalion rear boundaries to the brigade rear boundary. On the nonlinear battlefield, location of the rear area may be harder to define, or may not be contiguous with the forward areas. In either case, the tempo of the operation depends on the continuous performance of a myrid of functions within the brigade rear area.

While doctrine is clear that the FSB commander is responsible for defense of the BSA, it does not specify who in the brigade is responsible for the rest of the rear area. Without fixing responsibility for the brigade rear area to a subordinate commander, it seems from doctrine that the command and control responsibility defaults to the brigade commander. Although the BSA is a large part of the rear area defense challenge, it occupies only part of the terrain. There might well be other friendly units operating outside the BSA. Another challenge is securing the lines of communications that pass through the brigade rear. Since the BSA does not contain large stocks of supplies, sustaining the brigade requires daily resupply from corps and division. Without resupply, a heavy brigade can operate for only about 24 hours of intense combat. Thus, in planning rear operations, one must analyze the effects of enemy actions throughout this entire battle space.

Integrating rear operations in the operational plan begins with the interaction of the brigade commander and staff. The commander and his battle staff should consider rear operations during every step in the orders process. The key questions are: what is the threat, and how can that threat be defeated? The initial answers to these questions should come from the brigade S2 and S3. As the planning process continues, everyone on the staff should contribute, because successful employment of every battlefield operating system depends in part on rear operations. As the commander makes his estimate and issues guidance to the staff, he must say something about rear operations. The commander must state the level of risk he is willing to accept or degree of protection he requires in the plan. This guidance should come as early in the process as possible to provide the staff a catalyst to consider the problem in more detail.

Assigning mission responsibility for rear operations is a critical action, often forgotten in the rush to issue an order. The brigade commander is ultimately responsible for all aspects of the plan and its execution. To accomplish any mission, the brigade commander assigns manuever commanders broad missions and tasks, and those commanders fight the fight. The same relationship between the brigade commander and the assignment of subordinate missions and tasks should be true for rear operations. In the brigade operations order, an officer should be designated as the rear operations commander. This single act has a powerful effect on the planning process by focusing the staff on rear operations as an essential part of the overall plan. It establishes a clear chain of command from the brigade commander to the rear operations commander. Designating a subordinate commander also answers the question of where to locate the command and control node for the rear operations mission. Armed with that authority and responsibility, the rear operations commander can plan his operation and coordinate his efforts with the brigade staff.

Once the staff understands the commander's intent, and the commander has fixed responsibility for command of rear operations, solutions to the problem of how to protect the force can fall into place. All elements of combat power should be considered. If the threat of direct enemy action is high, designating a tactical combat force to protect the rear area may sometimes be necessary, but only as a last resort.

The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process must include the rear area. Knowledge of enemy intentions and capabilities should dictate decisions on how to task-organize the brigade. Included in those decisions should be how much, if any, additional combat power to assign to the rear operations commander. Only through IPB can the appropriate force allocation decisions be made by comparing the risk to the available resources. Another aspect of IPB is the products of the process which are critical to the rear area commander's plan.

Ideally, the end state of the orders process is a brigade operations order which describes a seamless battlefield where deep, close, and rear operations are synchronized, allowing the commander to fight in-depth and dominate the battle space. In the execution of the order, there should be only one continuous fight. To achieve this desired end state, I believe some changes to doctrine and training are needed.

Our heavy brigade doctrine should better portray the idea that there is only one fight, with deep, close, and rear components. Rear operations are not one of the "Other Tactical Operations" as described in the current FM 71-3. Rear operations are an integral part of every tactical operation, offensive or defensive. Further, FM 71-3 should make it clear that defense of the BSA is a component of, and not synonymous with, rear operations. Assignment of a rear operations commander should be part of our doctrine. Without a single command element, execution of the rear operations mission cannot be effectively synchronized. METT-T and other circumstances should dictate who the brigade commander assigns this mission. One apparent choice for this mission is the FSB commander, because of his location in the brigade rear and his doctrinal responsibility to protect the BSA. Depending on the situation, other battalion-level commanders could perform this role, for instance, the engineer, artillery, or reserve task force commander.

Brigade doctrine should be more specific in describing the components of a complete rear operations plan. The more complete the plan, the less of a chance there is of a successful enemy attack. Doctrine should guide the commander by discussing the components necessary to build the complete plan. One good method is to apply every battlefield operating system (BOS) to the defense of the rear area. If any one of the BOSs is not at least considered, the rear operations plan is probably incomplete. The foundation to all rear operations plans is an understanding of the degree of self-protection rear area units can provide using small arms and crew-served weapons. Depending on the threat identified during the IPB process, the rationale for adding other defensive measures should be discussed in the doctrine. These measures would include; air defense, indirect fire support, antitank weapons, aviation, and engineer-emplaced counter-mobility and survivability positions. Doctrine should identify the Military Police as a critical asset in rear area defense, best employed under the rear operations commander's control.

The rear operations training that units receive at the CTCs and at BCTP needs revision. Brigade commanders must pay the price for failure to protect the rear. This is not now the case at the CTCs training our heavy forces. At the NTC and CMTC, rear operations are treated as separate missions, exclusively the domain of the FSB. The scope of rear operation training is limited to only the defense of the BSA. Rear operations are rarely discussed in the brigade-level afteraction reviews. If the opposing force succeeds in destroying the brigade's sustainment capability, it has no effect on the brigade operation for the next day. Therefore, the brigade commander and staff never learn the lessons. At BCTP, the limitations of the computer simulations do not always allow for the replication of a realistic opposing force in the rear, with correspondingly realistic battlefield effects of opposing force actions. At the Army's premier training facilities, therefore, poor planning is rewarded by a chance to do the same thing the next day.

FM 100-5 presents commanders with the rear operations training challenge: "To preclude diverting assets needed for close operations, commanders train and equip units involved in rear operations to protect themselves against all but the most serious threats." For brigade commanders, this implies home-station training for the battle staff as well as units that operate in the rear. Training the staff begins with the commander's insistence that rear operations are included in every brigade operations order. During course-of-action analysis and wargaming, someone on the staff should be tasked to represent the interest of the rear operations mission. Like all aspects of the plan, rear operations must be included in the brigade rehearsal.

For unit training, brigade commanders should train their rear operations task force in a similar manner to the way they train maneuver task forces. All units operating in the brigade rear should be under the operational control of the rear operations commander for security, and trained together under that command arrangement. Training opportunities should include a progression of communications, command post, and field exercises. Without home-station training, brigades cannot hope to execute successful rear operations at a CTC, or in combat.

CONCLUSIONS: There are no easy solutions to the dilemma of brigade rear operations. One reason that makes it harder than it needs to be is that many brigades are not trained to conduct rear operations. Another reason is that we are not used to dealing with a robust rear area threat, in training or in combat. Our Army has not faced such a threat since the Vietnam War. With the lives of our soldiers at stake, we must apply the lessons learned to rear operations, and be ready to protect the force by dominating all aspects of the future battlefield.

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