Military

• The scout platoon is best suited and trained for the development of combat information.

• The scout platoon, however, is a small unit with a very large mission. The following elements are available to the battalion commander to augment the intelligence collection effort:

  • Artillery forward observers and Combat Observation and Laser Teams (COLT).

  • Stinger Teams.

  • Engineers can evaluate the use of terrain and location of obstacles.

  • Ground surveillance radars and remote sensors.

  • Aircraft, both Army and Air Force.

  • Patrols from organic rifle companies.

  Note: Soldiers conducting reconnaissance patrols must understand they are collecting information and are not conducting combat patrols.

• Night vision devices on organic weapons can be used to supplement the reconnaissance effort.

• Reconnaissance assets must continually assess the area of operations (AO) in light of the mission that the battalion must accomplish.

• Reconnaissance must confirm and feed intel to support the decision support template.

• Commanders must reconfigure their assets to provide sufficient communications to reconnaissance elements.

• The reconnaissance effort is planned and controlled by the S2. The key to making reconnaissance efforts effective is the briefing the S2 gives the reconnaissance assets. Tell them exactly:

  • what you want them to do,

  • where you want them to go and

  • what intel you want them to provide.

SECURITY

Comprised of combat arms, combat support, and combat service support units, the non-mechanized battalion operating in a non-linear, low intensity battlefield faces unique security problems.

Commanders can provide security to the force by countering the enemy's reconnaissance efforts and maintaining aggressive local security.

Countering Enemy Reconnaissance

Enemy units place high value on reconnaissance to identify the location, size and intention of the friendly forces. To protect the force and keep the enemy off balance, a battalion commander must find the enemy reconnaissance effort and kill it.

A tool to finding the enemy's reconnaissance effort is the counter-reconnaissance and surveillance plan.

Lessons Learned

• The S2 plans and executes the counter-reconnaissance plan in coordination with the S3 and the entire staff. The S2 cannot delegate the security effort to the companies. A centralized counter-reconnaissance plan is critical to success.

• Detect enemy reconnaissance efforts by employing multiple security elements and systems to provide depth to the counter-reconnaissance effort. Place more than one surveillance asset on each expected enemy avenue of approach. For example, cover an avenue of approach with an OP and back it up with a Ground Surveillance Radar. This provides redundancy, capitalizes on the strengths of each system, and reduces the possibility of the enemy by-passing a single system without being detected.

• Avoid having two reconnaissance patrols cover the same area. False reports and fratricide may result.

• Once an enemy reconnaissance element is located, act quickly to kill it. This may be accomplished through observed fires, attack helicopters, or a counter-reconnaissance combat patrol on-call for that mission.

• Avoid using scouts to perform counter-reconnaissance combat patrols since it risks the loss of this unique and highly trained asset.

Historical Example

A counter-reconnaissance force used in Vietnam employed three to five lift helicopters, two to four Cobras, and an infantry platoon on strip alert. When the battalion observed enemy reconnaissance elements, the reaction force, working as a team, engaged them via an air assault with fire support from the Cobras. When the ground element either killed or forced the enemy reconnaissance to displace, the reaction force returned to the airfield and prepared for the next insertion. This technique provided intelligence, force security, and allowed the battalion to retain the initiative.

LOCAL SECURITY

Local security is comprised of effective perimeter security and aggressive patrolling in the vicinity of your position. These actions must be taken by combat support and combat service support as well as combat units.

Lessons Learned

• Be careful of task force units, including combat support and combat service support units, becoming complacent about local security due to perceived safety provided by security and reaction forces "out front."

• Ensure that individuals pick fighting positions which make the most of natural cover and concealment and offer good fields of fire. Leaders at all levels should doublecheck these locations. Once a suitable site is selected, the priority goes to concurrently digging, clearing fields of fire, and camouflaging. Overhead cover and connecting trenches are added as time permits.

• Do not allow soldiers to put up sleeping shelters adjacent to their positions. This practice negates any camouflage they put on their position.

• At least one claymore should be emplaced for each fighting position.

• Require each platoon to emplace one listening post no less than 100 meters to their front and an ambush site 300-500 meters forward.

• Identify, by SOP, the type security you want for a specific circumstance. This will tell soldiers exact requirements and will provide a basis for inspecting local security. For example, during a halt in a road march, the SOP may state that every other soldier will face in opposite directions with weapons ready. This SOP is easy to implement and enforce.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Chapter 2: Maneuver