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SECTION II

A SUCCESSFUL MSE NETWORK BY THE NUMBERS

Chapter 1: PLANNING A SUCCESSFUL MSE NETWORK

Synchronizing and Integrating Communications Assets During the Wargaming Process
Table of Contents
Preparation for a Successful MSE Network

Part I
THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN A SIGNAL UNIT

The Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) is a tool used to solve complex problems by breaking them down into their component parts. The U.S. Army has adopted this method to plan complex military operations. FM 101-5, Chapter 5, states that the MDMP produces the greatest integration, coordination, and synchronization for an operation and minimizes the risk of overlooking a critical aspect of the operation. All signal units must use and practice the MDMP. All too often, the "Signal Plan" is the work of one great mind, rather than capturing the input of many great minds. The following discussion focuses on how to use the MDMP to plan a successful signal operation at the National Training Center.

STEP I. Receipt of Mission.

Often taken for granted, this step is sometimes hard to accomplish successfully. Signal units not used to working with brigades may not know the brigade's battle rhythm. Signal units must participate in the brigades' decision-making process. The Signal Company must synchronize its battle rhythm with the brigade's to assure they do not miss key events. The use of the Signal unit LO is an effective way to accomplish this. The items listed below are critical to accomplishing this first step in the MDMP.

Be there when the brigade issues its order.
Get a copy of the brigade's order.
Get a copy of the brigade's maneuver graphics.
Understand the Division and Brigade Commander's Intent.
Read and understand the brigade's SOP, specifically the Command and Control SOP and the Reporting SOP.

STEP II. Mission Analysis.

The second step in the MDMP is to perform the mission analysis. Although this is arguably the most important step, it is often the most overlooked. What is the mission of the MSE Signal Company? To provide MSE communications for the Brigade Combat Team. Sounds simple, but that entails so much more. What does it mean to provide MSE communications? In mission analysis, Signal planners must fully define the problem at hand. Identify restrictions/limitations, and any assumptions.

The signal mission can be better stated as "To provide MSE communications at the right time and at the right place on the battlefield." We must know when and where the Decisive Point on the battlefield is. To do this, one must understand the Brigade's scheme of maneuver. "SIGNALEERS" MUST UNDERSTAND MANUEVER! We must MASS our MSE assets at that decisive point to provide the necessary redundancy. Mission Analysis is further broken down into the following steps:

a. Analyze the Brigade's Order.

What is the Brigade Commander's Intent?
What is the Brigade's Scheme of maneuver?
When and where is the decisive point on the battlefield?
What are the Brigade's constraints and limitations?
What is the Brigade's AO?
What is the Brigade's Scheme of C2?
Where are the Brigade's C2nodes located?
When and where are they jumping?
Where are the Commanders and S3s located?
When and where are they moving? How are they going?
To Whom do they need to talk?
When is it critical to the success of the operation that they all communicate?

b. Conduct IPB.

What, When and Where are the threats to our Signal Units?
Consider:
OPFOR reconnaissance elements.
OPFOR Guerilla Forces.
NBC Threat.
Air Threat.
How do the different enemy COAs threaten us?
Do a thorough terrain analysis.
Update the IPB continuously.

c. Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks.

A specified task may be "Provide MSE comms at the BCT TOC."
An implied task may be "Provide RAU coverage for Task Force Commander's, TOCs, and S3s."
MSE comms at the Brigade's decision points may be an essential task.

d. Review Available Assets.

What equipment and teams are fully mission capable?
What equipment and teams have SHF? CNRI?
What teams are partially mission capable? Bad radio, cable.
What frequencies are available?

e. Determine constraints.

When can we cross the LD?
What is the limit of advance?
What terrain is off limits?
What are our boundaries?
Any frequency constraints? RF power constraints?

f. Identify critical facts and assumptions.

What effects will they have on the signal plan?
For example: FACT: The OPFOR can DF and jam MSRT frequencies.
ASSUMPTIONS: The OPFOR cannot DF or jam Band I and Band III frequencies.
Remember your assumptions' equal risks.

g. Conduct Risk Analysis.

Consider both Safety and Operational Risks.
Example of Operational Risk may be having an LOS relay on an internodal link, or emplacing a signal site forward of the FEBA or LD.

h. Determine initial Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).

The Signal Commander's CCIRs are linked to a specific decision point. For example: What must happen before a RAU team jumps forward? The answer may be a specific Task Force reaches its objective or a phase line. This becomes the CCIRs for the Signal Company.

i. Determine the initial reconnaissance.

Consider Route and Signal Site reconnaissance.
Who will conduct it?
When will they conduct the reconnaissance?
Did we give them enough time to do a thorough reconnaissance?
Signal Site reconnaissance is the basis for network flexibility and site defense. See Part III for checklist.

j. Plan use of available time.

Make the planning timeline.
Remember the 1/3-2/3 rule.

k. Write the restated mission.

Who, What, Where, When, How, and Why.

l. Conduct a mission analysis briefing.

Mission and intent of Brigade and Division.
Brigade's concept of the operation.
Review Signal Commander's initial guidance.
Initial IPB products.
Specified, implied and essential tasks.
Constraints on the operation.
Signal Forces/assets available.
Hazards and Risks (Include all assumptions).
Recommended initial CCIR.
Timeline.
Restated mission.

m. Approve the restated mission.

Commander decides after mission analysis brief.

n. Develop the initial commander's intent.

Clear concise statement of what we must do to successfully accomplish our communications mission.

o. Issue the Commander's guidance.

The signal commander focuses on essential supporting tasks that support mission accomplishment. Appendix B of FM 101-5 provides information that can be included.

p. Issue the Warning Order.

The restated mission.
The Commander's Intent.
Sketch of the Area of Operations.
The CCIR.
Risk guidance.
Reconnaissance to be initiated.
Security measures.
Deception guidance.
Mobility and counter-mobility guidance.
Priorities of work/planning.
Timeline.
Guidance on rehearsals.

q. Review Facts and Assumptions.

Throughout the planning process, continue to review facts and assumptions to ensure they are still valid and accurate.

STEP III. Course-of-Action Development.

Generally, different courses of actions will have different network diagrams or different schemes of maneuver for signal units and teams.

The COA sketch is a combination of the Network Diagram and timeline for moving signal assets.

The COA brief will include the following:

Updated Intelligence Estimate.
Possible Enemy COAs.
Restated Mission.
Brigade's and Signal Commander's Intent.
Brigade's Scheme of Maneuver.
COA Network Diagram/Sketch.
COA explanation.
Updated facts and assumptions.

STEP IV. Course-of-Action Analysis (Wargame Signal).

Evaluation criteria are based on principles of war, doctrinal fundamentals, commander's guidance.

Must step through the Brigade's scheme of maneuver to determine critical events and decision points for the communications plan.

Must portray realistic, aggressive OPFOR to determine the flexibility of the communications plan and our reactions.

Results of wargame should include:

Identifying on-order and be-prepared missions.
A thorough synchronization matrix.
Identifying key terrain.
Identifying and refining decision points, triggers and CCIRs.
Refining Task Organization.
Identifying most dangerous enemy.
COA.
Identifying critical events.
Determining movement time and tables.
Identifying additional hazards and conducting risk assessment.

STEP V. Commander's Decision Briefing.

Commander's Intent two levels up.
The restated mission.
Status of own forces.
Updated IPB.
Brief all COAs and results of Wargaming.
Assumptions.
Results of Staff Estimates.
Advantages/Disadvantages.
Recommended COA.
Decision Matrix.
Risk Assessment.

STEP VI. Course-of-Action Approval.

The Commander issues further guidance.
The Commander identifies any risk mitigation control measures.

STEP VII. Orders Production.

Upon approval of the COA, the unit should immediately prepare and distribute a FRAGO and, at a minimum, the Task Organization.

The Military Decision-Making Process is a powerful tool. When used by signal units at the National Training Center, a very detailed, synchronized signal operations order is produced. Differences between signal units and maneuver brigades require the process to be modified slightly, but the basic principles always apply. It is a skill that must be practiced at home station to be effective.

The following is an example of a one-page FRAGO that signal companies can use to disseminate critical signal information to all signal platoons and teams.

Part II
THE SIGNAL LIAISON OFFICER (LO) TO THE MANUEVER BRIGADE

FM 101-5, Appendix L, goes into detail about the roles and responsibilities of the LO. It provides a checklist for the LO. The Signal LO to the Brigade TOC must be trained to be an LO. He should be familiar with FM 101-5. He is the eyes and the ears for the signal unit (the Signal Spy so to speak). He will also fight for the Signal unit. He will gather information, such as graphics and orders, and forward them to SYSCON for further analysis. A good LO can keep the SYSCON informed of the numerous changes that occur to the Brigade's Plan.

Who is the Signal Liaison Officer?

No signal unit is authorized an LO to each Brigade, nor can they afford to give up one soldier to perform these duties. The reality is we cannot afford NOT to provide an LO to the Maneuver Brigade. There are some options however:

1. The best option is to provide an experienced officer or senior NCO to the Brigade TOC to be the LO. A little rank also helps. The LO must be trusted to speak on behalf of the SYSCON and Commander. The LO must also know the limits of his authority. The LO should show up with the necessary supplies to copy Brigade graphics. The LO is very helpful in getting the Brigade Order and all the changes to the Brigade's Plan as they occur.

2. The BCT TOC SEN Team Chief as the LO. This works well sometimes, and sometimes it does not. It depends on the individual team chief and the team. The LO must have experience and be trusted to speak on behalf of the SYSCON or Commander. The LO must be aggressive and take the initiative to get the job done. The SEN Team must be able to function effectively with minimal supervision of the Team Chief since he will be tied up in the Brigade's Planning Process. Usually a strong assistant Team Chief can take care of business.

3. The Company Commander as the LO. It cannot be done. There is simply too much for the Commander to do. He cannot afford to spend all his time day and night at the Brigade TOC. Some units have had limited success by using the Commander as the LO, but only at the expense of his duties as commander. There are times when the Company Commander should be involved in the Brigade's planning process and should attend various meetings such as the Combined Arms Rehearsal and Brigade's order briefs.

Part III
THE SIGNAL SITE RECONNAISSANCE

FM 11-43, The Signal Leader's Guide, page 5-10, explains the Signal Site Reconnaissance in detail. It is the basis for network flexibility. The site reconnaissance is the initial step in planning for site security and force protection. A thorough Node Center site reconnaissance requires 1-2 hours on site to complete. Technical data for each shot should be taken with the reconnaissance party. At a minimum, the reconnaissance party must know approximately what azimuths their LOS shots will be.

A good SOP for the Node Center site reconnaissance should identify who conducts it, what they use to mark positions, and what vehicles are taken.

The Node Center Reconnaissance party should consider the following:

Initial LP/OP established.
Main Avenue of Approach identified.
Equipment/Shelters placed in low ground.
Antennas on high ground/concealed/masked.
Initial site defense established.
Perimeter identified.
Crew-Served weapon positions identified.
Rally Point established.
Fighting position identified.
Detailed site diagram completed.

Part IV
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS IN THE OFFENSE AND DEFENSE

The Offense: Below are some specific considerations for planning MSE in support of an offensive operation. MSE is more difficult to plan and execute during the offense, because of the high tempo of heavy maneuver brigades.

When and where do we require RAU coverage?
What is the initial set for our critical C2nodes and MSRT subscribers?
When will they move forward, and where will they go?
When and where is the decisive point on the battlefield?
How do we push RAU coverage forward?
Who controls the RAU movement forward? What is the Task Organization?
What is the trigger for it to move? Is it synchronized with the Brigade?
Have we coordinated with the Battalion Task Force who owns the land?
No Fire Areas Security
CASEVAC Air Defense Coverage
Battalion Aid Stations Chemical Defense
Has the RAU team chief attended the Task Force Rehearsal?
Has the signal team linked up with the unit they are moving with?
Do we have a primary and alternate location identified?

There are different types of offensive operations. Generally, a movement to contact requires more flexibility because we do not know the exact disposition of the enemy. Can we jump a Node Center or a RAU to a hill 20 kilometers forward of the LD or will we get bogged down in the close fight 5 kilometers in front of the LD? We need to have plans for different contingencies.

The Defense: Planning an MSE Network for the defense is somewhat easier than the offense. You occupy the ground on which you fight. Doctrinally, we want to avoid putting MSE assets forward of the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA). Typically a remote RAU and possibly a SEN is forward of the FEBA. If your network is supporting a Division Cavalry Squadron, you can almost count on having assets forward of the FEBA. It is very important to know where all the friendly obstacles are located on the battlefield. Many obstacles are situational obstacles. The signal team forward of the FEBA does not want to get caught up in our friendly obstacles. The defense in sector is a temporary mission and is usually followed by a hasty attack. That will require additional planning. Here are some considerations for the defense.

When and Where is RAU coverage required?
What is the initial set of critical C2nodes and MSRT subscribers?
When will these C2nodes move and where will they move to?
Is there a passage of lines? Where is the passage point, and what is the SOP?
Where is the decisive point on the battlefield?
Where are the friendly obstacles located?
Where are the engagement areas (EA), and Close Air Support (CAS) target boxes?
Have teams forward of the FEBA coordinated with the Battalion Task Force?
Has the passage of lines been synchronized? Rehearsed?
Has the team chief attended the Task Force rehearsal?
Is there an NFA around the team? Do they have Air Defense coverage?
Where will the team get support for CASEVAC, Chemical Decontamination, and Security?
What is the trigger for the Team to break links, start movement, bug out, or hide?

TRUE STORY: One signal unit was planning for much success during the defense. They positioned their Node Center forward of the FEBA and in the middle of the Brigade's main engagement area. This was where the Brigade Commander had stated he intends to kill the enemy. The result was the Brigade took out the Node Center as well as the enemy.
One signal unit emplaced their Node Center well behind the FEBA; however, the Brigade had planned a situational obstacle that would prevent the enemy from flanking. Unfortunately, the Node Center was on the enemy side of the obstacle. The obstacle worked very well, and neither the enemy nor the Node Center got through the minefield.

Part V
PLANNING THE CONVOY

The checklist below gives some specific items to consider when planning the convoy. Significant network downtime is due to lost, separated or broken down vehicles and inadequate convoy planning. Do we have the wrecker with the convoy if available? Do we have fuel available in route? Remember the vehicle that breaks down or gets lost is going to be the one you need the most.

Situation, Friendly and EnemyBreakdown Procedures
Mission Start Point and DestinationAccident Procedures
Order of March/TimelineLost Vehicle Procedures
Route and AlternateAmbush Procedures
Halts/CheckpointsSecurity Force
Night OperationsFrequencies/Call Signs
Interval/Dust IntervalRequired reports
Speed/Catch-up SpeedConvoy Commander location
Road Hazards/WeatherMEDEVAC Support
Risk AssessmentCombat Lifesaver location
Defensive DrivingFood, Fuel, Water, Class III

TRUE STORY: One Signal Platoon planned a 35-kilometer convoy out to their new Node Center site located on Hill 1203. The Platoon Leader planned and gave a good convoy brief. During the convoy, two remote RAUs were to break off at a designated point and continue to Crash Hill and to the Yoda. Everyone knew where to go. At the last minute, the cooks joined into the convoy; they were told to follow the last vehicle. The main supply route was very dusty. So dusty that they could not see the vehicle in front of them. The cooks ended up following one of the remote RAU teams up to the Yoda. It took the First Sergeant until the next day before he found them and got them back to the Node Center where they belonged. What could have been done differently to prevent this?

Part VI
FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT

Frequency management at the National Training Center is often a challenge. The frequency spectrum is limited. Signal units will not always get exactly what they want. In large MSE Networks, frequency management becomes a very important consideration. Although the MSE network in support of one Brigade at NTC is relatively small, we must manage our scarce frequency resource wisely. The desert terrain does not mask or block frequencies very well. This is a two-edged sword. On one hand, signal units are capable of putting in reliable LOS shots up to 45 kilometers. On the other hand, two of the same frequency pairs in use on low power separated by 50 kilometers tend to interfere with each other.

One good technique to manage your frequencies is to list all Band I and Band III frequencies in numerical order. Go through and choose frequencies separated by 8-10 MHz. Match the first and the middle frequency to make one pair and continue through the list until all the usable frequencies are paired up. Go back and alternate the polarization on each consecutive pair. Now we have the best separation possible. For example:

Step 1: Highlight frequencies with a 10 MHz separation. Start with the lowest frequency.
Step 2: Count the number and divide by two (pairs).
Step 3: Pair the first frequency with the middle frequency (maximum separation).
Step 4: Alternate polarization beginning with pair one.
Step 5: Assign frequency pairs based on location. Maximum separation between adjacent pairs.

Figure 11. Frequency Management - The Simple Pencil-and-Paper Method, "A WAY"

Following Figure 11 gives us the following frequency pairs (Figure 11 shows this information in matrix format):

Pair 1: 230.625/325.625 H
Pair 2: 241.500/337.125 V
Pair 3: 272.375/347.625 H
Pair 4: 286.750/358.375 V
Pair 5: 300.125/368.250 H
Pair 6: 313.125/399.125 V

Part VII
RISK MANAGEMENT

Every leader plays a role in the risk management process. Risk management is not an afterthought. It must be incorporated into the planning process. Risk management is more than a safety brief. Risk management must address both Operational Risk (Risk to mission) as well as Safety Risk (Risk to soldiers). The Force XXI model of risk management is the Army Standard.

The first step is to identify these risks. During the planning process, we identified assumptions. These assumptions are risks. Some examples of risks that have been identified by units follow:

Operational Risk:

Risk of attack by small PPG force between EENT and BMNT.
Risk of losing MSE communications at the BCT TOC during the battle.
Risk of remote RAU team being attacked by OPFOR Armor threat.

Safety Risk:

Hazards while driving at night.
Hazard of casualties because of heat.
Hazards because of lack of sleep.

Control measures must be identified and implemented to mitigate these risks. How do we implement these control measures and who implements these control measures?

For example:

Operational:

Increased Security between EENT and BMNT; conduct patrols.
Provide redundant SEN at BCT TOC linked into a different Node Center.
Identify trigger for RAU to jump back.

Safety:

Drivers and TCs will have operational NVGs.
Forced hydration, one quart per hour.
Implement sleep plan.

After identifying the risks and the control measures, we must do two things: Identify who will supervise the control measures, and brief the soldiers.

For example:

Operational:

Sergeant of the Guard will supervise patrols at night. PSG develops schedule.
SYSCON, PLT LDR will monitor status of both SEN links at BCT TOC.
RAU team chief understands trigger, has binoculars to see trigger and battletracks.

Safety:

Section Sergeants will inspect NVGs prior to roll out.
Team leaders will conduct force hydration at the top of every hour.
Sleep plan is posted and enforced by Team and Section Leaders.

Use a risk management worksheet (see Figure 12) to document all this information.

The risk management worksheet must be briefed and posted where all can read it. All leaders at all levels perform the risk assessment. The higher the level of supervision, the more the risk is mitigated. In the example above, the team leaders supervise the forced hydration of their team. If the unit continues to have heat-related problems, the commander may elect to have section sergeants personally supervise the forced hydration. Doing this would increase the burden on the unit.

Synchronizing and Integrating Communications Assets During the Wargaming Process
Table of Contents
Preparation for a Successful MSE Network



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