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Problem: Fire plans executed at the company/team and platoon level frequently fail to reflect the brigade or task force commander's intent. The brigade FSO may or may not include targets submitted by forward observers, company and task force FSOs in the brigade fire plan. There often isn't enough time to collect target lists and fire plans from the companies, resolve duplications and redundancies, and consolidate them into a single cohesive plan at brigade.

Successful Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

• Fire planning must begin with the brigade commander's intent. Upon receipt of his intent, the brigade staff develops various courses of action and war games each one. Movement of batteries is the most important (FA) task when wargaming. Ammunition resupply is the second most important aspect. Without waiting for input from company and task force fire plans to arrive, the brigade FSO/FSCOORD must plan fires to support the critical elements of the brigade commander's plan. The FSO disseminates this plan down to the task forces. He also allocates targets, establishes cutoff times, and schedules a window for rehearsals.

• As time permits, FSOs refine the plan by applying formal fire planning techniques. Company and task force FSOs must "bubble up" their fire plans for resolution of duplication and consolidation at brigade.

Lessons Learned: Fire Support Execution Matrix--A Valuable Tool

Problem: Many commanders are unable to synchronize all fire support assets.

Successful Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

• A fire support execution matrix (FSEM), included in the brigade execution matrix, is essential to success on the battlefield. Used properly, the FSEM is a proven tool on the battlefield. The key is to scheme the fires with maneuver, both in the offense and defense.

• A critical aspect of the FSEM is it establishes responsibility for: who fires each target; series, group, etc.; when they fire; and what net they use to call. The FSEM also establishes how JAAT and/or CAS is employed.

Lessons Learned: Length of Target List

Problem: FSOs continue to submit excessively long target lists. Despite the speed at which TACFIRE can process targets and perform tactical fire direction operations, an excessive number of targets quickly overwhelms human capabilities.

Successful Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

• Target lists that consist of quality targets and not quantity are more likely to succeed. These target lists must support the commander's concept. The direct support (DS) artillery battalion commander, in concert with the brigade commander, should restrict the length of the target list to 10 to 15 targets per battalion/task force and 60 or less for the entire brigade.

• The FSCOORD should determine a cutoff time for changes to the target list and fire plan. A reasonable cut off time is five hours prior to crossing the LD or anticipated beginning of defensive operations. In situations where less than five hours are available for planning, the FSO should employ abbreviated (hasty) fire planning procedures as outlined in FM 6-20. Emergency or critically significant operational changes may still occur, but FSOs don't allow routine target list changes.

Lessons Learned: Location of FOs/FSOs

Problem: Frequently cited as one of the problems facing units on the battlefield is disagreement over the location of fire support personnel relative to their supported maneuver commanders.

Successful Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

• The tactical requirement is for the FSO to be responsive to or, in some cases, under the control of the maneuver commander he supports. The key consideration is whether his location enables him to accomplish his mission. If his primary function during a battle is to be the commander's FO, he should be as close to the maneuver commander as possible, while maintaining observation of the battle area. If his mission is to fire a series or group of planned targets as part of the overall fire plan, the FSO must observe those targets at all times and remain responsive to the maneuver commander throughout the entire battle.

• Commanders and FSOs should work together to determine the best location for the observers. They share responsibility for positioning them where they can see the battlefield and contribute to the operation's success. The FO must select observation posts and movement routes to support the maneuver commander's scheme of maneuver. The FSO must apply the factors of METT-T to determine optimal positions for his observers.

Lessons Learned: Voice/Manual Back-Up

Problem: Some units do not have procedures or criteria for determining when to switch to a manual/voice back up when TACFIRE fails. When the TACFIRE system fails, units frequently do not pass control to a mutually supporting unit (MSU) or firing battery FDC. Instead, units focus their attention on trying to fix TACFIRE. TACFIRE operators must remain aware of the battle and recognize situations where it is more efficient and effective to operate in a manual/voice mode than to work on repairing TACFIRE immediately.

Successful Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

• TACFIRE can become a casualty on the battlefield. Units should develop and train techniques and procedures to operate without it. They should establish methods to facilitate the transition from an automated, digital system of tactical and technical fire control to a backup system of manual fire control. The DS battalion and all TACFIRE subscribers must develop procedures if the digital system fails, incorporate them into their SOPs, and train to them at home station.

• All members of the gunnery team must aggressively establish and maintain adequate communications. Degradation of the communications system necessitates additional actions to communications nets.

• Back-up procedures must include a voice fire net to perform tactical fire direction if the shelter goes down and an alternate battalion FDC if the enemy destroys the entire DS battalion TOC. Fire supporters also need a voice fire support coordination net to use when the digital net becomes either too crowded or gets jammed.

• Alternate fire nets are essential for the FOs and company FSOs to use if their DMDs become inoperative.

• The fire direction officer in the battalion TACFIRE shelter must be able and ready to perform manual tactical fire direction (IAW FM 6-40) at any time. The battalion FDO can do this by using a Joint Munitions Effects Manual (JMEMs) or a Graphical Munitions Effects Table (GMET), and guidance contained in FM 6-40. He needs a range fan or range deflection protractor (RDP) to plot the target to battery/firing unit range to ensure his fire units can engage the target with the ammunition on hand. The unit TACSOP must state specific details of how the battalion will revert to voice/manual tactical fire direction. the unit needs to practice during home station training.

Lessons Learned: Effective Use of Mortars

Problem: Units don't use mortars enough during all phases of the battle.

Successful Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

• The task force commander is responsible for employment of the mortar platoon. The mortar platoon leader is the primary advisor in that regard. The platoon leader develops the fire plan for the mortars that supports the scheme of maneuver. He also positions, moves and directs the fires of the mortar platoon.

• The task force FSO is doctrinally responsible for integrating mortars into the overall fire support plan. The task force FSO must work closely with the mortar platoon leader in positioning the mortars. The task force must have a mortar displacement plan.

• One successful technique for movement of the mortar platoon is for them to travel behind a company/team, both for protection and movement control. This technique has the added benefit of providing responsive indirect fire support (especially smoke) to the company they trail.

• Another technique is to place the mortars DS to a subordinate unit for specific missions. The scout platoon in the conunter-recon role or the breach element in a mobility operation are examples.

• Consider using a limited visibility mortar fire plan on dismounted avenues and a daylight mortar fire plan on mounted avenues.

JAAT Employment

Problem: Task forces don't adequately synchronize JAATs

Successful Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

• Attack helicopter battalion observers are becoming our best shooters. They need priority of fires or direct support artillery since quick fire channels are too slow.

• CAS/JAAT works best when planned and executed by brigade. The battalion task force must still plan and recommend employment based on the battalion requirements.

• Be patient with JAAT employment. Those who wait until employment criteria is met have a higher rate of success than those who don't.

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Maneuver

Air Defense