The Largest Security-Cleared Career Network for Defense and Intelligence Jobs - JOIN NOW

Military

TA.5 INTELLIGENCE BOS


(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Positive Performance

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Positioning of field artillery assets to support the defense

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Field artillery battalions are using the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process to identify critical movement triggers and future firing battery positions.

DISCUSSION: The enemy's division/brigade reconnaissance elements are unable to locate and attrit friendly forces.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Task force commanders and staffs should conduct IPB exercises at Home Station to give the S-2 and staff experience in the IPB process and the products needed.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)


TREND 2
SUBJECT: S-2 and analysis and control team (ACT) integration

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): During this observation period, every unit physically integrated the military intelligence (MI) company ACT into their brigade tactical operations (TOC) tent.

DISCUSSION: This brought additional analysts into the brigade TOC to asssist the brigade S-2 section in tracking and analyzing the enemy, plus it brought additional connectivity into the all-source analysis system (ASAS) intelligence architecture.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)


TREND 3
SUBJECT: S-2 section operations

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): A majority of units came to their rotation with complete or nearly complete S-2 shops. These sections had useful SOPs and for the most part followed efficient, effective procedures.

DISCUSSION: Those units that used their enlisted analysts routinely tended to handle the stresses of the rotation better. The reasons for this success should be emphasized in training and include:

1. The workload was distributed better.

2. Young soldiers had more situational awareness and understood the importance of their tasks.

3. The more experienced NCOs and officers were able to spend more time conducting predictive analysis and visualizing the big picture.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Home Station training, the JRTC Leader's Training Program, and Mobile Training Teams appear to be working and must be continued.

2. Task force commanders and staffs should conduct IPB exercises at Home Station to give the S-2 and staff experience in the IPB process and the products needed.

(TA.5.3 Process Information)


TREND 4
SUBJECT: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), Evaluate the threat

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Brigade and battalion S-2s and intelligence analysts in the military intelligence (MI) company analysis and control teams (ACT) came to the rotations thoroughly prepared with adequate knowledge of the threat they would face.

DISCUSSION: This knowledge was effectively converted into doctrinal templates, databases on threat tactics, options, and high-value target lists.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Home Station training, the JRTC Leader's Training Program, and Mobile Training Teams appear to be working and must be continued.

(TA.5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)


Needs Emphasis

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Collection planning and reconnaissance and security operations and planning

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Brigade and battalion S-2s consistently failed to plan effective operations to collect the information needed to win.

DISCUSSION: A majority of units used well-developed matrices as planning tools, which indicated they knew what needed to be done. However, not one unit was able to plan and execute a successful reconnaissance plan in any phase of the rotations. Three common areas characterized intelligence collection failures: lack of focus, timeliness, and supervision. First, reconnaissance missions were unfocused and not linked to the commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) or Decision Points (DP). Second, missions were initiated late, often uncoordinated, and usually not tracked by higher headquarters. Third, units did not have a system to double-check when a named area of interest (NAI) was or was not covered or could not identify gaps in the coverage.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Collection/reconnaissance and security planning must begin with receipt of the warning order so that intelligence or reconnaissance teams can initiate collection operations while the staff is conducting the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Although this is not possible during initial entry missions, early reconnaissance would allow the staff and commander to make a plan based on current intelligence, not just templated enemy situations. Commanders must strive to ensure they have a well-focused collection effort. This includes limiting the number of tasks given to collection assets, ensuring tasks are tied to PIR or DPs, and ensuring the plan uses all assets available.

EXAMPLE: A scout platoon can only pinpoint an objective and then observe it. Reconnaissance operations should pull maneuver units toward enemy weaknesses or vulnerabilities. Too often units force reconnaissance down one axis to support an inflexible friendly course of action.

1. Small maneuver elements can conduct aggressive patrolling operations to help the reconnaissance plan. For example, the JRTC OPFOR often probes defenses; likewise, infantry platoons can probe the OPFOR's defense. They just need to be trained to do so prior to deployment.

2. There is no hard and fast rule on the number of NAIs that a unit can handle. However, the brigade staff must recognize that each NAI tasked to a subordinate unit becomes a specified task to them during the mission analysis.

3. S-2s and S-3s must have a combined method of tracking the collection/reconnaissance and security operation. Although planned by the S-2, the S-3 must maintain visibility over this set of combat assets maneuvering on the battlefield. One technique is to post an NAI chart next to the map that shows when an NAI is active, what is being reported, and when it should go inactive. This must be a staff battle drill practiced by all members of the S-2 and S-3 sections.

4. When combining assets from different units for reconnaissance missions (such as Marine FCTs, LLVI teams, and scouts), sufficient command, control and communications must be built in. These missions must be well coordinated and rehearsed routinely at Home Station prior to deployment. A rule of thumb is that when two like-sized units join to form a reconnaissance team, a headquarters from the next higher unit is probably needed.

5. Collection plans must be tied to the commander's key decision points. If a valuable asset is placed in a risky situation to support a tactical operation, then that asset is potentially wasted.

6. Reconnaissance is everyone's business. Every combat leader must conduct a reconnaissance as part of routine troop-leading procedures and must be involved with running the entire TOC.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)


TREND 2
SUBJECT: Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): IBP is a weak point for most aviation units.

DISCUSSION: The modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO), normally developed at Home Station, is usually not updated and used during a unit's rotation. Additionally, units habitually do not refine the doctrinal and situational templates provided by brigade, nor do they develop event templates other than for the defense phase.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

1. Units must develop a decision support template.

2. Review FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.

(TA.5.2 Collect Information)


TREND 3
SUBJECT: Finding the enemy using aviation assets

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Aviation units conduct search and attack operations by conducting either a zone reconnaissance, an area reconnaissance, or hasty attacks as a finishing force.

DISCUSSION: The commander may specify other reconnaissance objectives in his intent, but finding the enemy is usually the focus. Adherence to the critical tasks associated with a zone/area reconnaissance and the commander's PIR will help define the purpose of the reconnaissance for aircrews. Units that plan a zone/area reconnaissance with supporting graphics and control measures have greater success in thoroughly searching a zone. For a zone reconnaissance, the graphics break a zone up into logical segments that can be systematically executed, i.e. phase line to phase line.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Flight techniques are important while conducting the zone reconnaissance. Due to the nature of the terrain, it is imperative that aircrews fly slow enough to search down into the trees. A common trend is for aircrews to fly at speeds between 50 - 80 knots, which is too fast! Crews that slow down to speeds from ETL to 30 knots are more successful in finding the enemy, cache sites, and other targets.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information)


TREND 4
SUBJECT: Intelligence products

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Intelligence products should include enemy course of action overlays developed early in the IPB process.

DISCUSSION: Each overlay should have at least the following: enemy mission and potential task organization, enemy decisive point, task and purpose of each unit, main effort, supporting effort, unit boundaries, and objectives as appropriate. (Note: In this TTP, brigade and battalion S-2s should concentrate on analyzing the enemy in the above detail two levels below the senior enemy unit [i.e., if you are fighting a battalion, then you would track two levels below that, or platoons], and not try to template down to every team and weapon system.) Overlays should be layered on the map in the following order: MCOO, operations graphics, and enemy COAs.
Another technique is to place a blank drop over the overlays and combine different COAs into one overall template. Ensure that where the COAs merge and diverge is clearly shown. At the place they diverge, look for where the enemy commander would have to make a decision on a particular COA and put a symbol for a decision point there. In those places where the enemy's presence would indicate he has adopted a particular COA, place a symbol for a named area of interest. Based on the enemy's mission and the task and purpose of each element, show where the enemy wants to move and how long it will take him to get there using time phase lines. The enemy may not move in every operation, but the enemy will try to do things according to some operational timeline in every operation.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Once the overlay is complete, double-check to ensure that the following is identified and clearly depicted:

1. Enemy's overall mission.

2. Task and purpose of each unit tracked.

3. Boundaries for all units two levels down.

4. Templated locations of assets and systems two levels down (e.g., battalion logistics points, company supply points, platoon caches, and so on.)

5. Main and supporting efforts.

6. Time phase lines for those elements that will move.

7. Annotations of operational times or patterns for those elements that will not make large-scale movements (e.g., "Expect minelaying operations between 0400-0630 each day.")

8. Key and decisive terrain.

9. Status of population, as appropriate.

Remember, neatness counts. If the overlays are reproduced on a black and white field copier, make sure they are legible. This product can be a decisive factor in your victory or defeat.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)


TREND 5
SUBJECT: S-2 and analysis and control team (ACT) integration

OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Every unit physically integrated the MI company analysis and control team (ACT) into their brigade tactical operations center (TOC) tent.

DISCUSSION: This brought additional analysts into the brigade TOC to assist the brigade S-2 section in tracking and analyzing the enemy, plus it brought additional connectivity into the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) intelligence architecture. Although there was physical integration of the ACT into S-2 sections, the ACTs provided very little analysis and input into the S-2's threat analysis. The primary reason for the failure of the ACT to assist the S-2 in developing a threat picture is that ASAS operators are not fully trained prior to conducting a JRTC rotation. Remote workstation (RWS) operators are not fully able to exploit all of the capabilities of the system.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The ACT personnel do not fully understand how to integrate and synchronize military intelligence company (MICO) assets into the S-2's collection plan. Often the ACT is manned by junior soldiers who do not have the experience level to integrate and synchronize various MICO assets.

2. The MICO commander must integrate and synchronize MICO assets and ensure that the ACT serves as the fusion cell for all of the MICO SIGINT, HUMINT, GSR, and other MI collection reports that come into the ACT.

3. Recommend that Home Station training emphasize RWS training and exploitation of the capabilities of the ASAS. This should be done in a field environment and not in the comfort of garrison.

(TA.5.2.2 Collect Target Information)


TREND 6
SUBJECT: Leader conduct of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Company commanders and platoon-level leaders fail to conduct IPB, even informally, for their area of operation.

DISCUSSION: During continuous operations, company commanders are neither receiving updates on the enemy situation from the battalion staff nor using reports from subordinate leaders to conduct IPB.

1. Units conduct movement-to-contact for several days and never locate the enemy.

2. Units are developing friendly courses of action (COA) based on the initial IPB and on not locating the enemy.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Company commanders and platoon leaders must analyze the terrain and the enemy in their area of operations and determine probable enemy courses of action. Chapter 2, FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, outlines steps to take. A more detailed discussion can be found in FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.

2. Conduct unit conference calls, usually via FM, and include updates of the enemy situation (to include analysis by the S-2). The commander can also cross-talk with units who are able to locate the enemy to refine his analysis of the enemy and terrain.

(TA.5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)


TREND 7
SUBJECT: Gathering products for the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): The first step in developing the enemy event template is to gather the necessary products completed early in the IPB process and then check to see if they are complete.

DISCUSSION: The first product needed in developing the IPB is the Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO). At a minimum it should display the critical OCOKA factors (observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles and movement, key terrain, avenue of approach) and the effects of weather. The MCOO does not need to show every nuance of the terrain, just the results of the analysis.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Same as TREND 4.

(TA.5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)


TREND 8
SUBJECT: Enemy event templating

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Brigade and battalion S-2s consistently fail to accurately portray predicted enemy courses of action in a graphic enemy event template.

DISCUSSION: The event template is the culmination of the IPB process, and arguably the most important analytical product to support the MDMP and the targeting process and to fight the close battle. Without a clearly drawn event template, it is almost impossible for the S-2 to integrate his prediction of the enemy into the commander's and battle staff's decision cycle. Unfortunately, most S-2s were not able to produce an event template for a majority of the battles.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, shows the enemy event template in detail.

2. FM 34-130 treats the enemy event template as another equal step in the analytical process. S-2s, commanders, and XOs must accept that the event template is a goal of the process and vital to the success of the unit's mission.

(TA.5.3.1.2 Review Holdings)


TREND 9
SUBJECT: Terrain analysis

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Brigade and battalion S-2s are not conducting effective terrain analysis and are not communicating their analysis effectively.

DISCUSSION: S-2s are not presenting terrain analysis to commanders in such a way that commanders easily understand how the terrain affects the outcome of their mission. S-2s fail to identify key and decisive terrain, and do not update their initial analysis as battles progress.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: S-2s need to learn how to read the terrain both from the map as well as through a comprehensive study of the ground. In other words, S-2s need to get out of their offices at Home Station and get out of the TOCs during a rotation to see the ground first-hand. When the tactical situation does not permit the S-2 from standing on the decisive terrain, then he must develop a systematic method for collecting terrain data and updating his analysis. Some potential TTPs follow:

1. During Home Station training, S-2s need to train themselves and their sections using a series of terrain walks, map studies, and historical case studies. They need to develop a keen sense of how the terrain affects their unit.

2. There are ample opportunities for the S-2 to leave the TOC and see the ground. For example, during the defense while the battalion commander troops the line from the left flank, the battalion S-2 can walk it from the right flank. As he moves from right to left, he can adjust his analysis and then brief the platoons on what he expects them to face in their sector.

3. S-2s must focus the terrain portion of their mission analysis brief on the results of their analysis. They should key on effects of the terrain on friendly and enemy forces as well as identification of key and decisive terrain.

(TA.5.3.2.2 Consider Status)


TREND 10
SUBJECT: Delegate workload

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): S-2s do not adequately delegate the workload required during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) to their subordinates and do not have a complete understanding of the products required in the MDMP.

DISCUSSION: This is especially true in regard to enlisted 96B intelligence analysts, who tend to be nothing more than well-trained radio operators and map plotters. The trend is for S-2s and assistant S-2s to do all of the IPB themselves. As a consequence, S-2s generally run out of time and energy just when they start their event template and usually present a woefully inadequate product.
Brigade and battalion XOs do not have a complete understanding of what products to expect from their S-2s at each stage of the MDMP and the time it takes to prepare those products. Often XOs establish planning timelines that give their staff less than an hour from the end of the division operation order to the mission analysis brief. In those cases where S-2s were not able to start the IPB prior to the division order, their IPB products suffered in quality from the beginning. Since IPB is a process whereby each product builds upon the analysis of the last product, it is crucial that early products are done well. In most cases, S-2s generally fell behind from the beginning, were forced to sacrifice the quality of early products to adhere to an arbitrary time schedule and, as a consequence, were unable to produce accurate event templates later.
MI doctrine is not clear on how to complete event templates for every mission. IPB was designed for defensive operations, and most S-2s have a clear understanding of how to complete the event template while in the defense. However, few have the knowledge or experience to adequately portray the enemy in time and space during movement-to-contact missions, deliberate attacks, or other offensive operations. The S-2 must step away from doing the IPB and think about how to portray his prediction of the enemy COA.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Same as TREND 8.

(TA.5.4.4 Prepare Reports on Enemy Situation)


btn_tabl.gif 1.21 K
btn_prev.gif 1.18 KUser's Guide
btn_next.gif 1.18 KTA.1 Maneuver BOS



NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list


One Billion Americans: The Case for Thinking Bigger - by Matthew Yglesias