TA.4
COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS
(Trends
are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not
in
any priority order.)Positive
Performance
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
FM communications
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 MP): FM communications has improved.
DISCUSSION:
This
success is directly linked with sustainment training and new equipment training
that units conduct at Home Station. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
Continue
to emphasize communications during Home Station training.
(TA.4.1.1
Communicate Information)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Communication systems
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Aviation staffs continue to understand the correct employment of
their communication systems.
DISCUSSION:
Aviation
staffs are able to maintain multiple redundant secure means of communications
to higher and subordinate units. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
Units
need to sustain communication systems training at Home Station. (TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
SINCGARS and installing/operating/maintaining (OMI) multiple subscriber equipment
(MSE) systems operations
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 SIG): Operator skills for SINCGARS radio and the demonstrated proficiency
in OMI MSE team drills are continuing to improve.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Frequency hopping radio nets set to PLGR time is the standard by which all
light units operate. Operator level troubleshooting skills have also seen dramatic
improvement over the past year. However, net control stations (NCS) must pay
better attention to monitoring the "time drift" on their master radios and
over the air rekey (OTAR) procedures. 2.
MSE teams have consistently demonstrated proficiency in installing/operating/maintaining
MSE systems (NC, SEN, LOS, RAU, SCC-2, and CCPS). SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1.
A solid operator certification program at Home Station is the key to SINCGARS
operation. 2.
Teams are spending time at the intermediate staging base (ISB) and Home Station
conducting drills in accordance with (IAW) prescribed manuals (TMs and ARTEP
11-067-30-MTP).
Many units have developed policies and procedures for the standardization of
MSE drills; V
Corps Pam 11-30
is
a prime example. (TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Brigade main engineer cell (BMEC)
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ENG): Engineer battalions are more consistently resourcing the brigade
main engineer cell (BMEC) with the appropriate level of personnel and communications
equipment.
DISCUSSION:
The
result is a cell with true 24-hour planning and C2 capability. Battle staff
qualified NCOs, advance course graduate captains, and engineer lieutenants
have proven critical to the execution of duties and responsibilities of the
BMEC. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Review the BMEC as outlined in FM
5-7-30, Brigade
Engineer and Engineer Company Combat Operations.
2.
Recommend sustainment of Engineer Officer Advance Course (EOAC) graduate ABE's
augmented with a battle staff NCOIC, an engineer lieutenant or junior captain,
and one or two E-4 draftsman/radio telephone operator (RTO). (TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Company command post operations
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): Heavy teams have improved company (or troop) command post
operations.
DISCUSSION:
This
includes providing the necessary material (shelter, radios, map board, etc.)
and personnel to conduct 24-hour operations. The command post is especially
critical during the low-intensity conflict (LIC) phase because of decentralized
operations with the platoons/sections. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
Review
CALL
Newsletter No. 95-7, TOC
Operations,
for
ideas on setting up and operating a command post (CP). (TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Developing battle-tracking tools and situational awareness
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 NBC): Rotational chemical platoon personnel are arriving with a wealth
of knowledge and are thirsty for more information.
DISCUSSION:
Chemical
platoons have tools that will assist in keeping track of the NBC battlefield.
The use of charts help track items such as maps with current graphics, chemical
defense equipment, chemical downwind messages, FM communications status, NBC
equipment status, and personnel status. This enabled the platoons to better
battle track the current friendly activities and capabilities of the enemy.
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
Review
CALL
Newsletter No. 95-7, TOC
Operations,
for
ideas on battle tracking and situational awareness. (TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
7
SUBJECT:
Use of tactical command posts (CP)
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2): Commanders are making good use of their tactical command posts (TAC).
DISCUSSION:
1.
Commander's guidance is generally clear and concise, giving the staff a focus
for their efforts. 2.
Commanders are making good use of their TACs and generally bring the appropriate
staff members with them. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
Commanders
are also doing a great deal of battlefield circulation with subordinate commanders,
which in turns provides valuable planning information for the staff at the
brigade main. (TA.4.2
Assess Situation)
TREND
8
SUBJECT:
Integration of special units
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2): Light, airborne, and air assault brigades are becoming more adept
at using the armor/mechanized (mech) teams that deploy with them. This is primarily
due to better integration of the armor/mech LNO team into the brigade's planning
process.
DISCUSSION:
When
initially planned for at brigade and then followed up by battalion staffs,
Army attack aviation and ground maneuver forces have been very successful in
integrating their efforts. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
None.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
9
SUBJECT:
Small unit leadership
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): There has been a noticeable improvement in Bradley platoons,
as it relates to small unit leaders.
DISCUSSION:
Small
unit leaders in the platoon have been taking charge of the next higher unit
when key leaders have become casualties or are taken out of the battle. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
Numerous times young sub-unit leaders were observed taking the initiative,
in the absence of orders, to ensure that the mission gets accomplished. It
is interesting to note that most of the time these sub-unit leaders did not
have a clear understanding of the unit's situational awareness and where they
were going. (TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND
10
SUBJECT:
Integration of armor into the light infantry brigade/battalion
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): The integration of the armor platoon into the light infantry
brigade/battalion continues to improve.
DISCUSSION:
Commanders
are willing to use these assets and employ them within their doctrinal capabilities.
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: None.
(TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND
11
SUBJECT:
Tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP)
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Units have developed outstanding task force oriented TACSOPs.
DISCUSSION:
These
TACSOPs address a broad spectrum including attack, cavalry and assault tactics,
techniques and procedures. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
The
next step to a complete task force TACSOP is to include employment of other
items that are frequently tasked organized with the task force. Include a COLT
team, various intelligence assets (REMBASS, LLVI, GSR), armor/mech team, ADA
assets to include Stinger/Avenger teams, and engineer teams. (TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND
12
SUBJECT:
Troop-leading procedures
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Units continue to execute thorough troop-leading procedures at the
forward support medical team (FSMT) level, preventing any undue hardship during
rotation.
DISCUSSION:
FSMTs
are typically well prepared to perform their air-medical evacuation mission.
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
Aviation
unit maintenance (AVUM) level maintenance is performed well and is rarely a
cause for delay on missions. (TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND
13
SUBJECT:
Motivation
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 MP): The majority of military police (MP) platoons have a tremendously
positive attitude and a desire to learn.
DISCUSSION:
These
MP platoons practice new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and develop
and validate new platoon standing operating procedures (SOP). SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: MP
platoons demonstrate an incredible amount of flexibility and ability to accomplish
missions with limited resources available, a credit to proper troop-leading
procedures. (TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND
14
SUBJECT:
Tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP)
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 NBC): Rotational units generally have good TACSOPs.
DISCUSSION:
These
TACSOPs contained the information necessary to do sustained operations in a
chemical environment. The contents did need to be updated to reflect changes
in doctrine and unit missions. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: SOPs
are only effective if the unit's personnel are familiar with it and implement
the procedures. This still needs additional emphasis in all unit training and
execution. (TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND
15
SUBJECT:
Night-vision devices (NOD) usage
OBSERVATION
(ANTI-ARMOR CO): NOD usage is generally strong.
DISCUSSION:
Soldiers
and leaders are proficient in the use of NOD and the TOW thermal sight. Soldiers
consistently use NODs during hours of limited visibility. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: NOD
were usually, with a few exceptions, worn correctly (i.e., mounted and in use,
rather than worn around the neck). This is due to leaders checking their soldiers
and making on-the-spot corrections. (TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND
16
SUBJECT:
Pre-combat inspections (PCIs)/Pre-combat checks (PCCs)
OBSERVATION
(TF 2): Increased involvement of NCOs has improved PCIs and PCCs.
DISCUSSION:
Soldiers
are moving with the necessary equipment and knowledge to execute missions.
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: When
company orders are given early, checks and inspections are conducted to standard.
(TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND
17
SUBJECT:
Planning cells
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Companies have greatly improved the use of company mission planning
cells and the aviation mission planning system (AMPS).
DISCUSSION:
The
company mission planning cells provided the commanders with more time to develop
and refine their scheme of maneuver and intent at the objective by executing
less complex and time-consuming aspects of the mission planning process. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
These
cells brief their own sections at the company operation orders (OPORDs). Involvement
makes all crewmembers more familiar with the mission. (TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plan or Orders)
TREND
18
SUBJECT:
Mission planning
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Mission planning at the aviation company level is especially noteworthy.
DISCUSSION:
Assault
crews consistently show considerable determination toward in-depth planning
and mission accomplishment regardless of limited information from higher headquarters
and time available. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Continue to reinforce Home Station training in planning and in the Military
Decision-Making Process. 2.
Review CALL
Newsletter No. 95-12, Military
Decision-Making: "Abbreviated Planning" Update,
May
97. (TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans and Orders)
TREND
19
SUBJECT:
Reporting
OBSERVATION
(FS DIV): Unit communications from the gates and the towers to the base camp
defense operations center (BDOC) remain strong.
DISCUSSION:
Guards
must report all activity at the gates and around the perimeter in a timely
manner to the BDOC. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
None.
(TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans and Orders)
TREND
20
SUBJECT:
Develop and communicate a plan and rehearsal
OBSERVATION
(LF DIV): Given the limited time between the planning and execution phases,
most leaders develop and communicate an adequate operations order (70 percent
solution).
DISCUSSION:
Leaders
refine and finalize the plan through rehearsals and subsequent fragmentary
orders (FRAGOs). SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1.
By adhering to the 1/3-2/3 rule, company commanders and platoon leaders are
allocating to subordinates sufficient time for sub-unit rehearsals prior to
platoon or company consolidated rehearsals. 2.
Units are implementing contingency plans and conducting effective informal
after-action reviews (AAR) at the completion of each rehearsal. However, one
problem exists concerning the link between the planning/rehearsal phase and
the actual execution of the mission: Rotational unit leaders fail to tell their
subordinates that the rehearsal location does not exactly mirror the terrain
on which the unit will be conducting its mission. 3.
Rehearsals are conducted on somewhat similar terrain, but leaders need to ensure
that the focus of the rehearsals is on battle drills and necessary individual
tasks, not on the aspects of time, distance, and line of sight. When soldiers
expect the objective to look exactly like the rehearsal site, the unit suffers
a breakdown in momentum and action when its members experience the differences.
4.
This problem originates at Home Station where units habitually conduct a leader's
reconnaissance, dry rehearsals, and numerous blank fires on the same terrain
on which they live fire. Although a sound method for training fundamentals
and ensuring safety, this practice does not train or ready units for realistic
live fires or combat situations. (TA.4.4.1.1
Develop Complete Plans or Orders)
TREND
21
SUBJECT:
Movement and air assault planning during offensive operations
OBSERVATION
(TF 2): In the past, the slightest contact during movement stalled friendly
forces and gave an advantage to the enemy, which they exploited.
DISCUSSION:
1.
As a result, staffs, primarily the XO, S2, S3, FSO and S4, are preparing coordinated
movement plans and improving coordinating instructions provided to company
commanders for a safe and tactical movement to given objectives. 2.
Specifically, in air assault planning, prior coordination/planning, en route
mission planning, and detailed crosswalk during the mission has increased tremendously
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
The
increased quality coordination between the ground tactical commander, air assault
task force commander, fire support agencies, and rotary/fixed winged commanders
must be credited with this improvement. It has resulted in the development
of execution checklists that allow all those involved in the operation to track
the fight and maintain the momentum. (TA.4.4.1.1
Develop Complete Plans or Orders)
TREND
22
SUBJECT:
Battle handover and relief-on-station
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Most companies/troops have very effective battle handover and relief-on-station
standing operating procedures.
DISCUSSION:
Aircrews
are familiar with the required information and the format in which the information
is to be given. This includes battle handover between teams in the same company
and between teams from other companies. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
Units
must continue to practice and refine these procedures and ensure that attached
units receive and understand them. (TA.4.4.5
Synchronize Tactical Operations)
Needs
Emphasis
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
FM communications and actions on contact
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 NBC): Chemical platoons have not grasped the importance of good FM
communication with higher headquarters and adjacent units. They also fail to
bring all of their communications equipment to the JRTC (especially OE254 antennas).
DISCUSSION:
1.
Platoons consistently do not maintain radio contact with brigade headquarters,
battalion headquarters, or even with the platoon command post. They typically
have been using single channel unsecure communications for their platoon internal
nets. These internal communications shortcomings contributed to tremendous
amounts of planning time lost and a lack of knowledge of the complete enemy
situation. 2.
As a result, they made contact with the enemy when it could have been avoided.
Also, actions upon contact were also not executed or planned in advance, leaving
soldiers and leaders trying to figure it out under fire. 3.
Because of these poor reactions, the platoon's casualty rates were very high
during these rotations. Casualty rates were compounded by a lack of communications
capabilities, support from the brigade for CASEVAC, and slow assistance from
another unit. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Platoons must review their tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOPs)
and modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) for communications
requirements. 2.
Ensure that platoons bring all equipment authorized and maintain communications
in accordance with the signal operating instructions (SOI). 3.
Each platoon must develop actions-on-contact battle drills that they can train
on prior to combat and as part of their troop-leading procedures during mission
preparation. (TA.4.1.1
Communicate Information)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Battle tracking
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 SIG): Brigade and battalion communications sections do not have fully
developed mechanisms to battle track critical communications assets.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Their equipment tracking mechanisms are largely reproductions of unit modified
table of organization and equipment (MTOE) documents that lack detail and do
not provide information such as location, maintenance posture, or requisition
status of communications equipment. Subordinate units are not required to submit
standardized equipment status reports to the brigade, which hinders the brigade
in determining the overall communications posture within the task force. 2.
Additionally, units do not have a communication security (COMSEC) tracking
mechanism, which results in units having to start from scratch when investigating
COMSEC compromises. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Brigade signal officers should work with other staff members and subordinate
unit signal officers to identify critical communications assets and develop
a method for tracking these items. 2.
Brigade signal officers should also develop a standard format for subordinate
units to report their equipment status to the brigade and then enforce compliance
with that standard. This report should be received daily from the subordinate
units or incorporated into the format for a daily signal conference call. 3.
FM
11-43, The
Signal Leader's Guide,
Appendix A-14, provides a sample asset tracking list that can be adapted to
meet unit specific battle-tracking requirements. (TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Liaison operations
OBSERVATION
(TF 2): Liaison operations are poorly executed between battalion and brigade.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Battalions were not organized to provide a liaison to collect information and
deliver products to battalion commanders which would allow concurrent planning.
2.
Battalions waited impatiently for brigade Military Decision-Making Process
(MDMP) products to facilitate concurrent planning. 3.
The results were restricted planning timelines for battalions and subordinate
units and no voice in the brigade tactical operations center (TOC) to provide
input from subordinate units on issues discussed in the planning process. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Although battalion staffs are not manned to have a future planning cell, they
do attempt to do so; therefore use the "future plans" battle captain (AS3 or
S3A) as the liaison at brigade during the brigade's mission planning as a source
of information for the battalion commander. This way, if planning is not being
concurrently conducted at the TOC, the information is available when the battalion
begins its MDMP. 2.
Use new technology, i.e., a VDC-400 card, to send the completed products of
the brigade MDMP to battalions to facilitate concurrent planning. (TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Aviation liaison team communication
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Internal communications via aviation liaison teams is usually poorly
done.
DISCUSSION:
Aviation
liaison teams are usually not staffed for 24-hour operations. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
In an infantry brigade task force, the aviation LNO, as a minimum, should consist
of a four-man team: two officers (commissioned or warrant) and two SPC/SGT,
MOS 93P. 2.
The liaison team should be equipped with a vehicle, dual-net SINCGARS, and
UHF capability. The liaison team must have access to the tactical command post
local area network (TACLAN) and a mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) phone.
3.
This team would have the capability to function 24 hours a day, conduct split
operations if the TAC deploys, and maintain the capability to conduct face-to-face
coordination with the aviation task force and subordinate ground units when
required. (TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Information management in aviation units
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Brigade aviation liaison officers (LNO) have difficulty maintaining
current aviation task force specifics (i.e., aircraft maintenance status, crew
cycle/availability, FARP locations/status, mission status, aviation unit locations).
DISCUSSION:
This
is due to many factors, including lack of personnel to staff the aviation LNO
section for 24-hour operations, fog of war, and the absence of established
reporting procedures in unit TACSOPs regarding aviation operations. In addition,
many aviation task force staffs funnel an inordinate amount of information
through the LNO that more appropriately should be passed from staff to staff
using established reporting procedures. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Units
should establish a formal reporting format for more routine information, and
require subordinate aviation task forces to pass tactical information through
normal channels (such as the subordinate infantry) as opposed to using the
aviation LNO as the primary contact at brigade. This will, in turn, free the
LNO to assist in mission planning and coordination with the brigade staff.
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Communications and reporting
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): Transcription analysis (TA) teams continue to experience severe
problems establishing and maintaining direct communications with deployed teams.
DISCUSSION:
Often,
one outstation is forced to relay information through another station, which
then relays the information to the TA team. This not only slows the transmission
of perishable information, it detracts from the team's ability to conduct its
intercept/direction finding (DF) mission. Additionally, many soldiers are unfamiliar
with troubleshooting procedures on communications equipment once communications
are lost. Although most companies have organic radio retransmission assets
assigned to the unit, they either do not bring them or they are not deployed.
Consequently, rather than deploy a retransmission asset, the dismounted teams
carry additional equipment to facilitate communications. This severely impacts
the team's ability to conduct dismounted operations due to excess weight. A
"no communications" contingency plan is usually not addressed during mission
planning or is entirely too complex for deployed teams to follow once communications
are lost. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
The
platoon must understand the capabilities and limitations of its communications
equipment as well as distance planning ranges. Additionally, platoons must
use the terrain team located at division, or the S2's radar warning system
(RWS) or Warlord systems, for line of sight analysis to position assets where
they will be able to "see" both the enemy and friendly radio stations. Maintenance
of communications equipment is vital in order for the platoon to conduct its
wartime mission (to include the radio retransmission vehicle and equipment).
Leaders must ensure proper maintenance procedures are occurring at Home Station
prior to deployment as well as during exercises or combat operations using
the appropriate -10 maintenance manuals. (TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
7
SUBJECT:
Command post (CP) operations
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): During the mission rehearsal exercise (MRE), command post
operations are not well executed.
DISCUSSION:
In
the MRE some of the same issues and concerns surfaced that were identified
during a normal deployment. Soldiers assigned to the CP did a poor job tracking
missions and did not post critical information needed by the decision-makers.
The troop allowed the squadron to control their personnel and equipment and,
in reality, their operation by requiring nightly updates. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Review and implement the staff procedures outlined in FM
101-5, Staff
Organization and Operations.
2.
Review CALL
Newsletter No. 95-7, TOC
Operations,
for
ideas on battle tracking and situational awareness. 3.
Implement a standing operating procedure (SOP) that defines the roles of various
staff members in the operation of a command post. (TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
8
SUBJECT:
Dissemination of information
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): During the mission rehearsal exercise (MRE), dissemination
of information was extremely poor.
DISCUSSION:
Unit
leaders felt that they would always be available and did a poor job of keeping
their crews informed about the mission. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Review and implement the staff procedures outlined in FM
101-5, Staff
Organization and Operations.
2.
Execute the proper steps of the Military Decision-Making Process (as defined
in FM
101-5)
as a normal way of conducting business in all executed operations. (TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
9
SUBJECT:
Information flow and management
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Battle tracking is insufficient in various command posts.
DISCUSSION:
Friendly
unit locations are not normally updated and disseminated to subordinate companies.
Units habitually file critical information without any analysis or dissemination.
Most often the reason for this is the lack of a tactical operations center
standing operating procedure (TOCSOP) or the failure to follow an already existing
SOP. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES: Units
must develop a system for battle tracking in the TOCSOP and properly train
battle captains and NCOs in using critical documents. (TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
10
SUBJECT:
Brigade-level planning of aviation support for CSS operations
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): The principal CSS planner in the brigade task force is the brigade
S-4, who often fails to sufficiently coordinate with the aviation liaison officer
(LNO).
DISCUSSION:
The
S-4, the primary logistics planner, is usually assisted by the aviation LNO
and the support operations officer (SPO) at the forward support battalion/main
support battalion (FSB/MSB). At the JRTC, this entire responsibility is often
delegated to the FSB/MSB commander and his SPO. Unfortunately in these cases,
the loss in coordination and synchronization across all Battlefield Operating
Systems (BOS) results in little CSS moved by air. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
The
S-4 should be the primary planner for support operations and should use LNOs
to focus on using all air assets available in the resupply and support role.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
11
SUBJECT:
Planning, coordinating, and modifying the plan
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): It is all about planning, coordinating, and modifying the plan as
the battle conditions change.
DISCUSSION:
All
too often the unit has a great plan on D-Day, but the enemy has a vote too.
By Day 3 or Day 4, the plan is lost, and units are too busy manning the perimeter
to rescue their CSS effort. The supported infantry routinely runs out of water,
food, ammunition, and patience when better anticipation and CSS planning could
prevent those shortages. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Other efficiencies may be realized from adopting a simplistic, though effective
method for managing air movement of CSS. For instance, during the defense,
air movement priorities are usually to Class IV and V. Aircraft typically return
empty. 2.
Crews must be briefed to stop at the casualty collection point prior to returning
to the BSA. Many items may be "backhauled" quickly and safely by this method.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
12
SUBJECT:
Army airspace command and control (A2C2) responsibilities
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Brigade A2C2 elements rarely function doctrinally.
DISCUSSION:
The
S3 (Air), the chief airspace manager for the brigade, normally does not synchronize
all elements and users of brigade airspace: ADA weapons control status, ADA/FA
battery locations, flight routes, close air support (CAS) and airlift mission
schedules/routes, and rotary-wing missions. The preponderance of airspace management
and air mission requests is relegated to the brigade aviation liaison officer
(LNO). Subsequently, the lack of synchronization routinely results in fratricides
and airspace conflicts. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
The
brigade must formally establish the A2C2 element and ensure the S-3/Air is
firmly in charge. Establishing the A2C2 element in its entirety prior to deployment
to the JRTC is often difficult due to the geographic separation of sister service
elements (e.g., air liaison officers (ALOs) and ANGLICOs). The key is in putting
the S-3/Air back in charge of airspace management instead of focusing him on
deployment issues and joint issues. (TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
13
SUBJECT:
Company command posts (CP)
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Many aviation company CPs are used as a lounge and are very unorganized.
DISCUSSION:
Companies
are doing a poor job establishing and maintaining workable CPs. Most CPs consist
of a tent, an aviation mission planning system (AMPS) machine, and a blank
map. Threat graphics are not posted at all, and only minimal friendly graphics
are posted. Aircraft statistics are rarely updated and are sometimes completely
wrong. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Units need to work from established standing operating procedures (SOP) on
how a command post should function. 2.
Refer to FM
101-5, Staff
Organization and Operations,
for
staff functions and organization. 3.
Refer to CALL
Newsletter No. 95-7, Tactical
Operations Center (TOC),
to
develop ideas on how to set up a command post and manage information at the
company level. (TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
14
SUBJECT:
Mobility and survivability battle tracking and command and control (C2)
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ENG): Engineer command and control nodes at the brigade, battalion
task force, and forward support battalion do not maintain adequate visibility
on mobility/survivability conditions within their areas of operation.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Engineers are frequently unable to execute battlefield operating system (BOS)
integrated predictive analysis in an effort to accurately forecast enemy activity
and focus intelligence collection assets. Specifically, O/Cs observed a routine
inability to maintain a minefield incident chart or analysis wheel and/or updated
templates of the critical minefield systems (81mm mortar, and mine cache).
Failure to maintain and jointly analyze such information results in an inability
to identify or focus mobility assets against the decisive point. 2.
Engineers are not consistently advising commanders and staffs on enemy obstacles,
route status, or survivability. When associated information is relayed, it
often addressees the "status" of operations but does not include the analysis
and recommendations necessary to portray and influence the "state" (answering
the "so what" question). This often cripples the brigade's ability to maintain
maneuver control and make decisions concerning force protection of critical
assets. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Recommend that brigade and battalion tactical operation centers (TOCs) develop
a standing operating procedures (SOP) to disseminate enemy obstacle data and
route status to all members of the brigade. A technique similar to the clearance
of fire
battle
drill used in most TOCs has proven effective in initial dissemination and reaction
to discovered obstacles. 2.
Additionally, identifying specific responsibilities for enemy obstacle verification,
numbering, route status updating, and daily dissemination via intelligence
summary or fragmentary order (FRAGO) helps maintain a clear picture of mobility
conditions within the brigade AO. 3.
Brigade and battalion task force engineers should conduct regularly scheduled
information exchange with all BOS elements within the TOC to verify that each
have accurate enemy and friendly minefield data. 4.
The state of mobility conditions must be analyzed within the engineer battlefield
assessment (EBA) framework in order to bring nominations and recommendations
to targeting meetings. These nominations and recommendations focus on the combined
arms effort required to mitigate or remove the enemy mobility threat and consider
the complete range of enemy systems (mines, enemy, over-watching mortars, and
caches). These systems may be viewed as targets to attack or collect against
within the targeting process. (TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
15
SUBJECT:
Battalion staff planning
OBSERVATION
(FS DIV): Battalion staffs are not effectively incorporating division intelligence
and operational (I/O) objectives, themes, and messages into their I/O plans
and operations.
DISCUSSION:
This
often results in battalion operations that are not synchronized or focused
on achieving division objectives. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Units preparing for deployment to peace operations must establish who will
be responsible for planning and coordinating I/O and provide an I/O cell capable
of performing I/O- related tasks. 2.
Follow I/O tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) provided in CALL
Newsletter No. 99-2, Information
Operations,
and
FM
100-6, Information
Operations.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
16
SUBJECT:
Information management
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): Information and intelligence coming in to the various tactical
operations centers (TOCs) is not always received by the S2 or properly disseminated
to other battle staff sections.
DISCUSSION:
1.
The S2 section did not aggressively solicit intelligence and combat information
from higher and subordinate units. Incomplete or vague reports were not pursued
for additional details. 2.
Upon receiving reports, S2 sections had no tracking mechanism in place to ensure
that reports were logged and plotted, analyzed, and disseminated to higher
and subordinate units. S2 sections' battle-tracking capability was greatly
diminished because the sections did not have an SOP which clearly delineated
individual duties and responsibilities and established a section battle rhythm.
Consequently, the sections were unable to effectively conduct current operations
battle tracking and future operations planning. 3.
S2 sections were generally unable to effectively battle track under austere
conditions while deployed in a tactical command post (TAC) configuration, particularly
during initial entry operations. The S2 representative in the TAC was not equipped
with the proper tools to conduct battle tracking. Frequently, the S2 would
deploy with the TAC without a copy of his situation template, collection overlay/matrix,
intelligence journal, and functional operations and intelligence (O&I) radio
net. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Accurate and timely reporting can only occur if reporting standards receive
command emphasis from the brigade commander down to the squad leader level.
At a minimum, the standard size, activity, location, uniform, time and equipment
(SALUTE) report format should be enforced as the proper reporting format. 2.
Brigade and battalion tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP) and the
S2 section of any SOP must address information management in great detail.
The TACSOP should address how reports are disseminated within the TOC and also
establish criteria for types of reports that require an ATTENTION
IN THE TOC
announcement.
A good baseline to use is: Any report that impacts on one of the commander's
commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) should result in an ATTENTION
IN THE TOC
announcement.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
17
SUBJECT:
Analysis control team (ACT) and target analysis (TA) team skills
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): ACT/TA cell administrative and analytical skills are poor. Journals
are not properly annotated, updated, or tracked.
DISCUSSION:
Status
boards were not updated, which resulted in key leaders being unaware of asset/team
status. Moreover, priority intelligence requirements (PIR)/serious incident
reports (SIR)/specific order and request (SOR) were not updated, briefed to
subordinates, or focused in order to provide the collection required. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
S2s
must continuously refine PIRs throughout the Military Decision-Making Process
(MDMP) and execution of an operation to assist in focusing the collection effort.
The brigade S2 must consolidate the battalion reconnaissance and surveillance
(R&S) plans into an overall brigade collection plan in order to determine gaps
in coverage, and to ensure the executed plan provides the commander with the
intelligence required to make operational decisions. Detailed indicators of
a threat or threat courses of action must be developed to guide the collection
effort. (TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
18
SUBJECT:
Battle-tracking tools and situational awareness
OBSERVATION
( BDE C2 NBC): Chemical staffs do not have a set of battle-tracking tools that
allows the commander to have a rapid understanding of the chemical situation
as a visual display in the tactical operations center (TOC).
DISCUSSION:
These
tracking tools or charts must provide the decision-maker with a means for him
to make rational and well-founded decisions from the best and most current
information available. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
These tools should include a current NBC situation map, chemical unit mission,
chemical unit status and state, subordinate unit chemical defense equipment
status, and the impact of any shortages, chemical downwind messages, and enemy
NBC event template. 2.
The chemical staff should always maintain a chemical event journal or log annotating
what happened and what was done in response to the events. Without these tools,
brigades and battalions cannot maintain situational awareness of enemy and
friendly activities. (TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
19
SUBJECT:
Mission analysis
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2): During the mission analysis brief, staff members tend to brief facts,
not analysis, resulting in the commander being forced to think for the staff.
DISCUSSION:
This
lack of analysis boils down to a lack of experience of staff members. This
can be attributed to: limited training of staff officers or NCOs, staff members
not knowing what is expected of them, or staff members not knowing what to
expect from other staff members. 1.
A lack of specific guidance/standards from the XO and S3 is a significant problem.
2.
If these key leaders do not intimately understand the Military Decision-Making
Process (MDMP), they will not be able to coach, teach, and mentor their staff.
Junior staff members need someone to carefully guide their staff work, show
them how to develop and present a product correctly, teach them how to ask
the right questions, then demand detailed analysis. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Home Station training is the best answer to fixing the problems. The unit must
clearly define responsibilities during the mission analysis (MA), to include
what charts or software get set up, who manages the physical layout of the
planning area, who records what information, and when and how the information
is recorded. 2.
Staff officers must begin coordination and integration at MA preparation or
they will give the commander incomplete analysis before he gives his guidance.
State not only the facts and capabilities, but include limitations and initial
assessments of what the assets can do for the commander for this specific mission.
3.
Review FM
101-5, Staff
Organization and Operation,
the
Army's general reference on how to conduct the Military Decision-Making Process
(MDMP). Some infantry FMs, such as FM
7-10, The
Infantry Rifle Company,
and
FM
7-20, The
Infantry Battalion,
give
good pertinent details on the MDMP that, with slight modification, apply directly
at brigade. FM
34-130, Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield,
describes
the IPB and greatly assists staff members in providing the S2 pertinent battlefield
operating system (BOS) information (reverse BOS) on the enemy for the situational
and event templates. (TA.4.2.1.1
Analyze Mission)
TREND
20
SUBJECT:
Task and purpose
OBSERVATION
(BDE MANEUVER): The term "task and purpose" is becoming a buzz phrase with
many units. It is a good, quick way to focus in on the substance of the mission
statement (who, what, where, when, and why), but, typically, nested concepts
and missions are not seen, especially against a low technology threat.
DISCUSSION:
The
purpose defines the unique contribution a unit makes on the battlefield, while
the task merely helps to define how the commander sees the battle being fought.
Supporting effort missions support the main effort in either a direct or indirect
manner; if not the unit is a "wasted effort." O/Cs have seen many supporting
effort battalion and company missions that closely mirror the division mission
statement (X
unit attacks to defeat the CLF in AO Bear NLT DTG in order to prevent the CLF
from establishing a liberated zone).
This type of mission statement tends to mirror the main effort's mission, forcing
the staff to constantly assess just who the main effort REALLY is. Ask a company
commander how he interprets the above mission statement and you will get many
different answers. This
nesting problem occurs because staffs and commanders fail to do a detailed
mission analysis of the maneuver role their unit has in the division mission.
When a brigade headquarters (HQs) assigns a vague mission to a subordinate
headquarters, they have passed their responsibility to coordinate, integrate,
and synchronize to the subordinate. The brigade effectively just broke their
ability to nest the efforts of their subordinate units ("Let's hope the battalion
can figure it out!"). The results are seen on the battlefield when the effects
of combat power are NOT massed where the brigade commander desires them to
be. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
A
simple reality check is to ask a battle captain how he would interpret the
mission brigade is assigning a battalion, and then describe how he (as the
battalion) fits into the bigger scheme of things. If he gives you a weird stare
and an answer out in left field, you need to rewrite your concept and re-analyze
the key mission assigned to the subordinate unit. (TA.4.2.1.1
Analyze Mission)
TREND
21
SUBJECT:
Air defense integration and synchronization
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ADA): Air defense batteries experience difficulties in understanding
and contributing to the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).
DISCUSSION:
1.
Air defense officers (ADOs) have difficulty coordinating, integrating, and
synchronizing air defense due to incomplete aerial intelligence preparation
of the battlefield (IPB), lack of clear task and purpose to platoons, and ineffective
communications with subordinate leaders. 2.
ADOs are not integrated with brigade and battalion schemes of maneuver because
they are unable to articulate the aerial threat or the combat power they bring
to the fight. ADOs do not develop air defense priorities for the commander
or get his direct guidance on what the brigade's high-value targets (HVTs)
are. Without a clear understanding of the commander's priorities, ADOs fail
to allocate sufficient combat power to protect these HVTs. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
ADOs must bring detailed aerial IPB and integrate it with the S2's overall
IPB. This provides the commander a clear battlefield picture. ADOs do not develop
enemy air event templates and integrate them with the S2's product. This would
allow ADOs to predict when, where, and what type aircraft the enemy will use
to support its scheme of maneuver. 2.
A means to visualize the enemy's plans so the commander can develop his fight
is important. ADOs must articulate ADA capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities
of threat aircraft to the decision-makers. (TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
22
SUBJECT:
Platoon leaders/sergeants and the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): When a platoon is task organized as OPCON or attached
to a battalion, the platoon leadership enters into the fight too late and never
integrates themselves into the staff planning process.
DISCUSSION:
1.
The platoon leader (PL) usually shows up to the battalion tactical operations
center (TOC) and is given a task without a staff estimate to support the platoon.
The result is that the young, inexperienced platoon leader has limited situational
awareness of current operations. Also, the platoon leader does not know which
staff section to talk to explain his platoon's capabilities, limitations, and
constraints to the battalion staff. Usually the platoon leader talks to the
first person he sees and then is tasked to do something other than what was
originally tasked in the brigade's operations order. Consequently, there is
confusion between the staff and the platoon leader on what they are supposed
to do. 2.
The platoon leader fails to become integrated and synchronized into the staff
planning process due to a large TOC and the MDMP. He is not sure what to say,
when to say it, and how to integrate and coordinate his plan or capabilities
to the battalion commander and his staff. What happens is that the PL/PSG and
battalion staff do not coordinate, integrate, synchronize, or rehearse the
final course of action. This ultimately leads to a lack of rehearsals, lack
of platoon mission analysis, and a plan that is not synchronized. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The solution is for the junior PL to take an experienced platoon sergeant (PSG)
with him to the battalion TOC. This will help the platoon leader integrate
himself into the battalion MDMP. 2.
Also, there should be some familiarization training for young platoon leaders
at Home Station on the staff MDMP IAW Chapter 5, FM
101-5, Staff
Organization and Operations.
This
will help them become successful when they are attached or OPCON to a battalion.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
23
SUBJECT:
Determining decisive points for employment
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): The challenge to brigade staffs is to identify the decisive
point to employ the heavy team to achieve massed effects.
DISCUSSION:
When
determining task organization, the brigade should be wary of dividing the heavy
team below the platoon level. This is the basic maneuver unit of the heavy
force and contains sufficient command and control to operate independently
of the company. The brigade must also ensure that it provides a valid task
and purpose to the unit to conduct the mission. In addition, the brigade must
provide sufficient time for the subordinate elements to plan and rehearse.
Because of limited opportunities to train with the heavy force prior to the
rotation, this planning and rehearsal time becomes even more critical. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
The
integration of the heavy team liaison officer (LNO) into the brigade staff
will enhance the brigade's integration of the heavy team. (TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
24
SUBJECT:
Aviation task force integration
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Maneuver task force battle staffs lack proficiency in planning for
the doctrinal employment of aviation assets not assigned to the unit.
DISCUSSION:
Attack
battalions have difficulty in employing assault and heavy lift assets. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
A
solution to this problem is Home Station training and the use of aviation LNOs.
Commanders must ensure that their staff officers, including the LNOs, are intimately
familiar with all aviation doctrinal references, not just attack, cavalry,
or assault employment. (TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
25
SUBJECT:
Resourcing and using aviation liaison officers and cells
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Brigade task force organizations training at the JRTC economize on
one of the most versatile staff officers in their tactical operations center
(TOC)/tactical command post (TAC) -- the aviation task force LNO.
DISCUSSION:
The
parent aviation headquarters has a responsibility to be represented at the
higher headquarters. Usually a junior captain or first lieutenant with limited
experience is assigned as the LNO. The result is often inefficient planning
and coordination and sometimes aborted missions. Why are aviation units under
represented in supported brigade headquarters? TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Aviation
modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) do not provide sufficient
manpower and rank to properly perform the high-level tasks required in a 24-hour
battle rhythm. Successful units are those that augment LNO teams "out of hide."
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
26
SUBJECT:
Use of aviation assets
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Due to the inexperience of the aviation liaison, many units do not
properly use aviation assets.
DISCUSSION:
The
aviation LNO advises the brigade commander on the use of aviation assets within
his task force (attack, assault, medium lift, and EW). Additionally, he coordinates
for other aviation assets (external to the TF) and assists in integrating them
into the fight. He typically manages Army airspace command and control (A2C2)
for the brigade and assists in the management of CASEVAC/MEDEVAC assets. He
performs "911" liaison with the aviation task force when standby aircraft are
needed, and assumes staff responsibility for aviation risk management. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
The
liaison must be prepared to advise the commander on interpretations of weather,
fighter management, maintenance, and tactical employment of the aviation task
force. (TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
27
SUBJECT:
Integration of battalion engineers
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ENG): Battalion engineers are not integrated into battalion level decision-making.
DISCUSSION:
Staffs
are not integrating task organized engineer platoon leaders, mainly because
the platoon leader is not thoroughly familiar with the requirements of a staff
officer. Specifically, the engineer lieutenant is not trained or armed with
the tools necessary to complete and maintain a focused engineer battlefield
assessment (EBA), which forms the foundation of his input to the battalion's
Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) and targeting process. Battalion staff
officers often do not realize the importance of integrating engineer battlefield
operating system (BOS) analysis and estimates in the planning process. As a
result, the engineer often spends an inordinate amount of time away from his
platoon completing unfocused and non-integrated engineer estimates. This hinders
engineer C2 and leads to poor synchronization of mobility and survivability
operations at battalion task force level. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Battalion task force commanders and staffs must understand that the supporting
task force engineer has dual requirements as battalion staff officer and engineer
platoon leader. 2.
The battalion executive officer and S3 must ensure that the engineer is fully
integrated into the Military Decision-Making Process. Additionally, task force
battle captains and staffs must be trained at tracking and assimilating critical
engineer BOS information when the platoon leader is away from the TOC commanding
and controlling his element. 3.
The battalion engineer must ensure that he is familiar with staff procedures
as prescribed in FM
101-5, Staff
Organization and Operations,
as
well as developing a mutual solution with the task force staff outlining his
specific duties and requirements within the task force decision-making and
targeting process. (TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
28
SUBJECT:
Combined arms obstacle integration in planning
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ENG): Obstacle planning is an extension of the Military Decision-Making
Process (MDMP) and should be developed in conjunction with the maneuver plan,
not as an independent engineer battlefield operating system (BOS) requirement.
DISCUSSION:
Wargaming
of the preparation phase should include specifics of obstacle resourcing, sighting,
and emplacement based on detailed estimates of the entire staff. Planning and
wargaming of the execution phase must address the details of the family of
scatterable mines (FASCAM) employment, fires, obstacle protection, and lane
closure in order to synchronize and achieve the desired effects of obstacles.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Conduct reconnaissance as early as possible during the defense and consider
involvement of engineer squad leaders as a time management TTP. Site critical,
directed obstacles so that the engineer effort is not wasted while the staff
completes the operations order. 2.
Establish procedures that require the task force S4 and support platoon leader
to operate and supervise the Class IV/V supply points. 3.
Task maneuver companies with responsibility for obstacle group construction
to ensure that engineers receive assistance with mine dump operations and protective
wire emplacement. 4.
Comply with obstacle reporting requirements outlined in FM
20-32, Mine/Countermine
Operations.
5.
Review FM
90-7, Combined
Arms Obstacle Integration.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
29
SUBJECT:
Integration of the targeting process into the Military Decision-Making Process
(MDMP)
OBSERVATION
(FS DIV): Units are not effectively integrating the decide, detect, deliver,
and assess methodology into the steps of the MDMP.
DISCUSSION:
Routinely,
units wait until after wargaming before they clearly identify high-payoff targets
(HPTs), desired effects, and assets tasked to detect, deliver, and assess,
against those targets. Units do not produce a plan that effectively integrates
and synchronizes adequate combat power to achieve the commander's objectives.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Follow fire support planning procedures outlined in the White
Paper, Fire
Support Planning for the Brigade and Below
September
1998. 2.
Develop a brigade targeting standing operating procedures (SOP), which clearly
defines responsibilities of participants during the MDMP. (TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
30
SUBJECT:
Battle rhythm and the Military Decision-Making Process
OBSERVATION
(BN C2): Units either do not have an established battle rhythm or are unable
to maintain one during the conduct of combat operations.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Without an established battle rhythm, units find themselves constantly reacting
to the enemy. As a result, units are never able to get inside the enemy's decision
cycle and struggle in their effort to gain the initiative. 2.
Battlefield operating system (BOS) representatives are not integrated into
the TOC and are not present during planning sessions and briefings. The incorporation
of all BOS representatives into the TOC, which also includes their participation
during MDMP and the targeting process, would better synchronize the unit's
current and future planning effort.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Units
must establish an internal battle rhythm or "daily timeline" to provide predictability
to the battle staff while they conduct continuous analysis and subordinate
leaders are issuing orders conducting necessary pre-combat inspections and
rehearsals. (TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
31
SUBJECT:
Course-of-action (COA) development
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2): Brigades are not integrating all staff sections into COA development.
DISCUSSION:
COAs
are often based on the S2, S3, FSO and a few others developing the plan (based
on commander's guidance). The remainder of the staff often first see the COA
as they begin wargaming. The first requirement of good wargaming is that all
major integration be completed beforehand, during COA development. If this
is not done, the wargame becomes an integration drill instead of a synchronization
drill, and action, reaction, counteraction may never occur. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
After the commander issues his COA guidance, the S3, S2, FSO, and other select
BOS representatives (based on type of mission, i.e., engineer in a defensive
mission) develop an initial draft COA. While this is occurring, the XO focuses
the remainder of the staff on refining their estimates in support of the COA.
This will ensure they are prepared to quickly add their input to the draft
COA when it is presented to them. The S3 briefs the draft to the staff, then
the XO guides discussion to EVERY staff section to get basic details from them
for the S3 to integrate into the COA. This provides for the COA criteria check
(FM
101-5, Staff
Organization and Operation,
p.
5-11) and gives the staff a solid working knowledge of the COA, allowing them
to prepare in detail for the wargame. 2.
Read FM
101-5
(pp.
5-11 to 5-15) and review FM
7-10, The
Infantry Rifle Company
(pp.
2-16 to 2-26). FM
101-5
gives
a good doctrinal background, while FM
7-10
puts
the doctrine into words that are easy to understand and apply. FM
7-10
(p.
2-25) shows a procedure for COA development that works for company through
brigade. (TA.4.3.2
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
32
SUBJECT:
Route clearance planning
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): Units are doing a poor job in detailed route clearance
planning at brigade level.
DISCUSSION:
Poor
detail planning for route clearance is noted at brigade level in identifying
routes, conducting threat analysis, assigning appropriate command and control
(C2), and task organizing to execute the mission. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Review
FM
5-7-30, Brigade
Engineer and Engineer Company Combat Operations (Airborne, Air Assault, Light).
Appendix
D addresses mission analysis and planning considerations for route clearance.
2.
CALL
CTC Quarterly Bulletin No. 96-1, "Route
Clearance Operations,"
provides
techniques for the employment of route clearance. (TA.4.3.3
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
33
SUBJECT:
Troop-leading procedures in air defense artillery units
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ADA): Battery commanders and platoon leaders have difficulty applying
the principles of troop-leading procedures (TLPs).
DISCUSSION:
1.
Warning orders and fragmentary orders are seldom used to facilitate planning
and coordination for subordinate leaders. Timelines detailing critical events
are not developed to manage planning and preparation time. Leaders do not conduct
reconnaissance before moving teams to ensure routes are clear of mines/obstacles
and secured for transit. Air defense batteries are unable to synchronize their
plans due to lack of backbriefs and rehearsals. Platoon leaders, platoon sergeants,
and team chiefs do not understand the difference between pre-combat checks
(PCCs) and pre-combat inspections (PCIs). Within their planning sequence, they
fail to provide leaders with the opportunity to check soldier equipment and
soldier understanding of future operations. Air defense officers do not understand
the difference between a confirmation brief and a backbrief and how they are
used to ensure leader understanding of commander's intent. Most critical to
TLPs is the conduct of rehearsals. Leaders do not take the time to rehearse
critical events and contingencies of a future mission. 2.
Leaders do not understand the need to establish a battle rhythm that manages
their planning and preparation time. Air defense officers need to synchronize
brigade, task force, battery, and platoon timelines to backward plan time available
for mission preparation. This gives soldiers and first-line leaders maximum
time to conduct reconnaissance, plan, rehearse, and execute. Battle rhythm
establishes a daily routine to manage the current fight and future planning.
It allows time for first-line leaders to conduct their inspections and checks.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Troop-leading
procedures are essential to effective planning and time management. It provides
fire units necessary preparation time to conduct checks, inspections, and rehearsals.
Subordinate leaders must be given sufficient planning and preparation time
to execute future missions. (TA.4.4
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
34
SUBJECT:
Pre-deployment training
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): Pre-deployment training continues to be a problem for
the armor and mechanized infantry units that deploy to the Joint Readiness
Training Center (JRTC).
DISCUSSION:
The
emphasis and amount of training (or lack thereof) are evident within days of
initial mission execution. 1.
Platoons have not deployed with an operational document that they could refer
to for the execution of routine tasks. This lack of a standing operating procedure
(SOP) has been the demise of many operations. Crew members do not know their
duties and responsibilities, the execution of battle drills is poor, and no
standard is enforced. 2.
Units that are deploying lack basic knowledge on their tactics and equipment;
the result of not having a true subject matter expert (SME) that can discuss
the capabilities and limitations of their systems. It is critical that each
platoon-sized element and higher has an SME so that when they are attached
and/or operational control (OPCON) to a light infantry unit, they can provide
accurate information about their capabilities and limitations. When units do
not have an SME, they cannot properly employ the systems they have. In addition
to general knowledge, units are deploying with personnel that have not trained
on critical pieces of equipment. The counter-mine equipment (CME) is essential
to success in the area of operations (AO), but few units have a well-trained
team. 3.
The briefing on succession of command goes well in the operations order (OPORD),
but there really is not much thought given to it. When units deploy, there
is no depth to their leadership. The perception is that the unit is training
each individual for a single position; there is no cross-training or training
for the next higher position. When the leadership or essential members are
not able to perform their duties, units have come to a complete standstill
for periods up to 24 hours because they did not have any depth. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
The
specific areas identified above must be addressed in the unit's standing operating
procedures (SOP). (TA.4.4
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
35
SUBJECT:
Troop-leading procedures at platoon level
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): Troop-leading procedures (TLPs) continue to hamper operations
at the platoon level. The most noticeable problems are in the area of planning
and time management.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Platoons fail to do a good mission analysis and thus fail to properly plan
each of their missions. They are not looking forward and properly preparing
themselves; pre-combat checks and inspections (PCC/PCI) do not exist and, therefore,
do not adequately address needed resources. 2.
Time management is also another major concern for platoons. It is critical
that leaders effectively manage their time in order to maximize their effectiveness.
The inability to master available time leads to poor planning, little to no
mission preparation, and poor execution. Leaders continually wait for information
from higher before they begin planning -- putting themselves further behind.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Leaders
must establish detailed timelines that provide subordinates with guidance to
get them started in their mission preparation. (TA.4.4
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
36
SUBJECT:
Battle drills
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2): Platoons continue to have difficulty aggressively executing battle
drills.
DISCUSSION:
Soldiers
react to the contact and leaders direct action, but often the reaction is slow
and unrehearsed. Reacting to contact should be instinctive, immediate, and
rehearsed. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Units
should train on battle drills outlined in ARTEP
19-100-10, DRILL,
and
those developed for internal tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP).
(TA.4.4
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
37
SUBJECT:
Information flow to subordinates
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 NBC): Information flow to subordinates and the use of troop-leading
procedures are poor.
DISCUSSION:
Chemical
platoon leaders were familiar with troop-leading procedures, but did not practically
apply the steps towards the execution of their mission. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES: The
platoon's leadership must standardize troop-leading procedures. When leaders
cut corners on troop-leading procedures, their subordinates miss critical information
and intelligence needed to accomplish their mission. Platoons should review
the troop-leading procedures outlined in FM
7-8,
Rifle Infantry Platoon and Squad.
(TA.4.4
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
38
SUBJECT:
Use of standing operating procedures (SOP)
OBSERVATION
(ANTI-ARMOR CO): Most units did not have or follow their SOP.
DISCUSSION:
In
almost every mission, one or two critical steps were omitted because leaders
did not follow or know their SOP. A thorough SOP assists in daily tasks such
as maintenance (and other priorities of work). It further assists in the successful
accomplishment of assigned missions, such as convoy escort/security or establishing
a traffic control point. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Review
FM
7-8,
Rifle Infantry Platoon (pp.5-1
thru 5-36) provides an example of a generic SOP. It can be used to develop
or modify a current SOP to improve the unit's performance. (TA.4.4
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
39
SUBJECT:
Tactical operations center (TOC) functions
OBSERVATION
(BN C2): In spite of many individual staff sections' proficiency in the Military
Decision-Making Process (MDMP) process, battalion staffs across the board displayed
a complete lack of understanding and experience when it came to the functions
of the TOC.
DISCUSSION:
TOCs
provide the commander with a limited ability to "see the enemy and see themselves"
because they do not battle track all information critical to the commander's
decision-making process (reports, logistics status [LOGSTAT]/personnel status
[PERSTAT]). Regular shift changes within each BOS and scheduled staff updates
within the TOC would facilitate information flow and situational awareness
and improve the battle-tracking effort. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Regularly
scheduled "commander's updates" facilitate recommendations to the commander
and greatly improve the battle staff's ability to "see themselves and the enemy"
more clearly. This eliminates the need for the battalion commander to pull
information from the staff and, conversely, provides the staff with updated
information. These updates provide the commander with a better picture of the
battlefield. (TA.4.4
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
40
SUBJECT:
Establishing priorities of work
OBSERVATION
(BN C2): Commanders are not establishing timelines to accomplish tasks. Instead
they are giving an "as-soon-as-possible" suspense for tasks.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Commanders and leaders are not establishing timelines in their daily operations
during movement to contact, the defense, and the attack. 2.
Commanders are not enforcing established timelines. These bad habits result
in the following:
a. Platoon leaders are not able to allocate time for internal
planning and rehearsals; therefore, they move out on missions unprepared.
b. Pre-combat inspections (PCIs) are seldom conducted in the
field.
c. Platoons rarely accomplish essential tasks in the prescribed
time.
d. Companies have difficulty synchronizing the planning, preparation,
and execution of the defense.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Commanders and platoon leaders must conduct backward planning for all operations.
Leaders then issue the timeline in the warning order and operations order.
2.
Refer to ARTEP
7-10-MTP,
task
7-2-1605, Develop
and Communicate a Plan,
for
further information. 3.
A unit's timeline should designate "no-later-than" times with groups of tasks
for the platoons to accomplish. Platoons have different strengths and weaknesses.
When the commander gives a list of tasks to be accomplished by a "no-later-than"
time, the platoon leader can manage those tasks in the order best suited for
his platoon -- maximizing his time for platoon troop-leading procedures. 4.
The company command post should maintain a copy of the timeline and receive
reports from the platoons upon completion of tasks. The company commander should
assign one individual, preferably the first sergeant, to enforce the timeline.
5.
Refer to FM
7-10,
The
Infantry Company,
Company Command Post (p. 2-9) for more information on functions of the company
command post. (TA.4.4
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
41
SUBJECT:
Time management
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): The most common phrase heard during an after-action reports
(AARs) about troop-leading procedures is that: "We didn't have enough time."
We have so many tools at our disposal as leaders to manage time during planning.
Some areas requiring emphasis are assembly area procedures, priorities of work,
timelines, pre-combat checks and inspections, and rehearsals.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Assembly area procedures/priorities of work (POW): Platoons fail to execute
these simple steps to set the conditions for future planning and preparation.
Usually, when platoons first move into an assembly area there is no sense of
urgency to establish security or do the right thing. It seems to be more important
to sleep, eat, and do hygiene. These tasks are important, but not that high
on the POW list. Most units have some type of SOP for these tasks, but platoons
fail to adhere to them or follow commander's guidance. 2.
Platoons fail to set the conditions in the assembly area for future operations.
Too many times BLUFOR units have poor time management techniques and do not
use it to focus planning and preparation procedures. Too often platoon leaders
do not issue a timeline for subordinates to reference in executing their steps
of the troop-leading procedures. A majority of the time, subordinates just
get a start point (SP) time or not-later-than time for the mission and that
is all. Leaders do not put key tasks into timelines to let sub-unit leaders
know when tasks should be completed, when units will be inspected, or when
the mission will be executed. Timelines need to be established, adhered to,
and enforced by leaders to assist them in focusing their efforts in the troop-leading
procedures process. 3.
Leaders do not plan to execute pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections and
rehearsals in their timeline. Too often leaders make excuses for not doing
them or just do not do them at all. If platoons do not get anything else done,
platoon leaders should at least execute PCCs, PCIs, and rehearsals. Platoons
have been observed not having the appropriate equipment or personnel at the
right place and time to be employed to be effective against the enemy. It has
been observed that leaders do not ensure that soldiers are ready for the mission
through pre-combat checks and inspections, and that the soldiers have a clear
understanding of the mission through a rehearsal at platoon level. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Platoon
leaders (PL) must have time to accomplish the key tasks in troop-leading procedures.
They must fight to get time and use it to their advantage to be thoroughly
prepared to execute the mission. Platoon leaders must develop a timeline that
is realistic and adhered to, and which they enforce. Finally, the PL must ask
himself this: Who is doing what during troop-leading procedures while I am
gone at the company/battalion planning process? PLs must remember to give out
specific guidance on what must be accomplished by the unit to prepare for future
operations and be successful in combat. (TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans or Orders)
TREND
42
SUBJECT:
Contingency planning
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): Contingency plans are not addressed at all levels within the communications
and jamming (C & J) platoon.
DISCUSSION:
As
a result, deployed teams are unsure of what actions to take upon contact with
the enemy both during movement and once on site. Additionally, teams are unsure
of what to do if ambushed during movement and where to go if escape, evasion,
and rescue is required. Likewise, what actions to take if communications fail
or are compromised, and who, if anyone, is responsible for conducting emergency
resupply or extraction operations needs to be addressed.. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The platoon and teams should address all contingency aspects prior to deployment
in order to identify possible problems. Contingencies should be rehearsed and
backbriefed prior to deployment in order to instill confidence in all members
and to identify individual responsibilities among team members. 2.
Review FM
7-8, Infantry
Rifle Platoon and Squad,
Chapter 2, Section I, Para 2-2. (TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans or Orders)
TREND
43
SUBJECT:
Planning and staffing operations
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 MP): Brigades are not adequately planning/staffing operations and missions
they assign to separate company or below maneuver elements (armor/mechanized
team, brigade reserve platoons/companies).
DISCUSSION:
A
company commander or platoon leader does not have the staff or the time to
work though all the coordination and integration issues involving his particular
mission. If the leader tries to do this, he is no longer leading his element
-- he has become a staff officer. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The brigade staff must think like a battalion staff when preparing products
for these separate elements. Separate elements will need more detailed information
than a battalion staff would need for its mission. Failure to provide this
support will result in incomplete or no planning at the executor level. 2.
Units will become "911" units and suffer needless combat losses as a result,
with a greatly increased chance of mission failure. (TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans or Orders)
TREND
44
SUBJECT:
Battle rhythm
OBSERVATION
(TF 3): A battle rhythm should be a published list of events that soldiers,
staff, and leaders know will happen at set times with standard agendas; usually
it is not.
DISCUSSION:
The
importance of a battle rhythm, based upon the Military Decision- Making Process
(MDMP), cannot be overemphasized. It ensures predictability in any scenario
where time management is difficult. Battle rhythm is a total time management
system. It is comprised of four elements: (1) troop-leading procedures, (2)
friendly critical events, (3) enemy critical events, and (4) logistical critical
events. Visibility over the entire spectrum of events is essential for informed
decision-making and ensures synchronization of the battlefield operating systems.
Regardless of how good the plans are, a lack of a unified vision to consolidate
the disparate timeliness makes maintaining situational awareness impossible.
An effective battle rhythm synchronizes and visibly depicts, on a timeline,
the events in the unit that happen both simultaneously and sequentially. Once
the battle rhythm is nested with higher headquarters, subordinate elements
will be better postured to maximize the available time to plan and prepare
for future actions. Moreover, all echelons will benefit as a result of a process,
which adds predictability and routinely shares information. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES: Battalions
should adopt a battle rhythm methodology (preferably in an SOP) that convey
predictable events. It should include: -
Targeting/synchronization meetings
-
Staff huddles
-
Conference calls
