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CALL Newsletter 04-13 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) CAAT II Initial Impressions Report (IIR)

Summary

Coalition forces in Iraq are engaged in the military occupation of a predominately Arab Muslim state with extremely diverse political and socioeconomic divisions. Maneuver commanders are responsible for the law and order and administration of their assigned areas. Civil-military operations (CMO) is a critical element to both the establishment of a safe and secure environment and to the country's transition to a self-sustaining civil administration.

Implicit in this endeavor is a coordinated effort on the part of the Coalition, simultaneous to the continuous empowerment of and transition to local and national Iraqi governance. Civil affairs (CA) forces work for maneuver commanders and provide technical guidance and expertise. A defined command/support relationship, coupled with a clear understanding of that relationship, is an essential step for optimal integration with the maneuver unit. Specifically, the integration of CA with the S5/G5 staffs is crucial.

Task forces encountered several challenges in conducting CMO. Multiple CA brigade headquarters were deployed. Their integration posed unique challenges for the Coalition. CA augmentation to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) posed unique challenges as well. The Iraqi Operational Environment (IOE) required certain force protection measures to which CA units were not accustomed or task organized. Coalition forces had to adapt in order to conduct CMO in this environment.

In the IOE, success in civil administration requires an understanding of Iraqi religious and tribal institutions and their relationship with the secular forms of government inherent to democracy and proposed by the CPA. U.S. plans and practices cannot be successful in the absence of a knowledge and understanding of Iraqi sentiments and perceptions. This is all the more important given the high turnover of CPA personnel and the lack of regional expertise held by the majority of Coalition military and civilians in Iraq. Although nominally running Iraq, maneuver commanders are generally not trained in the complexities and subtleties of the area. This has resulted in some U.S. practices serving to alienate common Iraqis who initially supported the Coalition. To partially rectify this, some OIF units have sent division and brigade commanders and staff to Jordan to receive instruction on how to operate effectively in Arab/Muslim Iraq.

The security situation in parts of Iraq dictates modification of equipment and the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in order to maximize success. Integration with supported units requires communications equipment, while CA teams require crew-served weapons and additional armored protection on their vehicles.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1-Topic F: IO at the Brigade and Below

Chapter 2-Topic A: Integration of the Task Force CMO Effort