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Vignette: OPERATION DESERT STORM:
ACTIONS ON DAY G + 3

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At 1400 on 26 February 1991, a U.S. armor task force consolidated it's position and oriented north on a small desert hill to allow the task force on it's right to catch up. Visibility was under 1500 meters due to fog, dust, and smoke. Spot reports from higher indicated an enemy column of 20 tanks was crossing the brigade front from the east. At this time, the trailing task force in the right reported being stationary and over 2 kilometers behind the forward battalion on the left. Spot reports further confirmed the trailing unit's Scouts were in zone and no further north that the forward battalion's positions (vicinity the 39 grid line). Two T-55s then appeared along a road 2500 meters to the forward unit's front and adjacent to it's right boundary. Upon confirmation, these two tanks were destroyed, one by the task force commander's tank from his right flank vantage point.

The 40 N-S Gridline is the TF Boundary

A short time later, brigade reemphasized the threat of an enemy tank column from the east and cautioned the commander to be prepared. The trailing battalion reconfirmed it's location south of the 37 grid line, with Scouts vicinity the 39 grid line. During this time the forward battalion continued to have contact and enemy engagements among it's left flank company teams. Then a tank platoon from the right flank of the forward battalion reported two more vehicles vicinity the brightly burning T-55s and moving in a direction consistent with the brigade spot report. The task force commander gave a fire command to that company and initiated a 2700 meter engagement with his own tank. Within moments, his gunner, SSG Michael Duda, exclaimed over the intercom: "Sir, there is something wrong here!" His commander immediately transmitted a cease fire. Fortunately no one engaged the vehicles. SSG Duda had recognized the "hot" roadwheel thermal signature characteristic of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV). Quick investigation confirmed this was a misoriented Scout section from the adjacent battalion, and almost 4000 meters forward of the reported positions.

SSG Duda, ultimately credited with five tank kills during Operation DESERT STORM, terminated an almost certainly lethal engagement as a result of his excellent experience and training. Positive command and control in the battalion likewise averted any tragic shot from neighboring vehicles. Honor graduate of his Master Gunner's Course, SSG Duda benefitted from many hours on the Unit Conduct-of-Fire Trainer (the UCOFT which replicates the "hot" roadwheel BFV signature) as well as from field experience.

Table of Contents
Foreword
Chapter 1: Introduction and Historical Perspective