Military

LESSON(S): The Army must ensure adequate circuitry and communications security between echelons of command, both joint and combined, thereby enhancing the rapid dissemination of intelligence information.

TOPIC: Joint Intelligence Information Exchange.

DISCUSSION: Doctrine does not adequately address intelligence information exchange in joint and/or combined organizations. Operations orders sometimes do not clarify priorities or command relationships among joint intelligences (J2s). Intelligence collection units must understand their taskings and understand which J2 or G2s have priority of collection effort. The assumption should be made that a Joint Intelligence Task Force must be formed early to pull together the intelligence picture. Contingency plans (CONPLANs) and operation plans (OPLANs) should address this matter and modify intelligence structures to make implementation easy. Clarity of intelligence C2 is critical to the effectiveness of this task force. The Joint Intelligence Task Force must pull together the collection and production activities of the following:

LESSON(S): In joint and combined operations, there must be a central command to pull together and maintain an accurate, up-to-date intelligence picture.

TOPIC: Data-Link Architecture Employment.

DISCUSSION: The data-link architecture was theoretically sound, but not always tactically sound. For example, Class I Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) terminals, using the Interim JTIDS Message Specification (IJMS) for jam-resistant data communications, were minimally employed by capable units. Although all participants in the interface were not capable of IJMS operations and others were in the process of obtaining an IJMS capability, the initial capability to exercise this very important option existed, but had not been adequately exploited. The plan to implement the IJMS option in the "D-DAY" configuration with available equipment had been discussed, but basically had not progressed beyond the discussion stage. As more required equipment arrived in-theater, it was introduced into the architecture piecemeal without an overall plan. Communications limitations (primarily high frequency (HF)) for data link and voice between ground and seaborne platforms and airborne platforms were degraded by atmospheric conditions, physical location of surface elements and a host of other factors. The automatic radio relay equipment (AUTOCAT) capability was expedited for Operation DESERT STORM and was used as a radio relay (U.S. Air Force EC-130 aircraft (VOLANT SOLO), Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) KE-3, RSAF E-3) when required. Although an interface plan may meet the necessary technical requirements and "should work," there are many factors outside the theoretical limits of equipment that impact the architecture. Taken separately, these factors may have minimal impact, but, in combination, they detract significantly from link performance of communications capabilities, equipment limitations, and threat assessment. Sound, in-depth planning and control by the Interface Control Unit (ICU) are absolutely imperative and should be continually provided as the interface evolves and matures.

LESSON(S): Jam-resistant data-link operations must be exploited whenever possible. Planning must be conducted to rapidly and effectively integrate additional equipment into the architecture. Also, reconfiguration and relocation of ground communications and antenna systems must be explored to `improve reliability of data and voice communications between surface and airborne platforms. Finally, the radio relay (AUTOCAT) capability must be more fully exploited.

TOPIC: Communications Plan.

DISCUSSION: The communications plan as published in Operation DESERT SHIELD monthly special instructions (SPINs) was comprehensive, yet contained potential conflicts between data and voice frequencies and was extremely cumbersome to use. The entire communications plan was contained in the Operation DESERT SHIELD SPINs, but users had to leaf through or reference several pages to correlate required information, i.e., frequency, TADIL code, use, etc. Again, the information was there, but needed to be reorganized in an easier to use format to eliminate confusion by the user. Voice and data frequencies were basically deconflicted, but without considerable time-consuming research through the communications plan, users could select frequencies that did conflict, increasing the potential for system degradation and equipment failure. LESSON(S): The communications plan needs to be reorganized with input from the user and concentration on user friendliness.

TOPIC: Range Extension.

DISCUSSION: Range extension communications assets in the division and corps are inadequate. The ranges/distances covered and the speed of movement reinforces the AirLand Operations requirements for range extension and the ability to perform C2 on the move. Extensive use was made of multichannel satellite, single-channel satellite, single-channel HF, and multichannel Tropospheric Scatter Path (TROPO) systems. These assets were over and above what the tables of organization and equipment (TOEs) for division and corps now have. Also, the mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) system mounted on High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) was found to be capable of keeping up with fast-moving formations--much better than earlier systems.

LESSON(S): Relook the TOE of divisions and corps to consider the requirement for range extensions communications assets. This should be done as a part of organizational considerations in developing air and land operations force structure.

TOPIC: High Frequency (HF).

DISCUSSION: HF communications for voice and data were difficult throughout the region. The distances involved, the types of terrain to negotiate, atmospheric conditions, antenna site selection and other factors combined to make HF communications for voice and data extremely difficult. The Interface Control Unit (ICU) cell used a number of different types of HF radios and antenna configurations.

During operations there was a dependence on HF communications, either voice, data or both, to maintain connectivity within the data interface. Stations that were capable of it were tasked to simulcast on ultra high frequency (UHF), HF, and JTID S Class I terminals in an effort to get communications redundancy into the data links.

This redundant approach worked. Both UHF and the JTID S Class I operations worked well for line-of-sight operations. Operations that were conducted out of line-of-sight had to be accomplished by HF means.

LESSON(S): All participants in voice and data nets must expend the effort and take all the precautions necessary to enhance successful HF voice and data transmission and reception. They must:

TOPIC: Precedence Allocation.

DISCUSSION: Precedence allocation within the tactical circuit-switched network was excessive and resulted in unacceptable call completion rates. JCS Pub 6-05.7 tactical telephone subscriber precedence allocation criteria was not followed by the components. JCS Pub 6-05.7, Page 34-I, lists the following precedence allocation criteria as a guideline:

During the early stages of the Operation, a review of circuit switch traffic-metering reports indicated that precedence abuse was prevalent throughout the entire theater. The criteria listed above was adopted as policy and disseminated to all component System Control Stations (SYSCONSs) via message for review and enforcement. A subsequent review of traffic metering indicated that precedence allocation was still excessive. The determination was made that the only subscriber in the network that would be authorized the FLASH Override precedence would be the Commander in Chief (CINC). This decision then became policy and was transmitted via message to component Chiefs of Staff for review and enforcement.

This problem was further compounded by the Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) Preaffiliation List precedence allocation. The MSE software, initially brought into the area of responsibility (AOR), had excessively high subscriber precedence authorizations. At times, high precedence MSE calls dominated the MSE and joint tactical communications (TRI-TAC) gateways. In several instances, high precedence MSE calls also dominated the TRI-TAC gateways into the theater and direct support maintenance (DSM) networks. 

Lastly, this problem was compounded by the fact that there currently is not a mechanism that allows an MSE Preaffiliation List to be modified in theater in a timely manner. A new list had to be developed in CONUS and shipped to the AOR which resulted in a delay in achieving the desired theater call completion rates. As with D SN access, precedence allocation is not an unlimited resource. Trunk group cluster sizing and precedence allocation must go hand in hand. The G6 and 16 Staff Officer is charged with the validation of subscriber requirements, a subset being precedence authorization. He must coordinate closely with the network manager to ensure that subscriber precedence does not adversely affect the circuit switch network's overall performance.

LESSON(S): Precedence allocation, throughout the entire theater, must be closely monitored and managed at the Theater level. Current precedence allocation criteria, as listed in JCS PUB 6-05.7, is not stringent enough in a real-world hostile environment.

Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Command and Control (C2)
Chapter 3: Interoperability