TA. 1 MANEUVER BOS
Positive Performance
1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces (Units and Equipment)
* Battlefield circulation: Military police team leaders (many are junior sergeants) have successfully performed escort duty for large convoys, but also served as convoy commander - a large responsibility for a junior sergeant.
1.1.3 Navigate
* Field artillery battery use of GPS (PLGR): FA batteries are using the precision lightweight GPS receiver (PLGR) with the backup computer systems (BUCS) as a hasty method to determine position and azimuth orientation data to meet the accurate unit location condition for accurate predicted fires (APF).
Technique: PLGRs are capable of determining position on the ground to within 10 meters +/- circular error probable for horizontal distances and 10 meters probable error for vertical distances. Units then use BUCS with either the FC Revision 1 (REV1) or the survey REV1 chip to conduct a hasty astro sighting to establish a secondary means of directional control independent of any other station. RESULT: this method provides an accuracy of 2 mils +/- . NOTE: While this technique meets the accurate unit location requirement for APF, units using this method will not be on common survey extended from an SCP.
1.2.1 Employ Direct Fire
* Crew skills: Live-fire boresighting and gunnery skills at individual and crew level are strengths in the majority of units. When brigades and task forces succeed in positioning crews on the battlefield where they have the opportunity to engage and kill the enemy, soldiers and crews have been lethal and produced excellent results. Skilled crews continue to help make up for shortfalls in higher staff level planning, ie. synchronization and schemes of maneuver.
Needs Emphasis
1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces (Units and Equipment)
* Deconfliction of battlespace: At task force level, S3s must deconflict land issues for all brigade assets in sector/zone, to include COLT scheme of maneuver and command/control relationships; artillery positioning plan; military intelligence assets.
Technique: The use of WARNOs to the brigade FSE and direct support field artillery battalion will help alleviate land management and command relationship issues. A WARNO after TF COA development/wargaming would assist adjacent unit coordination.
* Forward movement of MI companies: The MI company must be able to support the higher unit's scheme of maneuver throughout the depth of the battlefield. Face-to-face coordination, passage of lines operations, tactical movement, and site security from ground and air attack are all difficult. However, MI elements must be prepared to stay with maneuver units conducting offensive operations.
1.1.1.3 Move Through Air
* Formation flying techniques v. movement techniques: Aviation units too often use formation flying techniques instead of movement techniques to occupy battle positions (BP) and attack by fire positions. Formation flying is appropriate for flying a properly planned route up to the release point (RP). From the RP into the BP or attack by fire position, units must use movement techniques to increase survivability. Formation flying from the RP to the BP increases the likelihood of the unit being spotted or being unable to deal with an unplanned situation in the BP.
Technique: Use appropriate movement techniques, ie. traveling, traveling overwatch, or bounding overwatch, from the RP into a BP or attack by fire position rather than formation flying techniques.
1.1.2 Negotiate Terrain
* Movement techniques for mechanized smoke platoons: Mech smoke platoons do not execute movement formations and techniques based on METT-T. In most cases the smoke platoon conducts little or no maneuver training with the mechanized units at Home Station. RESULT: the smoke platoon is not trained to maneuver at the pace or using the techniques of the mech infantry.
1.1.3 Navigate
* EW company maintenance response time during darkness or limited visibility: For a variety of reasons, maintenance personnel have difficulties locating the elements they support during darkness or limited visibility.
Techniques:
1. Home Station land navigation training at night and under limited visibility conditions.
2. Use the platoon sergeant or platoon leader of the supported unit to escort maintenance personnel to the repair site.
3. Have a representative of the supported unit meet maintenance personnel at a known, easy to find location, and then escort them to the repair site.
4. Equip the maintenance section with GPS.
1.2 Engage Enemy
* Massing combat power during movement to contact missions: Units fight piecemeal, unable to mass on the OPFOR. On contact with the lead OPFOR element, BLUFOR habitually does not fix or maneuver. A major contributor to this TF problem is the TF's inability to control the march formation. Most units spread out from the assembly area into columns 7 to 10 kms from the advance guard company to the trail element. This lack of mutual support allows the OPFOR to mass on individual BLUFOR companies resulting in eventual TF destruction. A lack of detailed rehearsal of actions on contact contributes to this lack of mass.
Technique: At Home Station, focus on platoon and company battle drills. TF should focus on control of the TF formation, and maneuver of the depth companies in order to destroy the enemy. Detailed TF rehearsals and refinement of the TF SOP will improve actions on contact and the subsequent close fight.
1.2.1 Employ Direct Fire
* MILES boresight and zero not to standard: MILES boresight and zero during assembly area procedures are routinely conducted, but not to standard. The subsequent inability of BLUFOR to hit with MILES is not necessarily indicative of their gunnery skills, but more likely indicative of a lack of understanding of the MILES system.
TECHNIQUE: Make MILES gunnery a priority during pre-rotation training. In addition to applicable TMs, refer to CALL Handbook 94-5, The Multiple-Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) Combat Review. This reference will assist crew members with techniques and procedures relevant to all aspects of MILES boresight and gunnery.
1.2.2 Conduct Close Combat
* Use of dismounted infantry in offensive operations: The lack of employment of dismounted infantry during offensive operations is a continuing long term trend.
PROBLEMS:
1. Dismounted infantry actions are seldom planned at TF or company/team level..
2. Mounted-dismounted coordination is not planned or rehearsed.
3. Dismounted squads rarely conduct anything more than very generalized rehearsals.
4. When called upon to dismount, dismount leaders and soldiers are generally unprepared.
5. Soldiers dismount with minimal orientation or guidance about the tactical situation. 6. Dismounts are often unequipped to accomplish their mission; they dismount without radios, maps, AT weapons, and other mission essential equipment.
7. Mounted-dismounted coordination during mission execution is ineffective; dismounted squads therefore operate independent of the mounted force.
RESULT: the dismounted element is either committed without support against superior enemy forces and destroyed, or becomes largely irrelevant and unable to influence the fight.
Techniques:
1. Consider dismounted elements during the planning process; base dismounted employment on IPB, specifically terrain and enemy analysis.
2. Commanders should then provide specific guidance to platoon and dismount squad leaders, which can be incorporated into their troop leading procedures.
3. Commanders should conduct specific dismounted rehearsals, PCCs and PCIs for the mission.
4. Mounted-dismounted coordination, as appropriate, should be rehearsed to the maximum extent possible.
1.2.3 Integrate Direct Fire with Maneuver
* Target acquisition in offensive operations: Company/teams are not rapidly and effectively acquiring enemy vehicles and dismount teams during offensive operations.
PROBLEMS:
1. Co/Tms are not maintaining effective security or acquiring targets rapidly during offensive operations.
2. Platoons and individual vehicles are not scanning assigned sectors consistently using correct search and scan techniques.
3. Crews frequently develop "target fixation," where everyone looks at targets already under observation or direct fire from other friendly forces. EXAMPLES: 1) When BLUFOR ground elements concentrated totally on enemy air in sector, these BLUFOR elements only acquired 50% of the OPFOR ground recon assets, and destroyed only 2 enemy recon vehicles. 2) Tank and Bradley crews also frequently get fixed on observing friendly artillery impact, or engineer breaching operations, or CAS, etc.
Technique: Co/Tm commanders must assign and enforce sector of scan during offensive operations, and then execute fire control and distribution upon contact. Refer to FM 17-12-1-1, Tank Gunnery and FM 23-1, Bradley Gunnery for the correct search and scan techniques.
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