Find a Security Clearance Job!


Center for Army Lesson Learned Banner
CALL Newsletter 04-13
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
CAAT II Initial Impressions Report (IIR)

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
CAAT II Initial Impressions Report (IIR)

Chapter 1: Information Operations
Topic B: Information Operations and Intelligence

It is typical for many different staff sections (S2, IO, S3, etc.) to request the tactical PSYOP team (TPT) to collect information in different areas. Some of these requests were specific questions and some were ongoing collectables. The TPT detachment commander, working with the staff representatives, would develop his own priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) that would cover the spectrum of the information required by the different staff elements. One example of this PIR occurred after the lead Iraqi Shia cleric, Sistani, issued a press statement calling for immediate elections. They developed and answered these PIRs and passed the information up through the daily PSYOP situation report (SITREP). This information was valuable not only to the higher HQ, but also to national strategists. PIRs are normally developed by the S2/G2, and approved by the commander. In this case, the detachment commander is working "outside the box" in developing his own PIRs and collecting on them. Also, it shows the importance of building strong interpersonal relationships with the various staff officers within the command to establish good working relationships.

TPTs at brigade level use face-to-face and word of mouth as the best ways of communicating with the local population. They have discovered that they need to use tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that are outside the conventional Army way of conducting business. For example, they have found that locals are much more receptive when the Soldiers are engaging them in a uniform without helmet, body armor, and load bearing equipment (LBE). This may sound like common sense; however, force protection measures require them to maintain this uniform when outside the compound. PSYOP at the tactical levels can benefit from the ability to operate unconventionally. Another example is that dedicated security can have great benefits over relying on a combat patrol for security; combat patrols have a specific mission which will take priority over providing security for a TPT. Current force protection requirements necessitate more personnel, weapons, and vehicles than what a TPT would traditionally have by MTOE. TPTs have worked around this by teaming with counterintelligence (CI) teams. Each team will provide security for the other while conducting their missions. The similarity of their missions allows them to share intelligence.

U.S. divisions do not maintain a central database or conduct human factors analysis on all entities that play roles in their AOR, such as civic leaders, religious Imams, terrorists, and insurgents. Human factors analysis is currently conducted at the national level by the Defense Intelligence Agency. There is no mechanism for conducting this task at the operational or tactical level. As a general rule, the IPB process lacks with regards to IO. U.S. forces understood who Saddam Hussein and his commanders were and how they operated, but did not understand all the other parties at play once the war came to a conclusion, such as tribal leaders, local leaders, and Imams. They had very little information about them. Through a process of trial and error, U.S. forces have formulated a picture of these leaders within each battalion's AOR.

In one U.S. division, the G2 has charted all the enemy leaders in his AOR. The G5 knows who the civil leadership is. PSYOP knows who all the key communicators are. However, these three databases are not shared. Thus far no one has the manpower to take ownership of it. The G2 does not want it because they are only tracking Former Regime Loyalists (FRLs) and adversaries. The G5 does not want it, because they are only tracking community leaders, and the PSYOP units do not want it because they do not have the manpower. No one is capable or trained to do human factors analysis which, according to FM 3.13, Information Operations, is defined as actions taken to influence other's decision-making processes. To affect or influence adversary decision-making, commanders need to have this level of analysis down to the tactical level. Commanders and staff are making some progress at their level. However, no one is collecting this information into a central database to develop a true picture of the whole AOR and to develop an organized analysis. They are overcoming it by trial and error. The IOCOORD believes it would it be helpful at the division level to conduct tactical level human factors analysis.

Lessons Learned

  • The development of PIR to support the IO program encourages and facilitates establishment of good working relationships.
  • Soldiers' interaction with the populace can have tactical, operational, and sometimes strategic implications. TPTs engage the populace and provide information that normally can only be answered by operational/strategic assets.
  • PSYOP at the tactical levels benefit from the ability to operate unconventionally.
  • The divisions are inadequately staffed to conduct the appropriate link and pattern analysis to benefit commanders at the tactical level who are conducting IO, and there is limited capability to maintain a central database for capturing all information pertaining to all leaders within the division's AOR. As a result, battalion and brigade commanders are learning the AOR by simple trial and error.
  • To be successful at the operational and tactical levels, human factors analysis level of information must be available to division, brigade, and battalion commanders and staffs. Currently, all human factors analysis is conducted by the Defense Intelligence Agency on strategic or national-level personalities.

DOTMLPF Implications

Doctrine: Include the use of human factors analysis in doctrine as a tool of a successful IO process.

Training: Incorporate Soldier interaction with local populaces as a standard template in all training events related to ROMO.

Organization: Add appropriate personnel and equipment to unit organizations/MTOEs in order to accomplish the IO mission, to include the link and pattern analysis process.

Table of Supporting Observations

Observation Title CALLCOMS
File Number
Non-Traditional Collection 10000-22464
IPB Process 10001-05468
Human Factors Analysis 10000-03924
IO PIRS 10000-13728
OSINT Media Analysis 10000-25805

Table of Contents
Chapter 1-Topic A: IO Synchronization Methods of Units
Chapter 1-Topic C: Public Affairs and the Media

Join the mailing list