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NARRATIVE, Part 4

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LESSONS LEARNED Light Infantry Infiltration vs. a Mechanized Enemy

Rockcastle glared and said, "I know the intent, Major, but let me offer you something else." He went on to recommend a combined attack using the stealth of his battalion and the shock and mobility of the mech task force. Pointing to his map, he showed Batista two major trails that his battalion could secure which would allow the counterattack to be executed earlier.

LESSONS LEARNED Use of Limited Visibility

To do this, however, he needed limited visibility to infiltrate the enemy's positions and cover 1-91's movement to the rear. The timing of the attack was critical, Rockcastle explained. "When we start our attack from the rear and flanks of the enemy, 1-91 will need to start its advance up the trails. If you give 1-91 the engineer company, it will enhance their mobility efforts since they've worked together before. That allows us to concentrate on the enemy's destruction once both task forces have passed through." Batista, seeing the merit of the light infantry LTC's wisdom, went off to secure the brigade commander's sanction.

LESSONS LEARNED Combat Multiplier of a Synchronized Light and Heavy Fight

Madison liked the idea of a combined attack because it would serve as a combat multiplier for the whole brigade. By not waiting for the light battalion to completely clear the Steinwald, Madison could unleash the brigade's mechanized Sunday punch sooner, setting the stage for the Division counterattack. As the brigade staff began its critical coordination for the plan's execution, the light battalion prepared for its unique operation.

LESSONS LEARNED Early Reconnaissance

When Rockcastle confirmed that COL Madison approved the infiltration, he realized that he had less than twenty four hours to conduct the critical reconnaissance. He immediately gathered his scout platoon and issued orders. He told them to begin movement now and identify holes in the enemy's hasty defense that the companies could move through so they could be in good assault positions to destroy the enemy that blocked the critical trail network. The scout platoon was the crucial ingredient needed for the success of the whole battalion. He had to hear from them as soon as they found the routes.

LESSONS LEARNED Rehearsals

After receiving the battalion order, the rifle company commanders began their own troop leading procedures. Orders were issued, leader's reconnaissance begun, ammunition distributed, weapons cleaned, class I consumed and, most importantly, a leader's precombat inspection conducted. The PCI ensured that weapons were ready, crew served ammunition was cross leveled, AT-4s were received and that the individual soldiers knew their responsibility. Once completed, platoons and companies conducted rehearsals of the movement and actions on the objective and then took their last opportunity to get some rest before LD time.

Based upon his discussion with the commander of TF 1-10 and CPT Brady, the tank company commander that did the link up with 2-74 IN(LT) during the first battle, COL Madison decided to conduct a leader's rehearsal. He included all the key players of 2-74 and 1-91. As they walked through the operation, COL Madison clarified some key points, but most importantly he saw that the leaders of each battalion began to trust each other and started to work as a team. He knew this would reduce some of the unfamiliarity that caused problems during the initial fight.

As TF 1-91 IN and TF 1-10 AR were relieved by the Division Cavalry Squadron, 2-74 IN(LT) began their infiltration. The light battalion scouts had found excellent routes that allowed the companies several options to get to their assault positions. This operation gave 2-14 the advantage of attacking on ground they knew from the initial defense. Once in the assault positions, many squads realized they would soon fight to regain positions they once occupied. Once TF 1-01 IN and 2-74 IN(LT) were in position, the only thing left to do was wait for the final order from brigade for the attack.

When in position, LTC Rockcastle made some slight modifications to the battalion plan. Capitalizing on information from the scouts, he diverted C Company from the reserve and issued orders for them to attack and destroy the enemy in the vicinity of the battalion's first TOC site. Based on the scouts' reports, he was sure this was a headquarters and by hitting their command and control he knew his units would be more effective.

COL Madison checked his watch for the fifth time in as many minutes. With H-hour eight minutes away, he could feel the tension build within himself. He knew the success of the operation hinged on surprise, and surprise hinged on the listening silence he'd imposed. Knowing this did not erase the urge to call each battalion commander to verify that their units were ready for the attack. In order to guarantee that the attacks of the mechanized and light infantry battalions began simultaneously, he had given orders to initiate the attack when the code word, "WHITE SNAKE", broke the listening silence of the brigade net. If this code word had not been rescinded by H-hour, the mech battalion commander was to wait two minutes, then contact the light battalion commander and begin the attack without the brigade initiation.

COL Madison checked his watch one last time and verified H-hour. He looked at MAJ Batista and said, "Here we go Bob." Squeezing the hand mike and waiting for the beep of the secure net he ordered, "WHITE SNAKE, over." Immediately the familiar voice of the mech battalion commander responded, "Wilco."

COL Madison waited impatiently for LTC Rockcastle's voice. The seconds seemed like hours, and Madison could feel the blood pounding at his temples. He muttered to no one in particular, "Come on...Come on," but his coaxing didn't brighten the call light on the radio.

LESSONS LEARNED Effects of Terrain on Radio Nets Commo Rehearsal

Commo with the light battalion during the defense had been one of the strong points of the operation. He knew that retrans was needed for the brigade A & L net, but the command net was always crystal clear. Now his TAC was even closer to the FLOT, so why didn't Rockcastle respond. Deciding to try again he depressed the transmit button and said using only the 2-74 commander's call sign, "J34 execute WHITE SNAKE, over."

Rockcastle's RTO handed him the mike and said, "Hey, sir, the old man wants you." Rockcastle, annoyed by the distraction as the attack started, grabbed the mike, pushed to talk and said, "This is J34, we are just starting WHITE SNAKE, over." Just as he released the mike, he again heard COL Madison calling for him. Realizing that the PRC-77 he brought forward did not have the range to reach COL Madison at the TAC, he called the mech battalion commander. After a quick sitrep, the mech commander said he would continue to relay to Madison.

As the battle to secure the routes continued, LTC Rockcastle was glad he had altered C Company's mission. Their attack on what turned out to be a regimental headquarters destroyed the command and control of the enemy's fight. The massive enemy artillery experienced during the initial defense now was reduced to sporadic 120mm mortar fire. Without the MRR's command and control, the enemy' s battalions were isolated which allowed 2-74 to have a one-on-one fight.

LESSONS LEARNED AT-4 Used to Create Trench Entry Point

The AT-4's were not only effective destroying enemy light armor from the flanks and rear but assisted the squads and platoons in gaining a point of entry into the enemy trenches. The scouts, having completed their route recon, confirmed the effectiveness of the high angle fire from the attached 4.2" mortar platoon. This fire reinforced the scout's screen which helped isolate 2-74's objective.

LESSONS LEARNED Route Clearing After Effects of Artillery in Forest

The simultaneous attack by TF 1-91 didn't go as fast as desired. The clearing effort took a great deal of time as the engineers pushed through the trails clearing blowdown, mines, and other obstacles while the lead mech company provided security. TF 1-91's scouts picked their way ahead of the clearing operation in an effort to linkup with 2-74's attackers.

LESSONS LEARNED Dismounted Identification

SGT Adams, third platoon, A/2-74 IN(LT) knew his squad had a critical job. They were designated as the unit to make contact with the mech battalion scouts. They had all been able to spend time with the mech scout platoon during the rehearsal. The familiarity they gained on the Bradley would keep them from an unnecessary AT-4 engagement. To identify themselves as friendly, the light battalion had issued the platoon bright orange road guard vests. Each member of the platoon had taped the vest to his uniform and then rolled it up to conceal it during the attack.

SGT Adams broke radio contact with his platoon leader. The sound of the approaching M3s confirmed the LT's message. Adams signaled his men and gave the warning order to be prepared to expose their vests. Peering into the woods beyond the squad, he saw the Bradley. Dropping his vest, he made his way to the track where he met the scout platoon leader similarly clad. After the exchange of information, the scout platoon was guided into positions marking the trails to assist the passage of 1-91. The command and control initiatives and the thorough rehearsals had proven themselves. Once the passage of the mech and armor task forces was complete, Rockcastle and 2-74 turned their attention to the systematic clearing of the Steinwald.

As the battalion completed its clearing mission, CSM Burnham and LTC Rockcastle were drawn together at the hasty CP. Starting to compare notes on the operation, the CSM shared stories of heroism and bravery that he had witnessed and stated his amazement at the intensity of the combat heavy brigade's operations. Rockcastle agreed and said he was elated as he witnessed the tanks of the 1st Brigade rocket out of sight continuing the attack to the northeast. As the battalion eliminated the final pockets of resistance in the Steinwald, they reflected on the battle. The old man said that it had been a hell of a price to pay to learn the capabilities and limitations of mixing light and heavy forces.

MAJ Batista coming out of the establishing TOC said, "Hey, Sir, good news, the division commander is enroute and wants a briefing on how we made out mixing heavy and light in our brigade." "Oh great! Bob, get your map and ops overlay and meet me in that house. Be prepared to do some brainstorming when you get there." To organize his thoughts, COL Madison turned back to his days when he was an OC at the NTC.

Listing the seven battlefield operating systems, he began to outline the points he would make with the General. A solid IPB effort had supplied the point of employment for the light battalion. Additionally, he was impressed with the information the light battalion scouts gained; however, time did not allow him to utilize the increased capability of their long range patrolling.

Under maneuver, Batista recommended discussing defensive terrain selection, light maneuverability and their individual selection of fighting positions inside versus on the outskirts of the woodline.

Madison knew he had to talk about TACFIRE under fire support and the problems the light battalion's voice net created. He would also point out the successful cross-attachment of the 4.2 mortar platoon and the ad hoc fire support team.

Madison would have to explain the drain that 2-74 made on the brigade's engineers. Their style of defense forced the priority of work to concentrate on counter-mobility, yet the BDU armor of the light infantry required a strong effort on survivability. Moreover, he couldn't resist pointing out the poor quality of the E-tool as a fighting position digger.

Madison paused as his thoughts transitioned to CSS. Immediately surfacing in his mind were the numerous shortcomings involving transportation and evacuation. These were overshadowed by the inability to resupply 60mm and 81mm mortar rounds from heavy division stocks. He also would point out in terms of classes IV and V the light battalion required throughput distribution to the obstacle locations. He knew that Class IX resupply and maintenance support would be an increasing problem as the light battalion exhausted its PLL. Host nation support had been a lifesaver, but he would have to question the General if it would be as readily available in the future.

After thirty some minutes of brainstorming, Madison considered the points under command and control. He decided to highlight the importance of exchanging liaisons, SOPs, and SOIs. He also wanted to emphasize the criticality of understanding terminology and would relive the story of the successful road guard linkup.

Just as Madison concluded his initial thoughts, SGM Cosby called the room to attention. Madison turned and came to his feet and the General entered and asked, "Well, 1st Brigade, how did it go with the light guys?"

Table of Contents
Narrative, Part 3