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Problem: Continuous employment of scarce engineer assets during defensive preparation is difficult to accomplish. Bulldozers are often lost, out of fuel, or broken down within the task force area of operation. Units site obstacles poorly, and don't cover them by fire. In general, the more engineer work required, the less effective that engineer work is. The problems are primarily due to inadequate engineer guidance by the task force commander and minimal coordination between company teams and engineers.

Successful Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

• Mass engineer headquarters forward
  Habitually employ an engineer company headquarters with each committed battalion task force and involve them in the planning process. An engineer company habitually associated with the task force provides significantly better support than one not habitually associated. If this is not possible, allocate engineer company headquarters IAW the principal of mass. Too often the company engineer headquarters are too far to the rear. This leaves an overburdened platoon leader who must control a heavily augmented engineer platoon and simultaneously attempt to be the task force engineer.

  Fix responsibility for engineer effort with maneuver commanders.

  Responsibility for success or failure ultimately resides with the maneuver commander. Both engineer and maneuver elements execute engineer tasks. Regardless of who does the work, the task supports a maneuver commander's plan. The simplest method to coordinate intent, logistics support, work party security, siting, etc. is to give the mission to a maneuver company commander and assign engineer support as required.

  Jointly and physically site all engineer work

  In their hurry to continuously employ themselves many engineers emplace obstacles and fighting positions before coordinating with the commander. Conversely, many maneuver commanders delay deciding on a defensive plan or drastically change the plan so engineers waste work time. The maneuver commander must site the engineer work with the engineer present to avoid ineffective positioning. Engineers advise and then implement. Additionally, the maneuver commander must rapidly finalize his plan.

  Employ engineer execution matrices

  Engineer execution matrices and clear detailed commander's guidance, continually monitored by the TOC/command group, assures that responsibility stays fixed and receives command emphasis. Below are examples of two types of execution matrices.

Lessons Learned: Dig In - What Is Seen Is Killed

Problem: The modern battlefield is too lethal for unprotected vehicles or personnel to survive. Unless the terrain provides natural hull and hide or turret down for fighting vehicles or overhead cover for soldiers, dig in. Currently, the average task force (supported by an engineer company) digs 56 vehicle positions, of which 14 are normally effective.

Successful Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

• Especially in open terrain, survivability positions are normally more important than anti-tank ditches. A tank platoon properly dug into two step positions can destroy a battalion. As such, earth moving assets normally focus initially on survivability.

• Since infantry can dig themselves in, normally the infantry works on digging in before assisting the engineers emplace mines, etc. The engineer soldiers normally focus entirely on obstacles. Once the task force completes crew served positions with overhead cover, they reinforce the engineer soldiers emplacing obstacles to the maximum extent possible.

• Employ "basic loads" of Class IV (sandbags, pickets, etc.) with all vehicles to expedite rapidly digging in. The S4 pushes forward replacement basic loads during the transition to the defense in standard infantry platoon packages.

• Employ reverse slopes as much as possible and camouflage frontal parapets for individual/crew positions. This avoids the obvious bunker positions easily seen and destroyed by direct fire.

• Ensure all maneuver/engineer leaders and heavy equipment operators drill the correct construction of fighting vehicle positions at home station. This is an excellent NCODP, ODP, or concurrent training station.

Lessons Learned: Include breaches in All Attack Planning and Training

Problem: Task forces do not adequately plan for breaches. Task forces don't adequately recon, secure, suppress, and obscure prior to breaching. Breaching is an integral combined arms part of all attacks. As such, poorly synchronized attacks cause breaches to fail while poorly synchronized breaches cause attacks to fail.

Successful Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

• Identify the enemy weakness and then mass on it. Verify the situational template before breaching or bypassing. The recon prior to the attack or actions on contact must achieve this.

• Ensure unity of effort. Train breaching as an integral part of all attacks. Push engineers forward. Train all soldiers and units to manually breach. Designate and specify the responsibilities for the assault, breach, and support forces. Conduct a combined arms breaching rehearsal.

• Isolate the enemy weakness with terrain, obscurants, or fire.

• Recon minefields before deciding to bypass, or conduct a hasty/deliberate breach. Most threat minefields are surface laid 200-300 meter wide strips.

• Neutralize enemy fires before reducing the obstacle. Suppress with direct fire (support force), counterfire, and massed SHORAD. Mortars initiate obscuration. Secure the flanks and far side of the obstacle with infantry assault/infiltration, fire support neutralization fires, or destruction fires from an overwhelming support force.

• To reduce the lane sequentially: Recon the minefields forward edge, clear the lane, proof the lane, mark the entrance/exit/sides, then post guides and recovery assets.

Lessons Learned: NBC Defense Requires Discipline

Problem: MOPP gear obviously degrades performance, but it is not a war stopper for well-trained units.

Successful Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

• MOPP decisions, to include unmasking, should be made at the task force TOC after a thorough risk assessment. Just because a M-256 kit indicates an "all clear" in the company area does not mean it is safe to unmask. Contaminants may remain just upwind in another area.

• The Company NBC NCO should be forward with either the commander or XO. He cannot perform his battlefield duties from the field trains. This requires on-the-spot knowledge of terrain and conditions.

• Blood agents break down mask filters, rendering them ineffective. S4s must have replacement filters planned for and prepositioned for quick exchange in case of exposure.

• All units, regardless of command relationship, operating in the task force sector should monitor at least one of the TF nets for NBC warnings. The TF should issue warnings on command, A/L and fire support nets to ensure the widest dissemination.

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