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CHAPTER 1

PREMOBILIZATION PHASE TOPICS AND LESSONS

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Premobilization issues fall into two categories: The preparatory phase and the alert phase. During the preparatory phase, RC units are at home station (HS). They prepare mobilization plans and files to improve their state of readiness during peacetime in preparation for mobilization. Each unit takes positive steps to accomplish as many personnel and administrative actions as possible prior to an actual mobilization. When an RC unit receives notification that an order to federalize is imminent, it enters the alert phase. The alert phase of premobilization ends when the unit enters active Federal service. During the alert phase, the unit takes specific actions to transition from RC to AC status. Further, the unit completes the personnel and administrative readiness assessment actions begun in the preparatory phase.

TOPIC 1-1: 200K Presidential Call-up.

DISCUSSION: The Army Mobilization and Operation Planning System (AMOPS) and the Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS) contain policies, plans and procedures to be implemented upon mobilization, but not for a 200K Presidential Call-up. These plans are based upon a large supporting infrastructure designed to provide sustained operations. This requires timely activation of installation base operations (BASOPS) support. Examples of BASOPS are transportation, central issue, direct support maintenance, automatic data processing (ADP), medical support, and training aids/devices. Additionally, mobilization stations (MOBSTAs) require USAR training units, and assistance from ARNG State Area Commands (STARCs) and Major USAR Commands (MUSARCs). Although HQDA eventually activated some of these type units during Operation DESERT SHIELD, most MOBSTAs endured considerable shortages of support personnel. This shortage hampered supporting operations throughout the mobilization.

LESSON(S):

• HQDA must rewrite AMOPS to address required and timely MOBSTA support during Presidential 200K Call-up.
• FORSCOM must rewrite FORMDEPS to address required and timely MOBSTA support during a Presidential 200K Call-up.
• HQDA and FORSCOM could have, and should have, instituted ad hoc rules modeled after AMOPS/FORMDEPS, tailored to fit the reduced requirements of a 200K call-up, and based upon the current political and military situation.

TOPIC 1-2: Failure to Follow Existing Partial Mobilization Plans and Procedures.

DISCUSSION: The Army did not follow partial mobilization procedures outlined in AMOPS and FORMDEPS even after the President ordered a partial mobilization. Failure to adhere to established procedures in AMOPS/FORMDEPS led to confusion and incorrect actions. Although it may have been necessary to operate with ad hoc rules during the 200K call-up, continuing to make rules after going to partial mobilization complicated the process. Further, constant changes without a definitive plan impaired the ability of support organizations to plan for, and meet, the requirements of the operation. Development of a sequenced action checklist in AMOPS/FORMDEPS would accommodate required procedures.

LESSON(S):

• If established plans and procedures are in place, avoid making ad hoc rules. Follow the plans as written and practiced.

TOPIC 1-3: Draft Version of the Reserve Components Unit Commander's Handbook (RCUCH).

DISCUSSION: Implementation of requirements under the Presidential call-up created some initial confusion, but many more problems and misunderstandings resulted from the distribution of 100 copies of a draft version of Vol III, FORMDEPS, Part 3, RCUCH, which was not available to all RC units. Only after FORSCOM identified the problem of a "draft" version and the "older" version being used by units did they send a message to disregard the use of the draft version. In the interim, however, confusion reigned whenever HQDA or FORSCOM generated messages that contradicted the RCUCH being used by respective RC unit commanders. Some HQDA messages superseded AMOPS and FORMDEPS guidance without clarifying the abandoned policy directive of the existing documents.

LESSON(S):

• Do not use draft copies of any publication unless it is available to all potential users. Include clarifying comments when superseding existing policy. Include representative users in any rewrite efforts.

TOPIC 1-4: Accessing RC Personnel into the AC.

DISCUSSION: In many cases, the AC did not follow standard personnel policies and procedures in accessing RC personnel after mobilization. Accessing reservists to the AC version of the Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS), while simultaneously keeping the individuals on the RC data base, created personnel accounting problems. Part of the problem may be attributed to the inability of automatic data processing (ADP) systems used by the AC, ARNG, and USAR to interface; thus, information could not be transferred between the various systems.

LESSON(S):

• Follow established personnel action regulations to accurately account for all personnel. HQDA must design and implement an ADP system that is compatible with all components.

TOPIC 1-5: Stop-loss Procedures.

DISCUSSION: When the Army applied stop-loss measures to the AC, it did not apply the same stop-loss measures to the RC, although HQDA eventually did apply stop-loss for the RC, but subsequent to the Presidential declaration. Stop-loss measures should apply simultaneously to the RC to ensure the retention of critical skills and personnel. Without a stop-loss directive applied to the RC, the potential exists that the RC would lose personnel required if a contingency operation lasts more than several months.

LESSON(S):

• Apply stop-loss directives simultaneously to all components.

TOPIC 1-6: Failure to Screen Records before Call-up.

DISCUSSION: In some cases, RC soldiers mobilized without their personnel records being fully and properly screened. The lack of either a thorough and complete manual or automated personnel records screening process created a situation in which individuals who did not meet Army accessioning standards were recalled or mobilized. The Mobilization Asset Transfer Program, for example, contains personnel who are untrained, or otherwise unsuitable for military service. These personnel are erroneously considered mobilization assets and counted in the IRR end strength. Activating personnel without screening their records, and discharging them within a few days, cost the government thousands of dollars in travel expenses, active duty pay and allowances, and adrninistrative costs.

LESSON(S):

• ARNG and USAR Commands must conduct personnel records screening prior to activating members of the RC.
• Personnel who are not fully qualified for active duty in peacetime should not be counted on as mobilization assets.
• An automated method should be created to identify personnel recently released from duty who should not be included in an 9RT- 12 call-up.

TOPIC 1- 7: Disposition of Nondeployable RC Soldiers.

DISCUSSION: During Operation DESERT STORM, HQDA recognized that some nondeployable soldiers being released from active duty should be discharged rather than transferred to nonmobilized units or to the IRR. Paradoxically, the administrative process available to RC commands to discharge nondeployables is administratively cumbersome. Thus, some soldiers who are not deployable during mobilization continue as members of the mobilization pool. Nondeployable soldiers who were mobilized had to be discharged or transferred. If an RC soldier was nondeployable, but not discharged, some MOBSTA commanders retained them at the MOBSTA to perform support functions, while other MOBSTA commanders transferred the nondeployable RC soldiers back to the major reserve command.

LESSON(S):

• HQDA must amend personnel policies to discharge personnel who are not valid mobilization assets.
• HQDA must devise procedures to implement board actions on nondeployable RC soldiers.
• HQDA must develop a standard policy on the disposition of RC soldiers identified as permanently nondeployable.
• HQDA must establish categories of nondeployables (i.e., temporary or permanent) and treat each category appropriately.

TOPIC 1-8: Family Care Plans.

DISCUSSION: Some members of the RC who were single parents or dual-service military parents with dependent family members did not have a validated Family Care Plan (DA Form 5305-R). Regulations require a "face to face" consultation between the soldier and the unit commander (or designated representative) to complete a family care plan and to periodically recertify the plan. This is impractical for members of the IRR/IMA/Ready Reserve as nonunit RC soldiers. For example, AR 600-20 does not specify the methodology and procedures for completion of a Family Care Plan for RT- 12s. Even if there were such a policy, the requirement for the face-to-face meeting between the soldier and the unit commander cannot be met.

LESSON(S):

• The Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR), in conjunction with ARPER- CEN, must devise acceptable methods by which all categories of RC soldiers who need a family care plan can complete one. For example, the IRR soldiers could complete family care plans, if required, on the day they report to the local recruiting station to review their microfiche.
• Devise necessary plans to ensure all categories of RC soldiers complete Family Care Plans.

TOPIC 1-9: Personal Issues of RC Soldiers.

DISCUSSION: RC soldiers had a myriad of personal issues that were not always anticipated. When anticipated, however, these issues were addressed and resolved. Most often asked were questions about the benefits of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act (SSCRA), military benefits and entitlements, promotion eligibility and policy, Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS)/health care eligibility, and legal issues. Commanders at all levels conducted orientation briefings that, in most cases, covered the topic areas of these issues. In some cases, however, problems arose that required commanders to provide individualized assistance to RC soldiers with unique problems as a result of the RC soldiers' rapid conversion from citizen/soldier to full-time soldier.

LESSON(S):

• Commanders at all levels must conduct orientation briefings that cover issues important to mobilized RC soldiers.
• Commanders at all levels must recognize that mobilized RC soldiers will have problems that require command assistance.

TOPIC 1-10: Perceived Issues of RC Soldiers.

DISCUSSION: When RC soldiers' personal issues were not given command emphasis and/or not properly resolved, many RC soldiers perceived that they were being treated differently than their AC counterparts simply because they were members of the ARNG or USAR.

LESSON(S):

• Commanders at all levels must ensure that RC soldiers are treated as viable members of the Total Force Army.
• Commanders at all levels must communicate to their command that mobilized RC soldiers become AC soldiers upon activation and are part of the Total Force team.
• Commanders at all levels must advocate expulsion of parochial thinking within the individual components and embrace the Total Force concept.

TOPIC 1-11: Standardization of Orders Format.

DISCUSSION: The format of orders federalizing RC units varied from command to command. Authorized entitlements for RC soldiers were not articulated on some orders mobilizing RC units. Orders not prepared in accordance with prescribed FORMDEPS guidance and AR 310-10 for USAR units and NGR 310-10 for ARNG units may result in the delay or denial of authorized entitlements to some mobilized RC soldiers.

LESSON(S):

• Commanders must ensure that published orders are prepared in accordance with published guidance, and include authorized entitlements.

TOPIC 1-12: Exemption from Mobilization Criteria of Special Category RC Soldiers.

DISCUSSION: The criteria for mobilizing all special categories of RC personnel (i.e., medical, chaplain, college students, high school students, officer candidates, ROTC Simultaneous Membership Program personnel, and nonprior service personnel in professional training programs) is not enumerated in existing regulations for each mobilization level. Exemption criteria need to be listed in FORMDEPS for each level of mobilization. Mobilization policy pertaining to special categories of RC personnel is set by HQDA and enumerated in AMOPS and/or the Army Regulation (AR) which authorizes the special program. In the beginnning of Operation DESERT SHIELD, HQDA issued messages which changed the criteria in several cases. For example, HQDA changed the commissioning criteria for ROTC/SMP participants. Additionally, it changed the reporting criteria for all college students.

LESSON(S):

• HQDA must review current mobilization criteria for various levels of mobilization, make appropriate changes to AMOPS, and not make hasty changes during an actual mobilization.
• FORSCOM should then rewrite FORMDEPS to conform with any changes to AMOPS.
• Where such exemption criteria are not listed in AMOPS/FORMDEPS, then authority to exempt special category soldiers from mobilization should be given to unit commanders on a case-by-case basis, in consonance with current regulations, and with approval at the next higher headquarters.

TOPIC 1-13: Disposition of Individual and Unit Records and Files.

DISCUSSION: The RCUCH contains conflicting guidance on the disposition of individual and unit records and files. In one section the RCUCH directs distribution of the records in accordance with a complicated distribution table listing several agencies, while another section states that records are to be shipped to the MOBSTA. The RCUCH should be a document that unit commanders can rely on as noncontradictory, clear, and undisputed guidance for use during mobilization.

LESSON(S):

• FORSCOM must rewrite FORMDEPS/RCUCH to specifically detail the desired disposition of unit and individual records and files.

TOPIC 1-14: Cross-leveling Personnel to bring Units up to Deployable, or Better, Standards.

DISCUSSION: During a full or partial mobilization, cross-leveling of personnel is accomplished at the MOBSTA. Paradoxically, during premobilization or immediately after mobilization while still at home station, cross-leveling of personnel must come from available RC assets. Many mobilized RC units cross-leveled personnel while still at home station. The home-station cross-leveling executed during the mobilization was an exception to policy granted by HQDA to FORSCOM, with HQDA guidance to fill units to C-3 without a losing unit dropping below C-3. This may have resulted because of a lenient policy that permits the double-slotting of soldiers in some RC units. In many cases, however, filler personnel came from like units within the command, or at a minimum, with like military occupation specialties (MOS). In essence, commands "robbed Peter to pay Paul" in an effort to bring units to C- l before movement to the MOBSTA. Luck prevailed! If the conflict had lasted, and more units needed to be mobilized, the Army potentially would not have had the personnel to bring other units to minimum deployable standards. Selected Reserve units do not have access to filler personnel from the Ready Reserve during a Presidential call-up, although that need is apparent.

LESSON(S):

• HQDA should propose legislation that would allow augmentation of the Selected Reserve with soldiers from the Ready Reserve (e.g., RT-12s, IMAs, etc.) during a Presidential call-up under Title 10, U.S.C. 673b.

"The success of the Guard and Reserve participation in DESERT SHIELD cannot be overemphasized. Their participation has been a significant factor in affording us flexibility and balance, and reinforces the policies and decisions made over the last ten years to strengthen theTotal Force concept." GENERAL Colin L. Powell Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Table of Contents
Historical Overview
Chapter 2 - Mobilization Phase Topics and Lessons