Military

INTRODUCTION

Fresh on the ground and ready to begin its rotation through the Joint Readiness Training Center, the staff of the FA battalion seemed eager when the initial order came down from brigade. Although the commander and the XO were seasoned veterans of such rotations, the rest of the staff was less experienced. The S3 was a CGSC graduate and he understood the military decision-making process (MDMP) at least as it applied in the schoolhouse at Fort Leavenworth. The other principal staff members especially the S2, looked to him and the XO for guidance. All were highly motivated and as soon as they received the order, the staff officers began working with almost frantic determination. Speed was the key in these rotations and they were set on beating their own record. The first decision in the staff's MDMP seemed to be to trash the process and get on with the operations order. They did not understand that their haste was working against their chances for success.

The Observer/Controllers (O/C) at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) see the same problem again and again, especially in the Field Artillery (FA) battalion staffs that rotate through every year. Observer/Controllers often note a weakness in the MDMP. An already published CALL Newsletter, No. 99-11, An Artillerization of the Military Decision-Making Process, presented the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used by a single FA battalion staff as they went through a combat training center (CTC) rotation. This newsletter is at once broader in perspective since it addresses trends observed in multiple CTC rotations and more narrow in suggesting detailed battle drills as a means of reversing those trends. The Observer/Controllers report that problems occur with the second step of the process, mission analysis. Trends from the CTCs show that incomplete or poorly conducted mission analysis results in a weakly stated mission, incomplete commander's intent, and a vague appreciation of available time.¹

The problem continues in the third step, course of action (COA) development. CTC trends reflect that incomplete or poorly conducted COA development results in missing the level of detail required to execute war gaming.² The reality at the CTCs is that MDMP is conducted in a time-constrained environment resulting in commander's guidance to develop one or two friendly COAs.³ The time-constrained environment further leads to the commander selecting a COA or refining a COA to take to the next step of MDMP, COA analysis (War game). However, the doctrinal result of COA development is the commander's acceptance of one or more than one COA.⁴

Course of action analysis, commonly known as war gaming, is a very difficult and painstaking process for a staff. The end state of this step should be a synchronized plan with all products completed for inclusion into the field artillery support plan (FASP). Although it is meant to synchronize the efforts of a brigade combat team or its direct support field artillery battalion, the opposite is often the result. When an inexperienced staff does not follow the MDMP as set out in FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, and Draft FM 6-20-1, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Field Artillery (FA) Cannon Battalion, a successful war game is nearly impossible. The war game is the sum of all the previous steps taken in the MDMP. Mistakes made and shortcuts taken early in the process all come to a head at the war game. Conversely, a unit can also make up for lost time by taking care and executing a good war-game battle-drill aimed at synchronizing their plan.

Mission Analysis

The staff of the FA battalion was deeply embroiled in a war game for the defensive phase of a Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation. From the beginning of the process, begun an hour earlier, confusion had reigned within the tight confines of the planning tent. Using a laser pointer to highlight the movement of the enemy division reconnaissance, the S2 began briefing the enemy counteraction to friendly actions during the security zone fight from a hastily prepared situation template. He did not understand the need for an event template, nor had he received one from his brigade. The S3, looking up from his copy of the commander's guidance thinks, "We should have caught the task to provide fires for the security zone fight during mission analysis, how the heck did we fall so far behind?"

Battle staffs commonly believe they can save time by skipping or paying "lip service" to the requirements of mission analysis, giving in to the urge to rush through the process in order to get at the "meat" of the orders process. Few things could be further from the truth, as a strong house built on a shaky foundation is sure to collapse. Another common failure in mission analysis is that the staff of the field artillery battalion, particularly the S2, is not trained or prepared to gather the appropriate tools from the beginning. Most staffs consist of officers who are not captain's career course or CAS3 graduates with little practical experience in the MDMP, assisted by NCOs who also have little school or field experience with the process. The artillery S2 is also typically an artilleryman with no training in the particulars of intelligence or the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). It is a formidable training task in today's Army, with all the difficulties of OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO, to bring a young staff together and train to standard the particulars of how to perform the MDMP. Turning each step of the process into a standard battle-drill assists in training the staff to provide the commander and his subordinate commanders with the information they need to act. Just as thorough training in howitzer crew drill improves a gun section's performance and mission times, a staff battle-drill reduces confusion and defines the standard products for moving to the next task. As the staff in the example above learned, failure to get mission analysis right will result in not having the tools prepared to get the most out of the rest of the MDMP. This article outlines one possible battle drill for the mission analysis phase of the MDMP.

Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, states, "mission analysis is crucial to the MDMP. It allows the commander to begin his battlefield visualization. The result of mission analysis is defining the tactical problem and beginning the process of determining feasible solutions." ⁵ The 17 steps of mission analysis, many of which occur simultaneously, are outlined in Figure 1.

THE MISSION ANALYSIS BATTLE DRILL

TASK: Conduct Mission Analysis

CONDITIONS: The Direct Support Field Artillery TOC in a tactical environment. All staff principals present and supervised by either the S3 or XO acting as Chief of Staff. Staff has all planning tools required to complete the process.

Recommended tools:

Large scale maps of AO 1:25,00 or larger with brigade graphics.

Cartoon of AO and/or prominent/significant built up areas.

Blown up and laminated mission analysis briefing boards.

Enlarged copy of a blank timeline.

STANDARDS:

1. Mission Overview (Step 1). The S3 gathers the staff and gives a brief overview of the brigade mission and general guidance from the FSCOORD on how the operation will unfold. A copy of the brigade order must be obtained at once by using a courier accompanying the FSCOORD, S3, and S2 to the orders brief. This way the staff can prepare the TOC for planning while the order is ongoing. The S3 briefs:

• Brigade mission and commander's intent.
• Brigade tasks, constraints, and limitations.
• Concept of the operation and outlines of the area of operations (AO). He also includes the mission and location of any adjacent units that may affect the brigade AO.
• Proposed timeline, to include rehearsals.

2. Analysis Worksheets (Steps 1, and 3-8). The staff receives the brigade order and each section immediately begins reviewing their appropriate sections and filling out the battalion mission analysis worksheet (Appendix A).⁶

Each staff member, after analyzing the brigade order for tasks and conditions in his area that may affect the battalion, starts refining data that will allow the principal staff members to paint a picture of the status of the battalion. The S3 and XO determine from the essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) the tasks brigade has directed the FA battalion to accomplish and produce the battalion essential field artillery tasks (EFATs).⁷ The S2 reviews tasks to the unit from the brigade reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan and begins to focus his intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products on what is most likely to be the battalion's mission (i.e. counter-mortar, SEAD, landing zone preparation, etc.). The FDO collects a status of the firing elements of the battalion, particularly of how the batteries are managing the five elements of accurate, predicted fire and ammunition status by lot, especially killer munitions. He also looks at the projected battalion EFATs to determine the ammunition necessary to achieve a certain effect. The S4 determines what ammo is available within the brigade by lot and also the quantity of projected resupply munitions, again by lot. All staff members look for ways to convert the raw data to meaningful capabilities, such as number of battalion volleys of RAP or number of smoke screens available to the unit. The radar technician should also be present with the staff for planning, assisting the S2 with his wealth of technical knowledge to influence the positioning and use of the Q36 radar section.

3. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (Steps 2, 8 and 9). The S2 and his section must be given time to complete his products before mission analysis can continue. Since the S2 holds arguably the most vital staff position in the battalion during the MDMP, and considering that he is probably the most inexperienced staff member, he needs help to complete this task successfully. The XO and S3 need to mentor him in this process, first by knowing what the S2 should be producing, and second by showing him what "right looks like" for intelligence products. The two senior officers on the staff must teach the S2 what his section has to produce and what function those products play in generating battlefield visualization for the commander and the rest of the staff. The S2 cannot simply produce a stock list of doctrinal intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products; he must focus on those products that focus on the mission of the direct support battalion and those that will provide the greatest visualization for the commander, staff, and eventually subordinate commanders and their units. The following methods will guide the S2 in his IPB process:

• Obtain the brigade S2's IPB products and his interpretation of the enemy situation and possible courses of action. The S2 section must be able to articulate this vision ` to the rest of the staff while ensuring that their own products are synchronized with those of brigade. The brigade S2 is a busy staff section. Sometimes the battalion S2 must be patient or be prepared to proceed on partial information. Products obtained from brigade must be refined as necessary to have relevance to the direct support battalion.
• Produce the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) either obtained from brigade or completed by the section itself. Since the brigade's AO is the FA battalion's AO, this product should exist in the S2 section's repertoire prior to deployment. A good example for the components of an artillerized MCOO exists in the draft FM 6-20-1, The Field Artillery Battalion. The S3, XO, and radar technician can use this product to prepare possible firing position areas, trains locations, and radar positions for current and future operations. It should be modified from the brigade's MCOO in the following areas to account for specific items of interest to the artillery:

  Cant (slope) greater than 90 mils, site to crest, and intervening crests.

  Elevation, possibly using an elevation tint.

It should also highlight:

Air and ground avenues of approach

Built up areas.

Key terrain.

• Produce a situation template (SITEMP) for at least two enemy courses of action (ECOAs) or a cartoon snapshot representing them. Typically this equates to a most dangerous ECOA and a most likely ECOA. Depending on the battalion mission, the S2 section should refine this SITEMP to reflect the area that will be of most interest to the FA battalion. If the primary mission of the battalion is counter-mortar, the S2 should focus on the enemy mortar threat that supports that ECOA. Time will be short, and he cannot focus on everything, so he must portray the threats that most directly affect the unit. The S2 must also highlight potential dangers to the batteries to assist the S3 and radar technician in selecting positions for unit. Air avenues of approach and infiltration routes from the MCOO are helpful in depicting this.
• Develop initial deployment specifications for the radar section with the assistance of the radar technician. As the radar is virtually the only collection asset the battalion truly owns, the S2's reconnaissance effort is concentrated here. If the radar technician is present during mission analysis, the intelligence officer's workload is lighter. The S2 shows the tech where the enemy indirect systems will position and where they will shoot (i.e. point of origin, point of impact, and aspect angle) based on his and brigade's best interpretation and allows the tech to do the analysis for himself. If the radar technician is not present, he must train the S2 to do this for him.
• Determine the gaps in available intelligence using the imperfect picture obtained of the enemy situation. Using these gaps, he develops the battalion priority information requirements (PIR). He also puts together part of the essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) that relate to enemy actions. The S3 develops the rest of EEFI and friendly force information requirements (FFIR) to eventually become the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) when approved by the commander.

4. Posting on Mission Analysis Boards (Steps 3-8, 10 and 14). Once complete, each section submits the completed copy of the mission analysis worksheet to the XO or S3. Each worksheet is reviewed and the S3 uses a highlighter to indicate to the operations sergeant or assistant S3 which tasks, constraints, restrictions, request for information (RFI), or other pertinent data to post with alcohol pen or grease pencil on the mission analysis boards. Critical times, such as rehearsals or staging times, are also identified and placed on the battalion timeline. A technique to accomplish this is shown in Appendix B. All times are displayed on a horizontal bar timeline, with separate bars for daylight, enemy actions (based off the S2's estimate), and friendly actions. Posting the timeline graphically in this manner allows the staff to see how their actions relate to the enemy and light conditions. The use of the mission analysis worksheets quickly collects the pertinent data in the brigade order for further collective analysis as it applies to the battalion. The fire support coordination (FSCOORD), while the staff is collecting information, completes his initial guidance worksheet composed of at least the following thirteen elements :⁸

• Priority of EFATs, guidance on methods to accomplish each, and clarification of effects.
• Course of action (COA) development guidance, to include number of friendly FA COAs and enemy FS COAs to consider and decisive points.
• CSS priorities
• Type of order to issue
• CCIR and RFIs
• Positioning priorities and deception
• Munitions mix (CCL) and distribution
• C² arrangements
• Retrans guidance
• Survey and R&S priorities
• Risk guidance
• The time plan, produced from the commander's analysis of available time
• Rehearsal guidance

5. Staff Review (Steps 3-11). Once the S2 has completed his initial IPB products, the Chief of Staff gathers the entire staff together to review the collected information posted on the mission analysis boards. This meeting follows the format in Figure 2 but it is not a briefing. The staff begins just like they conduct a mission analysis briefing, but the intent is to bring the staff's specialized information together to weld a picture of the battalion in time and space as it currently exists. The S2 should brief his portion as follows:

• Terrain- illuminating effects of weather and terrain.
• The enemy -- from big to small, using doctrinal templates if available to show organizations.
• The enemy commander's objective, intent, and greatest concern.
• Enemy COAs, using sketches, concentrating on his FS assets
• What we know about the enemy.
• What we don't know about the enemy.
• What the enemy knows about us.
• Recommended PIR.
• Tentative reconnaissance plan, mainly concentrating on the Q36.⁹

Since the staff has identified their pieces on the MA worksheets, this brief review allows the entire staff to visualize the state of the battalion, the battlefield, and the threat. The XO or S3 leads the procedure and finalizes the analysis of the battalion mission, culminating in the wording of the restated mission and revised battalion timeline. The XO or S3 also completes the initial risk assessment of the mission for approval by the commander. The staff is now prepared for the mission analysis brief to the FSCOORD.

6. Mission Analysis Brief (Steps 12 and 13). The brief uses the format in Figure 2. Time should not be wasted in making the brief pretty (i.e. transcribing all data into power-point slides and the like), but rather on making the presentation visually effective to help the commander see the enemy and the battlefield. The S2 can do this by using graphic cartoon of the ECOAs and the doctrinal organization of the threat on butcher block or chart packs. A picture, after all, does say a thousand words. The commander then either approves or modifies the restated mission, resulting in the final battalion mission statement.

7. Issue Commander's Guidance (Step 15). The FSCOORD issues his guidance after approving the battalion mission statement using at a minimum the thirteen points stated earlier. The entire staff must understand what to expect out of the commander's guidance, and what minimum information their section needs to continue the planning process. Ten minutes after guidance is issued the staff briefs back the FSCOORD on their understanding of his guidance. This demonstrates to the commander that his staff has a firm grasp on how he intends to develop this operation. Too often staffs have only a partial understanding or a general misunderstanding of critical pieces of the commander's guidance that result in wasted time, a flawed plan, or both.

Mission Analysis Briefing

XO: Introduction, Purpose, and Agenda S2: Initial IPB: Terrain and weather (illuminate effects) The enemy (big to small) Enemy commander's intent/objective/worst fear Enemy course of action (ECOA) development Snapshot ECOA sketches What we know about the enemy (targeting implications) What we don't know about the enemy (recon implications) What the enemy knows about us (positioning/counter-recon implications) Recommended PIR Tentative recon plan (Q36 focused, briefed by radar tech) S3: Mission Analysis: Current combat power Current situation of batteries Current and projected task organization Missions/intents two levels up Specified, implied and essential tasks (EFATs) Limitations (constraints and restrictions) Restated mission (who, what, where, when & why) Additional assets required (RFIs) S4: Current Equipment & Classes of Supply Status (Cl I(w), III, IV, V (arty and small arms) S1: Current and Projected PERSTAT and Medical Assets Available SIGO: Communication Status (voice and digital) FSCOORD: Commander's Guidance XO: Timeline

8. Issue Warning Order (WARNO) number two to Batteries (Step 16). Once the brief back is concluded the S3 issues warning order number two to subordinate elements either verbally or in writing. Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) should be used as much as possible to transmit the WARNO, with a follow up confirmation on FM radio to ensure the subordinate commanders have received a copy. The second WARNO consists of, at a minimum:

Intelligence update

Restated mission

AO and known mobility/counter-mobility information

Commander's intent

Prioritized EFATs and other key priorities

Timeline estimates for planning/rehearsal/execution

CCIR: PIR, EEFI, and FFIR

Risk and survivability guidance

Reconnaissance to be initiated

Rehearsal guidance

Pre-combat inspection/pre-combat check (PCI/PCC) priorities

9. Review Facts, Assumptions, and Gather Tools (Step 17). After the WARNO has been transmitted, the staff updates any information that might have changed on the battalion briefing boards, and begins to gather the necessary tools to begin course of action development. The products developed during mission analysis are depicted in Figure 3.

This battle drill works best after the receipt of the brigade operations order. However, due to encountering compressed timelines, concurrent planning is a necessity particularly at the CTCs. Typically, units try to get too far ahead of the brigade MDMP process and find their plan becoming desynchronized with the brigade plan. Time is nearly always better spent refining mission analysis products and allowing the S2 to finish developing his initial IPB, until the brigade is complete with its war game (course of action analysis). In certain situations where the brigade's final COA is very clear, the FA battalion can effectively begin COA development, but it still has to monitor the brigade's war game carefully to avoid becoming desynchronized. One technique many battalions have used effectively is for the FSCOORD to come back to the battalion tactical operations center (TOC) during breaks in the brigade MDMP and help the staff refine its products for mission analysis. A possible timeline for concurrent planning is included in Figure 4 with the FSCOORD's location depicted for each step. In cases where the MDMP must be accelerated or modified, the commander's presence and influence is critical for ensuring that the process stays focused and on the proper track.

The preceding battle drill is not the only way for the field artillery battalion to successfully conduct mission analysis, but it is a proven method that works for units in the field. Good mission analysis defines the tactical problem and presents methods and solutions by creating the building blocks for every tactical decision made thereafter. Mission analysis is a crucial step of the MDMP that can be streamlined, but never cut short. Only time and experience speeds up the process. Units that take the time to provide solid mission analysis give their units all the advantages of a common visualization of the area of operations and a clear understanding of the enemy and the battlefield environment. They are therefore ready to begin developing courses of action in the next step of the MDMP.

SECTION 2

A Course of Action Development Battle Drill

Life was not getting any easier for the FA battalion staff struggling with war gaming the defensive phase of a Joint Readiness Training Center rotation. Confusion still ruled the planning tent. The S2 was again briefing the enemy counteraction to friendly reactions-this time in the motorized Infantry attack - off another situation template, this one less detailed than that of the security zone fight. This time the laser light dancing around the less than clear template seemed like a high-tech version of the "big-hand, little-map" known to all briefers caught unprepared or ill-informed. The S3 again thought, "We are not clicking the way we should be. The S2 is trying but we need to get our act together. Otherwise what should be second nature to a staff is going to eat us alive. We should have identified the battery to fire this EFAT, as well as the required munitions for its successful accomplishment during COA development."

As stated earlier, problems with the military decision-making process (MDMP) encountered by this inexperienced staff are common to many of the FA battalions that rotate through the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) every year. Observer/Controllers have noted a weakness in MDMP beginning with mission analysis and continuing with course of action (COA) development. Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, outlines the doctrinal six steps for COA development shown in Figure 5. Field Manual 6-20-1, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Field Artillery Battalion uses the same steps as FM 101-5, except for Step 5 which in FM 6-20-1 is "Examine C² Options."

THE COA DEVELOPMENT BATTLE DRILL

TASK: Conduct COA Development

CONDITIONS: The Direct Support Field Artillery TOC in a tactical environment. All staff principals present and supervised by either the S3 or XO, acting as Chief of Staff. Staff has all planning tools required to complete the process. Mission analysis is complete resulting in receiving commander's guidance and publishing WARNORD #2 to subordinates.

Recommended tools:

Large-scale maps of area of operations (AO), 1:25,000 or larger with brigade graphics.

Sketch/cartoon of AO and/or prominent/significant built up areas.

Brigade commander back brief board.

Brigade's initial fire support plan: FSEM, TSM, target list, etc.

Enemy initial event template.

Artillerized modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO).

Enlarged copy of timeline established in mission analysis.

Blown up and laminated field artillery support matrix (FASM).

Icons of all assets available.

Blank or PA overlay for recording PAs and routes.

Air movement tables and/or convoy tables.

An RFI or issues log.

Gunnery data: JMEMS, rates of fire, range fans, etc.

STANDARDS:

1. Analyze relative combat power, facts, and assumptions (Step1). The S2 section plays a key role in this step. The section interacts with various members of the staff to include the S3, FDO, and radar tech. The S2 section can facilitate this interaction through the use of event templates, artillerized MCOO, imagery, and an understanding of the enemy's TTP.

The FDO and S2 jointly determine the ammunition needed to achieve the EFATs identified during mission analysis. The S2 lays out for the FDO the high priority target (HPT) or the enemy formation, based on the brigade FSO's established engagement criteria and its degree of protection. The FDO ascertains the number of times he must fire against the specific enemy formation/HPT to achieve the required effects. The FDO computes this using various shell/fuze combinations and volleys. Additionally, he computes volleys required for his internal assets of 105mm and 155mm and any other GS weapon systems available. Lastly, the FDO determines how long it takes to fire each of these fire missions based on sustained rate of fire for the firing units.

The S2 decides the location of the mortars, as well as where and when they will fire based on the enemy's task and purpose for each mortar. This analysis should match or refine the brigade S2's R & S Matrix. The S2 uses this analysis to determine potential Q-36 locations. If the radar tech is present, using his technical knowledge, he can decide on the best map spot locations to acquire the mortars . The S2 will also refine the division G2's analysis of the brigade artillery group (BrAG) and division artillery group (DAG) locations. When and where the BrAG and DAG fires will impact the brigade's AO is just as important as the locations of those firing units.

Once the S2 places these templates on the map board in conjunction with the artillerized MCOO, the S3 can decide on potential position areas (PAs) for the firing batteries and the radar.¹² The S2's artillerized MCOO allows the S3 to determine the more desirable position areas based on cant and sight to crest or intervening crest problems. The initial analysis of the PAs likely occurred before deployment and is refined during the brigade's COA development. The S3 ensures all of the PAs are still available based on brigade's land management.

Lastly, if the mission includes brigade-controlled movements the assistant S3 or S3 Air determines the requirements and availability of slots to get FA assets into the fight. Accomplishment of the initial EFATs, in large part, is based on the combat power available. Brigade will limit, to some extent, the FA battalion's ability to project its full combat power. Therefore, the battalion must determine what is acceptable to accomplish the initial EFATs, as well as, determine when and where the battalion's follow on will close on the AO. In Step 2, the nodes necessary to command and control the combat power are generated. In addition, to provide some flexibility at the initial PA prime movers need to be a consideration. Possible means of insertion include the following:

Airborne assault: the number and type of platforms and chutes available, the arrival of chalks and passes at the DZ.

Air assault / Air mobile: the number and type of rotary wing aircraft available, the ACL, weight restrictions, and the arrival of lifts and serials at the LZ.

Airland: the number and type of aircraft available, the ACL, the arrival of aircraft at the flight landing strip.

Ground Convoy: the number of vehicles per convoy march serial, the number of march serials available to the FA battalion, the arrival of march serials at the release point.

2. Generate Options (Step 2). If the commander issued guidance to develop more than one COA, then this is the step to do so. Even if the commander directed only one COA the staff generates ideas through brainstorming to arrive at the best possible solution. No matter the number of COAs developed each COA must meet the criteria of: suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and completeness.¹³ In Step 5 the S3 or XO, acting as the chief of staff, ensures each COA developed meets the criteria of the SFADC test. The decisive point maneuver task forces use to start this step is altered for the field artillery's process where the EFATs become the starting point for the FA battalion. ¹⁴

3. Array initial forces (Step 3). The S2 must have at a minimum a SITEMP developed for each phase of the fight. Optimally he would have an initial event template completed for each phase of the battle. Using the JRTC motorized infantry brigade (MIB) attack as an example, the S2 should complete the following templates: insertion and ensuing actions, enemy air reconnaissance and attacks, division reconnaissance (recon) fight, brigade recon fight, the motorized infantry attack, and the mechanized attack. The event templates display the enemy graphically for the rest of the staff so they can see when and where fires need to be effective to achieve an EFAT and when, where, and how each one of these enemy formations will affect the FA battalion's positioning of its assets. The S2 does this for both the enemy's most probable COA (MPCOA) and most dangerous COA (MDCOA).

The S3 and FDO jointly arrive at the preferred PAs for the FA assets. The FDO looks at the EFATs for each phase of the battle. The S3's initial PA analysis in Step 1 is the start point for the FDO's backward planning to accomplish each EFAT. Starting at the location of the EFAT, the FDO determines range to target, angle T and/or BMA if required, and EFATs likely occurring at the same time. These factors help decide which PA will be the primary PA. Alternate PAs are determined in war gaming.

The end state for this step is location and orientation of FA assets - each asset is assigned a task and purpose, initial method of delivery tied to the FDO's scheme of fires, ammunition and propellants required at each position, and the identification of threat to each FA asset. Priorities for survey, MET, logistical support, engineer, and air defense also come from analysis in this step. Example task and purposes for a firing battery and radar for two different phases are shown below.

Enemy Phase - PSOC Insertion

Battery X

Task: Destroy PSOC platoon and 81mm mortar on the insertion LZ

Purpose: Engage when the PSOC is most vulnerable to minimize damage to friendly HPTs (BSA, AVN AA, BDE TOC)

Q-36

Task: Pass counter fire acquisitions of the PSOC 81mm mortar to the counter fire battery, battery X

Purpose: Minimize damage to friendly HPTs (BSA, AVN AA, BDE TOC)

Enemy Phase - Motorized Infantry Attack

Battery Y

Task: Disrupt dismounts' breaching of friendly obstacles

Purpose: Force mechanized forces to conduct in-stride or deliberate breaches

Q-36

Task: Pass counter fire acquisitions of the motorized infantry mortars to the battalion FDC

Purpose: Suppress enemy mortars forcing enemy dismounts to attempt breaching without their own SOSR fires

4. Develop the scheme of maneuver-movement plan (Step 4). The movement plan is based on either achieving an EFAT or avoiding the enemy threat. Maneuver can occur by ground, air assault, or a raid type of mission. The end result of this step is a partially filled out FASM (see Appendix C). The S2 starts this step by placing his first template on the sketch or map board. The S3 follows by placing the firing batteries, radar, survey teams, command and control (C2) nodes, retrans, and other attachments in their locations. The FDO briefs the scheme of fires designed to achieve the BN EFATs and discusses any specified or implied priority targets and final protective fires (FPFs) the battalion is responsible for. The S2 or radar tech addresses any known BDE NAIs or radar zones to be covered by the Q-36. Once each asset's information is determined and recorded on the FASM for that specific phase, then the process starts again for the next phase. Another format for a FASM is found in CALL Newsletter 99-11.¹⁵ At the end of this step, the S3 or XO quickly run through each of the enemy's templates again to determine routes from PA to PA, placing FA asset time-phase lines on the same overlay as the PAs and routes. The same timeline developed during mission analysis is used to capture friendly events: battery in position ready to fire times (IPRTF), radar in position ready to observe (IPRTO) times, SP times, PZ/LZ times, etc. Enemy events to note on the timeline are expected times to shoot or deliver EFATs and expected threat times to the batteries or other subordinate units. The enemy timelines help the battalion direct the number of howitzers to be manned. See Appendix B for an example timeline.

5. Assign headquarters (Step 5). The hard staff work occurred in the first four steps. Step 5 merely formalizes the process by placing attachments under battery or battalion control; assigning EFATs, priority targets, FPFs, and targets to the batteries responsible to deliver them to include GS firing units; determining an initial RDO for each phase; determining the C2 structure; and determining the retrans frequencies. The firing units in the FASM switch from generic X, Y, and Z Battery to A, B, and C Battery. The S3 or XO conducts a SFADC test to ensure each COA developed meet those criteria.

6. Prepare COA sketch/statement (Step 6). The FA TOC personnel place the COA on the unit's brigade commander back brief board (see an example in Figure 6) as a time saving technique. The staff ensures each asset task organized to the battalion has a task and purpose listed by phase and that a battalion EFAT covers all EFSTs requiring attack or acquisition by FA assets. The staff uses multiple boards to brief the commander on multiple COAs.

Once finished with the COA brief the TOC can issue combat instructions to subordinates focusing on reconnaissance and battalion directed pre-combat checks (PCCs) enhancing the subordinates' ability to conduct their troop-leading procedures (TLPs).¹⁷ The battery commanders, radar technician, and support platoon leader have enough information at this point to conduct Steps 3-5 of the TLPs (Step 3-make a tentative plan, Step 4-initate movement, and Step 5-conduct reconnaissance). The battle staff monitoring the current fight must ensure they attain and disseminate the results of the reconnaissance to the planning staff for incorporation into war gaming. The staff derives PCCs from assigning an EFAT or from a perceived future enemy threat to the subordinate element.

As discussed in the first article, the FA MDMP battle drills work best after receipt of the brigade's OPORD.¹⁸ However at the CTCs, MDMP is conducted in a time-constrained environment and therefore the FA battalion must conduct concurrent planning to allow subordinates enough time to conduct their troop leading procedures. The FA battalion realistically cannot start their COA development until after the brigade's war game where EFSTs are flushed out. The FA battalion must fight the tendency to rush through their MDMP. They can better spend their time on mission analysis and preparing their products for COA development while waiting on the results from the brigade's war game - in essence going slow to go fast.

The preceding battle drill is not the only way for the field artillery battalion to successfully conduct COA development, but it is a proven method that works for units in the field. COA development is the conceptual step in the MDMP. The staff must develop the concept in enough detail to carry forward into the war game. If the staff does not get to this level of detail in COA development, then they spend too much time war gaming. This forces the war game to last beyond everyone's attention span causing the process to lose its effectiveness. Only time and experience speed up the COA development process. Units that take the time to provide a solid concept with enough detail enhance their subordinate's ability to conduct TLPs in a timely manner. Execution of the COA development battle drill also delivers the staff to the war game ready to execute that step efficiently. Together, these two notions increase the likelihood of successful execution of the battalion's mission.

SECTION 3

A War Game Battle Drill for the Direct Support Field Artillery Battalion

Once again the FA battalion staff garnered its strength to get through war gaming the defensive phase of a Joint Readiness Training Center rotation. This time it was the S3 on deck, prepared to guide the staff through the FA battalion's actions in meeting the main enemy attack against the brigade. The S2 watched and listened but remained ready to participate in the war game. Appearing confident, the S3 hoped to restore some self-confidence in his inexperienced staff. He was only minutes into his discussion when he realized that what his staff had produced during COA development was not in sync with the brigade plan. Chagrined by this revelation, he thought, " Well Major looks like you got some polishing to do on your own staff work. This is gonna be a loooooooooong evening."

Trends from the Combat Training Centers show that most flaws in unit execution can be traced back to inadequate war gaming. Few units attempt to test their plan realistically. They usually fail to give the enemy his vote in the upcoming operation. Battalion staffs often attempt to war game with only the active participation of the S3 and S2; most other staff members sit in silence and scramble to generate their annexes after the war game is complete. Staffs traditionally do not enter the war game prepared with all the data and products required for a synchronized plan.¹⁹ The greatest contribution members of the DS battalion staff can bring to the table for a successful war game is to come to the process prepared with all the knowledge, products, and data available from the preceding steps of the MDMP. Only then will a staff be prepared to begin this battle drill.

The steps of the war game are slightly modified from the war game steps found on page 5-17 of FM 101-5, and are derived primarily from FM 6-20-1. These steps are found in Figure 8.

THE WAR-GAME BATTLE DRILL

TASK: Conduct Course of Action Analysis (War game)

CONDITIONS: The Direct Support Field Artillery TOC in a tactical environment. All staff principals present and supervised by either the S3 or XO serving as Chief of Staff. Staff has all planning tools required to complete the process. Mission analysis and course of action battle drills successfully completed with all output products present.

Recommended tools:

Large scale maps of AO 1:25,00 or larger with brigade graphics.

Commander's back brief board for each COA (From the article "A COA Development Battle Drill").

Partially completed COA field artillery synchronization matrices (FASM) from course of action development.

Enlarged copy of timeline established in mission analysis and refined in COA development.

Enemy event templates for all enemy courses of action to be war gamed.

Overlay for the decision support template.

Brigade fire plan or target list.

Icons of all assets available.

Issues/RFI board.

Gunnery data: JMEMS, range fans, or other critical data

Movement plans and rates of march.

Medical evacuation SOPs and casualty data.

Ammunition consumption and transportation data.

STANDARDS:

1. Gather the Tools (Steps 1-4, and 6). The S3 or XO gathers all of the available staff and directs which COA/ECOAs are to be war gamed, and what method will be used to conduct the war game (box, belt or avenue). The operations section directed by the operations sergeant and assistant S3 then should prepare the TOC planning area for the war game using all of the recommended tools. Required attendees: XO, S3, S2, intelligence sergeant, S4, S1, RSO, FDO, signal officer, chemical officer, assistant S3, operations sergeant, support platoon leader, PA, and radar technician. Certain members of the staff (typically the SPL, radar technician, and PA) in the critical steps of their troop leading procedures might not be able to attend the war game. Their participation depends on the state of training within their sections and personnel manning; however, if they can attend, the war game is better off for their expertise. If not, the XO or S3 must ensure someone is representing their interests during the process.

The large-scale map is set up in the center of the planning area with all participants in front of it. The assistant S3 and operations section supervise the posting of friendly unit icons to starting positions on the large scale map, critical assumptions identified during the previous two battle drills (COA development and mission analysis), and a listing of battalion EFATs derived from brigade EFSTs. Prominently displayed to one side is a blown up copy of the FASM partially filled out during COA development (See Appendix C). The operations sergeant is assigned as recorder. The S2 section ensures the correct event templates for the ECOA to oppose the friendly COA are on the mapboard. The rest of the staff prepares to conduct the war game and ensures they have all critical tools and data they need to provide the expert insight on their particular area. Each staff member should bring a laminated or blank copy of their annex so they can write their portions on the spot as events unfold within the war game and therefore reduce the time to prepare the final FASP. Several copies of the specific annexes will be needed if the staff is war gaming multiple COAs. Make maximum use of the noncommissioned officers within the staff to enhance the productivity of the war game. Staff NCOs provide detailed understanding of unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) and small unit capabilities; they are also usually the long-term continuity in any unit and an invaluable asset to the successful execution of a plan. Train them to be a part of the process and their insights will enhance the end result of the war game.

2. Initial Brief (Steps 5 and 7). Once preparations for the war game are complete the XO or S3 outlines the rules of the war game to the rest of the staff (see Figure 9). He reviews each EFAT using the task, purpose, method, effects methodology to ensure the staff has a complete understanding of the tasks the battalion must synchronize in time and space. The XO then reviews the developed COA that the staff will war game and assigns the operations sergeant as the FASM recorder for the process. He also designates the chemical officer the recorder for outstanding RFIs and issues. If more than one COA is to be war gamed the XO or S3 post evaluation criteria that the staff will use to measure the relative effectiveness of each COA. Once the XO or S3 completes his introduction, the S2 gives a brief overview of the ECOA that opposes the friendly COA using the series of event templates his section has provided (See Appendix D, Example Event Template). He also covers the mission, intent, and HPTs of the enemy commander.

3. Create a Decision Support Template (DST -Step 8). The DST is probably the least utilized tool in any maneuver or field artillery TOC. This is primarily because the S2 section does not have enough time or experience available to produce the event templates necessary in time for the war game. Without the preceding products the creation of a usable DST is highly problematic. The DST is a product of the war game, stemming directly from the enemy event template and the brigade maneuver graphics and timeline. The entire staff has a part in creating this product; it is not simply a responsibility of the S2, though he is key to the process. The DST is a graphical depiction of how the enemy's actions and timeline juxtapose with those of the battalion and brigade. This allows the staff to determine where critical decisions, such as the correct time and trigger to fire a FASCAM minefield or displace a firing asset, must be made. The S3 or XO must control the creation of the DST. The war game begins with either a copy of brigade's DST or as a blank overlay on top of the event template. The S2 and S3 have the joint responsibility during the war game to use the tools provided and create an effective DST.²²

4. War game (Step 8).

a. War game each EFAT. Whatever method the XO or S3 determines to use for war gaming the COA (box, belt, or avenue), the staff war games each event, focusing on the EFATs in order of occurrence. If time is short, start with the most critical events first. The process used for this is the action-reaction-counteraction drill. Many staffs do not understand their role during this process and as a result simply sit back and let the more active members take the lead. Staff members cannot play dead during the process; they must actively contribute with BOS specific information or just their general expertise on the operation. During offensive operations friendly actions occur first, then the enemies counteraction, and finally the friendly reaction. In defensive operations the cycle is reversed, with enemy actions starting first. The staff follows the FASM (Appendix C) and addresses all areas down the column, ensuring that no blank spots are left on the matrix after finishing a particular phase (depending on what method of war game the staff is using). As each event occurs, and a unit changes position, the staff must move the unit icons on the large-scale map to confirm the movement timelines and spot potential conflicts. Time and again at the JRTC, a war game continues from phase to phase and the icons never move from their initial PAs. As the staff addresses each event by the script, some things are naturally addressed during the war game such as coordinating instructions; changes to the CCIR, MOPP, or ADA warning; and weapons control status. Alternate battery EFATs should be identified as well as the alternate PAs to support their accomplishment. Movement and cache of Class V and evacuation of casualties are also identified during this process. The S3 or XO ensures the recorders capture the pertinent information for inclusion into the FASP. All too often the staff will encounter a difficult area that requires drastic modification to the plan and skip over it intending to come back later and address the issue. They usually never get back to it. If the staff has a fundamental problem with the plan and cannot resolve it in the war game, the enemy will usually solve the dilemma for the unit during execution. War gaming is the time to get concrete answers to the hard problems of timing and synchronization. The fill in the blanks test at the end of each column of the FASM lets the S3 or XO know they have addressed all the pertinent issues. The S2, in particular, must aggressively try to "win" the war game to ensure the staff is fully addressing all aspects of friendly responses to enemy actions. Each friendly response is translated to an "on order" or "be prepared" task for friendly assets or batteries. The operations sergeant records those tasks onto the synchronization matrix for later inclusion in the tasks to subordinate units. Figure 10 displays one possible script for the conduct of a war game.²³ The XO (or S3 if the XO is unavailable) must adjudicate the process as Chief of Staff. If the XO is present, the S3 fights the friendly COA while the S2 fights the enemy plan. The key to a successful war game is to have someone objective overseeing the process to ensure all BOS elements participate and that all aspects of the plan are addressed. If the XO is not present, the S3 assumes the role of proctor for the war game, while the AS3 or operations sergeant fights the blue plan. This has an added benefit of showing the S3 how well his staff understands the plan by having them fight the developed COA in front of him. It also allows the blue and red plans to compete equally without the possibility of the S3 starting to favor "his" plan over other possible solutions. Growing too wedded to a plan is a hazard of all staff officers and the tendency must be avoided, especially in the war game.

b. War game the fire plans. Though the fire plans for the battalion are war gamed in accordance with the script in Figure 10, many critical issues are covered during this part of the war game that are of extreme importance to the success of the brigade's plan. The FDO, S4 and SPL (if present) must work together to determine if the proposed fire plans are actually executable. The FDO reviews the established engagement criteria and volume of fire and quantifies the effects on each target the battalion desires to engage during the time period being war gamed. He also states how many times he expects to engage that target before he is successful. He can also postulate based on the current target list and the S2's portrayal of the enemy situation the number of targets of opportunity the battalion will encounter. The S4 or SPL respond with what is actually present on the line of metal, what is at the BSA in the ATP and uploaded on trucks or ready to be airlifted, and what they can expect to receive in the future. Combat configured loads (CCLs) are also identified at this time. Shortfalls in Class V should be very evident at this stage of the war game, and the staff can determine probable emergency resupply packages tied to the CCLs. It is absolutely essential that the staff have a current target list, if not the final one, giving them at least an indication of where the brigade wants to shoot. Without this critical piece of information, the staff can only guess at what their Class V requirements may be. The S3 and battalion FDO must emphasize to the brigade FSO how critical it is for subordinate FSOs to quickly refine the brigade target list instead of merely allocating targets to them. Every target created after the FA battalion war game is another target that desynchronizes the FA plan. Battalion FSOs must communicate efficiently with their brigade FSE and the battalion FDC to get their refined and/or priority targets to the FA battalion in a timely manner. The war game may be delayed until this occurs. War gaming without at least an initial brigade target list is almost always an exercise in futility. A good TTP to use to adjust for late target refinements is to conduct the war game normally using the best target list available and follow with a synchronization meeting to catch changes after target refinement cutoff time.

c. Determine other FA decision points. Other decision points that affect the battalion must be identified at the end of each column of the FASM or as they are encountered. They are based in the main on the experience of the staff. Some examples include resupply triggers for critical types of munitions, displacement criteria, when and under what conditions should the unit request additional GS volleys, switching C² nodes for the battalion and how the FDC will pass control, reorienting or moving the batteries, or when to fire an avenue blocking FASCAM minefield. The war game is where all of the moving pieces of the battalion fight come together, and only at this stage if they have done their job properly, can the staff see the potentially fatal pitfalls in their plan. Only when an event template is overlaid on the brigade graphics can the S3 see that the enemy dismounts will move through an area before A Battery can possibly displace. Countermeasures are fairly simple to produce during the war game but extremely difficult to execute on the fly without desynchronizing the rest of the battalion fight.

d. Display Decision Points (DPs) on Operations Overlay (Step 8). Once the S3 or XO has reached a decision point the intelligence sergeant graphically represents that DP on the DST after that column of the FASM is completed. This way the product is built during the process, and does not get in the way of orders preparation. The DST is an excellent execution tool for members of the DS battalion staff once they are trained to use it to alert themselves and their units of upcoming decisions.

8. War game another COA or begin FASP preparation. If another COA needs to be war gamed, follow the steps just outlined above. If only one COA is war gamed begin the FASP preparation battle drill. Issue WARNORD number 3 at the completion of the war game.

This battle drill works best after the receipt of the brigade operations order. However, due to compressed timelines, concurrent planning is a necessity particularly at the CTCs. Typically, units try to get too far ahead of the brigade MDMP process and find their plan becoming desynchronized with the brigade plan. The FA battalion must attempt to delay their war game at least until after the brigade's war game, due to the lack of a fairly concrete target list. A good SOP on how the battalion conducts parallel or concurrent planning will make the planning process much smoother for the unit.

The preceding battle drill is not the only way for the field artillery battalion to successfully conduct course of action analysis, but it is a proven method that works for units in the field. A good war game delineates the tasks to be accomplished by the DS battalion and synchronizes that plan in time and space. A field artillery battalion's war game is the sum of all the mistakes made during the preceding steps of the MDMP. What goes into the war game is what eventually comes out. If you fail to give the enemy his vote during course of action analysis, he will invariably get it during execution. It is too late to do anything then except react. Only time and experience speeds up and refines the process. Units that take the time to train up to an effective war game find their actions synchronized with the movements of their brigade, and their supporting fires more effective.

CONCLUSIONS

The next operations order to the DS FA Battalion came 24 hours later. This time the S3 grabbed the XO as soon as the commander had reviewed the new mission. "XO, let's do this one right and we will get it right the first time. We squeaked by on the first mission. We can do better. We just gotta go slow when we need to and then we can go fast when we have to..."

That really is the essence of the military decision-making process (MDMP). It is designed to be a painstaking process that forces the participants to consider all the factors in arriving at and war gaming a course of cction. There are adaptive differences in the process from maneuver to support units but the baseline process remains the same. The use of the MDMP is critical for new staffs or for staffs new to operational tempos as sustained at the CTCs. Once those staffs have undergone several iterations of the MDMP, they will become more seasoned and begin to function like true battlestaffs. The battle drills suggested by the authors in this newsletter will help unit staffs achieve greater seasoning even before they arrive at the JRTC. Crawl through the drills until your staff can walk through them. You will be ready when you can run through them without even thinking about it.

¹NTC Trends Compendium 97-17 3QFY96-2QFY97, pp. N-171-174. JRTC Priority Trends 3QFY96, pp. N-59-63.

²CTC Trends (JRTC) 00-2, February 2000, pp. 62-63; CTC Trends (NTC) 99-10, August 1999, pp. 30-31, p. 93; JRTC Trends Compendium 98-7, p. N-45.

³Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, 31 May 1997, p. 5-30.

⁴FM 101-5, p. 5-16.

⁵FM 101-5, p. 5-5.

⁶Another version of a MA worksheet is provided in CALL 99-11, An Artillerization of the MDMP, Appendix B

⁷These EFATs are not complete yet. They will probably consist of, at most, task, purpose and effects.

⁸Draft FM 6-20-1, The Field Artillery Battalion.

⁹Fort Sill Handout TV01CN, 24 Sep 97, "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield with a Purpose", pg. 5.

¹⁰FM 101-5, p. 5-11.

¹¹Draft FM 6-20-1, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battalion, p. 4-14.

¹²FM 6-20-1, p. 4-13.

¹³FM 101-5, p. 5-11.

¹⁴FM 101-5, p. 5-12.

¹⁵Center for Army Lessons Learned, Newsletter 99-11, August 1999, p. G-1.

¹⁶FM101-5, pp. 5-16 and 5-25.

¹⁷Field Manual 7-10, The Infantry Company, 14 December 1990, p. 2-11.

¹⁸"A Mission Analysis Battle Drill for the Direct Support Field Artillery Battalion"

¹⁹CTC Trends (JRTC) 99-7, July 99 p. 50. and CTC Trends (NTC) 99-10, Aug 99, pp 95-96.

²⁰FM 101-5, p. 5-17 & Draft FM 6-20-1, p. 4-15 and 4-16.

²¹USACGSC Lesson Plan S320BL4, p. 4-31, Feb 97.

²²See FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, Figure A-4, page A-13, for an example of a decision support template).

²³Another similar war game script is found in CALL CTC Quarterly Bulletin, 00-03, FY99, March 00. "Wargaming the DS Battalion Way", p. 63.

²⁴This script is optimized for defensive operations. In offensive operations friendly events go first.