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Organized by BOS, these narratives amplify the bullet listings in Section I. As appropriate and/or available, they provide doctrinal references and techniques and procedures for the needed training emphasis. The narratives are labeled IAW the Blueprint of the Battlefield system for reference and long-term trend development.


Positive Performance

1.1 Move

* Movement formations and dispersion: Units have shown improvement in the use of movement formations with tactical dispersion appropriate to the enemy situation.

Technique: Rehearse tactical formations and dispersion based on terrain and situationally templated enemy actions.

1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces (Units and Equipment)

* Improved land navigation: use of GPS and map reading techniques

1.1.2 Negotiate Terrain

* Attack helicopter terrain flight: Individual crews are performing well by demonstrating an awareness of dust signatures, maintaining a backdrop and making good use of shadows.

1.2.1 Employ Direct Fire

* Long range gunnery in offensive operations: This success is the result of being willing and prepared to engage at ranges in excess of 3000 m. Preparation of weapon systems, ie. boresighting, etc. in conjunction with the use of observed fires at platoon and section level produce target hits at extended range.

1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces (Units and Equipment)

* Movement techniques: Units are failing to situationally adjust both their movement formation and movement technique. EXAMPLE: Many units make contact while using the traveling technique.

RESULT: Making contact while using the traveling technique unnecessarily increases the vulnerability of the unit, and makes actions on contact more difficult to effectively execute.


1. Units must rehearse a movement to contact, including the transition from traveling to traveling overwatch, or to bounding overwatch as the situation dictates.

2. Actions on contact must be drilled repetitively to insure that reaction is swift and sure.

3. Rehearsing actions on contact can be done using "walk-thru" drills until all personnel are ready to execute a more sophisticated type of rehearsal.

1.2 Engage Enemy

* Co/TMs rarely execute effective actions on contact:

PROBLEM: Reaction to enemy contact too often consists of halting in place and attempting to return fire, often at targets beyond maximum effective ranges.

RESULT: Units quickly rendered combat ineffective

Techniques: Develop and practice battle drills at Home Station

  • Establish a base of fire, and, depending upon the terrain, move aggressively to covered and concealed positions. Establish fire superiority before attempting to maneuver on the enemy

  • Platoon leaders and company commanders must develop the situation, select a course of action, or at least recommend a course of action to the task force commander.

1.2.1 Employ Direct Fire

* Company/team direct fire planning and execution: Crew gunnery skills determine the outcome of most NTC live-fire battles, rather than unit fire plans.

PROBLEM: Range cards, platoon sector sketches, and company fire plans are not linked.

RESULT: Commanders cannot focus, shift or mass company fires with sufficient control.


1. Co/Tm commanders should personally site or approve each vehicle fighting position to insure an integrated fire plan.

2. Subordinate leaders at platoon level should link squad/section fire plans, then link platoon fire plans - all in an effort to integrate the Co/TM plan in accordance with the commander's guidance.

3. At Home Station, in training for defensive operations, practice the steps necessary to build an engagement area so that adequate weapon systems are available to execute the direct fire plan and achieve the desired results. For offensive operations, practice direct fire planning appropriate to the mission, ie. actions on contact for a movement to contact and the fire and maneuver inherent in a deliberate attack.

1.2.2 Conduct Close Combat

* Mech/Armor TFs do not effectively use dismounted infantry:


1. Dismounted infantry not integrated with the scheme of maneuver

2. Dismounted infantry not used in conjunction with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV)

3. Units are not specifying a clear task and purpose for dismounts; when they dismount they are unprepared to accomplish the mission.

4. Routinely dismounted infantry leave essential equipment (radios, AT weapons) behind because they are not sure of the tactical situation and unsure of their mission.

5. Most mechanized infantry employed as dismounts are unfamiliar with dismounted drills from FM 7-7J.


1. Mech/Armor TF employment of mechanized infantry as dismounts contributes little to mission success.
2. Dismounts too often do not use appropriate movement formations or techniques.
3. Dismounted operations are not conducted as a BFV-dismount team, which hinders mission success.


1. At Home Station, dismounted drills should routinely be trained in conjunction with BFV crews.
2. Dismounts must be briefed on their mission for each operation.
3. The appropriate dismounted drills must be rehearsed in conjunction with BFV crews.
4. Based on mission requirement, PCIs prior to rehearsal should ensure that dismounts will employ the proper equipment.

1.2.3 Integrate Direct Fire with Maneuver

* Attack helicopter battalions do not correctly plan or use triggers for employment of their assets: Triggers drive --

  • Timely employment of attack assets
  • Displacement of FARPs
  • Displacement from assembly areas
  • Employment of retransmission communications equipment

Technique: Units must practice at Home Station the use of triggers as a mechanism for putting actions into motion. The planning for triggers and the procedures involved in employing triggers during mission execution must become routine prior to deployment.

1.3.1 Control Terrain Through Fire or Fire Potential

* Poor execution of dismounted observation posts: Scout sections are not conducting dismounted OPs to standard.


1. The selection of OP sites are not well thought out; generally placed on top of significant terrain features.
2. No consideration is given to OP sites which have good fields of observation and make use of terrain.
3. Routes from vehicle locations and the OP often provide no cover or concealment.
4. Discipline of the scouts occupying the OP is poor.
5. The observers often do not have the proper equipment, situational briefing, or graphics on their maps.
6. The scouts usually do not identify or conduct a reconnaissance of their alternate OP sites.


1. OP sites often compromised, and targeted.
2. Lack of equipment hinders mission success.
3. Without a situational brief or graphics, it is difficult for scouts to understand what they are looking for and what they may see.
4. If the original OP is compromised, the mission is jeopardized if no alternate is immediately available.


1. At Home Station, train scouts in selecting, occupying and improving dismounted OP sites.
2. Enforce standards for OP occupation; squad and section sergeants must supervise.
3. Set up OP bags, with the proper equipment as outline in FM 17-98.

Procedure: Ensure that unit SOPs designate procedures and standards for OP occupation.

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