Chapter 3, Part 3: ORGANIZATION: FRATRICIDE REDUCTION MEASURES AND LESSONS LEARNED: FRATRICIDE:

SECTION III: ORGANIZATION

LIAISON OFFICERS (LOs) AND LIAISON PARTIES

LOs' duties and responsibilities must be more than arriving at a predetermined location and exchanging graphics and company location. They must have good understanding of the commander's intent and scheme of maneuver to anticipate problems. Combat AARs repeatedly attribute coordination successes to high-quality liaison teams.

BOUNDARY COORDINATION TEAMS

A valuable coordination technique, particularly between Allied or coalition forces, involves cross-attaching small elements (preferably w/vehicles) between companies most likely to make direct contact across the boundary. In addition to normal liaison elements, these teams are instrumental in resolving radio, SOI, language and coordination difficulties between adjacent forces.

SECTION IV: MATERIEL

MATERIEL SOLUTIONS

Although technological navigation aids show much promise, currently there are no materiel solutions to the fratricide problem. Many individual items, such as those discussed in this section, are being aggressively examined by Army Materiel Command (AMC) and show varying degrees of promise. Their primary utility appears to be as aids in command and control, not vehicle recognition. Example marking uses include:

TRPs or Engagement Area boundaries in limited visibility.
Near side of friendly minefields or lanes.
Guide beacon for vehicle positions, maneuver, march columns or passing units.
Flank coordination and orientation.
Front-line trace for close air missions.
Friendly recognition at passage points or contact points.
Deception operations.

An effective ground combat IFF system is a long-term development project. AMC has initiated intensive developmental efforts that will give us an interim IFF system in about three years. Meanwhile, various field expedient techniques, such as those mentioned below and used in Operation DESERT STORM, are proposed to augment existing flashlight and chemlight signaling capability. This is particularly true when units use them in combination for redundancy. Keep in mind these general disadvantages:

Infrared (IR) sources are visible in a wide variety of IR viewers and are hard to discriminate from visible light sources.
IR sources have little utility in daytime operations.
IR sources are generally not visible in thermal sights.
Pulsating sources (Budd/DARPA/beacon) can resemble machine gun fire.
IR sources can have a blinding effect when used improperly on or around vehicle and personnel night sights.
These devices are all difficult to positively screen from enemy air and ground detection.
Their use as IFF would require identifiable arrays, changed daily with SOIs for OPSEC.

"QUICK-FIX" INITIATIVES

BUDD LIGHTS AND DARPA LIGHTS

These are both near IR strobe emitters for strap-on vehicle or soldier use. They are visible at night up to 6 to 8 kilometers using image-intensifying night vision devices. Both are susceptible to atmospheric attenuation and obscuration. Budd lights are smaller, more economical and use a simple 9-volt battery. DARPA lights are bigger and need seven "C" cell batteries, but have a somewhat adjustable beam.

THERMAL BEACON

These prototypes are essentially thermal "Whoopee lights," 24 inches high, which attach to the top of a combat vehicle, emitting a thermal signature in a strobe-like fashion. They are currently being examined for adaptation to combat vehicles. One test configuration causes the beacon to flash when a separate sensor detects incoming laser range finder energy. In their current design, they add a conspicuous physical presence to the vehicle outline and have a polished aluminum surface that flashes reflected sunlight during the day or bright moonlight at night.

THERMAL TAPE

A technical innovation called No Power Thermal Target (NPTT) material was used during Operation DESERT STORM. When viewed by a thermal sight at close range, NPTT material offers a distinct image that appears as the reverse polarity of the thermal image. When viewed by thermal sights in the white hot mode, the tape is seen as a black image on white vehicle background. ARCENT adopted it as the material of choice for a common theater-wide vehicle marking procedure. The inverted "V" was utilized since it could easily be understood by our Arab Allies as the number eight in Arabic. To be discernible at 2,000m, large panels (approx 2 x 2 feet) are necessary. Many practical problems arise in finding a smooth, clean, unobstructed surface at the right angle of presentation for any combat vehicle. Generally, the tape will appear to alter the outline of a vehicle, but not generate a specifically recognizable image. This may cause familiar vehicles to look unfamiliar (or potentially like enemy), but does not permit vehicle or unit recognition at long engagement ranges.

EXPEDIENT SOLUTIONS

Luminescent paint, GLINT tape (IR reflective) and chemical lights were used to mark vehicles during Operation DESERT STORM. These fixes were not as successful as NPTT, but they all contributed to the reduction of fratricide. Light forces have used GLINT tape more successfully. Other ideas include strobe lights with IR filters or Whoopee lights in No. 10 cans pointing upwards for aerial identification. GLINT tape on personnel in the jungle worked well for aerial ID during Operation JUST CAUSE; however, in built-up areas, ambient light degraded this technique.

"...they had like a point element for security coming up near and I [saw] people but didn't recognize them from enemy...so I pulled out and IR [infrared] beam and I shot across and got their GLINT tape to glow (in PAS 7s) so I knew it was friendly..." --Post Operation JUST CAUSE Interview, Ranger Regt

COMBAT VEHICLE MARKING SYSTEM (CVMS)

The CVMS (draft Army Regulation 34-XX) establishes a single prescriptive standard for marking combat vehicles. The system uses numbers, chevrons and half chevrons on the side (20 x 20 inch) and back (30 x 30 inch) panels for combat vehicles. Features of the systems will aid command and control efforts by allowing quick and easy identification of combat units in the close battle. AR 34-XX was developed by Combined Arms Command-Training (CAC-T) and staffed with Major Army Commands (MACOMs), CTCs and TRADOC schools for review and comment. It is currently at HQDA for approval as an Army Regulation.

NAVIGATION AIDS

Several ground- and satellite-based navigation systems were employed in the Persian Gulf. Specifically, the Long Range Aide to Navigation (LORAN) and the Global Positioning System (GPS) were widely used for the first time by Army forces. These passive receivers generally triangulate from signals transmitted from either satellite or ground antennae arrays. Soldiers and aviators reported that these devices were invaluable in confirming location and maintaining orientation in the largely featureless Saudi desert. The Air Force had GPS for each of the 2,200 forward air controllers (FAC) working with ground forces and with many aircraft. Distribution to ground forces varied by unit, but was generally down to company commander level. Reports indicate that the ground-based systems were limited in range and, therefore, utility for offensive operations (the distant antennae selection within the receiver may some what alleviate this problem). The GPS was widely praised, but some aviators and ground operators reported erratic GPS performance under the Kuwait oil clouds. These navigation aids tested in the desert, and improved models are continuing to be fielded and have become an important element of field training.

SECTION V: LEADER AND SOLDIER DEVELOPMENT

AFTER ACTION REPORTS (AARs)

All AARs should address fratricide whether or not it occurs. Highlight near-fratricidal incidents and fire control successes. Discuss and capture techniques for fratricide reduction. Observer and controllers for FTX and external evaluation must analyze fratricide occurrences and include them as a discussion point during their exercise AARs (add fratricide numbers to AAR collection charts from the Mission Training Plan examples). Each CTC has historically given major emphasis to this issue. Following are specific examples:

Beginning with rotation 91-12, 8-21 Sep 91, the NTC initiated the following enhanced fratricide prevention measures:

Emphasize fratricide at AARs by:
- reviewing planning, preparation and execution of incidents.
- determining why incidents took place.
- discussing ways to prevent like incidents.
Integrate flank units and lost friendly vehicles into force-on-force scenarios.
Introduce revised NTC Rules of Engagement (ROE) based upon fratricide potential.

JROTC procedures include the following:

Addressed at D-90 O/C visit to player unit in the context of ROE and fratricide trends in training observations.
Key topic in commander's briefback of order to emphasize as part of normal plan, preparation and execution.
O/Cs highlight fratricide in coaching and teaching process during execution. Fratricide preconditions are stressed.
AARs direct increased emphasis towards friendly fire incidents since Operation DESERT STORM. O/Cs continue to identify what happened, why and how it could have been prevented. Finally, the Take-Home Package documents fratricide throughout the rotation.

Recently the CTCs have been asked to capture data on fratricide incidents, contributing factors, and prevention techniques in a centralized effort to disseminate trend and improve unit performance. CALL provide these trends and lessons learned from this analysis to the field, branch schools and CTCs for maximum exposure.

FIELD DISCIPLINE

A final category of self-inflicted losses involves mistakes made with weapons and explosives. Only careful guidance at the lowest levels and supervision can control these preventable casualties. Enforcement of strict policies (ROE) on use of booby traps, weapons on safe, employment of Claymores and explosives and use of hand grenades can help to prevent fratricide.

Table of Contents
Chapter 3, Part 2
Vignette: Operation JUST CAUSE: Air Support