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BRIGADE PERCEPTIONS: BCTP WARFIGHTERS (WFX) AND SEMINARS Before Crossing the LD. . .

by MAJ Chris Abbott, BCTP, Fort Leavenworth, KS

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After serving as a Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) Observer/Controller (OC) during numerous WFXs, and the seminars preceding, certain issues consistently show up as problematic.

The listing of "errors" below and the recommended techniques and procedures to fix the errors have several caveats. First, these observations are from only a brigade perspective. Second, not every Battlefield Operating System is covered. Third, the techniques and procedures recommended to fix the errors are not a checklist that will guarantee success in combat or in a WFX. Finally, the recommendations focus on "warfighting," rather than on how to win a WFX.

Accepting the above conditions, the intent of this article is to outline problems experienced by your contemporaries during WFXs. Use these observations as an assessment tool. If you recognize some of the same problems, then take the recommended techniques and procedures and give them a try. Or, implement your own solution based on your unit-specific conditions.

Top 10 Errors at Brigade Level during WFXs (in no rank order).

• Use of NCOs
• Orders
• Unit SOPs: Either "Under Review" or Nobody Reads Them
• Not Fixing What is Broken
• Deception: We Are Only Fooling Ourselves
• Doctrine: What's It Good For?
• Intelligence v. Data
• Battlefield Geometry
• Synchronization of Resources
• Staff Functions

What follows is a brief discussion of specific problems for each of the "errors," followed by recommended TECHNIQUES or PROCEDURES to try to fix the problem.

Use of NCOs

* Brigades don't develop, train, assign or utilize the NCOs assigned to the TOC.
- often fail to put battle staff-qualified NCOs in key staff positions.
- do not allow NCOs (2S ASI) to do anything except set up the TOC; ensure coffee is on; monitor the radios.
- do not use NCOs' vast experience as a combat multiplier in the TOC.

TECHNIQUES:

1) Utilize Battle Staff-qualified NCOs in key staff positions whenever possible.
2) Integrate NCOs into wargaming, plan development, and reading orders for clarity, brevity and content.
3) Train NCOs in staff procedures, i.e., tactical decisionmaking process; graphics, terms and symbols; handling TOC message traffic; maintaining journals; updating and posting maps and overlays, etc.
4) Solicit NCO input whenever possible.

Orders

* Brigade orders routinely have problems with: - clarity: no one reads the finished product.

TECHNIQUE:

Designate an "honest broker" (JAG officer, Operations NCO, etc.) who did not participate in writing the order to read it and look for disconnects. Orders must be written so an attached unit, unfamiliar with the parent unit SOP, can quickly grasp the plan without spending an inordinate amount of time asking questions to clarify the order.
- doctrine: Planners often use the wrong doctrinal term to describe what they want subordinates to accomplish. PROCEDURE: Use the doctrinal term that best captures the commander's intent; have someone verify key terms with FM 101-5-1.
- format: Often a mix of a matrix order (not IAW FM 101-5, Final Draft) and a written order. PROCEDURE: Format by FM 101-5, Final Draft, Jan 94.
- author: Usually written by a CPT right out of OAC without command or tactical experience (intent not written by commander).

TECHNIQUE:

The S3 should be the primary author of the concept of operations, scheme of maneuver; the commander should write his own intent. - task organization: Doesn't match maneuver or tasks to maneuver subparagraphs in order, nor capture the command or support relationships designated by the commander. PROCEDURE: Organize IAW procedures in FM 101-5, Final Draft, Jan 94; task organization should match maneuver and tasks to maneuver units subparagraphs; clearly delineate command/support relationships.
- intent and maneuver subparagraphs: Fail to identify a form of maneuver, when describing the "how" of the operation. TECHNIQUE: Offense - specify a form of maneuver; Defense - specify a pattern of defense (mobile or area).
- battlefield framework: Orders fail to articulate the battlefield framework ( deep, close, rear, reserve, security) in each phase of the operation. PROCEDURE: Always address deep, close, rear, reserve, and security.

Unit SOPs: "Under Review" or Nobody Reads Them

* Common Problems

- typically units say their TACSOP, with annexes, is "under review," and that is supposed to explain away problems. TECHNIQUE: SOPs have to be "living" documents. Develop a design that allows for changes to be easily disseminated and then incorporated into existing copies. Routinely collect comments about the functionality of SOPs, and make necessary changes.
- far too many unit personnel do not read the SOP, or have adequate familiarity with the procedures. TECHNIQUE: SOPs are supposed to streamline operations. If units routinely exercise SOPs during training, familiarity with SOPs will be a natural byproduct. The unit will also get timely feedback about the SOP's functionality.
- units do not follow their own SOPs, i,e., markings, names for objectives, phase lines, etc. TECHNIQUE: Unit SOPs must be simple and they must be ruthlessly enforced by the chain of command. (See article No. 1 in this bulletin: "What Now, Battle Captain?")
- unit SOPs do not match the next higher headquarter's SOP. PROCEDURE: Common sense dictates that SOPs must match from higher to lower. Take the time to cross-walk SOPs looking for disconnects; then, take the steps necessary to align the documents well before any deployment, and realign as changes are made at each level.
- too many SOPs are so large they can only be carried in a vehicle. TECHNIQUE: Make SOPs portable, and as "GI proofed" as possible, i.e., weather, dust, dirt survivable.

Not Fixing What is Broken

* Units have a tendency not to fix identified problems, even when they are fixable.

- EXAMPLES: incorrect task organization; incomplete overlay graphics, failure to annotate problems as they occur, etc. TECHNIQUES: 1) always fix an identified, correctable error. 2) use a butcher paper chart or notebook to record problems as they occur, and the solution implemented; record "lessons" about how to better operate as they occur. 3) Make pen and ink changes as necessary to the TAC and TOC SOPs; disseminate the changes at orders briefs; publish and distribute a new edition when you return to home station.

Deception: We Are Only Fooling Ourselves

* Common Problems:

- we seldom practice deception or OPSEC. TECHNIQUE: Make deception a "priority," i.e., provide command emphasis.
- not integrated nor synchronized across the Battlefield Operating System (BOS) spectrum. TECHNIQUES:
1) Start building deception and OPSEC with mission analysis.

2) Ask the following questions:

a. What does the enemy expect us to do?

b. What do we want the enemy to believe we are doing?

c. What can we do to convince the enemy to believe our deception plan?

d. Can we use an alternate course of action as our deception plan?

e. How can our reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance efforts assist the deception plan?

3) Build dummy positions to lure enemy SPF teams in and then destroy them.
4) Resource the deception force to accomplish its mission.
5) Reflag units to hide unit boundaries.
6) Send false radio traffic; use smoke, engineers, mockups, PSYOP to support the deception.
PROCEDURE: Divisions should develop a deception plan for every major operation which brigades support.

Doctrine: What's It Good For?

* Common Problems:
- units often do not use the correct doctrinal terms for capturing intent, scheme of maneuver, or tasks to maneuver units.
- units often invent nondoctrinal terms they use for their operations in lieu of the proper term.

- commanders fail to use the one word which best describes the operation:

a) offensive operations: envelopment; infiltration; turning movement; penetration; frontal attack.

b) defensive operations: mobile or area defense.

c) retrograde operations: delay; withdrawal; retirement.

d) security operations: screen; guard; covering force

- orders often have more than one commander's intent.
- units often use a matrix for task organization, even when working in a joint operation. (FM 101-5 prohibits the use of matrix task organization for joint/combined operations.)
PROCEDURES: 1) Use the appropriate doctrinal terms. 2) Have only one intent statement. 3) Do not use nondoctrinal terms. 4) Use orders techniques common in joint/combined operations.

Intelligence v. Data

* Few brigade S2s provide anything to the commander but data from higher.- most brigade S2s do not come up with their own analysis based on higher, lower, and lateral intelligence that comes into the brigade TOC.
- most brigade S2s accept division/corps analysis as "gospel," even when their own intelligence sources contradict the information.
- brigade S2s frequently fail to template the OPFOR below battalion level. - brigade S2s frequently fail to ensure the organization has a good R& plan during all phases of the operation.

TECHNIQUES:

1) Focus the S2 on giving the commander intelligence v. data.
2) Intelligence should answer the "so what" question.
3) Every member of the TOC should know the difference between data and intelligence, i.e., PIR; EEFI; FFIR.
4) Well-developed battle boards will enable brigade S2 sections to give the commander a good assessment of the OPFOR status and capabilities.
5) Brigade S2s must synergize higher, lower, lateral data and develop a clear intelligence picture for the commander. Rather than telling the commander the 5th Krasnovian MRB is at 70-percent strength, tell him they have 20 T-62 tanks, 15 BTR-60 APCs and 350 men. This allows him to clearly see what he is up against.

Battlefield Geometry

* Common Problems:- units often fail to study the battlefield (another lost art).
- must be able to understand key terrain; obstacles; distances; weather; roads; choke points, to include ground and air.

TECHNIQUES:

1) Know the best/worst-case travel times for ground, water, and air for:

a) Dismounted soldiers

b) Vehicles (wheeled and tracked)

c) Aircraft (fixed wing and rotary)

d) Day and night

2) Know obstacle locations, dimensions and their impact on friendly and enemy forces.

3) Know river/stream depth, width, current, banks, etc.

Synchronization of Resources

* Common Problems:- units are not used to working with or using all the available resources they will have in combat.

TECHNIQUE: Incorporate all seven BOSs for every operation.

- fire and maneuver assets are rarely synchronized to ensure maximum support during the entire operation.

TECHNIQUE: Adequately prepare at home station for the synchronization of fire and maneuver at all levels.

- units often fail to adequately "weight the main effort."

- CA/PSYOP/SOF assets are often ignored; failure to use Containerized Delivery System (CDS), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), PSYOP, and dummy equipment to support the operation.

TECHNIQUE: Knowledge of all the BOS assets creates a greater likelihood for successful employment of those assets.

- poor lateral communication between adjacent units.

- poor use of LOs in higher, lower, and lateral headquarters.TECHNIQUE: Use LOs; integrate them into shift changes to keep everyone abreast of the whole picture.

Staff Functions

"Without SOPs, every time you take out the TOC, it's a brave new world." COL MICHAEL A. SUOZZO, Commander, Operations Group A, BCTP

* Common Problems:- ODP, turnover, branch qualification, and unit requirements make staff training difficult.
- brigade staffs seldom get time to train on deliberate or combat decisionmaking; division staffs have the same problems.
- brigade staffs too often operate with outdated doctrinal manuals.
- key players often do not participate in wargaming/mission analysis.
- backbriefs and rehearsals turn into wargaming sessions.
- the 1/3 - 2/3 rule is ignored.

TECHNIQUES:

1) Staff training: make it a home-station priority; the training will pay dividends.
2) Try to minimize TOC personnel changes; carefully scrutinize who serves in the TOC. 3) Get the latest manuals.
4) Key players must do the mission analysis; it is the foundation for the remaining decisionmaking process.
5) Wargaming should be completed long before commander's briefback or elements conduct rehearsals; take the time to war-game at the right time.

"You don't innovate until you know the process." GEN (RET) RICHARD E. CAVAZOS6) Drill the military decisionmaking process often enough, under a variety of conditions at home station so that the Battle Staff vigilantly adheres to the 1/3 - 2/3 rule. Elements at each level need to drill the process often enough to meet the same standard.

The "errors" spelled out in this article occur often enough to warrant mention. The techniques and procedures detailed do work in correcting the errors. Obviously each unit is unique, and strengths and weaknesses vary. However, as you assess your unit, use the lessons discussed as a starting point in helping determine where you are, and where you need to go.
To the TABLE OF CONTENTS
To Rehearsals: A Key To Success
To Acknowledgements