APPENDIX
A
NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL
- Consider
mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) in the conduct of the low-intensity
conflict (LIC) phase; however, be prepared to push forward equipment and suits
if needed. Always carry masks. In most circumstances the threat during the
LIC phase is minimal.
- Consider
using smoke pots to obscure the tactical operations center (TOC) from enemy
observation.
- TOC
personnel must rehearse the chemical attack drill and be prepared to rapidly
notify brigade units of chemical attack. Chemical platoon status regarding
the current mission may have to be changed rapidly to decontamination (DECON).
- Many
units have adopted the following MOPP levels:
- MOPP
ready during the LIC phase.
- In
the defense consider transition from MOPP 0 to MOPP 2; i.e., prepare obstacles
and individual fighting positions in MOPP 0, and as the OPFOR closes with the
defending unit, go to MOPP 2.
- In
the attack units behind the line of departure/line of contact (LD/LC) are in
MOPP 0; units crossing the LD/LC, infantry battalions, and tank companies are
MOPP ready.
- Units
and elements having HMMWVs or other wheeled or tracked vehicles carry their
equipment with them.
- Use
of smoke in the attack. Using smoke to provide a significant smoke screen over
the first obstacle breached has the side effect of drawing the enemy's attention
away from the direction of the main attack.
- DECON
of casualties must be preplanned with the chemical officer (CHEMO), combat
health support officer (CHSO), S4, and S1. Many units mandate that all casualties
be decontaminated prior to any soldier being sent to the rear. This cannot
be accomplished without a complete and wargamed plan of action. In a mass casualty
situation this is exceedingly difficult to accomplish, and in many instances
the died-of-wounds (DOW) rate (due to chemical exposure) dramatically increases.
(This is mandated doctrinally to preclude inadvertent contamination of medical
treatment facilities which would cause even higher DOW rates than from chemical
exposure.)
- The
main causes for chemical casualties are the lack of early warning, non-compliance
with directed force protection measures, and not following established battle
drills.
- Units
within affected chemical attack areas fail to properly employ their M8A1 chemical
agent alarms.
- Alarms
are normally emplaced but not checked to ensure proper operation.
- The
improper emplacement of the M8A1 also results in no early warning for units
and the loss of soldiers.
- The
brigade-directed MOPP level is frequently ignored or misunderstood.
- During
chemical attacks, some units do not have masks and MOPP gear readily available.
- When
units react to a chemical hazard, they normally mask and give the alarm, but
stop short of increasing the level of MOPP.
- The
unit sustains a high amount of casualties due to a lack of protection and reaction
throughout the area.
- Consider
smoke pots and generators in MOUT. Their use must be planned and rehearsed.
- Should
the CHEMO be used as a battle captain, he must be prepared and fully understand
the capabilities of assets and the operational plan.
- The
CHEMO should be prepared to tell the commander when the enemy will use chemicals
and why.
- The
CHEMO must know the chemical assets available and their capabilities.
- Chemical
personnel are left out of the daily brigade and battalion targeting and synchronization
meetings. As a result, input from chemical personnel to the process is lacking.
Meetings that exclude chemical officers and their NCOs render the assets they
oversee ineffective. The targeting and synchronization process allows the brigade
to ensure effective servicing of targets as well as ensuring the integration
and synchronization of all the brigade's battlefield operating systems (to
include NBC). Many commanders use the targeting and synchronization process
to drive their operations. One of the major products from a meeting of this
nature is a daily FRAGO addressing operations 48-72 hours out. The chemical
officer must be involved in this process if his work is to be coordinated with
the battle staff and have timely influence on the brigade fight.
- Chemical
personnel, in coordination with the S2 at both brigade and battalion, often
fail to produce a template of where (based upon their analysis) they suspect
the possible employment of chemical agents on the battlefield. A sound template
will drive the NBC decontamination and reconnaissance effort. The chemical
officer must possess an understanding of how the enemy fights; this can be
found in the enemy order of battle. Once the chemical officer understands the
enemy order of battle, he need only conduct reverse analysis to ascertain where
he thinks the enemy will employ agents; he then depicts these locations on
his template. The chemical officer must design a decontamination and reconnaissance
plan that covers the depth and width of his battlespace, but allows him to
focus his limited resources with respect to location on the ground and times
of enemy use of agents. The chemical officer must coordinate with the S2 to
ensure that they are presenting the same picture for their respective commanders,
and then publish the results to subordinate units.
- During
chemical attacks it takes one or more hours to receive the initial NBC report
with any type of useable information. Chemical personnel often delay taking
any action until this report is received. The key is to not delay reporting.
If the chemical officer has conducted a thorough IPB and a strike has occurred
in a templated area, he can then start taking some action in response to the
attack. One tool that assists TOCs and chemical personnel in dealing with chemical
attacks is the "BATTLE DRILL." This provides focus for everyone in the TOC
and causes a preselected number of actions to be executed, with the chemical
officer being the center of focus. One condition of the battle drill is the
submission of an NBC 1 report to higher headquarters. The NBC 1 will provide
the chemical officer necessary information to identify the hazard that confronts
him.
- Chemical
staff officers at every level need to be included in the MDMP. Begin with a
rigorous development of a staff estimate IAW FM 101-5, Appendix C. Complete
the remainder of the MDMP process IAW FM 101-5, Chapter 5 (MDMP), and FM 3-101,
Appendix D (MDMP) and Appendix E (IPB). Staff estimates should be the basis
for every briefing that a staff officer conducts. The material in the special
staff estimate is particularly pertinent to the chemical staff officer's products.
Ensure that statistical numbers on type of equipment, personnel, and classes
of supply are translated into capabilities expressed in a way that allows the
commander to visualize both current and future enemy and friendly situations.
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