SECTION II
FRATRICIDE RISK ASSESSMENT
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Fratricide should be addressed early-on. As part of accomplishing your mission while preserving combat power, you should identify and incorporate necessary risk-reducing measures. Be sure to update your assessment "in-stride" as the situation develops.
The Fratricide Risk Assessment Matrix we provide in this guide will allow you to address fratricide using the following steps:
- Identify the fratricide risks using the matrix during your analysis of METT-T factors.
- Using each submatrix, assess possible fratricide loss and probability.
- Make decisions and develop ways and means to reduce risks.
- Implement measures by integrating them into plans, orders, SOPS, training performance
- standards and rehearsals.
- Supervise and enforce safety measures and standards.
Leaders at squad, section and platoon levels must consciously identify specific fratricide risk for may mission. Using this structured approach, troop leaders can predict the most likely causes of fratricide and take action to protect their soldiers. Whether used for an actual combat operation or a training event, this thought process complements the Troop Leading Procedures and analysis of METT-T factors in planning.
The Fratricide Risk Assessment Matrix shows an approach to assess the relative risk of fratricide for combat maneuver platoons and companies. To assign a risk value to each direct cause of fratricde from the previous section, we pair the most critical METT-T contributing factors associated with each cause.
For each primary cause, favorable conditions lead to the lower left corner of the matrix and lesser risk values. As either contributing factor becomes unfavorable, risk increases, with the worst precondition for each kind of fratricide represented by the upper right had corner of the matrix. To introduce this matrix approach, we will discuss applicable METT-T factors and follow an example platoon-level assessment. For instance, assume an experienced tank platoon leader of a well-trained platoon is attached to a mech company for the first time during a defense. With the help of his platoon sergeant, he reviews the employs the Fratricide Risk Assessment Matrix. To determine the relative risk of fire and maneuver control measures, the leader looks at the first submatrix.
SUBMATRIX 1: When considering Fire and Maneuver Control, the platoon leader finds that defensive scheme of maneuver initially ensures spatial separation by virtue of terrain and reinforcing obstacles. His position covers 700m, resulting high dispersion or low force density. However, the platoon's role in the counterattack plan may require maneuver toward other elements or attacking an enemy formation. If situation clarity decreases as he conducts the counterattack, and probable weapons density increases, he predicts a high fratricide risk of seven for the counterattack phase.Density of Forces
Low Risk
- Full Dispersion
- Greater the Doctrinal Frontages
- Low Dispersion
- Compressed Frontages
Low Risk
- Units Stationary with Stand-off
- Masking Terrain Between Adj Units
- Friendly Forces Converge
- Friendly or Enemy Forces Intermingle
SUBMATRIX 2: Effectiveness of the Fire Distribution Plan is a function of how well-trained team is to start with, and how well they understand the plan for this mission. Plenty of Preparation Time allows for thorough Rehearsals and Dissemination of the fire distribution plan. However, under Collective Proficiency, the platoon leader in our example selects moderate risk due the task organization. He fells his unit is well-trained, but the parent company and its SOPs are unfamiliar. This leads to a risk value of two for this collective assessment.
Preparation
Low Risk
- Full-Force Rehearsals & Inspections
- Complete Troop-Leading Process
- Thorough Coordination
- Complete Contingency Development
- Abbreviated Troop Leading
- Brief back Rehearsals
Low Risk
- Habitual Team
- Practiced, Effective SOPs
- Fire Control Success in Tng or Cbt
- Unfamiliar attachments
- Limited Team Experience in Tng or Cbt
"Time Spent on Reconnaissance is never wasted." --Lord WellingtonExtent of IPB & Recon
Low Risk
- Hazards found & Eliminated
- Terrain, Route & Enemy Confirmed
- Guides or Beacons Positioned
- Security Emplaced
- No Information Available
Low Risk
- Positioning or Vectoring Equipment Used
- Terrain Known to Friendly
- Detailed Route Recon & Prep
- No Reconnaissance
- No Technological Aids
- Adverse Viability & Weather
SUBMATRIX 3: Land Navigation is normally critical in the offense, but less so in defensive operation. The leader's confidence in his ability to navigate precisely is dependent upon the local terrain, weather and visibility characteristics and any technological navigation aids at his disposal. Assume in our example the tank platoon leader's maneuver role in the counterattack is through somewhat difficult terrain. He has no Global Positioning System, but has extensive opportunity to reconnoiter his route. This puts him on the bottom row of the third submatrix with a risk value of two.
Clearance of Fires
Low Risk
- Positive Control of All Supporting Fires
- Cleared by eyes on" Ground Unit
- Observed Fire and Adjustments
- Based on Higher HQ Battle Tracking Only
- "Silence is Consent"
Low Risk
- Multiple Radios and Nets
- Leaders Forward, Reporting Higher
- Consistent Lateral Commo & Reports
- Max Range Commo or Dsmted Systems
- CPs Do Not Keep Current Unit Status
SUBMATRIX 4: The lieutenant's analysis if Fire Control and Battle Tracking leads to a low risk rating of three. His vehicular commos reliable and he has on clearance of fires responsibilities until the counterattack, where he has priority of task force field artillery fires. the company FIST is an experienced officer who has been with the company for over six months, and his commo is also good, with positive clearance of indirect fire at company level. The platoon sergeant reminds his to also confirm his maneuver does not coincide with any preplanned task force fires.
Hazard-Producing Munitions
Low Risk
- No Use in Sector
- Force is Survivable of Munitions in Use
- FASCAM on Maneuver Route or Flank
- DPICM on Objective, CAS Danger Close
- Type of Munitions are Unknown
Low Risk
- Thorough Reconnaissance Possible
- Friendly Presence of AO
- All Hazards Reported & Marked
- AO controlled by Enemy
- Friendly Use of Munitions Unreported
- "Don't Know What to Expect"
SUBMATRIX 5: In reviewing the danger of Battlefield Hazards, he determines a significant risk. Although none of the planned DPICM is a threat to his tankers, the Task Force commander planned an on-call FASCAM minefield within 1500m of the platoon's counterattack route. Despite partial or better knowledge of likely hazards, there is a major hazard planned for his vicinity; thus, his high risk value is three.
SUBMATRIX 6: Combat Identification is generally a strength with this platoon with near optimal acquisition and engagement ranges of under 1600m. However, the platoon sergeant is very skeptical of the unit's expedient recognition SOP based largely upon IR chemlights and bon- thermal panels. This results in a moderate risk value of three.Engagement Ranges
Low Risk
- Fields of Fire & Range Make ID Likely
- Acquisition Range Matches ID Range
- Vegetation or Range Make ID Unlikely
- Acquisition Exceeds ID Range
Low Risk
- Established, Very Effective & Well-Understood
- Works at Acquisition Range Day & Night
- Short Range
- Not Thermally & IR Distinct
Command & Control
Low Risk
- Competent Supervision of Weapons Employment
- Habitually Associated Elements
- Wpns Restrictions & Limitations Known
- Improvised Chain of Command
- Unfamiliarity with Unit SOP & Techniques
Low Risk
- Complete (e.g.main effort, reserve & rear)
- Balance Safe Opns with Mission Reqt's
- Covers EPWs, Refugees & Neutrals
- Non-Specific or Permissive
- Not Understood or Enforced
SUBMATRIX 7: The risk of FIRE CONTROL DISCIPLINE is a low value of two, because the task force Rules of Engagement (ROE) have proved very effective in preventing inappropriate weapons employment. The platoon's attached status elevates it slightly due to differences in equipment and command relationships.
Mission-Related Experience
Low Risk
- Cbt or Cbt Tng Ctr Seasoning
- Competent, Confident Leaders Execute Commander's Clear Intent
- Disciplined, Acclimated Soldiers
- Ill-Prepared to Achieve Cdr's Intent
- Unseasoned Soldiers with Seasoned Leaders
- Unseasoned Leaders and/or Soldiers
Low Risk
- Disciplined, Effective Sleep Plan
- Exertion Rate Managed Throughout Opn
- Overloaded Soldiers, Prolonged Opns
- Leaders Fail to Rest
- Ineffective Sleep Plan
SUBMATRIX 8: Finally, the lieutenant and his platoon sergeant consider the platoon's Soldier and Leader Preparedness. They have been together over eight months and have great confidence in themselves and their soldiers. The training level is high, but combat experience is limited. Considering these factors they use a moderate training level combined with low exertion and fatigue to assess a low risk level of three.
OVERALL RISK: The total risk value based upon this assessment is then 25, putting the platoon in the caution area for this mission. Despite being well-trained and operating under generally favorable conditions, the platoon must consider several important fratricide countermeasures to reduce risk. After reviewing the highest risk areas, the platoon leader and platoon sergeant decide which risk reduction measures will be possible, practical and effective.
| LOW RISK | CAUTION | HIGH RISK | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8 to 20 | 21 to 30 | >30 |
The leaders' new appreciation of how risk affects this mission will allow them to apply appropriate controls without compromising mission accomplishment. Typically, they will combine several conventional control measures with specific antifratricide controls. The counterattack phase of this defense clearly entails the most risk. Controls to reduce risk due to Fire and Maneuver, Battlefield Hazards and Combat Identification could include:
- Recon and mare entire route with key leaders.
- Coordinate directly with overwatching elements.
- Establish a Restricted Fire Line or other spatial separation for supporting fires.
- Recon firing positions masked by terrain from friendly fire.
- Rehearse entire move with full platoon and overwatching elements.
- Mark extent of FASCAM safety zone on ground, modify route and possibly register the target for accuracy.
- Establish a codeword and signal for FASCAM emplacement.
- Add thermally visible smudge pots to tanks or thermally mark counterattack positions.
- Back brief commander in detail on all measures and coordination.
- Complete full-force rehearsals of all phases and possible contingencies (include limited visibility and MOPP).
- Coordinate with any adjacent units that will move mounted or dismounted.
- Review and test understanding of plan and ROE to instill confidence and discipline in execution.
- Enforce absolute compliance with sleep plan and security plan.
In summary, leaders must select the most relevant measures which have the best payoff and integrate them into their planning and preparation. The leadership must then employ those controls with the greatest payoff in risk reduction. The platoon sergeant's experience is often key to determining this payoff. This highlights the need for the chain of command to implement the Troop-Leading Procedures as efficiently as possible in any situation.
The following section will discuss examples of fratricide risk assessment for various organizations in different scenarios. Review these for a better appreciation of how the Fratricide Risk Assessment Matrix can meet your unit fratricide reduction training requirements. We offer this Fratricide Risk Assessment Matrix can meet your unit fratricide reduction training requirements.
We offer this Fratricide Risk Assessment Matrix as an effective technique to control fratricide. Please direct any suggestions to the CALL point of contact. (Commander, Combined Arms Command, ATTN: ATZL-CTL [Lsns Analysis], FT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027, DSN:552-2132/2659; Coml:(913) 684-2132/2659.) Each of the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) is now recording fratricide incident data which should lead to a much clearer understanding of fratricide contributing factors and preconditions. As trends emerge, we will publish them in future products.
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