CHAPTER 7
AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY (TA.3)
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- Early
warning (EW) planning continues to be the most difficult challenge air defense
batteries encounter. During the planning process, air defense officers (ADOs)
do not provide specific procedures for sensor management and early warning
dissemination within the battery. Sensor team chiefs are left out of the battery
MDMP process. Batteries do not address EW frequency management, sensor looping,
sensor chaining, or maintenance management as part of the overall sensor management
plan. This creates problems in maintaining early warning link-up with fire
units. Batteries experience difficulties in getting all fire units to monitor
digital early warning. Fire units lack confidence using the handheld terminal
units (HTUs). Batteries must improve in operating and integrating the system
into their daily air defense operations.
There are inconsistencies within batteries to monitor the division's early warning (DEW) net. Many teams receive early warning through platoon or battery nets instead of directly through the DEW. The effect is that fire units receive EW late because it is rebroadcast, as opposed to near real-time from the DEW. This affects target engagement. Batteries do not execute a C3I commex prior to deployment. This would identify inoperable HTUs and verify if the Air and Missile Defense Workstation (AMDWS) is loaded properly. Batteries must use and exploit the AMDWS better.
Recommend developing training scenarios to enhance the fire unit's confidence in the HTUs and exploit the full range of the AMDWS capabilities. Develop a troubleshooting checklist to ensure functionality of AMDWS and HTUs.
Recommend batteries and platoons review technical manuals on the operation of HTUs and develop training exercises to enhance familiarity with use and employment. Recommend batteries conduct a C3I commex prior to each operation. Batteries need to add to their TSOP C3I TTPs on linkage architecture, correlation of tracks, and troubleshooting procedures.
- Establish and follow known air routes/corridors for ingress and egress to assist in distinguishing friendly from OPFOR aircraft. The LSDIS radar crews can provide better warning if they know where friendly aircraft are flying. This technique is especially useful should the division early warning net go down.
- ADA success story: During a rotation an ADA battery shot down 17 of 23 OPFOR aircraft and was successful in driving away the remainder. The reason? From O/C observations, the battery commander issued a professional operations order and rehearsed the fight. This was something that is normally not done.
- ADA assets must be integrated into the defense. Think security. However, one must be judicious in positioning to ensure that enemy aircraft can be killed.
- Ensure the ADA officer identifies enemy air avenues of ingress and egress. In most circumstances the OPFOR will fly the streambeds low and fast. Unless gunners are placed where they can see enemy aircraft and not just hear them fly by, there will be no kills. The placement of Stinger teams with infantry companies during a night infiltration may not always be the right answer. However, Stinger teams must be secured either by infantry or using stealth.
- Consider using smoke to deny enemy helicopters the use of streambeds; this has worked with other units. It will force the helicopter to fly higher, allowing Stinger and Avengers better shots.
- ADA planners need to carefully analyze the restricted terrain in the JRTC environment when determining where to position Stinger or Avenger teams. The tall pine trees restrict line of sight, and the "5 KM concentric circles" which overlap may not do what you think in this environment.
- Ensure that when Stinger teams are listed in the order under a company team, there is a clear understanding of whom they report to, who positions them, how they are resupplied, and who secures them.
- List any missions for companies to secure ADA assets in tasks to subordinate units.
- In mission analysis, the ADA officer should recommend the priorities for use of his assets. Once approved, loss of an ADA asset must be tracked in the TOC to ensure the most critical missions are not left uncovered due to loss of the ADA weapons system.
- ADA resupply should go out with the infantry company LOPAC. The ADA platoon cannot resupply itself.
- Plot NFAs on tentative and actual ADA positions to prevent fratricide. Remember: good ADA positions for your forces are also good positions for the enemy.
- Position ADA assets, if possible, so they can engage the aircraft before the aircraft can engage the target.
- Range fans showing coverage must be adjusted to the terrain.
- During the attack, make sure ADA assets are in a position in the objective area to destroy any aircraft attacking in support of the enemy counterattack.
- In the order, define what weapons control status and warnings mean. Many people do not remember.
- Seeing
the Enemy.
Air
defense officers (ADO) have difficulty in contributing to the brigade/battalion
S2's Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) products (R&S collection
plan, situation and event templates). Without contributing to these products
("Seeing the Enemy"), the ADO will struggle in planning, coordinating, and
integrating the air defense operating system (OS) into the brigade/battalion
concept of operation.
Clear and concise aerial IPB is better received if it includes analysis of enemy air capabilities, limitations, and, most importantly, vulnerabilities. When this analysis is integrated with the S2's IPB products, it significantly contributes to linked analysis and truly articulates an integrated threat product.
When seeing the enemy air the ADO must think in regards to the operating systems. How will air contribute to the enemy's intelligence OS? Common sense is Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RISTA). Every enemy aerial platform will be focused on RISTA despite their task and purpose. How will the enemy air contribute to the fires and maneuver OS? Lastly, how will the enemy air contribute to the logistical OS? The challenge is to articulate the "So What Analysis": Who (type of unit and aerial platform), What (clear task, reconnaissance, resupply deliver minefields/chemical/biological or attack), When (predictive based upon pattern and linked analysis with the S2), Where (location or type of target - HVT/HPT), and Why (purpose for the aerial platform).
The four-step IPB process should be a methodology to achieve pattern and "predicative analysis." ADOs must make the call on what enemy aerial platforms will do and how it will contribute to a linked and integrated threat picture.
Although the brigade/battalion commander's source for the intelligence OS is the S2, the ADO must aggressively contribute in arming the S2 with the pattern and predictive analysis for the enemy's most probable and dangerous courses of action.
- C3I/Sensor
Management Plan (the "sensor-to-shooter" link).
The
most misunderstood capability air defenders bring to the fight is early warning
(EW) assets (LSDID/Sentinel) and C3I capability (SHTU/HTU/AMDWS). ADOs, specifically
many battery commanders, do not fully understand the capabilities and limitations
of these assets. Without knowing the capabilities and limitations, an ADO cannot
efficiently use them to facilitate the "sensor-to-shooter" link. Besides providing
counter-air, SHORAD, air defense, and other active defense terms, an essential
task is to provide "early warning" or passive air defense.
This process starts with the sensor management plan. This is more than determining and publishing a C3I frequency plan. It requires ADOs to define specific procedures for sensor management and early warning dissemination. Sensor team chiefs must be included in the planning process as they are the subject matter experts. They can assist the commander in developing the sensor management plan, the employment of sensors, and techniques to disseminate early warning. The sensor management plan must include EW frequency management, sensor looping, sensor chaining, and maintenance management. Batteries must understand linkage architecture, correlation of tracks, and troubleshooting procedures. They need to develop TTPs for each of these and include them in EW planning. This will eliminate problems associated with early warning link-up with fire units.
Batteries experience significant challenges in getting all fire units to monitor digital early warning. Fire units lack confidence using SHTU/HTUs. Batteries must improve in operating and integrating the system into their daily air defense operations. Additionally, there are inconsistencies within batteries to monitor the division's early warning (DEW) net. Many fire units receive early warning through platoon or battery command nets. The combined effect of not using SHTU/HTU or monitoring is late or poor target engagement. Batteries must execute a C3I COMMEX before deployment. This will identify inoperable HTUs and verify a fire unit's ability to gain link-up. Batteries need to fully exploit AMDWS capabilities. Batteries should develop training scenarios to enhance a fire unit's confidence in the HTU and exploit the full range of AMDWS capabilities. Batteries and platoons must review technical manuals (TM) on the operation of HTUs and develop training exercises to enhance their familiarity with use and employment.
- Targeting/Synchronization
Meeting.
A
good number of ADOs do not feel comfortable with their role in brigade- and
battalion-level targeting meetings. They do not understand the four-step targeting
methodology used to synchronize the fight. ADOs must articulate to the staff
that there are other brigade assets that can perform air defense roles without
directly using air defense assets. Using the Decide,
Detect, Deliver, and Assess
methodology,
staffs integrate and synchronize their future planning by identifying resources
available to ascertain targets the enemy can not afford to lose; identifying
detection means to pinpoint exact locations of potential targets; determining
friendly resources to deliver lethal and non-lethal fires on a designated target;
and assigning resources to assess reduction or elimination of a designated
target. ADO participation ensures that all brigade elements are used to counter
the air threat, not just the air defenders. ADOs usually are casual observers
because they do not possess the tools necessary to be an active participant.
At a minimum, ADOs must bring the air SITTEMP and enemy air event template
to the targeting meeting. These allow the ADO to graphically depict enemy events
and activities (pattern analysis) and using predicative analysis, assess what
the enemy will do. ADOs contribute to both templates by the specificity and
fidelity of what they think the enemy air will do to support the most probable/dangerous
enemy COA. ADOs must speak up in the targeting meeting to assist the staff
with resources and ideas rather than using only his assets to fight the air
battle. ADOs must answer the "Big Three":
- (1) What is the threat? (pattern analysis - capabilities, limitations, vulnerabilities)
- (2) How will the threat affect brigade operations? (when, where, and what type aircraft)
- (3) How do we defeat the threat? (when, where, and who will do it)
Answers to these lead ADOs to develop products necessary to integrate into the targeting process and synchronize the effort. Integration into the targeting process ensures air defense artillery is in the best position to defeat the air threat; if not, the remainder of the BDE is poised to deter.
- Battle-Tracking and Situational Awareness. Some battery CPs (both main and rear), platoon leaders, and platoon sergeants have great difficulty battle-tracking the current fight and maintaining situational awareness within their units. Battle-tracking is nothing more than information management that provides leaders with a vision of the battlefield. It allows battery/platoon CPs to anticipate actions rather than react to changes in the situation. CPs and platoon leaders must develop the tracking tools necessary to gather information, analyze it, and make informed decisions. CP crews and RTOs need to understand their role in gathering information within a brigade/battalion TOC and get it out to fire units. If an Avenger is about to move, there is prerequisite information that fire units need before proceeding; i.e., enemy situation, minefield awareness, current operations, and route clearance. RTOs must maintain the tracking tools with current information. Charts should be self-explanatory and easy to use. CPs and RTOs must develop battle-tracking tools as part of a battery or platoon SOP. Information flow is the key. It is a two-way circuit from battery to fire units and back. Fire units need to know what critical information must be sent to the battery; likewise, the battery must identify critical information so that fire units can survive. CP crews and RTOs must be trained on what, how, and when to gather information, how to analyze it, and who receives it. Effective battle-tracking enhances situational awareness. This, in turn, keeps everyone informed, allows leaders to make decisions, and maintains force protection to fire units.
- Battery and Platoon TSOP. A significant number of air defense batteries and platoons do not have their own TSOP oriented on how they intend to fight. Lack of battery and platoon SOPs hamper unit planning and execution. Usually, air defense units arrive with their battalion TSOP which is not detailed enough to cover all contingencies a battery or platoon may face. Often, battalion TSOPs are oriented at the macro level of warfighting. Units encounter specific problems that require their own unit SOP. Batteries and platoons need to develop specialized TSOPs to address how they will fight and written so that it is understood by everyone in the unit. An example would be a TSOP written like a playbook. Different situations call for a different play. TSOPs should assist the unit's ability to shoot, move, and communicate. Once developed, batteries and platoons must verify TSOPs in the field to ensure soundness and to make necessary changes. ADA leaders must ensure their soldiers follow the SOPs and must enforce them.
- Developing Air Defense Priorities. Many ADOs do not know how to identify air defense priorities using a logical process to accurately determine what brigade assets are most critical to the BCT's success. ADOs typically get AD priorities from their maneuver commander while he issues guidance after mission analysis. The ADO must do his homework during mission analysis and identify the brigade's HVT and prioritize them for protection. He must use the CVRT (criticality, vulnerability, recouperability, and threat) methodology to analyze the brigade's HVTs. ADOs must ask themselves the following questions:
- Criticality -- What is the mission and how would their loss affect the brigade's fight?
- Vulnerability -- What enemy assets can attack these critical assets? What passive defense measures could be employed to prevent attack? Where are the assets located in relation to enemy AAAs?
- Threat -- What are the capabilities of the enemy? How will they be employed? Is this an enemy HPT?
- Recouperability -- If loss due to attack can these assets be easily repaired or replaced? How will the loss effect BCT force composition?
Once the ADO completes this methodology, he must assess the brigade's capabilities to protect itself with either active or passive defense measures. The ADO must make the call and recommend AD priorities to the maneuver commander. Be prepared to justify why these priorities are important and provide your initial proposal to protect them. Get the commander to approve the priorities and continue with the MDMP process. These approved priorities should come out during the maneuver commander's guidance so that all the staff can work to meet the commander's intent. This allows ADOs to allocate sufficient air defense combat power where it is most critically needed and does not waste it protecting "infantrymen in the brush."
- Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Programming. Air defense batteries are not trained on the use of IFF equipment. They do not develop plans to sustain IFF programming beyond the initial four days of code. Often their equipment is non-functional and needs servicing. IFF programming is not a priority among the platoon sergeant's duties and is considered an afterthought. Battery leaders must develop an IFF programming plan as part of CSS operations. There should be a supply of charged batteries on-hand and then the platoon sergeant should reprogram IFF at fire unit locations. The platoon sergeant should reduce a fire unit's state of readiness while reprogramming. The fire unit can maintain an active air defense role but must use different ROE to execute an engagement. Battery commanders need to ensure that brigade aviators have properly programmed their IFFs as well. They should coordinate for IFF exercises at Home Station to establish a habit of always programming before takeoff. This will prevent fratricide. Aviator commanders must ensure programming is always completed. Battery commanders should address this during the MDMP.
- (1) What is the threat? (pattern analysis - capabilities, limitations, vulnerabilities)
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