TA.5
INTELLIGENCE BOS
(Trends
are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not
in
any priority order.)Positive
Performance
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Positioning of field artillery assets to support the defense
OBSERVATION
(FS DIV):
Field
artillery battalions are using the intelligence preparation of the battlefield
(IPB) process to identify critical movement triggers and future firing battery
positions.
DISCUSSION:
The
enemy's division/brigade reconnaissance elements are unable to locate and attrit
friendly forces. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Task
force commanders and staffs should conduct IPB exercises at Home Station to
give the S-2 and staff experience in the IPB process and the products needed.
(TA.5.2.1
Collect Information on Situation)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
S-2 and analysis and control team (ACT) integration
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): During this observation period, every unit physically integrated
the military intelligence (MI) company ACT into their brigade tactical operations
(TOC) tent.
DISCUSSION:
This
brought additional analysts into the brigade TOC to asssist the brigade S-2
section in tracking and analyzing the enemy, plus it brought additional connectivity
into the all-source analysis system (ASAS) intelligence architecture. (TA.5.2.1
Collect Information on Situation)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
S-2 section operations
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): A majority of units came to their rotation with complete or nearly
complete S-2 shops. These sections had useful SOPs and for the most part followed
efficient, effective procedures.
DISCUSSION:
Those
units that used their enlisted analysts routinely tended to handle the stresses
of the rotation better. The reasons for this success should be emphasized in
training and include: 1.
The workload was distributed better. 2.
Young soldiers had more situational awareness and understood the importance
of their tasks. 3.
The more experienced NCOs and officers were able to spend more time conducting
predictive analysis and visualizing the big picture. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Home Station training, the JRTC Leader's Training Program, and Mobile Training
Teams appear to be working and must be continued. 2.
Task force commanders and staffs should conduct IPB exercises at Home Station
to give the S-2 and staff experience in the IPB process and the products needed.
(TA.5.3
Process Information)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), Evaluate the threat
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): Brigade and battalion S-2s and intelligence analysts in the military
intelligence (MI) company analysis and control teams (ACT) came to the rotations
thoroughly prepared with adequate knowledge of the threat they would face.
DISCUSSION:
This
knowledge was effectively converted into doctrinal templates, databases on
threat tactics, options, and high-value target lists. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
Home
Station training, the JRTC Leader's Training Program, and Mobile Training Teams
appear to be working and must be continued. (TA.5.3.1
Evaluate Threat Information)
Needs
Emphasis
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Collection planning and reconnaissance and security operations and planning
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV):
Brigade
and battalion S-2s consistently failed to plan effective operations to collect
the information needed to win.
DISCUSSION:
A
majority of units used well-developed matrices as planning tools, which indicated
they knew what needed to be done. However, not one unit was able to plan and
execute a successful reconnaissance plan in any phase of the rotations. Three
common areas characterized intelligence collection failures: lack of focus,
timeliness, and supervision. First, reconnaissance missions were unfocused
and not linked to the commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)
or Decision Points (DP). Second, missions were initiated late, often uncoordinated,
and usually not tracked by higher headquarters. Third, units did not have a
system to double-check when a named area of interest (NAI) was or was not covered
or could not identify gaps in the coverage. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES: Collection/reconnaissance
and security planning must begin with receipt of the warning order so that
intelligence or reconnaissance teams can initiate collection operations while
the staff is conducting the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Although
this is not possible during initial entry missions, early reconnaissance would
allow the staff and commander to make a plan based on current
intelligence,
not just templated enemy situations. Commanders must strive to ensure they
have a well-focused collection effort. This includes limiting the number of
tasks given to collection assets, ensuring tasks are tied to PIR or DPs, and
ensuring the plan uses all assets available. EXAMPLE:
A scout platoon can only
pinpoint
an objective and then observe it.
Reconnaissance
operations should pull maneuver units toward enemy weaknesses or vulnerabilities.
Too
often units force reconnaissance down one axis to support an inflexible friendly
course of action. 1.
Small maneuver elements can conduct aggressive patrolling operations to help
the reconnaissance plan. For example, the JRTC OPFOR often probes defenses;
likewise, infantry platoons can probe the OPFOR's defense. They just need to
be trained to do so prior to deployment. 2.
There is no hard and fast rule on the number of NAIs that a unit can handle.
However, the brigade staff must recognize that each NAI tasked to a subordinate
unit becomes a specified task to them during the mission analysis. 3.
S-2s and S-3s must have a combined method of tracking the collection/reconnaissance
and security operation. Although planned by the S-2, the S-3 must maintain
visibility over this set of combat assets maneuvering on the battlefield. One
technique is to post an NAI chart next to the map that shows when an NAI is
active, what is being reported, and when it should go inactive. This must be
a staff battle drill practiced by all members of the S-2 and S-3 sections.
4.
When combining assets from different units for reconnaissance missions (such
as Marine FCTs, LLVI teams, and scouts), sufficient command, control and communications
must be built in. These missions must be well coordinated and rehearsed routinely
at Home Station prior to deployment. A rule of thumb is that when two like-sized
units join to form a reconnaissance team, a headquarters from the next higher
unit is probably needed. 5.
Collection plans must be tied to the commander's key decision points. If a
valuable asset is placed in a risky situation to support a tactical operation,
then that asset is potentially wasted. 6.
Reconnaissance is everyone's business. Every combat leader must conduct a reconnaissance
as part of routine troop-leading procedures and must be involved with running
the entire TOC. (TA.5.1
Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): IBP is a weak point for most aviation units.
DISCUSSION:
The
modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO), normally developed at Home Station,
is usually not updated and used during a unit's rotation. Additionally, units
habitually do not refine the doctrinal and situational templates provided by
brigade, nor do they develop event templates other than for the defense phase.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES
1.
Units must develop a decision support template. 2.
Review FM
34-130,
Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield.
(TA.5.2
Collect Information)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Finding the enemy using aviation assets
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): Aviation units conduct search and attack operations by conducting
either a zone reconnaissance, an area reconnaissance, or hasty attacks as a
finishing force.
DISCUSSION:
The
commander may specify other reconnaissance objectives in his intent, but finding
the enemy is usually the focus. Adherence to the critical tasks associated
with a zone/area reconnaissance and the commander's PIR will help define the
purpose of the reconnaissance for aircrews. Units that plan a zone/area reconnaissance
with supporting graphics and control measures have greater success in thoroughly
searching a zone. For a zone reconnaissance, the graphics break a zone up into
logical segments that can be systematically executed, i.e. phase line to phase
line. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Flight
techniques are important while conducting the zone reconnaissance. Due to the
nature of the terrain, it is imperative that aircrews fly slow enough to search
down into the trees. A common trend is for aircrews to fly at speeds between
50 - 80 knots, which is too fast! Crews that slow down to speeds from ETL to
30 knots are more successful in finding the enemy, cache sites, and other targets.
(TA.5.2.1
Collect Information)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Intelligence products
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): Intelligence products should include enemy course of action overlays
developed early in the IPB process.
DISCUSSION:
Each
overlay should have at least the following: enemy mission and potential task
organization, enemy decisive point, task and purpose of each unit, main effort,
supporting effort, unit boundaries, and objectives as appropriate. (Note: In
this TTP, brigade and battalion S-2s should concentrate on analyzing the enemy
in the above detail two levels below the senior enemy unit [i.e., if you are
fighting a battalion, then you would track two levels below that, or platoons],
and not try to template down to every team and weapon system.) Overlays should
be layered on the map in the following order: MCOO, operations graphics, and
enemy COAs.
Another
technique is to place a blank drop over the overlays and combine different
COAs into one overall template. Ensure that where the COAs merge and diverge
is clearly shown. At the place they diverge, look for where the enemy commander
would have to make a decision on a particular COA and put a symbol for a decision
point there. In those places where the enemy's presence would indicate he has
adopted a particular COA, place a symbol for a named area of interest. Based
on the enemy's mission and the task and purpose of each element, show where
the enemy wants to move and how long it will take him to get there using time
phase lines. The enemy may not move in every operation, but the enemy will
try to do things according to some operational timeline in every operation.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Once
the overlay is complete, double-check to ensure that the following is identified
and clearly depicted: 1.
Enemy's overall mission. 2.
Task and purpose of each unit tracked. 3.
Boundaries for all units two levels down. 4.
Templated locations of assets and systems two levels down (e.g., battalion
logistics points, company supply points, platoon caches, and so on.) 5.
Main and supporting efforts. 6.
Time phase lines for those elements that will move. 7.
Annotations of operational times or patterns for those elements that will not
make large-scale movements (e.g., "Expect minelaying operations between 0400-0630
each day.") 8.
Key and decisive terrain. 9.
Status of population, as appropriate. Remember,
neatness counts. If the overlays are reproduced on a black and white field
copier, make sure they are legible. This product can be a decisive factor in
your victory or defeat.
(TA.5.2.1
Collect Information on Situation)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
S-2 and analysis and control team (ACT) integration
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2): Every unit physically integrated the MI company analysis and control
team (ACT) into their brigade tactical operations center (TOC) tent.
DISCUSSION:
This
brought additional analysts into the brigade TOC to assist the brigade S-2
section in tracking and analyzing the enemy, plus it brought additional connectivity
into the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) intelligence architecture. Although
there was physical integration of the ACT into S-2 sections, the ACTs provided
very little analysis and input into the S-2's threat analysis. The primary
reason for the failure of the ACT to assist the S-2 in developing a threat
picture is that ASAS operators are not fully trained prior to conducting a
JRTC rotation. Remote workstation (RWS) operators are not fully able to exploit
all of the capabilities of the system. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The ACT personnel do not fully understand how to integrate and synchronize
military intelligence company (MICO) assets into the S-2's collection plan.
Often the ACT is manned by junior soldiers who do not have the experience level
to integrate and synchronize various MICO assets. 2.
The MICO commander must integrate and synchronize MICO assets and ensure that
the ACT serves as the fusion cell for all of the MICO SIGINT, HUMINT, GSR,
and other MI collection reports that come into the ACT. 3.
Recommend that Home Station training emphasize RWS training and exploitation
of the capabilities of the ASAS. This should be done in a field environment
and not in the comfort of garrison. (TA.5.2.2
Collect Target Information)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Leader conduct of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)
OBSERVATION
(TF 2): Company commanders and platoon-level leaders fail to conduct IPB, even
informally, for their area of operation.
DISCUSSION:
During
continuous operations, company commanders are neither receiving updates on
the enemy situation from the battalion staff nor using reports from subordinate
leaders to conduct IPB. 1.
Units conduct movement-to-contact for several days and never locate the enemy.
2.
Units are developing friendly courses of action (COA) based on the initial
IPB and on not locating the enemy. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Company commanders and platoon leaders must analyze the terrain and the enemy
in their area of operations and determine probable enemy courses of action.
Chapter 2, FM
7-10,
The
Infantry Rifle Company,
outlines steps to take. A more detailed discussion can be found in FM
34-130,
Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield.
2.
Conduct unit conference calls, usually via FM, and include updates of the enemy
situation (to include analysis by the S-2). The commander can also cross-talk
with units who are able to locate the enemy to refine his analysis of the enemy
and terrain. (TA.5.3.1
Evaluate Threat Information)
TREND
7
SUBJECT:
Gathering products for the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)
process
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): The first step in developing the enemy event template is to gather
the necessary products completed early in the IPB process and then check to
see if they are complete.
DISCUSSION:
The
first product needed in developing the IPB is the Modified Combined Obstacle
Overlay (MCOO). At a minimum it should display the critical OCOKA factors (observation
and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles and movement, key terrain,
avenue of approach) and the effects of weather. The MCOO does not need to show
every nuance of the terrain, just the results of the analysis.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES: Same
as TREND 4.
(TA.5.3.1
Evaluate Threat Information)
TREND
8
SUBJECT:
Enemy event templating
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): Brigade and battalion S-2s consistently fail to accurately portray
predicted enemy courses of action in a graphic enemy event template.
DISCUSSION:
The
event template is the culmination of the IPB process, and arguably the most
important analytical product to support the MDMP and the targeting process
and to fight the close battle. Without a clearly drawn event template, it is
almost impossible for the S-2 to integrate his prediction of the enemy into
the commander's and battle staff's decision cycle. Unfortunately, most S-2s
were not able to produce an event template for a majority of the battles. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
FM
34-130,
Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield,
shows
the enemy event template in detail. 2.
FM
34-130
treats
the enemy event template as another equal step in the analytical process. S-2s,
commanders, and XOs must accept that the event template is a goal of the process
and vital to the success of the unit's mission. (TA.5.3.1.2
Review Holdings)
TREND
9
SUBJECT:
Terrain analysis
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): Brigade and battalion S-2s are not conducting effective terrain
analysis and are not communicating their analysis effectively.
DISCUSSION:
S-2s
are not presenting terrain analysis to commanders in such a way that commanders
easily understand how the terrain affects the outcome of their mission. S-2s
fail to identify key and decisive terrain, and do not update their initial
analysis as battles progress. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
S-2s
need to learn how to read the terrain both from the map as well as through
a comprehensive study of the ground. In other words, S-2s need to get out of
their offices at Home Station and get out of the TOCs during a rotation to
see the ground first-hand. When the tactical situation does not permit the
S-2 from standing on the decisive terrain, then he must develop a systematic
method for collecting terrain data and updating his analysis. Some potential
TTPs follow: 1.
During Home Station training, S-2s need to train themselves and their sections
using a series of terrain walks, map studies, and historical case studies.
They need to develop a keen sense of how the terrain affects their unit. 2.
There are ample opportunities for the S-2 to leave the TOC and see the ground.
For example, during the defense while the battalion commander troops the line
from the left flank, the battalion S-2 can walk it from the right flank. As
he moves from right to left, he can adjust his analysis and then brief the
platoons on what he expects them to face in their sector. 3.
S-2s must focus the terrain portion of their mission analysis brief on the
results of their analysis. They should key on effects of the terrain on friendly
and enemy forces as well as identification of key and decisive terrain.
(TA.5.3.2.2
Consider Status)
TREND
10
SUBJECT:
Delegate workload
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): S-2s do not adequately delegate the workload required during the
Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) to their subordinates and do not have
a complete understanding of the products required in the MDMP.
DISCUSSION:
This
is especially true in regard to enlisted 96B intelligence analysts, who tend
to be nothing more than well-trained radio operators and map plotters. The
trend is for S-2s and assistant S-2s to do all of the IPB themselves. As a
consequence, S-2s generally run out of time and energy just when they start
their event template and usually present a woefully inadequate product.
Brigade
and battalion XOs do not have a complete understanding of what products to
expect from their S-2s at each stage of the MDMP and the time it takes to prepare
those products. Often XOs establish planning timelines that give their staff
less than an hour from the end of the division operation order to the mission
analysis brief. In those cases where S-2s were not able to start the IPB prior
to the division order, their IPB products suffered in quality from the beginning.
Since IPB is a process whereby each product builds upon the analysis of the
last product, it is crucial that early products are done well. In most cases,
S-2s generally fell behind from the beginning, were forced to sacrifice the
quality of early products to adhere to an arbitrary time schedule and, as a
consequence, were unable to produce accurate event templates later.
MI
doctrine is not clear on how to complete event templates for every mission.
IPB was designed for defensive operations, and most S-2s have a clear understanding
of how to complete the event template while in the defense. However, few have
the knowledge or experience to adequately portray the enemy in time and space
during movement-to-contact missions, deliberate attacks, or other offensive
operations. The S-2 must step away from doing the IPB and think about how to
portray his prediction of the enemy COA. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES: Same
as TREND 8.
(TA.5.4.4
Prepare Reports on Enemy Situation)
User's
Guide
TA.1
Maneuver BOS
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