• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

OBSERVATIONS OF COMMANDER'S INTENT

I observed commander's intent expressed in many different ways. Most used the structure of purpose, method, and end state. Intent ranged from very general to a detailed description of the concept of the operation. Most commanders did not write their own. Usually the S3 did, then presented it to the commander for approval. Most intent statements lacked clarity and contained a lot of useless adverbs like "we will attack rapidly and violently to penetrate the enemy's defense" and so on. By useless, I mean it did not reflect a clear vision of how the commander intended to accomplish his mission--a view of how the commander saw the battle unfolding, how he wanted to shape his battlefield, or the effects he wanted to achieve against the enemy.

This is no trivial point. If the commander's intent is not expressed in terms of the effects he wants to achieve within his battle space, the staff has no basis to build and produce synchronization in the planning process. And if synchronization is not produced in the planning process, there will be no evidence of it on the battlefield. We can take that to the bank.

To illustrate, here's a good expression of intent for deep operations, one which expresses the effects the commander expects. The mission is movement to contact under conditions of a meeting engagement.

"I intend to destroy the forward security element of the lead regiment before it closes with our advance guard. If we do that, we will seize the initiative. Next we will focus fires against the advance guard main body to disrupt its ability to fix our lead task force."

This short statement, as simple as it seems, reflects a mastery of battle command skills. The brigade commander recognizes what he has to do to win. If the forward security element (FSE) is not destroyed, our advance guard task force will be fixed and we will fight on the enemy's terms. The FSE is the high payoff target because it's the enemy commander's means to seize and retain the initiative. The battle for the initiative will be won or lost right there. He also recognizes he must deny the advance guard main body freedom to maneuver and the ability to mass, which sets conditions for its destruction by our lead task force. Equally important, he describes the effects he wants using unmistakable doctrinal terms. In the hands of a well-trained staff, with units who can perform their tasks to standards, this is all it takes.

For instance, a well-trained staff would take this commander's intent into the planning process and do the following. Given a detailed situational template of the enemy's most likely course of action, they would conduct a detailed terrain analysis and decide where the FSE would be most vulnerable to available deep fires, considering the range of our weapons and ability to observe the target. They would designate this as an engagement area, draw targets, establish trigger points, and select observation posts for primary and alternate observers, e.g., combat observation lasing teams, tactical air control parties, air cavalry, unmanned aerial vehicles, and J-STARS.

Next, they would determine how many vehicles by type in the FSE had to be destroyed to make it combat-ineffective, so as to disrupt and delay the advance guard main body. Then, they would determine the total number of close air support sorties and specific munitions required to achieve the effects desired. This analysis would then take the form of a pre-planned air request. The same goes for artillery. They would determine how many rounds of artillery were required to achieve the effects: DPICM, COPPERHEAD, maybe FASCAM. Once this is decided, they would determine how many volleys would be required to deliver these effects, then how many batteries, and so on. Finally, they would select initial and subsequent firing positions for the batteries within range of the engagement area(s), suitable for COPPERHEAD engagements, etc., but without interfering with maneuver units. They would also select positions for collection and jamming elements, ensuring line of sight to target, establish trigger points for their fires, and so on.

Finally, they would establish air corridors/routes, aerial check points, and an air space coordination area to permit simultaneous engagement of the enemy by close air support aircraft and artillery. Additionally, they would establish trigger points to call aircraft forward, initiate engagements, perform jamming, etc. If necessary, they would adjust gun-target lines and battery positions. In other words, they would set conditions to effectively employ and control all the fires of the brigade.

From this process, the staff would produce an order, detailed operational graphics, and specified tasks to subordinate units which tell every member of the combined arms team what they have to do, when they have to do it, and where they have to do it; but never how to do it. In other words, they would write the score for the orchestra. Without a score, there is no music nor harmony, only noise. Nothing is done in concert. In a brigade, this equates to piecemeal application of fires, inability to mass, loss of initiative, and no synergy. To sum up, without clear commander's intent--expressed in terms of the effects he wants to achieve within his battle space--it is impossible to set conditions for effective synchronization of the combined arms team. It is the cornerstone of success. Now, some observations on training deficiencies within brigade staffs.

OBSERVATIONS OF THE BRIGADE STAFF

From my observations, few staff officers at brigade level have the individual and team skills described in the preceding vignette. Of course there are exceptions, but the majority of our officers simply don't know how to fight our systems. We don't think of our systems in terms of the effects they can produce. Given the commander's intent, the enemy's most likely course of action, and a concept of operations, we cannot immediately perceive how our systems can contribute to achieving the outcome the commander desires. We cannot look at the terrain, through the depths of the battlefield, and immediately understand its effects on employment of the our systems--our ability to see, move, or shoot. Compounding our problem, we do not know the enemy like the back of our hand: his capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities. Without these skills and knowledge, we are unable to see where and when our capabilities will have their greatest effect and create the outcome the commander expects. We simply have not mastered the art of fighting our battlefield operating systems.

The reason we have not mastered the art of fighting is that we have not mastered the science of it. We do not know the capabilities and limitations of our own systems and the soldiers that employ them. We don't know how far they can see or shoot, the effects of terrain and weather on our systems, how long it takes subordinate units to perform tasks given their level of training, how fast they can move, day or night, the limits of communications--the list goes on. If we don't know these fundamental things in our business, we have no hope of applying our capabilities against the enemy at the right time and place.

To make matters worse, most staff officers don't know what tasks they must perform during planning, preparation, and execution of operations. We don't know our individual tasks and we don't know our team tasks. Consequently, effective teamwork is rare in most brigade command posts. For example, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is left to the S2, despite the fact that every staff officer has a role in its development. The S2 seldom analyzes and describes the effects of terrain and weather on every system in the combined arms team. Other staff officers do not demand it and do their own work in isolation, culminating in entirely different views of the battlefield.

More likely than not, the air defense officer, Air Force liaison officer, and the Army aviation liaison officer work off separate maps and use separate graphics. The fire support officer seldom has airspace control graphics on his map. And if we do not have them, our subordinate commanders and soldiers who must execute the tasks do not have them either. No wonder effective integration and control of airspace are seldom achieved. In short, we don't know the tasks we must perform as a team or how to perform them to standards.

These skill deficiencies become blatantly obvious when the staff conducts a deliberate wargame, the only means of setting conditions for effective synchronization of the combined arms team and the only means of posturing the force for success. Our brigade staffs don't know how to war-game as a team, capture its results, and produce effective orders and operational graphics. The absence of this team skill, in my view, is the primary cause of the performance pattern we continue to see at the NTC, and other training centers as well. We don't know how to win our battles before we fight them.

To sum up, there is a science and art to becoming a proficient and an effective staff officer. In fact, staff skills and competencies are very similar to the battle command skills which battalion or brigade commanders must possess. In combined arms operations, it is no exaggeration to say that a well-trained staff is an element of combat power. Any outfit without one is crippled, even if it is packed full of well-trained subordinate units. As an Army, we simply don't have them, and, until we do, I predict we will see no change in performance patterns at our training centers. Synchronization will continue to elude us. Missions will be accomplished at high costs. Force protection will seldom be achieved.

THE BLACKHORSE (OPFOR) - A COMPARISON

The fighting ability of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the OPFOR at NTC, is admired and respected throughout our Army. They are tough, disciplined fighters with tremendous pride in what they do. They seldom lose a fight. Few people recognize the source of their power. Granted they are well-trained, disciplined, know the terrain, execute tasks with precision, boresight continuously, and so forth. These certainly form the basis of their success, but they are not the source.

The source of their success, the winning factor, is actually their unparalleled ability to synchronize and apply every capability of their combined arms. In practically every battle, close air support strikes at the right time and place with sufficient sorties and munitions to achieve the effects the commander expects. Artillery and rockets strike the blue forces precisely with sufficient volume and type of munitions to achieve desired effects, whether it be obscuration, suppression, or destruction. Moreover, they strike in perfect harmony with the advance of their maneuver forces. Air defense elements are positioned astride enemy air approaches, on terrain which permits them to dominate the battle space and protect the force. Commanders always shape their battlefield to set conditions for success. Somehow through the years, the commanders and staff of the OPFOR have become masters of the art of synchronization. Yes, American soldiers just like the rest of us, but they are armed with skills and competencies absent in the remainder of the force.

The real challenge for brigade commanders and their staffs at the NTC is to match or exceed the OPFOR's ability to synchronize the combined arms team. This ability, in my view, is the principal difference in performance potential between the two forces. My conclusion was reinforced time and time again. As a brigade commander and his staff became more proficient in synchronization of their team, blue force losses decreased and red force losses increased. Fighting the OPFOR at the NTC is a contest of synchronization. That is the essence of the fight.

How do they do it? How do they produce this endless succession of victories? It isn't magic. Commanders master the science and art of synchronizing the combined arms team. They devote themselves to it. Staff officers are expert in employment of their systems. Their planning process is a sight to behold. Through the conduct of deliberate wargames, they work as a team and fight several enemy courses of action from beginning to end. A base plan with several branches are produced. Detailed orders and operational graphics are produced and issued. Every member of the team is told what to do, where to do it, and when to do it.

Then, they rehearse the plan and branch plans with every leader on the team. They rehearse until they get it right. Through this process, what they really do is win their battles before they fight them. Execution is all that remains and well-trained soldiers get it done. They are not interested in initiative at the regimental level, they expect everybody to do what they are ordered to do. However, they demand initiative at platoon and company levels during the performance of their tasks because they recognize the friction that inevitably occurs.

If we could bottle and distribute the skills and competencies of that outfit, learn how they sustain it, fighting the same personnel turbulence the rest of us face, we could raise the fighting ability of this Army to unprecedented levels. If we don't, we will never reach the full combat potential of the force.

Main Table of Contents
The Burden Our Soldiers Bear, Part 2
The Burden Our Soldiers Bear , Part 4