WHAT
RESULTS CAN I EXPECT?
Some form of the protection (safety) procedures and tools described above will be integrated into the Army's doctrine, training and operations. Effort and a change in thinking will be needed for a unit to successfully implement these procedures and tools. Why should a unit do this now? Why not wait until it is required? As mentioned earlier, these procedures and tools were tested at the brigade level and the results were as follows:
TOPIC: HOME-STATION TRAINING.
DISCUSSION: A mechanized infantry brigade task force (4,800 soldiers) conducted four FTXs as trainup for an NTC rotation. The average FTX lasted 23 days. The brigade averaged four accidents and three injuries which produced a casualty rate of only .63 per 1,000 soldiers.
An aviation brigade, from the same division, began using the procedures and tools at the same time as the mechanized infantry brigade. In the preceding 6 months, the aviation brigade had experienced two aircraft accidents that caused two deaths, two injuries and $13.8M in costs. During the six-month trainup for the NTC rotation, the brigade reduced its aviation accidents to zero.
LESSON(S): By applying the procedures advocated in this newsletter, the units listed above were able to reduce the number of accidents and injuries in training. These procedures add to the planning process a focus that allows the unit to be better prepared to accomplish a given mission.
TOPIC: CTC TRAINING (NTC).
DISCUSSION: The mechanized infantry brigade experienced seven class C accidents with only four minor injuries for a casualty rate of .83 per 1,000 soldiers. This was the best rate achieved by a brigade from this division at the NTC for at least 10 years. Compared to a typical NTC rotation rate of 3.52, this brigade's protection efforts resulted in a 76 percent better safety performance.
During the NTC rotation, the aviation brigade experienced no aircraft accidents and thus continued its outstanding performance.
LESSON(S): These brigades also achieved good battle results at NTC indicating that the command emphasis on protection did notdetract from tactical performance (and probably enhanced it). If you are a commander, are you prepared to accept the risk of not implementing these protection procedures and tools?
DURING AN ESCORT MISSION, A HMMWV DRIVER FELL ASLEEP WHILE DRIVING. THE VEHICLE RAN OFF THE ROAD AND OVERTURNED, INJURING THE DRIVER. THE SOLDIER HAD BEEN DRIVING FOR NINE CONTINUOUS HOURS AND HAD BEEN ON DUTY WITHOUT SLEEP FOR TWENTY-THREE CONTINUOUS HOURS. THE VEHICLE WAS DAMAGED EXTENSIVELY AND WAS LOST TO THE COMPANY FOR SIX WEEKS FOR REPAIRS. |
This accident could have been prevented. Commanders can use the procedures and tools provided in this newsletter to ensure that accidents do not happen. By doing a risk assessment of this situation, leaders would know that the driver of the HMMWV was overtired. He should not have been driving. Replacing him with another driver that was rested would have prevented this accident. The injury to the soldier, his subseqent rehabilitation, and the loss of the vehicle for six weeks would have all been saved.
What
can I do now in my unit?
Appendix
A
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