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DISCUSSION: Commanders who had experienced an ongoing CAPSTONE relationship, and continued that relationship following mobilization, stated that the CAPSTONE Program was valuable in preparing them and their staffs for the operation. Exercises that prepared RC units through the CAPSTONE Program include the CAPSTONE Battle Book preparation; training conducted with VII Corps wartime commands, both in Europe and in CONUS; VII Corps CAPSTONE Conferences; and REFORGER. Commanders expressed that even though the mission changed from Europe to Southwest Asia, the working relationships continued and helped effect a smooth transition in the new theater of operations.

LESSON(S):

• The CAP STONE Program works when followed and should be continued.
• The actions required by participation in the CAPSTONE Program helped prepare units for operations in Southwest Asia even though the mission changed.

TOPIC 3-2: Mobilization and Deployment Readiness Exercises (MODREs).

DISCUSSION: Units who underwent a MODRE prior to mobilization for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM were more prepared than those units who did not conduct a MODRE. MODREs provide an opportunity for unit personnel to increase their preparedness in administrative and personnel matters, training, and logistics. MODRE Tearns provide assistance to unit personnel in conducting mobilization and deployment exercises. MODREs proved to be a valuable tool to prepare bits for contingencies, and should be conducted by all RC units.

LESSON(S):

• Continue MODREs.
• Expand MODREs to encompass all RC units on a periodic schedule.
• Continue MODRE Team support and expand the support to all RC units.

TOPIC 3-3: Overseas Deployment Training (ODT).

DISCUSSION: Units whose mission involved ODT acquired invaluable experience by performing preparation for overseas movement (POM), deploying to the training site, conducting wartime training missions in an overseas theater, and redeploying to home station.

LESSON(S):

• Continue ODTs.
• Expand ODT opportunities to more RC units.

T0PIC 3-4: Promotion policy issues.

DISCUSSION: Promotion policies and procedures differ among AC, ARNG, and USAR. Units with personnel assigned or attached from other components had the most difficult time with the overall promotion system. Furthermore, soldiers from one component assigned or attached to a unit of another component, and otherwise eligible for promotion, often were not promoted, or at best, received long delayed promotions.

LESSON(S):

• HQDA must revise the promotion system to make it uniform for all components.
• Commanders must initiate timely action to promote eligible and deserving soldiers.

TOPIC 3-5: Transfer of Command Relationships upon Mobilization.

DISCUSSION: ARNG commanders and staffs must be aware that federalized ARNG units are no longer under State control. Under a Presidential call-up, State Area Commands (STARCs) are not federalized, the National Guard Bureau and the Adjutants General of the several states remain responsible for ensuring the readiness of nonfederalized units. Requests for volunteers and equipment loans should be coordinated with the National Guard Bureau. RC commanders and staffs bypassed the chain of command to task units directly to obtain additional equipment and personnel to fill mobilized units. Understanding the chain of command and exercising it properly should ensure that mission requirements will be met with appropriate resources without adversely affecting unit readiness. Additionally, all personnel should understand the command relationship within the USAR, and not bypass command channels. Once a mobilized unit arrives at the MOBSTA, it is an AC asset, and must be treated accordingly.

LESSON(S):

• RC commands must be notified when subordinate units are tasked to provide personnel/equipment to mobilized units.
• Senior leaders must recognize the change in readiness of those units tasked to provide personnel/equipment. The level of readiness of the tasked unit is decreased for future mobilization.
• Proper exercise of the chain of command ensures coordination, compliance with diverse component regulations and policies, and effective resourcing for successful mission accomplishment.

TOPIC 3-6: Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System (TACCS).

DISCUSSION: Many RC units did not have TACCS upon mobilization because the units were not authorized it or it was not available within the supply channels. Thus, those RC units without TACCS could not interface with the AC data bases in personnel and logistics, including the SIDPERS-AC. There is no single-source personnel data base with a standard set of data elements for the AC, ARNG, and USAR. At present, unique RC data cannot be added to this data base.

LESSON(S):

• TACCS must be issued to all RC units.
• Fund the supply channels to make TACCS available to all RC units authorized TACCS.
• The Army must develop Total Force automation packages and field them to all appropriate units.

TOPIC 3-7: Computerized Movement Planning and Status System (COMPASS).

DISCUSSION: Defense Movement Coordinators were unable to obtain accurate Automated Unit Equipment List (AUEL) data from FORSCOM because the COMPASS data base was outdated. Thus, the Army transportation system did not have current RC AUEL data available.

LESSON(S):

• FORSCOM should revise its automation system to accept up-to-the-minute changes as they are entered into the data base instead of waiting for data to be transmitted through channels to SORTS and then retransmitted to COMPASS.
• Unit commanders must submit accurate and timely COMPASS reports.

TOPIC 3-8: Loan of ARNG Equipment.

DISCUSSION: DOD Directive 1225.6 requires approval of the Secretary of Defense to transfer equipment from the RC to the AC. During the early stages of Operation DESERT SHIELD, the AC attempted to remedy its own equipment on hand (EOH) shortages and equipment readiness (ER) deficiencies by requesting transfer of ARNG equipment and/or spare parts. The RC faced a dilemma: concur with the requests and face readiness decrements or nonconcur and jeopardize the war effort. The answer: concur if and when a valid requirement exists.

LESSON(S):

• Continue the policy of DOD Directive 1225.6 requiring DOD approval for RC equipment transfer to the AC.
• Minimum cross-leveling of equipment between components should be the policy.
• HQDA, FORSCOM, CONUSAs and STAR must comply with the requirements of DOD Directive 1225.6.

TOPIC 3-9: Incompatible Equipment.

DISCUSSION: The RC has a significant number of units which are equipped with major end items which are not in the AC inventory. Many RC units accomplished extensive equipment cross-leveling actions for alerted and/or mobilized units because the AC wouid not accept or support the incompatible RC equipment. Because of the low standing on the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) of RC combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units, many RC units are not equipped with authorized items of equipment. HQDA should review the current list of in-lieu-of items contained in Appendix H, SB 700-20, and remove those items that are not supportable by the AC.

LESSON(S):

• Only acceptable and supportable items should be listed.
• HQDA must modernize the RC at the same rate as the AC.
• In the alternative, if HQDA cannot modernize the RC at the same rate as the AC, then it must ensure that required support (i.e., general- and depot-level maintenance and repair parts) is available for RC equipment.

TOPIC 3-10: Chemical Defense Equipment (CDE) Supply Stock.

DISCUSSION: There is no set policy on the supply stock of CDE. Different MACOMs have established various guidance regarding quantities, requirements, and location of CDE. FORSCOM established guidelines for CDE contingency stocks, i.e., one personal protective garment per soldier and other items in accordance with authorizations. RC units should continue to stock CDE sufficient for one garment per soldier.

LESSON(S):

• When additional CDE is required by the mission, make it the responsibility of the MOBSTA or gaining command to provide the required CDE.
• Standardize the guidance at the highest level possible.

TOPIC 3-11: Family Support Centers.

DISCUSSION: It is not widely known that ARNG STARCs in each state provide support for the Family Assistance Program to all services during a mobilization. DOD mandates this support for all services if it is not available at a reasonably close active installation. During the Presidential call-up, these centers were manned by full-time ARNG personnel and by ARNG soldiers on Active Duty Special Work (ADSW) orders. When partial mobilization occurred, recalled retirees were also used to man these centers. The Family Assistance Centers supported over 200,000 people of the ARNG, Air National Guard (ANG), USAR (including the Individual Ready Reserve), AC, Air Force, Air Force Reserve, Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reserve, Navy, Navy Reserve, Coast Guard and Coast Guard Reserve during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Staffing the centers with retirees is an effective use of the Retiree Recall Program. Volunteers in this instance provided over one third of the assets because of strong public support for the Operation. (See CALL Newsletter, No. 91-2, The Yellow Ribbon, Jun 91, for family support lessons of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.)

LESSON(S):

• Staffing the centers with retirees worked well.
• Volunteers are a viable assets to man Family Assistance Centers.

TOPIC 3-12: Dental Care for RC Soldiers.

DISCUSSION: Routine dental care is not provided to RC personnel while in any status other than active duty for more than 30 days. The panographic X-ray is the only dental examination required for RC soldiers. Although some RC soldiers were nondeployable for other reasons, approximately one of every four RC soldiers was in the Dental Class III category. Dental Class III indicates that emergency dental care may be required within one year. One estimate posits that 30 percent of the U.S. population is in dental category Class III. Even though MOBSTA dental personnel were able to upgrade approximately nine out of every ten RC soldiers in Class III to Class II or better, policy/regulation change is required that will provide dental care to RC soldiers on active duty for less than 30 days, and during Inactive Duty Training (IDT).

LESSON(S):

• HQDA must change existing regulations to provide dental care to Selected Reserve soldiers during IDT.
• If the above is not possible, then FORSCOM must increase dental support at MOBSTAs.
• All commands should provide dental hygiene classes to RC soldiers.

TOPIC 3-13: Selected Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP) and Montgomery GI Bill.

DISCUSSION: RC soldiers who volunteer for active duty jeopardize their Selected Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP) and Montgomery GI Bill eligibilityif they are no longer members of the Selected Reserve or if they leave the MOS or unit for which they are being paid the bonus. The Army should not penalize Selected Reserve members receiving individual incentive bonuses who volunteer for active duty during a Presidential call-up.

LESSON(S):

• Propose the necessary legislation to continue invidual incentive bonuses for Selected Reserve members who volunteer for active duty during a Presidential call-up.

TOPIC 3-14: Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ).

DISCUSSION: Some RC personnel activated for short periods of time face possible financial hardship because they may not be eligible for Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) under current regulations. RC soldiers may be required to continue payments for leases, mortgages, and/or storage of furniture at their home of record. HQDA should take appropriate action to ensure RC soldiers not currently eligible for BAQ who are activated for short periods will receive this benefit.

LESSON(S):

• Take appropriate action to ensure BAQ is furnished to all RC soldiers activated for short periods.
• Make appropriate changes to regulations to make all RC soldiers activated for short periods eligible for BAQ.

TOPIC 3-15: Temporary Storage of Personal Property.

DISCUSSION: Single servicemembers are not entitled to government temporary storage of household goods if a deployment is less than 90 days. HQDA should take appropriate action to change Title 37, U.S.C. 406, to allow for temporary storage of baggage and household goods for RC soldiers who are ordered to active duty for periods of less than 90 days.

LESSON(S):

• Title 37, U.S.C. 406, requires legislative change to allow for temporary storage of baggage and household goods for RC soldiers who are ordered to active duty for periods of less than 90 days. Take necessary steps to initiate required changes.

Table of Contents
Chapter 2 - Mobilization Phase Topics and Lessons
Appendix A