DISCUSSION: In this particular operation, the decision to deploy a division headquarters was critical to success. This level headquarters is resourced to respond to actions, such as liaisons with civil governments and agencies, coordinate logistics for both humanitarian relief and disaster assistance, and sustainment of military forces. Unlike subordinate headquarters, a division-level headquarters has both the assets and experience necessary to successfully orchestrate public affairs operations. A division headquarters also has the staff required to coordinate engineering demands, and the organization to provide a buffer between the JTF and the "tactical" units supporting the operation.
LESSON(S):
TOPIC: Doctrine.
DISCUSSION: The advance party and early echelons of the JTF had little joint experience and no template with which to stand up the JTF. JCS Pub. 500.2, was not available to the JTF, but even if it had been, it would have been of little value. JCS Pub. 500.2 is an inadequate document for standing up a JTF for disaster assistance. Generic to a fault, JCS Pub. 500.2 is primarily focused on standing up a combatant command with an "international" mission. JTFs are normally ad hoc organizations that, by definition, take some time to mature into a working command and control element. JTF Andrew was no exception. Valuable time was lost as the JTF sorted out manning, functions and work space issues. The most critical time in a disaster assistance operation is the period immediately following the disaster. Had better and more succinct doctrine been available to the JTF Commander and his staff, this valuable time would have been better used. While there were challenges in standing up the JTF headquarters, they were handled well. Manning, function, and work space issues did not affect prompt action in a significant manner.
LESSON(S): JCS PUB 500.2 needs to be revised to address the mechanics of forming and operating a "generic" JTF. It also needs to address the specifics of forming and operating a JTF for disaster assistance. There is also a lack of knowledge by key DOD leaders (potential JTF Commanders) on Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) operations.
There are four activities that a JTF can do simultaneously:
- Stand up the JTF HQ;
- Learn the roles of players;
- Initiate operations; and
- Develop a rapport with local officials.
TOPIC: Assignment Sectors Along Civic Boundaries.
DISCUSSION: All interviewees agreed that division, brigade, battalion, and company areas of operation should correspond to some type of civil administration boundary. For example, the 10th Mountain Division Commander's counterpart was the mayor of Homestead, FL. One of his brigade commander's counterparts was the city manager of Florida City, FL. Echelons below concentrated on specific neighborhoods or easily identified boundaries within a given municipality. The 82d Airborne Division operated in a similar fashion. In one instance, both the 10th Mountain and the 82d Airborne Divisions had overlapping boundaries within an unincorporated area. By establishing close working relationships with civilian counterparts at all administrative levels, coordination was facilitated, and redundancy reduced.
LESSON(S): Wherever possible, division, brigade, battalion and company areas of operation should correspond to a civil administrative boundary.
TOPIC: U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) as a JTF Headquarters.
DISCUSSION: Becoming a JTF headquarters was something of a surprise to the USARPAC staff. It thrust many of them into new roles to support the JTF mission. Additional communications were installed in the operations center and in the logistics area. The operational staff was expanded. A Joint Movement Control Center (JMCC) and a supply management center were formed and collocated in the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) area. The components provided senior LOs to USARPAC and worked well in advising USARPAC on component issues and operations. The operations staff quickly learned many of the Joint procedures needed to run a JTF. The conversion of USARPAC to a JTF HQ could have been accomplished faster if there had been a local standing operating procedure (SOP) and a battle roster for a JTF organization from USARPAC staff.
LESSON(S): Division and above headquarters should be prepared to form a JTF or ARFOR headquarters in operations other than war.
TOPIC: Disaster Assistance Tasks.
DISCUSSION: Military forces normally have several tasks that make up the overall mission in disaster assistance operations. These tasks are to provide emergency disaster and humanitarian assistance, and a highly visible military presence. The mission provides help, hope, and calm in neighborhoods devastated by a disaster.
LESSON(S):
- Establish areas of operation down to company level. Commanders on the ground are responsible for all activities within their areas of operation.
- Operate "company hubs" within each area of responsibility.
- Conduct saturation patrols from the company hubs. Patrols should be squad-sized operations to search and assist. Include combat life savers in the patrols.
- Provide a highly visible military presence in disaster assistance operations.
TOPIC: Liaison Officers (LOs).
DISCUSSION: LOs were integrated into state-level management centers and performed well considering the tremendous volume of requests for support. Because county and local agencies were initially unfamiliar with National Guard and active military capabilities and limitations, LOs were needed in the office of the county commissioners and the city managers or mayors. After placing LOs at the lower levels of management, the request process worked more efficiently and effectively.
LESSON(S): When authorized by the DCO, LOs must be placed at the lowest level possible. If sufficient warning exists, liaison should be established prior to the emergency. The LO requirement may be dropped after the military unit is assigned to a particular geographical area. LOs should be placed in the emergency operations cells at every level of government, and the major departments or agencies of those government bodies.
TOPIC: Safety.
DISCUSSION: The success of all of the aforementioned missions was enhanced because of a relatively low accident rate. There was, and will continue to be, tremendous potential for a high accident rate in these types of operations. This fact is in- escapable considering the type of work, long arduous hours, and the large numbers of soldiers and equipment involved. Clearly, the augmentation of the JTF staffs with teams from the U. S. Army Safety Center, coupled with the efforts of unit leaders and safety personnel, provided an invaluable impact in these operations. Safety in both ground and aviation operations is an issue that must be stressed at all command levels at all times during combat operations and operations other than war.
LESSON(S): Safety is a paramount consideration in all operations. It should be continually emphasized and practiced at all command levels.
TOPIC: Intelligence.
DISCUSSION: Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) must be part of the deliberate planning process. For disasters, as in all no-notice operations, there is always danger. Troop presence is required before IPB can be completed. It must be remembered that even in disaster assistance, the intelligence process is continuous. Specific requirements for planning, preparation and execution for IPB in disaster assistance operations should be developed.
LESSON(S): The following list of requirements should be considered for the IPB process when deploying to a disaster area.
- Fire and police department-type city maps that will be overprinted with latitude and longitude and Magnetic Grid System (MGS) for compass use. However, if these maps are not available, city and county maps with street names will be very acceptable.
- Location of all federal property with access rights to stage troops and equipment.
- Location of state and local government seats of power and jurisdiction (government buildings).
- Names of key officials - elected and professional.
- Location of National Guard Armories and USAR Centers.
- List of all agencies working within the operational area and those personnel in charge.
- Location of units and their missions.
- Location of public and private schools and names of principals.
- Location of religious organizations/activities and names of religious leaders.
- Location of operational hospitals and clinics.
- Damage assessments made by local government agencies.
- Aerial photos of damaged areas.
- Status of water supply.
- Location of relief depots for classes of supply.
- Location of critical utilities (water, electricity, sewage, telephone, radio and television).
- Current weather.
- Priority list of buildings where power should be provided first.
- List of type generators to power important facilities.
Establish
a liaison with local police authorities. Liaison at the county level by counterintelligence
(CI) personnel and Task Force Military Police (TFMP) and with local precincts
by battalions and companies is very effective. Companies and patrols should
request police radios that can communicate with police departments, fire departments
and emergency medical assets.
Table
of Contents
Interoperability,
Part 1
Health
Care
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