REALISTIC TRAINING
COMBAT EXPERIENCE
Battlefield performance directly relates to the quality and amount of realistic unit and individual training. Armies which failed to realize this important lesson have paid the price with wasted lives and lost battles. Rigorous and demanding training paid dividends for the British in the Falklands and U.S. forces in Grenada. The Soviets, Iranians and Iraqis discovered their training did not match the battlefields they faced. The examples below point out some of the good and bad experiences.
Lesson Learned
Training must relate to a unit's wartime mission and to the climatic conditions it can expect to face.
WW II: A NEW GUINEA "NIGHTMARE"
During the costly campaign to drive the Japanese from the Northeast coast of New Guinea (Nov 1942-Jan 1943), the 32nd Infantry Division suffered as many casualties from the jungle as from the Japanese. A National Guard Division from Wisconsin and Michigan, the 32nd, was assembled at Ft. Devens, Massachusetts. It was originally scheduled to go to Northern Ireland. However, at the last minute, it was sent to Australia and then on to New Guinea. There it was to fight in some of the worst terrain in the world. They conducted training in Australia in cold and wet weather with no opportunity for jungle training or even acclimatization to hot weather.
ON THE JOB TRAINING
The 32nd landed in New Guinea in November 1942 with some of the units marching overland across the towering Owen Stanley mountain range which split the island and other units moving up the coast. They had to learn "on the job" how to live, fight, and move in the dark, disease-ridden jungle under constant fire from the Japanese. Patrolling, fire support, camouflage, security, and jungle survival had to be learned under enemy fire by those who survived. The fighting quickly broke down into small unit actions with minimal artillery, air or armor. The men, their morale sapped and their bodies wasted by disease and fatigue, came close to breaking from this failure to "train as they would fight." Only renewed leadership within the division saved them from disaster. [21]
FALKLANDS
Just after the Argentines surrendered Port Stanley in the Falklands, one British Commando reflected back on his unit training prior to deploying to the Falklands. He thought the British were better trained and better prepared for the severe weather conditions in the Falklands than were the Argentines. He attributed this to the winter training grounds in Norway where they had become acclimatized to the cold weather. Also, their traditional training ground in the United Kingdom replicated the cold wind and rain they experienced in the Falklands. He said "the maxim, train hard, fight easy proved to be very true." [22]
The British Marines and Paratroopers were already well trained in unit operations so they used the time aboard ship and the short stop at Ascension Island to fine-tune basic military skills, conduct battle staff training, and test fire their weapons. All this training gave the British the mental and physical conditioning required for combat. [23]
Lesson Finally Learned?
The frightening experience of the 32nd Div. in the jungles of New Guinea and that of other units ill-prepared for jungle warfare had an effect on later training. Shortly after their successful invasion of Kwajalein Atoll, the 7th Infantry Division moved to Hawaii to prepare for the landings in the Philippines. The soldiers of the "Bayonet" Division were put through an extensive jungle training program at the Jungle Training Center in Hawaii. The emphasis of this program was on learning how to fight, patrol and live in the jungle. Some 98% of the division received at least one week of realistic jungle training at the center to prepare them to fight the Japanese on their own terms and win. This realistic training and acclimatization to the jungle, coupled with their previous battle experience, resulted in a successful landing in the Philippines. In the words of an Army Ground Forces observer, the training was conducted in a "highly efficient and successful manner." The result was victory. [24]
IRAN / IRAQ
Prior to invading Iran, Iraqi armed forces placed much of their emphasis on indoctrinating their soldiers with nationalism and revolutionary fever. During the early stages of the war, it was evident that Iraqi forces did not train for maneuver of combined arms warfare. Iraqi forces attacked across open terrain with armored forces leading, but would stop the advance after moving short distances (4-10 km) and dig in. This occurred whether the units were opposed by Iranians or not. Also they did not train for urban fighting. They attacked the cities with pure armor units which suffered very heavy casualties. The Iraqi failure to train junior officers and NCOs to make decisions and use combined arms created confusion and chaos on the battlefield. [25]
Lesson Learned
Live fire training teaches the importance of accurate and disciplined fire and helps prepare the soldier for the shock and noise of combat.
GRENADA
During Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, several NCOs reported that the training programs they and their soldiers participated in were invaluable to their small unit success. For example, marksmanship and live fire training helped their units engage the enemy with accurate and disciplined fire. Known distance and short ranges provided the skill and confidence of knowing they could hit their target. Live fire exercises helped the soldiers get accustomed to other soldiers firing weapons adjacent to and behind their positions as they maneuvered. Physical training prepared the soldiers to endure the strain of combat. One NCO reported that he intends to do more training in first aid. He felt that "Increased training will help his soldiers to overcome the shock of helping buddies who are bleeding like hell." Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE) training prepared the units to execute the deployment phase of the operation with minimum problems. All in all, realistic small unit training with good junior leaders leading the way proved to be the backbone of this operation. [26]
Lesson Learned
Training plans require as realistic a duplication of battlefield conditions as possible.
AFGHANISTAN
The Soviet experience in Afghanistan caused them to focus their attention on realistic training in mountain operations for combat support and combat service support units. The Soviets experienced considerable difficulties in this area during the early part of the war. Soviet training now includes: drivers operating vehicles on different types of mountain roads under all weather conditions, drivers repairing and maintaining vehicles under combat conditions, combat engineer training on realistic topographic and soil conditions, and air assault units training in specially constructed models of Afghan villages.
References
These references will assist you in training your soldiers and unit for combat.
FM 25-1, Training, Feb 85. This publication gives the Army's philosophy and principles of training.
FM 25-2, Unit Training Management, Sep 84. This manual provides the Army training management process which includes long-range, short-range and near-term planning.
FM 25-3, Training in Units, Dec 84. Planning, preparing, presenting, practicing and performing training are discussed. Some tips and procedures are provided.
FM 25-4, How to Conduct Training Exercises, Sep 84. The planning and conduct of exercises are discussed. An example of a scenario is given.
FM 21-75, Combat Skills of the Soldier, Aug 84. A good reference for individual soldier skills required for combat in any environment.
ARTEP 7-8-Drill, Battle Drills for the Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad.
ARTEP 7-8-MTP, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad.
ARTEP 7-10-MTP, The Infantry Rifle Company.
ARTEP 7-20-MTP, The Infantry Battalion.
ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force.
ARTEP 7-30-MTP, The Infantry Brigade.
Bottom Line
Train as you will fight. Training conditions which closely replicate a realistic combat environment will save lives. Allow time for units to adapt to the climatic conditions if possible.
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Small
Arms Air Defense
Law
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