UNITED24 - Make a charitable donation in support of Ukraine!

Military

TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

by Senior Observer Controllers, CMTC

Following are current TTP based on the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs).

INTELLIGENCE

TOPIC: Use of Counterintelligence/Civil Affairs (CI/CA) and linguists in Operations Other Than War (OOTW).

DISCUSSION: OOTW intelligence gathering is usually human intelligence (HUMINT) intensive and requires effective and efficient use of CI/CA teams and linguists. However, units conducting OOTW have difficulty planning for, integrating, and resourcing CI/CA teams. Task forces do not understand the capabilities of the teams and often misuse the assets. Also, TF integration of the teams is poor and leads to inefficient use of the CI/CA teams and linguists. Some of the problems encountered are:

  • CI/CA often do not have the vehicles, radios, weapons, and NBC equipment that they need to operate.
  • The task force does not provide command and control for the CI/CA teams.
  • CI/CA teams are not integrated into mission planning.
  • CI/CA teams are employed without a linguist.
  • CI/CA and linguist assets are not used efficiently. Some are not used at all due to the absence of a plan.
  • CI/CA teams operate without the task force knowing their status.
  • Task force commanders do not understand the CI/CA teams' value.
  • LESSON(S):

  • Understand the capabilities of the CI/CA teams and linguists so they can complement each other and be used effectively.
  • Coordinate with G-5 for training on the CI/CA team and linguists capabilities and on their use.
  • Develop a plan to provide battle command for the CI/CA teams and enforce the plan.
  • Integrate the CI/CA teams into planning early.
  • Split assets into as many teams as possible that still provide adequate capability (e.g., at least one linguist, one CA soldier, and one CI soldier per team).
  • Ensure the G-5 provides adequate resources for CI/CA teams and linguists.
  • MANEUVER

    TOPIC: Scheme of Maneuver.

    DISCUSSION: Task Forces often have difficulty developing schemes of maneuver that describe the mission from line of departure through the objective (consolidation and reorganization). Often, the planning stops at an intermediate objective with very vague plans to continue to the final objective. One of the primarycauses is a lack of a complete rehearsal of the mission. Additionally:

  • The scheme of maneuver does not meet the full scope of the commander's intent.
  • Combat functions are not fully synchronized throughout the entire scheme of maneuver.
  • No control measures for the direct and indirect fires are used once the units begin to close on the objective.
  • LESSON(S):

  • The commander must describe how the task force will maneuver from the line of departure to the final objective. This should begin at the objective and work back through the line of departure to the attack position. Units generally have problems once they arrive at the objective as a result of a lack of a clear plan that has been rehearsed on actions at the objective.
  • Ensure that a thorough, well-developed rehearsal is conducted that carries the mission through the objective.
  • Include actions on the objective, consolidation, and reorganization once the objective is secure. All combat functions should be involved in the rehearsal.
  • The commander's intent (from brigade to task force) must address unit orientation and missions at the end state if the staff is expected to develop adequate sequel plans.
  • FIRE SUPPORT

    TOPIC: Use of Mortars.

    DISCUSSION: Mortars are the only organic indirect fire support asset of the task force commander. They are a significant fire support asset and must be managed continuously. However, many task forces fail to use mortars effectively. Consistently, units are late in bringing mortars to bear. It is evident that units are unsure of the most effective means for employing mortars. Problems identified are:

  • Mortars are not used sufficiently to influence the battle.
  • Mortars are consistently not integrated into fire support planning, preparation, or execution.
  • Mortars are not used to complement other fire support assets.
  • LESSON(S):

  • Focus on training to use mortars in all operations.
  • Mortars should be used to complement other fire support assets.
  • Identify situations where mortars can be used effectively and give the mortar section specific missions.
  • Rehearse mortar responsibilities.
  • Maintain close, habitual relationships between mortars, observers, and the FSO.
  • Do not neglect to train the logistical requirements that support mortars in combat.
  • Specifically include intent for mortars in the task force commander's intent.
  • MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY

    TOPIC: Task Force Deliberate Breach.

    DISCUSSION: Battle command of a task force deliberate breach is abattalion commander's responsibility. Too many task forces are improperly prepared to execute the breach. This is the result of inadequate IPB, faulty offensive reconnaissance, and incomplete COA wargaming. Thus, critical battlefield functions are improperly arranged to execute the breach, i.e., ADA coverage, mobility resources, fire support in position with targets identified and observers, C2 forward with adequate communications, and CSS prepared to push supplies and receive casualties. The results are loss of momentum and ease of location by the OPFOR.

    LESSON(S):

  • Train obstacle clearing teams for each company and team using procedures in 71-1-MTP, task number 17-2-0501.
  • When encountering an obstacle, attempt to bypass it first. If a bypass is not possible, attempt to clear the obstacle using the techniques in the reference shown above.
  • Mark and report the obstacle for subsequent engineer clearing.
  • Through IPB, identify likely obstacle sites; confirm or deny by reconnaissance; wargame and schedule battlefield function responses at the most likely and dangerous obstacle sites.
  • Conduct full-up rehearsals.
  • AIR DEFENSE

    TOPIC: ADA Employment at Lodgement Areas During OOTW.

    DISCUSSION: ADA employment guidelines are not being applied for lodgement area defense. Stinger teams are often employed piecemeal and do not provide adequate coverage for the entire area. Some of the common problems are:

  • Stinger teams are employed without consideration for balance, mutual support, early engagement, or overlapping fires.
  • Teams are employed without considering the ordnance release line of enemy aircraft.
  • A thorough analysis of the area in relation to ADA employment is not conducted. This includes analysis of size, terrain, and air IPB.
  • LESSON(S):

  • Do not piecemeal ADA weapon systems.
  • Maintain mutually supporting and overlapping fires.
  • Conduct a thorough analysis of air avenues of approach into the lodgement area prior to employing ADA assets.
  • Integrate the ADA system placement for the lodgement area into the reconnaissance/surveillance plan.
  • COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

    TOPIC: Logistics for Special Platoons and Slice Elements.

    DISCUSSION:Special platoons and slice elements are not taken into consideration by task force logisticians when preparing the logistics plan. This problem is compounded because special platoon leaders and slice element leaders do not articulate their logistics needs well. Also, unit logistics reporting is often poor. Specific problems identified are:

  • Medical evacuation and vehicle recovery plans are insufficient for scouts and ADA units.
  • Scout casualties are not evacuated in a timely manner.
  • Planning considerations for the mortar platoon often overlook unit basic load (UBL) requirements to support the task force mission.
  • LESSON(S):

  • Structure the logistics matrix to include special platoons and slice elements.
  • Discuss logistic responsibilities for special platoons and slices by each phase of the operation.
  • Understand unique and special requirements of the special platoons and slices and emphasize these requirements during planning to sustain their combat power.
  • Task force executive officers must ensure that task force logistics planners do not neglect the special platoons and slices in their planning.
  • TOPIC: Mass Casualties.

    DISCUSSION: Several units have experienced problems with mass casualties when the leadership is among the WIA/KIA category. The units are either unsure how to properly evacuate their soldiers, or their leaders haven't drilled them on procedures.

    LESSON(S):

    The senior person on site needs to take charge, regardless of his position. The battalion medical section is there to assist, not to run the evacuation operation. The medics should run triage and loading, but the unit must do the rest, such as arranging transportation and identification. Each time the casualty collection point moves, a route reconnaissance should be made and disseminated to define procedures on how to get help to the wounded.

    COMMAND AND CONTROL

    TOPIC: Succession of Command.

    DISCUSSION: Many units experience problems with succession of command at company and platoon levels. When the primary leader becomes a casualty, the effectiveness of the unit is often seriously degraded. Some of the specific problems encountered are:

  • The second in command is not identified. Once the primary leader becomes a casualty, the soldiers are confused as to who is in charge.
  • The second in command is unable to continue the mission because he does not understand the mission, the commander's intent, or combat status of the unit.
  • The second in command is not prepared to assume the role of commander with respect to interface with local authorities or nongovernmental organizations operating in the task force area of operations.
  • LESSON(S):

  • Ensure the succession of command is specified by SOP or OPORD; identify the primary location on the battlefield of the second in command.
  • Ensure the unit knows the priority for command succession.
  • Ensure that personnel identified in the succession of command are thoroughly familiar with the mission and the commander's intent through use of backbriefs and rehearsals.
  • Continue to develop junior leaders through effective training.
  • TOPIC: Rehearsals.

    DISCUSSION: Many units consistently fail to conduct rehearsals. This is evident at all levels and over all combat functions. Rehearsals ensure that subordinates understand the mission and help to synchronize the combat functions. The primary cause of rehearsal failure is improper time management. The 1/3 - 2/3 rule for planning time is often violated (the rehearsal must be included in the OPORD-issuing headquarter's 1/3 time block). As a result, rehearsals develop into question and answer sessions, simple orders briefs, wargaming sessions and almost never encompass all combat functions. Some additional problems are:

  • Key personnel and attachments and augmentees do not attend rehearsals.
  • Confusion develops on the battlefield due to a lack of understanding of the mission.
  • Time is wasted because units do not have a rehearsal standard to work against and no format or process developed to conduct the rehearsal.
  • LESSON(S):

  • Practice effective time management. Ensure the 1/3 - 2/3 rule is adhered to. This allows subordinates to have adequate planning time.
  • Develop a battle drill-type procedure for rehearsal format and process. If the standard is not met during the rehearsal, do it again if time permits.
  • Ensure that all key personnel (in particular, the Executive Officer) and attachments participate in the rehearsal.
  • Make rehearsals combined arms rehearsals so that all combat functions participate to ensure synchronization.
  • Facilitate interactive rehearsals where subordinates explain in their words the details of their mission execution.
  • Read CALL Newsletters No. 91-1, Apr 91, Rehearsals, and No. 93-4, Jul 93, Combat Training Centers' Bulletin,
    pg 16, Brigade Rehearsals.
  • Table of Contents
    Onward Movement
    Deep Operations: A Look from BCTP at the Process



    NEWSLETTER
    Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list