• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

Battle-tracking is another name for situational awareness. Signal units are not training in this area and, consequently, most units have no knowledge or systems in place to track the battle. Poor battle-tracking results in unnecessary loss of life and equipment on the battlefield. Figure 16 provides a summarized list of what soldiers need to know.

1. AT A MINIMUM, does each soldier get a DAILY update on:

• NBC threat (not just the MOPP level!)?
• Air threat (what does "yellow tight" really mean? Ask soldiers.)?
• Artillery threat (are we in enemy range fans)?
• Ground threat (rear area, bypassed units, snipers)?
• General situation. Is there a battle going on right now? Tomorrow? Which way is the enemy?

2. Does the Node CP update all soldiers daily? How?

SUGGESTION: Get an intelligence update from SYSCON or Bde. Just before Stand-to, brief team chiefs as part of Stand-to and have them go out and brief soldiers on the perimeter. Brief EVERYBODY. Get all extensions on a conference call and update them, as well as verify sensitive items.

Need to brief from SITMAPs and posted maneuver graphics. Train junior officers and NCOs. Prompt leaders to ask the S2 if they do not understand a symbol posted on the graphics.

3. How are extensions kept current? Not just remote sites, such as RAUs and relays, but SEN teams which may or may not be briefed by their supported unit.

Extensions are the toughest part of battle tracking. SENs operate across the division under a variety of threat conditions. Assuming their supported TOCs will take care of them is assuming the problem away. At a minimum, leaders must check to ensure they are briefed and intervene as necessary. The threat to Remote RAUs and relays is considerable, and it must be analyzed and disseminated. How is the unit doing this; what is the SOP; what is the plan?

4. Does the Node CP have maneuver graphics (division or brigade)? Do they know how to read them? Do officers/NCOs know basic map symbology and maneuver terms? This can become a training goal for the rotation -- encourage it.

NOTE: At a minimum, leaders can get by with the following symbology and terms:

• LD. The line of departure for the attack. They need to know how far from it they are. Knowing the time of attack is critical. Systems should be up and checked, MSRT numbers verified, and soldiers at a heightened alert status. The LD time lets you deduce lots of other things: which way the traffic's going, what time the hospitals will be maxed out on casualties, and so forth.
• No pen line. The no penetration line in a defense. In addition, the size of the enemy unit they will deny.
• Phase lines and routes/axis of advance.
• Bypass criteria. This tells you the size of the enemy force that our combat troops will bypass; this is the size enemy signal soldiers will probably face.
• MSR. And routes, as well as axis of advance.
• Objective. The point of it all.
• The brigade/division mission?

5. During the Battle.

• Does the node management facility (NMF) maintain good situational awareness during the battle? Are they tracking the enemy, phase lines? Are they monitoring the appropriate battle net (BDE CMD or O/I)?

• Are extensions updated on the situation during the battle (recommend every hour as a minimum)? Who does it, NMF or SYCON (SOP!) Do extensions have maps? Do they know where they are on the battlefield -- how far from the LD? Do they have any mini-graphics or any way to track the battle?

• Do extensions and nodes have withdrawal criteria? Is it realistic, based on OPFOR rate of march? Does the site understand it?

• Is the SYSCON monitoring the battle and updating the nodes? Who exactly is responsible to update remote sites? How? How often? Has SYSCON/S2 coordinated or set withdrawal criteria for endangered sites? Is it based on OPFOR rate of march and battle situation?

• Do nodes have a plan to move if threatened? Have they thought about how they will break their site? Have they practiced the withdrawal plan? Cargo should be forward-positioned to help the node or RAU break (maybe extra bodies to the RAU) and leaders should have a definite plan. Has the plan been rehearsed?

6. SYSCON/S2. Is SYSCON attending division LO meetings; do they know what's going on? Are they aggressively wargaming the impact of best and worst battle outcomes for the network? Are they planning to reconfigure the network if sites must "bug out"?

7. Do leaders and drivers check in with the NMF for threat updates before leaving the site -- this includes mechanics, extension supervisors, CE Maintenance, GTE reps, cooks, company Cdrs, XOs.

8. If SYSCON does not answer the NMFs' questions, do they quit? Do team chiefs quit if the NMF or their supported TOC fails to inform them? Are extensions getting updates from their supported TOCs; is anyone in the signal battalion calling and checking their situational awareness?

9. Are NMFs using all available data -- from extensions, bde staff, SYSCON -- to keep the clearest possible picture?

10. The chart below highlights critical battle-tracking considerations for all signal sites.

Figure 16. Battle-Tracking - What Soldiers Need to Know.

Site defense is inadequately trained, if trained at all, in most signal units. Look for a logical plan that is realistic and smart, and that is possible with whatever limited manning the site has. Figures 17a and 17b provide a list of considerations for the site defense plan. All signal units are short-handed. That is reality. The enemy will not care that you are undermanned. To compensate for low manning, leaders must develop detailed plans, SOPs, and assign specific tasks down to individuals. The plan must be rehearsed, day and night.

Figure 17a. Signal Site Defense Planning Considerations.

Figure 17b. Signal Site Defense Planning Considerations.

Assess the plan on METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available). You simply cannot go wrong. Each site will be different. Defense plans and preparations should get better the longer the unit remains in place. Priority of work may differ based on the enemy threat.

Good site defense requires (1) Common Sense, (2) Knowledge of your enemy, (3) A Good Plan (that the leadership spent serious effort developing) and (4) A well-rehearsed team. Rehearse both day and night. Every soldier has to know what to do. Below are some basic questions all too often never asked.

1. REALISM/METT-T. Is the plan realistic for the site's manning? Does it try to cover too much (frequently the problem with Node Centers) or not enough (typically the problem with remote RAUs, which do not post security although they could)?

2. REHEARSALS. Has the site rehearsed the plan, day and night? Battle Drills! During Stand-Too and Stand-Down, do we go to DC power and turn the generators off?

3. ALARMS. What is/are the site alarms? Do the soldiers know? Can everyone on the site hear even in the shelters with generators going?

4. FIGHTING AND SURVIVALBILITY POSITIONS. You need both. Survivability positions are holes to protect you from incoming artillery. They should be dug near where soldiers work and live. Fighting positions are dug on the perimeter based on the site defense plan. Rarely should the two be combined.

5. LIKELY AVENUES OF APPROACH. Use common sense. The enemy will most likely come from the direction that offers him the best opportunity for success. Know your enemy. Will they walk, drive wheeled vehicles, tanks, tracks, use artillery? Do we cover the likely avenues of approach with our biggest weapons? Do we observe these areas more often? Have we planned any obstacles?

6. PATROLS. Do them. Do mounted patrols in the daytime and dismounted patrols at night.

7. CREW-SERVED WEAPON POSITIONS. Do they have:

• Blank adapters?
• Traverse and elevation mechanisms that soldiers know how to use?
• Range cards that soldiers can explain?
• Ammunition?
• Are the gunner and assistant gunner qualified?

8. OBSERVATION POSTS. If you spot the OPFOR before he gets in, you will kill him. If he gets in your perimeter, you are dead. Do night OPs have NVGs? Do the OPs have communications back to the site CP? Walk outside the perimeter and look to see what the OPFOR will see - you may be surprised.

9. QUICK REACTION FORCE. Do you have one? Do they rehearse? They must learn how to maneuver as one team; otherwise, they are not effective.

10. PERIMETER COMMAND AND CONTROL. How do you control the perimeter when you are under attack? At night, this is very difficult. What is the SOP? Where do the PLT LDR and PLT SGT go? Who calls higher to report? Who controls the QRF? Where is the Casualty Collection Point? Is there a rally point if the site is overrun?

b. Make sure you do not hide yourself out of communication. Make sure you set up on the friendly side of the terrain.

17. What is their basic load for ammunition? Do they have VIPERs, illumination flares, trip wires? Do they have any Class IV: plywood for overhead cover, concertina?

18. Are they in the right MOPP status? Do they know what it is? Do they have an M256 kit?

19. If chemical strikes occur, is the team notified? Do they get any intelligence during the battle? Are they notified of any enemy spot reports that may apply to them?

Part IV
TROUBLESHOOTING, SHF, AND CNRI

Signal units that have troubleshooting SOPs and enforce them do much better at maintaining reliable communications at NTC. Do we have agreed-upon procedures that take us through each link systematically? When soldiers start replacing equipment, changing frequencies and polarization, we quickly lose control of what is going on and the down time goes up exponentially. Develop a good SOP with one person in charge of troubleshooting the entire link. See the troubleshooting considerations, taken from TM-11-5800-216-10-4, at Figure 18.

Figure 18. Troubleshooting by the Numbers.

SHF (Super High Frequency Radio System). A fantastic asset at the NTC, yet the most underutilized system in all of MSE. When used, it is always the most solid shot. It often eliminates the need for a relay, and frees up another frequency pair. SHF must be practiced at home station to be successful at NTC. Make SHF a training objective while you are at NTC.

CNRI (Combat Net Radio Interface). Another asset that often goes unused. Teach your subscribers about CNRI at home station. Sell this asset. Publish the frequencies/numbers in the phone book. Brief it at all meetings. CNRI is a lifesaver for Task Force SIGOs only if they know about it.

CONCLUSION

Implementing some of the TTPs and lessons we addressed in this article will assist the BSO and MSE Signal Company in time management and planning for a deployment anywhere in the world.

This article is intended to show signal leaders some critical tactics, techniques, and procedures that most often affect communications at the National Training Center. Signal leaders should take the information contained here, update their SOPs, and teach their subordinates, peers, and supervisors what it takes to communicate successfully at the NTC.

As units in the U.S. Army become more technologically advanced, their reliance on communications becomes more critical. It is no longer valid to simply assume your unit will communicate without the proper planning and training.

Final Note: NTC is an eye-opening experience. Keep your mind open and learn from it. Train your unit well and best of luck!

NEWSLETTER

Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list

Enter Your Email Address