COUNTERDRUG LESSONS
The current trend in DLEA requests for support center on ground, area and point reconnaissance. Specific taskings, however, vary based on DLEA requirements. If you are in a light infantry, scout, engineer or military intelligence unit the following observations should be of special interest.
The Joint Uniform Lessons Learned (JULLS) format is used to present the following observations. CALL's success in producing CD lessons depend entirely on the accurate and timely after action reports (AARs) submitted by your unit. The more detailed your reports, the better our product.
TOPIC: Command and Control of CD Operations.
DISCUSSION: A question commonly asked by Army force engaged in CD operations is "Who is in charge?" The answer is that the military is not. The Army will always be in support of DLEAs and will never conduct independent CD ground operations. The Army commanders role is to advise the DLEA commander in the best use of military assets. Care must be taken by the military commander to not overstep his bounds.
LESSON(S): Military leaders need to understand the limitations of their role in support of CD operations. Military personnel will never command a CD operation and will always be subordinate to a DLEA. DLEAs resent the implication that DoD can perform law enforcement missions better than they can.
TOPIC: Measures of Success
DISCUSSION: The success or failure of a particular operation, and the part the Army plays in that operation, is controlled by the DLEA, not the military. Most DLEAs measure their success quantitatively (number of plants, pounds, street value of drugs seized, etc.) and not by the quality of the execution or training benefit.
LESSON(S): Military success should not be measured by "body count," but rather by the quality of the missions as it relates to the unit Mission Essential Task List (METL). Another measure of success is the payoff gained from the military support and assistance provided to the DLEA. For example: U.S. Customs doubled the amount of cargo inspected; U.S. Border Patrol increased its ability to observe known points of entry.
TOPIC: Establishing relations with local DLEAs.
DISCUSSION: Although single agency operations have been successful, combined agency task forces have had greater success. Establishing a close working relationship with the local DLEA facilitates current and future operations. Since most DLEAs are uncomfortable in dealing with strangers, the principle of habitual association is very real and should be adhered. DLEAs also have a much shorter chain of command and expect the military liaison officer (LNO) to make on the spot decisions. LNOs who have to constantly refer to their commanders for decisions lose credibility.
LESSON(S): Division and brigade staffs must establish a CD cell within the G-3/S-3 section to handle CD mission requests. The personnel assigned must be long term and must be able to answer questions for the commander. When discussing CD support with DLEA personnel, ensure they understand your timeline and the processes involved to obtain military support.
TOPIC: Interagency Training.
DISCUSSION: Training soldiers and DLEA personnel prior to a CD operation is a must. Combined task forces normally use a mix of military and civilian equipment and procedures. Cross training not only ensures smooth operations but also develops trust and confidence between military and civilian counterparts. Training may include airmobile procedures (e.g., rappelling), use of DLEA radios, M-16 marksmanship, and land navigation.
LESSON(S): Units must plan and conduct interagency training. This should include briefings on soldiers' legal responsibilities (most importantly ROE and RUF certification), intelligence as it applies to the mission, communications and weapons training, air crew training (if necessary for aerial spotters), and videos or slides of past operations.
TOPIC: Interagency Planning.
DISCUSSION: Coordinated planning needs to be conducted by the DLEA and the military unit participating in CD operations. This total operation concept allows both agencies to provide input on each others capabilities and limitations. DLEAs routinely act on very timely and perishable information that precludes the detailed planning with which military leaders are most comfortable.
LESSON(S): Military commanders involved in CD operations must become familiar with DLEA methods. The military must recognize and accept that they are not in charge and that military planning methods do not fit every situation. In depth contingency plans and well rehearsed battle drills normally lessen the impact of "knee jerk" operations.
TOPIC: Interagency Communication.
DISCUSSION: In almost every case, military and DLEA communication systems are non-compatible. This non-compatability can become critical, especially when military aircraft are supporting CD operations. Some military units have found it necessary to locally purchase standard law enforcement radios to facilitate communications. Federal DLEAs normally have a contingency fund to purchase additional radios if the mission requires it. Some local and state DLEAs have also purchased radios for military units, from funds obtained during drug busts.
LESSON(S): Military units and DLEAs need to have a standardized communications equipment available for use during CD operations. In an operation where standard military equipment is replaced or supplemented by non-standard items, operators must be given enough training to become proficient with the non-standard equipment.
TOPIC: ROE and RUF Training
DISCUSSION: The Justice Department and most Judge Advocate General (JAG) officers view ROE and RUF as the most critical part of premission training. Military involvement in support of CD operations has yet to be challanged in court, however, because drug cartels have the best lawyers that money can buy, it is just a matter of time before a test case is found. To ensure that soldiers participating in CD missions fully understand ROE and RUF some units are giving written exams which are scored prior to the mission.
LESSON(S): Soldiers must receive a briefing by JAG officers regrading ROE and RUF. They must be absolutley clear on how to interpret ROE and RUF and under what circumstances they apply. Written guidance and briefbacks are ways of ensuring soldiers understand their roles.
TOPIC: Maintaining Soldier Proficiency
DISCUSSION: As outlined in FM 25-100/101, operational efficiency can be enhanced through the performance of defined tasks executed to standard. By SECDEF directive, commanders cannot support CD operations to the detriment of their unit readiness. Although there are some specific CD tasks in which soldiers must become proficient (e.g., use of civilian radios and procedures), most support requests call for tasks that soldiers already know. Unit commanders actively involved in CD missions have identified training opportunities that furnish support required by DLEAs while simultaneously enhancing their unit readiness. They accomplished this by improving proficiency in tasks that are readily transferable to other missions (e.g., reconnaissance, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), and combat engineering support).
LESSON(S): Proactive commanders can selectively involve specific units in CD operations that will enhance soldier proficiency.
TOPIC: IPB Process
DISCUSSION: Although the IPB process is being used successfully in CD operations, unit S-2s and commanders must be careful not to over emphasize it on initial contact with DLEAs. Some units have found it useful to add a peice of the process with every mission until a clear picture of the area of operation (AO) is obtained. Once the DLEA sees how beneficial the IPB process is they normally incorporate it into their planning.
Some units use target folders to consolidate all information, photos, and reports on targets obtained during the IPB process. For example geography and hydrology, exposure to sun, and growing season take on added significance when templating an AO for marijuana erradication missions.
LESSON(S): Commanders should work towards establishing a minimum requirement of an intelligence estimate with Essential Elements of Information (EEI) and Named Areas of Interest (NAI) from DLEAs prior to the start of a mission. Do not alienate DLEAs by over emphasizing the IPB process intially. Since the majority of missions are repeated, intelligence summaries should also be developed.
TOPIC: Record Keeping Techniques.
DISCUSSION: Record keeping is vital. Some commands have found that a case file system, similar to the one used by Criminal Investigation Commands, is the best way to handle and manage information on CD operations. A written request from a DLEA is important because it confirms their desire to receive support and clarifies what they what. However, waiting for a written request before taking action may be detrimental to rapid response times. Some commands have found it beneficial to develop a support request template which they forward to the DLEAs, who simply retype and return them. This has two advantages. First, the unit can get legal input on how the request should be written and, second, it speeds up the request.
LESSON(S): Establish a case file system to track CD operations. Include written request templates that can easily be adjusted to fit the particular operation. These samples must be formulated with the help of the JAG to ensure all legal issues have been addressed. Military commands may receive a lot of classified CD information that does not pertain to their AO. Information not relating to the AO should be destroyed to avoid storage and security problems.
TOPIC: Impact of DoD resources on CD mission.
DISCUSSION: DoD resources can have a dramatic impact on the National CD mission. Units should not let bureaucratic inertia or resistance discourage them from finding ways to help. CD staff officers waiting for requests from DLEAs may be disappointed. Military capabilities have to be sold to many DLEAs which, historically, are wary of outsiders. Remember that common sense and National intent must guide all CD actions.
The military can also provide some effort to demand reduction. MACOM CD offices have funds that can be used to participate in community and school anti-drug programs. These programs have a tremendous impact on grade school through high school students who are often targeted by drug pushers.
LESSON(S): The military must find innovative ways to bring its resources to bear on the CD problem. Units must be proactive in the area of CD operations. The precedents and doctrine that guide DoD activity is in flux and, therefore, units must constantly explore new ways to use their assets in support of the CD mission. Emphasize both supply and demand reduction activities.
TOPIC: Establishing Credibility with DLEAs
DISCUSSION: It is very important that military units establish credibility early with DLEAs. The military CD coordinator represents the entire military when he makes contact with the DLEA. For this reason, it is important that he be aware of what the DoD can and cannot do in CD support. When military units offer support to a DLEA, the DLEA generally assumes that the unit can deliver it the next day. Ensure the DLEA understands military timelines to obtain mission support approval. Units can decrease this timeline by streamlining staff procedures. Telephonic coordination, followed by message traffic, is the norm.
LESSON(S): Units must know their capabilities and limitations when coordinating CD operations with DLEAs. Units must streamline staff procedures in order to provide timely support. Better that a unit successfully provide something small, on schedule, than to fall short on a complex support attempt.
TOPIC: Publicity of CD Operations
DISCUSSION: DLEAs conducting the CD operation always take the lead in determining the public affairs plan. They conduct all interface with the various media. Well meaning Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) are often anxious to get their unit in the headlines. This approach often leads to alienation of the supported DLEA. Historically, when the mission is complete and successful, the DLEA will provide sufficient praise to the military for its support. DLEA praise is much more valuable than self praise. A low profile in CD operations has two benefits; first, it provides Operational Security (OPSEC), which increases the success of the mission. Second, it demonstrates to the DLEA that the DoD can be trusted. It reinforces the point that using DoD resources is in the DLEA's best interest and that DoD does not want to "steal the show."
LESSON(S): DLEA PAOs have the lead in all CD operations. Military PAOs need to refrain from seeking immediate benefit. Maintaining a low profile in CD operations earns DLEA respect. Let the DLEA report all good news.
Table
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Threat
Conclusion
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