Military

LESSON(S): Use of MAP in its current form should be curtailed. Another program for transferring data should be used which is more tolerant of poor quality communications lines as is sometimes found in a tactical environment. Consider a communications program which employs some type of error correction, such as the Microcom Network Protocol (MNP) to establish a "reliable" communications link and still allow protocol data transfers, should be considered.

The link between the SARSS applications and the MAP should be resolved so that some amount of flexibility can be provided the managers of a DPA in processrng data. The MAP really "ties the hands" of the LASSO as it attempts to service requests and updates status of its customers.

TOPIC: Inter-theater COMSEC Page (ICP).

DISCUSSION: Communications between unit boundaries was a problem. The use of an ICP throughout the duration of the battle was a necessity. Keying material was made unreliable to both of the Corps. This keying material is designed for temporary use until units are in place. A theater-wide key code is needed for Flight Operations Center and Flight Coordination Center (FOC and FCC) operations to allow aircraft communications from one boundary to another.

LESSON(S): A joint net needs to be established in the very early stages of pre-war operations, then allowed to continue in use until a cease fire has been called.

TOPIC: Technical Operational Data (TECHOPDAT) Development.

DISCUSSION: Technical pre-arranged data items are developed by the C2 agencies to connect their units via data links. Development of these data elements, to be published in a formatted message (TECHOP-DAT), should be done with several important factors in mind. The TECHOPDAT is a U.S. Message Text Format (USMTF) message used to publish technical prearranged data items necessary to link suitably equipped C2 platforms.

(l) Number and types of data links thataunit can operate with at the same time.

(2) Any known restrictions associated with Participating Unit (PU) or Reporting Unit (RU) assignments for a particular unit.

(3) Any known restrictions associated with selection of a Data-link Reference Point (DLRP) for a particular unit.

(4) Any known limitations affecting the display capabilities for a particular unit.

(5) Any known track number block assignment limitations including nnmmnm an-or maximum number of tracks to be assigned, upper and lower limits of track number block assignments.

(6) Organic and nonorganic cornmunications media available to the data-link participant to include Ground Mobile Forces Satellite Communications (GMFSATCOM) access, HF, UHF radio availability for voice and data circults, cryptographic equlpment and keying material availability at a particular unit, and secure voice communications available at a particular unit.

LESSON(S): The command responsible for developing and publishing the TECHOPDAT must be sensitive to the needs of all of the interface participants and develop the TECHOPDAT using inputs from all of the potential users of the technical prearranged data items. The following must be considered and included in the TECHOPDAT:

TOPIC: Technical Operational Data Input.

DISCUSSION: Input to the TECHOPDAT must be coordinated at unit level prior to submission to ensure that the personnel responsible for developing the technical prearranged data items for the C2 interfaces have current and accurate input. There was an extensive C2 interface using many different ground, airborne, and surface agencies. The number of participants, their capabilities and limitations and other factors was quite extensive. To properly develop the interface, a substantial set of parameters had to be managed. Once all of the various factors were considered, a TECHOPDAT was then published.

The TECHOPDAT was used by all of the interface participants to initialize their individual systems and link them via digital data in various configurations. Each of the systems had various parameters to take into consideration. Development of this extensive set of prearranged data items was quite tedious. The TECHOPDAT must be written using the following factors:

LESSON(S): Inputs to the TECHOPDAT should be fully coordinated within the user units prior to hardcopy transmission to the agency responsible for producing it.

TOPIC: Joint Tactical Air Operations Training.

DISCUSSION: The education and training received by members of the CENTAF Air Defense Staff did not adequately prepare them to plan and execute Joint Tactical Air Operations (JTAO) interface operations of the scale required for Operation DESERT SHIELD. The size of the area of responsibility (AOR) and the variety of data link capable units presented the CENTAF Air Defense Staff with a planning and execution situation never before experienced. Traditional training has not addressed the need to integrate such large numbers of participants with varying capabilities into a single interface. This action required a much more detailed knowledge of system capabilities and a greater range of experience in data-link architecture design than is normally available in an Air Force Component Headquarters.

LESSON(S): Tactically sound data-link architecture in support of the JTAO interface requires detailed planning using factual information on the system capabilities of all expected participants. If the education and experience of the planning staff does not match the requirements, ask for assistance early in the planning phase. Increase the level of participation by component air defense staffs in the CINCFOR JTAO Interface Training Program.

TOPIC: Air Defense Communications Flexibility.

DISCUSSION: Army air defense units are limited in their communications flexibility for JTAO. Air defense units (HAWK and PATRIOT) are limited in the number and type of voice communications the console operators have available to them. This limitation hampers their effectiveness towards joint interoperability in JTAO. There are four voice circuits that are employed in conjunction with the JTAO data links. Voice communications drops in the AN/TSQ-73 and the PATRIOT Interface Coordination Circuit (ICC) are sufficient to support Army-only need lines. The additional voice circuits that support JTAO have to be routed through various instruments rnto the shelters supporting air defense (AD). The four additional voice circults for JTAO are generally placed on instruments that have a handset attached to them. These additional handsets have to be constantly monitored by personnel in the Army AD shelters. It is inconvenient for the operators to hold these handsets or monitor these instruments that are not routed through the communications panel of the AD equipment. The AD joint voice circuits do not receive the same attention as circuits routed through the communication subsets.

LESSON(S): Careful consideration must be given toward making equipment available to Army AD units that will participate in JTAO data links. The communications capability at Army AD units is severely limited and does not support the four-voice circuits required for JTAO data-link activity. Changes to the communications subsystems should be made so that they can be configured to support the four voice circuits required for JTAO data-link activity.

TOPIC: Air Defense Communications Encryption.

DISCUSSION: Army air defense units that have a TADIL-B capability do not have compatible TADIL-B encryption and decryption capability. Army air defense units are configured for bulk encryption; all other services with a TAD1L-B capability are configured for single-channel encryption. Air Force and Marine Cons TADIL-B-capable units use end-to-end encryption (single channel) to cover the TADIL-B link. Army air defense units (AN/TSQ-73 and PATRIOT) do not have this capability. These units rely on bulk-encrypted multichannel UHF systems for primary tactical communications. These UHF directional systems do not have an inherent single-channel encryption capability. Procedures exist to integrate Army AD units into the JTAO interface. However, if the proper equipment is not available, establishing a TADIL-B data link between Army air defense units and any other JTAO elements is greatly complicated.

Doctrinally, Army units provide the communications connectivity to the Air Force Control and Reporting Center (CRC), Control and Reporting Process (CRP), and Message Processing Center (MPC) source by collocating a directional UHF system and connecting it to the TADIL-B source with a special shielded cable. Interfacing Army air defense systems with Marine Corps TADIL-B sources is more difficult. No special cable exists to connect an Army system directly to the Marine Corps TADIL-B source. Single-channel encryption devices have been acquired for some Army AN/TSQ-73 sections which are interfaced using locally fabricated connecting cables. For PATRIOT operations, other arrangements have to be made. PATRIOT units can either have their TADIL-B signal routed through an appropriately equipped ANffSQ-73 or fabricate cables to interface the TADIL-B encryption device inside their system. During contingency operations, and when a rapid response is required, the amount of effort required to integrate Army air defense units into an Integrated Air Defense System (lADS) is considerable. This effort could be reduced or eliminated if data encryption devices used by the Army air defense systems were compatible and interoperable with all of the other agencies that already have the proper equipment. Army air defense data encryption devices must be installed to provide compatible, interoperable equipment to Army units capable of conducting TADIL-B. Single-channel encryption using KG-30s is used by all other services and agencies capable of TADIL-B operations. Bulk encryption is employed only by Army air defense units.

LESSON(S): Army air defense HAWK and PATRIOT units that are not properly equipped for Contingency Joint Operations must have sufficient training to use the procedures to enter the JTAO interface. Then existing equipment must be improved for incorporation of encryption devices that the other services have already placed in service.

TOPIC: Data-link Equipment.

DISCUSSION: Commanders purchased Joint Tactical Air operations (JTAO) data-link equipment for their units that was not certified for use on the joint interface. In the past few years, there has been a proliferation of JTAO data-link-capable equipments that have not been certified for use on the joint interface. Examples of this equipment are AN/TSC-110 Adaptable Surface Interface Terminals Joint TAD IL-A Distribution System (JTADS), Data-link Set, Portable Configuration (DLS-PC), and similar names for JTAO data-link-capable equipment .

When personnel are detailed to plan for their insertion in the data-link architecture, interoperabilit cannot be assured. These systems are generally purchased for contingency operations or rapid response usage. When acquired, their use was predicated on the assumption that no certified systems were available for interface or the scope of operations was such that certified C2 agencies would not be employed. Whether intended or not, they will invariably be used by units to meet the requirements of a tactical situation when no other alternative is viable.

Data-link equipment has the capability to participate in TADIL-A or TADIL-B or ATDL- 1. They also can be used to feed C2 agencies. When data-link anomalies or errors occur in the certified systems, it is very difficult to determine both the cause of the errors and develop workarounds to solve the problems. These "quick-fix" systems have unknown implementation of the TADIL standards and may not behave in a predictable manner with other certified equipments or agencies. Development of JTAO data-link architectures and troubleshooting of the links is complicated by not knowing the TADIL implimentations of these systems.

LESSON(S): Special-purpose equipment procured outside of normal acquisition channels must still be subjected to configuration control standards. The agencies responsible for proponency of these systems, and proponency for their users, must establish procedures for configuration control of these systems.

TOPIC: Computer-Assisted Force Management System (CAFMS).

DISCUSSION: CAFMS reporting requirements cannot reasonably be accommodated by Army Aviation units. Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) controls theater airspace and assigns missions above the coordination altitude in the daily Air Tasking Order (ATO). Army aircraft must be included in the ATO to fly missions above the coordinating altitude. The CAFMS is the primary means of transmission for the ATO and airspace instructions. It is also used by USAF units to report flight mission information back to the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). It is a two-way communication system for mission and airspace. The Army units below corps headquarters do not have CAFMS equipment, but are still expected by JFACC to keep up with airspace measures, mission changes, and to report mission information through the CAFMS. Noncompliance with changes is dangerous and not reporting through the system can result in airspace requests, for subsequent periods, being rejected. In essence, some Army Aviation units are forced to operate in a system without adequate equipment. Army Aviation units were forced to collocate or commute daily to Air Force units which had CAFMS terminals to input and extract mission information necessary to fly in theater airspace.

LESSON(S): CAFMS equipment must be supplied to Army Aerial Exploitation and fixed-wing units which must comply with the system. Develop a new system which will incorporate the Army units which fly in airspace above coordination altitude.

Table of Contents
Chapter 3: Interoperability, Part 1
Chapter 4: Interface Control Unit (ICU)