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INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Problem: Some brigade and task force commanders are unable to achieve an appropriate combat ratio after the battle begins due mainly to their lack of knowledge about the enemy situation. This is due to the staff's failure to confirm the situation template and a lack of synchronization with other staff members who do not understand the reporting system.

Successful Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

• The IPB drives tactical planning. The S2 is a key player, but IPB is not strictly an S2 function. The IPB process requires the involvement of the commander and his entire staff. Production of event and decision support templates requires participation by the S3, FSO, ADAO and Engineer at a minimum.

• Physical reconnaissance on the ground is necessary to confirm or refute the situation template. The situation template depicts suspected positioning of enemy elements and provides a basis for where to deploy the reconnaissance elements. The recon mission is to find the enemy and report this to the commander and S2. Any and all elements of the task force or brigade can help fill in missing elements of combat information through the reporting system, SALUTE, spot reports, etc., as they execute their mission.

• The S2 should address priority intelligence requirements (PIR) during the OPORD brief. These are items of combat information that help the S2 fill in the blank pieces of the intelligence puzzle. At a minimum, the S2 must update and disseminate the situation template confirmed by reconnaissance just prior to the firepower and maneuver options. Finally, develop the decision support template to form the basis for staff planning and wargaming.

• The commander's intent is the cornerstone to the rest of the IPB staff process. The S2 finalizes his collection plan against the commander's intent. This enables him to tell the commander:

  • what the enemy force opposing them is
  • where it's located
  • what kind of terrain they can expect
  • other mission critical information

• Communicating the initial situation template during the OPORD process forces task force leaders to focus on the enemy's intent. A good technique for communicating the IPB is the use of large scale sketches to show expected enemy dispositions and actions.

• All key leaders and staff must realize that the IPB process never stops. Templates require continuous updating throughout all aspects of operational planning and execution. Notifying all key personnel of all significant changes is critical to the process. IPB is not a process separate and distinct from all the information toward answering certain questions relative to the ongoing mission.

Lessons Learned: Rapidly Recon as the First Offensive Priority

Problem: Recon is the basis for successful attacks. Eighty-three percent of units which recon effectively before deliberate attacks, win. Ninety percent of those that don't, lose. (Note: Effective recon is reporting enemy positions and obstacles in sufficient detail to confirm the IPB template by H-1.)

Effective recon takes time. To confirm the IPB template, the recon must identify (6-digit accuracy) approximately 80% of the enemy anti-tank systems. Dismounted observation posts normally provide the commander his best combat information. Recon elements must dismount to infiltrate the security zone. Scouts are recon patrols, not combat patrols, and should attempt to gain information through stealth. In general, scouts which engage the enemy don't provide intelligence, they die. Seventy-three percent of units which issue timely recon plans, attack successfully. Eighty-two percent of those that don't, fail.

Successful Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures to Maximize Recon Time

• Resupply recon assets first
  Task forces typically don't adequately resupply their scouts. As a result, several days into an operation the scouts stop their recon/screen as they run out of fuel, etc. FM 17-98 addresses all the techniques to resupply the scouts who have no dedicated LOGPACS.

  Gain/Maintain contact with the enemy

  Ideally, the task force scouts continually gain/maintain contact with the enemy. This provides the task force continual real time intelligence which speeds up the decision making process. Maintaining and gaining contact reduces susceptability to enemy deception measures.

  Rapidly issue the recon/surveillance (R/S) plan to recon assets.

  "Time is blood." Don't wait for the perfect situational template or the ideal tentative plan. Don't wait until the OPORD. Initiate recon now with minimal guidance.

  Use all recon assets (Don't overtask the scouts)

  Scouts can't do all the recon for a task force. Fifty percent of units which augment scouts to recon, win. Sixty percent of those that don't, lose. Scouts confirm the assumed weak point in the enemy defense. The task force then plans backwards to mass on this point. Task forces usually have more than two NAIs for area recon and one or more axis for route recon. As required, augment the scout platoon recon with:

  --Infantry platoons (area recon)
  --Company/Teams (route/zone recon)
  --Army aviation
  --Engineers (for technical expertise)
  --Ground surveillance radars
  

  Note: Sometimes a company/team with the scouts attached performs the recon mission.

  Provide redundant commo

  Task forces commonly lose communications with recon assets. Dedicate communications to all recon assets. Maintain communication with:

  --Jump Command Post
  --RETRANS
  --Company team with scouts attached/assigned the recon mission
  --RC292 or OE254 antennas given to the scouts

  In addition to maximizing the use of all TF assets for reconnaissance, the task force commander must do his own personal recon if he is to truly "SEE" the battlefield. Complete familiarity with the terrain over which he must fight is a key ingredient for a commander's success at any level.

Lessons Learned: Maintain Security as the First Defensive Priority

Problem: Security is the basis for successful defenses. Seventy five percent of units which maintain security, win. Ninety three percent of those that don't, lose. Security involves defeating both mounted and dismounted enemy recon elements as well as good COMSEC. The dismounted elements (OPs) report the eight digit grid for every major anti-tank system in the task force through triangulation. So long as these OPs survive, the enemy commander easily sees the task force's weak point and exploits it. The enemy mounted elements confirm these positions during the final hours before the attack, since the enemy OPs don't have sophisticated night vision devices and can't track any repostioning during periods of reduced visibility.

Successful Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

• Security must be a state of mind. Everything that moves or acts/looks suspicious must be challenged or checked.
  "Until we actually faced the NTC OPFOR recon, we had not spent the time to train a fully effective counter-recon force. Our home station OPFOR recon was not as effective as the NTC OPFOR recon," to quote a recent NTC battalion commander. Units employ minimal security because they don't understand the criticality of the task. All units must continually provide their own local security throughout the TF sector.

  Screen (identify/track) mounted enemy recon with dismounted OPs in depth and kill with indirect fire, if possible.

  Guard (destroy) mounted recon with tanks or BFVs.

  To stop enemy mounted recon elements, you must identify, track, and destroy them. Normally, the scouts and ground surveillance radars screen, while a "guard" force destroys. Screening in depth with two thin screen lines is much more effective to identify and track than one screen line. Scout platoons employ a mix of dismounted and mounted (thermal) OPs. In some cases, a BFV scout platoon can perform both the screen and guard mission.

  Commanders use varying sized guard/destruction elements based on METT-T. In general, these guard elements trade off combat power available to fight the main battle with certainty of destroying the enemy recon. A company/team, platoon, or reaction platoon all will work so long as the screen-guard coordination is strong. If possible, make engagement areas into free fire areas. Units tend to hold fire given excess movement in the task force area. The key is an integrated effort on a single net.

  Report of enemy recon on one avenue of approach should alert the commander that the remainder of his sector is also being reconnoitered.

  Locate dismounted enemy recon in the sector using aviation, electronic warfare support measures (ESM), and R/S patrols.

  Destroy dismounted recon elements (OPs) with artillery and reaction forces.

  The combination of helicopters, ESM, and local security patrols best identifies dismounted recon (OPs). Units must employ all three means and rapidly respond to enemy OP sightings. All company/teams and the task force maintain reaction forces on five minute standby. Slow reaction allows the enemy ESM to alert and move the OPs before the reaction force arrives.

Lessons Learned: Effective Utilization of the Field Artillery Battalion S2

Problem: Task forces generally do not receive input from the DS battalion S2; conversely, the DS battalion S2 does not always receive IPB products from the task force.

Successful Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

• The DS artillery S2 should coordinate early detailed targeting intelligence with the brigade. He should use this information to develop targeting priorities for field artillery target acquisition assets. For example, the brigade S2's collection plan contains guidance relative to types of targets, vehicles, or enemy assets that are priority information requirements. The Q36 and TPS25 radar could concentrate on trying to pick up indications of these targets. The S2 must integrate both FA and maneuver target acquisition assets into the fire support plan/execution matrix. The artillery target acquisition assets are frequently left to operate independently of the combined arms effort after the battle begins, with no concerted effort or plan to use them to confirm pre-planned targets.

• The DS battalion commander and the task force or brigade commander should ensure coordination of their collection plans. This includes coordination locations of weapons locating radars, such as the Q36 and Q37, and moving target locating radar (MTLR). The S2s should share intelligence estimates and other IPB products, and interact more with other staff members from their own headquarters and the supported maneuver unit.

• The DS battalion S2 and the task force FSO can extract specific targets from the computer files by establishing a standing request for information. He can obtain additional data by establishing a message of interest (MOI) file that provides intelligence, fire support, and planning information. Therefore, the task force S2 also has access to this information.

• The VFMED located with the brigade and task force FSOs receives and prints information copies of fire mission requests and reports submitted by other fire support agencies within its zone. Brigade and task force fire support VFMEDs, in effect, share a common pool of target, tactical, and fire support-related information on an automatic basis. The maneuver S2 should actively seek this information. Consider calls for fire a spot report.

• Some of the most important information on the battlefield is combat intelligence derived from spot reports submitted by observers who see the battlefield in real time. Brigade S2s should press for combat intelligence derived from targets to integrate artillery assets into their intelligence collection plan.

• The DS battalion S-2 will have information requirements that need brigade S-2 support. This data is necessary to drive the artillery battalion's decision support template for battery movement.

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Training

Maneuver