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TA. 7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS


Positive Performance

7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment

* Aviation battalion use of repair parts system: Aviation unit commanders routinely maintain high operational readiness rates that support tactical operations. NTC does not stock aviation repair parts on the installation ASL. This forces the aviation unit to bring its PLL/ASL to the NTC, and the supply system to receive other repair parts. Units that routinely use the repair parts supply system demonstrate a greater capacity to sustain tactical operations.

7.5.2 Supply the Force

* Class IV/V point operations: Units deployed to the NTC trained to routinely have TF S4 involvement in running the Class IV/V point.

RESULT: Allowed critical engineer assets forward to focus on emplacement of defensive obstacles and survivability position, rather than running the Class IV/V point. The fewer number of engineers used to run a Class IV/V point, the more engineers available to emplace obstacles or dig survivability positions.

Technique: It is very important, however, that an engineer expert work directly with the TF S4 at the Class IV/V point to ensure the proper minefield packages are distributed and who can assist in prioritizing resources.

Need Emphasis

7.1 Arm

* Establishment of standardized, pre-configured ammunition loads: FM 6-20-1, Chapter 7 states that "a series of standardized, pre-configured ammunition loads should be developed and the ammunition sections trained to use them. This allows flexibility and saves time when briefing crews and uploading carriers."

PROBLEMS:

1. 155mm units are not developing pre-configured combat loads to facilitate ammunition management.

2. CSS planners and S3s are not coordinating to develop load plans and configurations suitable to support the scheme of maneuver and fires.

3. Most units leave it up to the battalion ammunition officer to develop load plans without guidance from the battalion commander, XO, S3 or other staff members.

4. Units do not train with pre-configured loads at Home Station.

5. Too often ammo sections are required to draw all the FTX ammo forecast and deliver all the ammo directly from the ASP.

RESULTS:

1. CSS planners and staff do not know what ammunition is available in the battalion and on what carriers.

2. The desire to deliver ammunition to the guns quickly upon deployment and ASP requirements are actually driving unit ammunition planning and management.

Procedures:

1. Develop a workable Unit Basic Load (UBL) referencing FM 101-10-1/2 series.

2. Identify probable RSR/CSR for mid/high tempo combat operations, both offense and defense.

3. Combine these expected ammunition haul requirements with technical data from the ammunition carriers to develop several standardized load plans. Two or three configurations are recommended:

  • Load ammunition by type and lot, ie. all DPICM or all HE
  • Load based on a mix that reflects the same percentages loaded on the gun sections UBL
  • High usage missions, ie. offensive preps, FASCAM, or smoke

Techniques:

1. Load only complete rounds; make allowances for 10% overage on powders and fuses and maximize each carriers capability.

2. Other factors to consider:

  • Standardized ammunition packaging
  • Palletization
  • Weights
  • Physical characteristics of the pallets, as they relate to the dimensions of the carrier bed

3. ASPs do not allow complete rounds to be loaded, but once drawn, range regulations do allow combat configuring of ammunition on authorized combat vehicles and ammunition haulers.

4. Draw excess ammunition and allow sections to train with these rounds, while training leaders how to inspect the loads to enforce compliance.

* Class V estimates:

PROBLEMS:

1. TF leaders and CSS planners are not conducting accurate inventories of CL V on hand
2. Munitions available for draw are not being tracked
3. Ammunition haulers are not being tracked by bumper number.
4. The TF FDO is not being consulted on the schedule of fires or expected expenditures he has determined.
5. CSS planners are not associating specific support requirements for the artillery battalion's CFSTs.
6. Units down to battery level are not being resourced to fulfill CFSTs
7. Triggers are not being established for backup supply to the battery or to the alternate shooter.

RESULTS:

1. Units are not correctly resourced to accomplish their mission.

2. Resupply considerations are occurring too late to prevent mission interruption.

3. CSS and operations planners do not have accurate information about where ammo is, on which truck, and how long will it take to resupply a unit that needs the ammunition.

Technique:

STEP 1: Develop a work sheet that prompts answers to key question in estimating expenditures for future operations.

STEP 2: Use this work sheet, or checklist, to ensure key ammo information is requested, pushed and tracked accurately.

STEP 3: Convert ammo estimates to triggers for resupply; these triggers should also be included on a mission execution matrix.

STEP 4: Publish ammunition numbers in the FASP which reflect the ammo required, by battery, to accomplish their respective CFSTs.

STEP 4a: Should also specify the ammo to be carried by the ammo platoon and/or repositioning requirements.

STEP 5: Following coordination with the BAO, publish which standard load plans, by bumper number, the ammo platoon will use.

RESULTS: Leaders and staff will understand . . .

1. Where all of the ammo is located.
2. When and where it is expected to be pushed.
3. Which quick adjustments, based on a changing tactical situation, are feasible.

7.3 Fix

* Status of equipment and repair parts requisitions: Units experience difficulty transitioning the use of ULLS, SAMS 1/2 and SARSS from garrison to a field environment.

RESULT: Units quickly lose an accurate picture of what equipment is inoperative, what parts are required, and the status of the parts requisitions. This further results in units struggling to maintain readiness rates at or above 90% during intense operational periods. In this quarter the mission capable rating during rotations for M1 tanks was 71% and for BFVs 76%.

7.3.1 Distribute

* Ammunition status reporting: Field artillery units experience difficulty forecasting, managing, and resupplying FA batteries because they are not working with accurate ammunition counts.

PROBLEMS:

1. Battery leaders are not actively conducting ammunition accounting.

2. A lack of command emphasis and loose accountability at the initial issue contributes to units tarting their rotation with poor ammunition numbers.

3. With subsequent deliveries, batteries fail to adjust their ammo status quickly.

4. Batteries then fail to report all ammunition received on their status board and also fail to nform battalion.

5. The accountability worsens further as units begin to cross level ammunition and manage individual rounds.

Procedures:

1. The S3 and FDO should develop an initial issue plan. This plan segregates the ammo to be calibrated from the unit basic loads (UBL), that batteries will receive in their initial upload.

2. The battery ammunition officer (BAO) and the Bn XO confirm when the ammo has been configured to meet this initial requirement.

3. Batteries confirm these counts when they report completion of upload.

4. Battery commanders should bring ammo counts to every OPORD and/or rehearsal, and report their status to the FSCOORD or S3.

5. Require periodic physical inventories, by component, to confirm on-hand figures.

RESULT: This command emphasis will place responsibility on leaders to verify the ammunition on hand will meet their Critical Fire Support Tasks for the upcoming mission.

Techniques:

1. Train TOC personnel to track ammunition expenditure based on their unit's execution of the scheme of fires.

2. When cross leveling ammo as part of a reorganization/reconstitution, manage munitions according to standard packaging, ie. pallets of eight for 155mm rounds.

3. Leave ammunition banded until it is time to prepare it for firing.

RESULT: Units will not waste time managing ammo by "eaches."

7.4.3.1 Provide Personnel Administration Services

* Status of assigned personnel: The maintenance of accurate battle rosters is a continual problem. Units do not consistently use the automated strength accounting system with any degree of effectiveness.

7.4.4 Provide Health Services

* Planning, management, and execution of medical operations:

PROBLEM: The FSB medical company commander is often unable to participate in the orders process because of operational responsibilities; the FSB support operations officer normally lacks the experience in medical operations.

RESULT: Medical operations are not being properly synchronized into the overall operation.

PROBLEM: This is a lack of consistency in how FSB medical companies establish treatment facilities. Some units use tracked or wheeled vehicles; others use various shapes and sizes of tentage for treatment space.

RESULT: This situation detracts from the smooth flow of patients through the medical company because of either a lack of space, or dysfunctional layout.

PROBLEM: FSB medical company facilities are poorly marked.

RESULT: Casualty evacuation is hindered because it is overly difficult to locate medical facilities on the battlefield.

Techniques: Home Station Training

1. Incorporate medical planning into all field training exercises.
2. Pay particular attention to blood management and to the management of air evacuation assets.

Procedure: Health Services Command should develop a standard equipment TO & E for FSB medical company treatment sections.

7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties

* Casualty evacuation of Stinger teams: Casualty evacuation proved a serious problem, particularly during offensive operations. Air Defense officers tend to want to evacuate the Stinger teams through the Co/TM to which they were attached. Too often, however, poor planning and coordination hindered evacuation efforts.

Technique: Stinger team evacuation in offensive operations works best when the Stinger platoon sergeant travels with the main effort and assists in any necessary casualty evacuation.

7.5 Distribute

* Aviation support platoon training: The support platoon (CL III/V) has the responsibility to execute FARP operations. This organization consists of the support platoon under HHC and the armament section under the AVUM company.

PROBLEM: Successful FARP operations require synchronization of all sections and cross training of team members. This is not the case with most FARPs. Personnel have not worked together or trained together in FARP operations.

Technique: Home Station Training Integrated training of support platoon and aviation armament sections is a must. This training can take place during regularly scheduled field training exercises by deploying FARPs to field sites to refuel and rearm inert Hellfire training missiles on aircraft conducting training flights.

7.5.1.2 Move/Evacuate Cargo, Equipment, and Personnel

* Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) Planning: Aviation unit commanders have an inherent responsibility to plan for and execute unit-level CSAR operations using internal resources. CSAR must be planned for close, deep and rear battle. CSAR must have updated intelligence, operational security and the command and control mechanisms firmly established in order to successfully execute the mission.

7.5.2 Supply the Force

* Tracking of high priority requisitions via transportation manifests: FSBs have difficulty tracking the flow of high priority parts. Manual transportation manifests are either not used or not accurate when used.

RESULT: The failure to have a system in place to track parts has a negative impact on combat power.

* FSB water support planning and fuel filter effectiveness testing:

PROBLEM: FSB logistics planners have difficulty planning for adequate water supplies to cover both general and decontamination requirements, and a particular inability to calculate water requirements for decontamination.

PROBLEM: Units lack a thorough understanding of the Army fuel filter effectiveness program, which is covered under AR 710-2. By not having effective home station fuel filter effectiveness programs, units have difficulty instituting such a program during a rotation.

* Future logistical requirement development and reporting: Units have difficulty developing timely forecasts of logistical requirements, including the reporting of casualties, damaged/destroyed equipment (Area Damage Control) and daily LOGSTAT reports.

RESULT: CSS units have difficulty determining, with any degree of accuracy, what will be required to support the fight.


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