4.1 Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status
* Inadequate work environment for ALOX/BSOC operations: Too often ALOC/BSOC personnel work in a cramped, unorganized shelter in the back of a 5-ton truck which is inadequate space for the equipment employed, ie. computers, MSE phone, radio systems and possibly a switchboard.
Technique: Rebuild the back of the truck with a shelter of the approximate dimensions of the old M-109 van:
- build in shelves for the commo systems
- use filing cabinets (or drawers) for the PAC and the S4 shop to use for day-to-day field operations.
- use cabinets/drawers to store office supplies
- establish some work space for RTOs and shift OICs to function.
* Task force battle tracking: TF staffs/command posts fail to effectively battle track during the planning, preparation and execution phases of missions
PROBLEM: TOCs usually maintain two battle tracking boards/maps - the S2s and the S3s. Both boards usually have an assortment of information posted, but fail in tracking all enemy and friendly forces in the AO..
Technique: One battle tracking board/map in the TOC is the standard. The TOC should track at least the following information -
1. Co/tm troop-leading procedures (critical tasks only)
2. All friendly unit locations/activity within the AOI
3. FLOT, down to platoon level, or section level for scouts
4. Combat power, both vehicles and the manning capability
5. Collection, consolidation, and distribution of subordinate unit fire plans
6. Timeline
7. TF critical tasks list identified prior to or during the planning process
NOTE: Refer to CALL Newsletter 95-7, May 95, Tactical Operations Center (TOC) which contains excellent techniques and procedures covering the full spectrum of TOC operations, as well as an example TOCEX.
4.1.1 Communicate Information
* TF planning for scout missions: TFs and scout platoons fail to synchronize and coordinate a complete scout plan in a timely manner. Wanting to send the scouts out early, units do so without a detailed plan based on staff input and valid CCIR.
Technique:
1. The scout platoon leader must parallel plan with the TF commander and staff.
2. The TF battlestaff must focus early on the scout mission so either the recon or security requirements can have the greatest chance for success.
Procedure: Ensure the unit TACSOP incorporates battlestaff procedures where the S2 and S3 must concurrently build an R&S plan in a timely manner and then mission the scout platoon early based on mission analysis and identified PIR.
* Signal unit (node center and remote site) situational awareness: Signal units display poor situational (friendly and enemy) awareness at the node center and remote sites.
PROBLEM: Soldiers too often do not know what is going on in their sector, and are not aware of the current threat, ie. ground, air, artillery or NBC. Battle tracking and information flow stops at the SYSCON, node management facility or the company operations tent.
Technique: Soldiers at node centers and remote sites need copies of the maneuver graphics, OPORD, as well as receive updates during mission preparation and execution. This emphasis on situational awareness will result in fewer personnel casualties. The rate of CSS fratricide from minefields, artillery and direct fire will decrease. Also, the casualty rate from enemy contact should also be reduced by increased situational awareness.
4.1.1.3 Receive and Transmit Terrain and Weather Information
* Terrain analysis application to mission analysis: Terrain analysis is not sufficiently integrated into brigade mission analysis, COA development and war-gaming.
PROBLEMS:
1. Placement of battle positions out of direct line of sight or line of fire of obstacles.
2. Offense: attempts to maneuver over impassable or restrictive terrain
3. Poor terrain analysis, coupled with insufficient analysis of probable enemy actions, leads to poor task organization and placement of breaching assets to support ground maneuver.
Techniques:
1. At Home Station, develop an AO MCOO incorporating:
- LOS analysis
- intervisibility line analysis
- restrictive terrain analysis (GO/NO GO)
- geological analysis
- hydrology analysis
- off limits; no dig/restrictive dig
2. Provide SITEMP and terrain analysis to the supported brigade prior to the brigade staff mission analysis brief to the commander.
3. ABE should conduct parallel planning with the brigade staff to refine products.
4. ABE must have all overlays and products completed for use in brigade war-gaming.
5. Use TerraBase to provide graphic products for brigade and TF OPORDS.
4.1.1.4 Receive and Transmit Friendly Troop Information
* Engineer battalion staff knowledge of subordinate unit plans: The staff's ability to synchronize engineer operations, track battles, and coordinate support is impeded when the staff is not informed about subunit plans.
Techniques:
1. Get structured backbriefs from subordinate unit commanders.
2. Allow time during the preparation phase for at least "rock drill" rehearsals; this will help synchronize engineer operations within the brigade, while concurrently rehearsing specific engineer support operations.
* Unit logistical reporting: Units are not conducting effective logistical reporting. Though many units arrive with adequate reporting systems, both FM and hard copy as outlined in their TSOPs, these units fail to enforce the use of them.
PROBLEMS:
1. Batteries do not complete LOGSTATs and turn them routinely (usually through the LOGPAC/LRP system).
2. Personnel status (PERSTATs) are not routinely filled out and updated.
3. Units are not using the standard maintenance reporting formats to request battalion level support.
4. Routine maintenance reporting (DA Forms 2404, 2406, 13 and 5988) is not conducted with accuracy and is not closely managed.
5. Battery and battalion leaders are not conducting a careful analysis of who is performing quality PMCS and repairs.
Technique: While units may not expend large quantities of supplies because the rotation is "training," logisticians should still generate reports as if the battle damage, losses, and supply expenditures had actually happened. This will exercise the system and give CSS planners an appreciation of the magnitude of logistical expenditures and requirements in a high intensity combat operation.
4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status
* Fire support information flow from task force to company/team: The untimely flow and exchange of information between higher headquarters and subordinate units negatively impacts the fire support planning process - particularly at TF and Co/Tm levels.
Technique: Use a system where the FSE's monitor critical fire support information requirements -
1. Commander's concept for fire support
2. Higher headquarters' scheme of fires/scheme of maneuver and allocations of fires
3. Commander's attack guidance HPT/HVTs, engagement criteria by phase
4. Class V availability/constraints allocations to TF (FASCAM, smoke, illum, DPICM)
5. Task organization/attachments (COLTs, OH-58s, radar, MI (IEW) assets, additional artillery, and CAS)
This information should be available to subordinate units once the wargaming session has been completed. At TF level this information is critical to forming the fire support plan. TF FSOs should disseminate this information to Co/Tm FSOs so they can facilitate Co/Tm troop leading procedures.
* Personnel loss reporting: Units are not reporting their personnel losses in a timely manner.
PROBLEMS:
1. Units are not submitting hasty personnel losses as they occur, or when the situation permits them to report.
2. Brigades cannot submit a consolidated personnel requirements report to division until subordinate units submit their reports.
3. Too often units wait hours after a battle to call in their losses.
RESULT: delays in the replacement process.
* Materiel readiness reporting and high priority requisition tracking: Units have difficulty maintaining an accurate picture of the materiel readiness of equipment and status of open repair parts requisitions.
PROBLEMS:
1. The tracking of DA Form 2404 flow remains a problem.
2. The tracking of high priority requisitions via transportation manifests by the Main Support Battalions (MSB) remains inconsistent.
3. The success rate of Class IX electronic data transfer (BLAST) declined 40% in the last quarter.
Technique: The BLAST system must be trained and routinely used at Home Station to build a familiarity with MSE interface.
Back
to NTC BOS LIST
Back
to TA.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS, STATEMENTS
Go
to TA.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS: part B, STATEMENTS
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
