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Chapter 6

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Historically, soldiers operate on the battlefield for prolonged periods of time without sleep. Some soldiers have exhausting physical demands, some have exhausting mental demands, many have both. Continuous operations (CONOPS) provides only brief opportunities for sleep. Sleep opportunities that occur may be scattered throughout the day or night. Sustained operations (SUSOPS) provides no opportunity for sleep. CONOPS or SUSOPS will have a significant affect on combat operations.

Historical Perspective

The men of the 31st Regimental Combat Team on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir in Korea had been under attack for virtually 80 straight hours by the Chinese army. At dawn on 1 December 1950, the commander, LTC Don Faith, and his staff decided on a breakout attempt to the south. The enemy attacks, sub-zero weather, and the shortage of food and ammunition combined to create a situation where the officers and men were literally staggering with mental and physical fatigue.

Partly as a result of this fatigue, the breakout plans were poorly prepared and disseminated. Many officers and men were not even informed that a break-out was being attempted until they saw the trucks forming up. Soldiers began to panic. Equipment and supplies were abandoned. Command and control was lost virtually from the start. As enemy fire and road blocks halted the trucks moving south, it became a situation of every man for himself. Most men who broke through the surrounding enemy forces kept going without a thought for their fellow soldiers left behind.

Of some 1000 men, almost 30% were killed or captured. Normally brave and strong soldiers could not stand the inhuman stress of the continuous operations.

(Taken from Roy Appleman, East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950)

Lessons Learned

• Commanders must demand that key leaders discipline themselves to obtain a minimum level of rest. Command and control elements are the first to feel the effects of CONOPS. Judgment abilities degrade more rapidly than physical strength and endurance. Judgment errors begin to appear as early as 18 hours without rest.

• The following is a guideline of daily minimum sleep requirements and its impact on tactical operations:

  • Ensure all soldiers receive a minimum of 4 hours of uninterrupted sleep or 5 hours of interrupted sleep per day (24 hrs). This is the minimum requirement for sustained operations. Sleep periods are preferably between 2400 and 0600 hrs.

  • Priority for sleep should go to those whose judgement and decisionmaking are critical to mission accomplishment.

  Use drills. Train individuals on tasks to the point where they over-learn the job. Repeatedly train crews and platoons until battle drills become instinctive. The higher the state of training going into CONOPS, the longer performance deterioration can be "staved off."

  Identify and train back-up personnel. Individual job rotation gives soldiers opportunity for rest without degrading the mission.

  Develop a plan for rotation of soldiers between demanding and non-demanding tasks.

  High morale, unit cohesion, and strong leadership reduce the adverse effects of CONOPS.

  Give consideration to soldiers who prefer to work during a specific timeframe. Owls work better at night and larks work well during the day.

TIME MANAGEMENT

Historically, units in combat and training have two enemies: the Threat and time. Time is the greater challenge. At the JRTC, time management continues to plague all levels of task force operations.

Lessons Learned

• Leaders must give the greatest amount of available time to subordinate leaders. Use no more than 1/3 of the available time for planning and preparation of the order. Provide no less than 2/3 of the available time for subordinate units to prepare for combat.

• Prioritize critical tasks and use available time to concentrate on those tasks.

• Use daylight hours for preparation of operations. Preparation (i.e., selection of defensive positions, inspection of soldiers, reconnaissance, etc.) requires more visibility than execution or planning.

• Time available dictates the amount of detail allowed in planning.

• Reverse planning is an indispensable technique for time management. Begin with the time an event must take place (i.e., LD time) and estimate the time each prior event will take.

• Attachments and OPCON units require lead time to conduct operations to support the task force (i.e., time to develop fire support plans or emplace obstacles to support the scheme of maneuver). Commanders and staff officers must make these needs known and integrate these times into the task force plan.

USE OF DOCTRINAL TERMS

Confusion on the battlefield can result from misunderstanding doctrinal terms. Terminology problems result from two areas:

1. Individual training shortfalls. Individual soldiers and commanders do not know the definition of terms or their definition has been modified by past experience.

2. Use of non-standard terms in combined arms operations. Task force level operations magnify the terminology problem. Combat/combat support/combat service support units work together for a common mission. However, the soldiers of the task force use vocabulary foreign to other soldiers of the same task force. Unique meanings to the same terms may cause confusion and error.

A Historical Perspective

The officers and men on both sides of the Battle of Chickamauga (19-20 September 1863) suffered heavily during the first day of the fight. General Rosecrans' Union Army of the Cumberland had spent the night creating fortifications in preparation for renewed Confederate attacks.

A staff officer riding along the center of the Union line saw what he thought was a division-wide gap between the divisions of Generals Reynolds and Wood. In reality, General Brannan's division was in the "gap," hidden in the woods. The staff officer hurriedly rode to Rosecrans' headquarters and reported what he had seen.

General Rosecrans sent an order for Wood to "close up on" Reynolds. General Wood, reading the order and knowing that Brannan's division was on his left, interpreted the order to mean move out of line and get behind Reynolds. Wood pulled his men off line and thereby created a real gap in the line.

By coincidence, several Confederate divisions assaulted that part of the line. The Confederate soldiers poured through the gap and routed the Union forces.

A misunderstood term in a hasty order resulted in a grave misunderstanding at a critical point in the battle which lead to a Union defeat.

(Taken from: Glenn Tucker, Chickamauga: Bloody Battle in the West, pp. 253-259)

Lessons Learned

• Base SOPs on FM 101-5-1, not on local terminology. Do not make up terms for tactical operations.

• During the preparation of combined arms training, pay special attention to terms that are used. Enforce the use of FM 101-5-1 to standardize the use of terms.

• Analyze task organization of a task force for support relationships and implied missions.

• Require subordinates and task force members to conduct detailed brief backs in their own words. Pay special attention to attachments and OPCON units as different branches speak different languages.

• During the preparation and execution of a mission, observe unit performance to see if they are doing what was ordered. If they are not, the reason could be a misunderstood term.

• During the After Action Review, concentrate part of the discussion on clarity and understanding of the written and verbal communications.

• Combined arms training must take place during professional development programs in the classroom as well as during field exercises. Combat arms soldiers can provide professional development classes to the supporting arms. Likewise, Combat Service Support and Combat Support units need to share information on the nature of their operations.

Table of Contents

Chapter 5: Combat Service Support

Chapter 7: NCO Corner