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TOPIC: Supply Flow for Humanitarian Support Centers.

DISCUSSION: Humanitarian support centers distributed supplies donated to the victims of the disaster. Centers were located at Homestead, Cutler Ridge, and West Palm Beach, Florida. All three of these sites were under the control of the Army Materiel Command (AMC). Two of the sites, Homestead and West Palm Beach, were operational when Army units arrived. However, proper warehousing procedures were not being used, and many supplies were not protected from the elements. Since materials handling equipment (MHE) was not available, trucks were being unloaded and loaded by hand. This resulted in more supplies coming into the centers than going out. The U. S. Army was able to increase the productivity of the humanitarian support centers by establishing proper warehousing procedures and providing MHE. Relief agencies, such as the Salvation Army, Red Cross and religious organizations, were also operating separate, high-volume "stovepipe" distribution systems.

Using proper warehousing procedures and the push package concept, supplies were received, stored, accounted for, and distributed from the main humanitarian support centers to the distribution centers in the south. When supplies arrived at the support centers, they were off-loaded and made ready to be pushed out to the numerous Humanitarian Relief Sites (HRSs). These HRSs were operated by church groups, Red Cross, Salvation Army, and other relief agencies. The HRSs were either under the control of the 10th Mountain Division or the 82d Airborne Division for support. Units from these two divisions came to the support sites with a shopping list of supplies needed at the HRSs. Using Army vehicles, supplies would be "pushed out" from the support centers.

LESSON(S):

a. Identify requirements for support early in the planning process. Deploy combat service support (CSS) units early to support the distribution of supplies.
b. Property accountability must be emphasized. Generators, tents and other military FEMA equipment were distributed at times with no accountability. Units then had to return and account for each piece of equipment.

TOPIC: Prepositioning of Supplies and Equipment.

DISCUSSION: One day after Hurricane Iniki hit the island of Kauai, the JTF directed units to preposition and stage supplies and equipment: 50,000 MREs; 100 tents, blankets, cots, and light sets for the tents; and 10 MKTs. By prepositioning supplies, the Army placed itself in a proactive mode of support rather than a reactive mode.

LESSON(S): The JTF should quickly identify supplies and equipment to be prepositioned to support a disaster assistance effort.

TOPIC: Facilities for Storage of Supplies.

DISCUSSION: Supplies located at the logistics bases and the Full Service Centers (FSCs) need to be covered to protect them from the elements. Many supplies were stored outside and not covered by either canvas or plastic. Cover is needed to reduce spoilage and the need to repackage supplies. Cardboard boxes deteriorate without proper protection from the elements.

LESSON(S): If fixed or temporary facilities are not available for use as supply points, ensure that supplies that need protection from the elements are covered. Use canvas or plastic that is available through the supply system to protect the supplies.

TOPIC: Joint Transportation Operations.

DISCUSSION: The deployment of forces to support JTF Andrew was an excellent validation of the Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE) program. Many units deployed on less than a 48-hour notice during a weekend.

The Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) was not used as designed during the first couple of days of the deployment. JOPES was not responsive enough for such an immediate deployment. The majority of the actual arrival information for commercial aircraft moves was never entered into JOPES. The other system, Transportation Coordinator-Automated Command and Control Information System (TC-ACCIS), was used very little during the deployment. The Joint Movement Control Center (JMCC) was not activated until several days after JTF Andrew was formed. There is neither a set structure nor a designated trained group of personnel to form a JMCC.

In CONUS, the JMCC structure needs a Joint Transportation Office (JTO) to give the JMCC the capability to make commercial transportation arrangements with required documentation. With the exception of sufficient railcars for redeployment, the JMCC that supported JTF Andrew had an abundance of civilian and military transportation assets. This allowed decentralized movement control to exist while still having an effective distribution system. One of the highlights of the distribution of supplies was the use of 5-ton engineer bridge trucks such as the Palletized Load System (PLS). The trucks were capable of dropping their loaded cargo beds at a retail site without the aid of any MHE. The trucks were not dependent on MHE to be unloaded. MHE was not always available at the retail sites.

LESSON(S):

a. The JMCC must be activated at the same time the decision is made to form a Joint Task Force.
b. The Army must improve its use of the JOPES and TC-ACCIS in deploying units for disaster assistance missions. A staff section in the division could be responsible and staffed to conduct JOPES input, validation and monitoring.
c. Adequate personnel for movement control organizations are required in the disaster area to control movements.
d. Collocation of JTF, JMCC and materiel managers is a key to controlling supply distribution.
e. A JTO is required for joint operations conducted within CONUS.
f. The JTO should be activated early in the planning process.
g. JCS should resource a JMCC that can respond to worldwide contingencies.
h. A JMCC requires a USTRANSCOM forward element.
i. Joint operations require joint forces for transportation support. DD Forms should be used and included in JCS PUB 4.01-3, JTTP for Movement Control.

BACKTable of Contents
BACKLogistics, Part 1
NEXTAviation Support



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