THE THREAT
"Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."
The doctrinal Soviet defense is quite formidable. It is relatively standard and representative of all Warsaw Pact defenses. This defense is noted for depth and the extensive fortification of platoon strongpoints. A U.S. task force normally attacks no more than one enemy company at a time. Since FM 100-2-1 describes only battalion and above Soviet defenses, this article will describe:
- Typical Soviet squad to company positions
- The minefield threat
- Unique threat mines
- The minefields that protect these positions
Typical Threat Positions
The placement of the squad BMP/BTR to the rear of the trench, normally centered, provides the depth to the motorized rifle squad defense. The covered slit (dugout) protects the squad from indirect fire with overhead cover. The squad normally completes the position in 10-12 hours using manual labor. Covered communications trenches join the squad trenches to form the platoon strongpoint. Identifying movement to/from the OPs may identify gaps/lanes in obstacles.
The platoon/company positions shown represent some of the possible variations.
"The combat formation is always set up according to the commander's decision for conducting the forthcoming engagement. It depends on the task to be performed, enemy actions, the availability of men and equipment, and the nature of terrain." (Tactics, Moscow, 1984)
The Soviets prefer a two echelon defense at all levels if the situation makes this possible. All units may be on line or with the center element offset/recessed. One element may be forward as a security element. Ideally, two elements will be up with one back.
"When necessary, a battalion's defenses are broadened frontally on adverse terrain by increasing the gaps between companies, although not by dispersing the combat formations of the component subunits" (Tactics, Moscow, 1984)
Platoon strongpoints are part of company strongpoints. The gaps between platoon strongpoints are minimal, at most 100 meters.
These strongpoints are well protected against artillery fire. After 30 hours, typically only 13% of the personnel in a motorized rifle battalion are vulnerable to airburst and shrapnel. The other 87% are in:
100%
Minefield Threat
U.S. units will encounter Soviet minefields in all combat operations. Minefields are the primary Soviet obstacle. All units must be prepared to breach interdiction or nuisance minefields. Artillery and aircraft can create interdiction minefields by delivering remote mines (like our FASCAM) into the rear areas. Nuisance minefields can disrupt a unit's movement, deployment, or occupation of a position. These minefields are not covered by fire. This greatly simplifies the breach or bypass by allowing the force to focus on the minefield. Given current mine technology, only well trained units safely and rapidly breach or bypass minefields. Each unit must reconnoiter moves and be prepared, trained, and organized to breach minefields.
Tactical/protective minefields, covered by fire, are the principle threat. Soviet units rapidly emplace minefields if the offense stalls. If units are in contact, they normally emplace minefields during periods of limited visibility. In both the offense and defense, mobile obstacle detachments (POZ) rapidly emplace minefields.
Each Soviet regiment and division has at least one POZ. Each POZ:
- emplaces 1200 meters worth of triple row, surface laid antitank mines in 12 minutes from its basic load (30 minutes to bury mines).
- reloads its mine basic load of mines in 15 to 30 minutes if mines are available.
- is normally with the antitank reserve.
Threat Lines
Soviet mines are similar to those in our own inventory. (For detailed information see FM 20-32, pp 151-170 or FM 5-34, pp 2-6 to 2-12.) The significant differences between our mines and threat mines are:
- the POMZ2 stake emplaced fragmentation mine
- the PFM-1 "butterfly mine"
- the limited antihandling devices on AT mines
This mine resembles a grenade on a stake and has a 25 meter kill radius. Visual detection of this mine means trip wires are present and that the minefield is 50-150 meters or more deep just with AP mines. Visual detection can allow visual identification of the forward edge and lateral boundaries of the minefield.
Aircraft/helicopters remotely deliver the PFM-1 "butterfly mine." Due to its unique fusing/arming process, employ extreme caution when breaching. The best method to defeat the mine is to destroy it in place with demolition. Using grapnel hooks and rope to defeat mine tripwires for other types of mines may detonate the PFM-1.
Use small arms fire or any armored blade (CEV, M-88) to clear PFMs. This is important especially for movement of logistics units in rear areas.
Only the obsolete TM46 antitank mine has fuze wells for antihandling devices. Even so, assume that all mines have antihandling devices. Do not lift any mine without clearing/disarming antihandling devices. Trained engineers (12Bs) can remove/recover U.S. mines armed with antihandling devices by hand. Only highly trained explosive ordinance detachment (EOD) personnel should remove/recover non-U.S. mines by hand. The preferred method of clearing mines is to destroy them in place with demolitions.
Threat Minefields
The average minefield initially consists of surface laid, blast, antitank mines, without antihandling devices or antipersonnel mines. The offensive nature of Soviet doctrine and their prolific use of mines mandate rapid emplacement and recovery of minefields. As defenses become more prepared, hull mines (e.g., tilt rods), antihandling devices, and antipersonnel mines appear.
The rear of minefields are normally marked with signs below ground level.
Unlike NATO, the Soviets lay mines in 200-300 meter strips with a low density (.5 mines per meter). A Soviet minefield is typically 60 meters deep, but after 24 hours of preparation, may be up to 300 meters deep. These dimensions are not carved in stone but are a general guide. Numerous strips versus long continuous minefields:
- facilitate counterattacks through numerous gaps.
- maximize the depth of the obstacle system.
- allow siting where direct fires are most effective.
Not
Defending The Main Effort
While Soviet minelaying capabilities are impressive, the extensive minefields seen in World War II will be uncommon. These massive minefields will only appear once the Soviet offensive stalls at the operational level. The example in figure 1 indicates the quantity of mines that a motorized rifle battalion, which is not defending the main effort, can be expected to emplace in 24 hours. At first glance this does not appear to be much. On European terrain below (figure 2), any deployed formation would encounter at least one, and probably two minefields.
Not
Defending the Main Effort
Table
of Contents
Preface
Countermine
Example
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NEWSLETTER
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