APPENDIX A
Training
Assessment Checklist
Combined
Arms Breaching Operation
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Schedule Home-Station Breach Training.
1. Is combined arms breach training scheduled on the brigade's/task force's long-range calendar?
2. Is breach training planned at an echelon high enough to ensure it is combined arms?
3. What resources were allocated (i.e., sufficient land, time, combined arms assets, evaluators, and an evaluation plan) for breach training?
4. Was breaching doctrine taught to the combined arms leadership (OPD or NCOPD)?
5. Was there a logical training model used to train breaching from individual to collective tasks, to include staff procedures?
6. Do all echelons have a consistent breach drill as part of their TACSOP?
Plan Breach Operations.
1. Did the staff use the command and engineer estimates to develop the situation template?
2. Did the staff base the scheme of maneuver, actions at obstacles, and the scheme of engineer operations on the situation template?
3. Did the staff use reverse breach planning when planning the operation, beginning with actions on the objective?
4. Did actions on the objective determine the size and composition of the assault force?
5. Did actions on the objective and the size and composition of the assault force determine the number and location of lanes to be breached?
6. Did lane requirements and the type of obstacle drive the amount and type of mobility assets task-organized to the breach force?
7. Does the commander express the risk he is willing to accept to maintain mass and momentum?
8. Does the Scheme of Engineer Operations (SOEO) support the commander's intent?
9. Did the MPs help develop a traffic control plan with higher headquarters and an engineer focus?
10. Did the MPs plan for the possible need to establish a division-forward EPW collection point near the breach site?
Provide Intelligence-Gathering for the Breach.
1. Did the staff include templated obstacles in the situation template when developing the initial event template?
2. Was obstacle data (obstacle location, orientation, bypasses, composition, and location of enemy direct fire weapons) included in the PIR?
3. Did obstacle data and the enemy situation template influence the NAIs for the R&S plan?
4. Were all available intelligence-gathering assets (scouts, imagery, and HUMINT) focused on observing the NAIs to both confirm the enemy situation template and obtain obstacle data included in the PIRs?
5. Did the staff have a means for integrating hard intelligence, gathered by reconnaissance, into the situation template to revise, develop, and validate it?
Apply Breaching Fundamentals.
1. Did the staff apply SOSRA in developing courses of action?
2. Did the staff address SOSRA during the wargaming process?
3. Did the staff address SOSRA at the rehearsal?
4. (Suppress) Were direct fires employed to prevent effective enemy fires on friendly forces?
5. (Suppress) Were indirect fires employed to prevent effective enemy fires on friendly forces?
6. (Suppress) Were there effective control measures used to control direct and indirect fires?
7. (Suppress) Were CAS and aviation integrated into the suppression plan and how effective were they?
8. (Suppress) Did suppressive fires achieve sufficient volume (3:1 minimum) to isolate the breach site?
9. (Suppress) What fire control measures were used to ensure all fires were massed, lifted, and shift-synchronized with other actions at the obstacle?
10. (Suppress) How effective were the fire control measures?
11. (Obscure) Was the trigger to begin obscuration fires effective?
12. (Obscure) Was obscuration smoke effective in hampering the enemy's observation and slow his target acquisition?
13. (Obscure) Was screening smoke employed effectively at the breach to conceal movement and obstacle-reduction activities?
14. (Obscure) Were all smoke assets (FA, mortar, smoke generators) used effectively?
15. (Secure) Did the enemy situation template determine the method for securing the breach site?
16. (Secure) Was security effective, either with fires or by occupation, in preventing the enemy from interfering with obstacle reduction and passage of the assault force through the breach lanes?
17. (Reduce) Did the breach force wait until the other elements of SOSRA were in place before attempting to breach (did they have tactical patience)?
18. (Reduce) To what extent were friendly forces able to successfully breach?
19. (Reduce) Were the breach lanes wide enough in accordance with FM 3-34.2?
20. (Reduce) Were the breach lanes marked properly in accordance with FM 3-34.2?
21. (Reduce) Were the breach lane locations reported in accordance with FM 3-34.2?
22. (Reduce) What control measures were used to signal successful breaches?
23. (Reduce) Were there any planned signals to indicate a failed breach or exhaustion of breach assets?
24. (Reduce) What TTP did the breach force use to create a lane through the obstacle?
Identify the Breaching Organization.
1. Did the commander identify and task-organize units in accordance with doctrinal breaching organizations?
2. (Support Force) Did the support force consist of a mix of direct and indirect fire systems?
3. (Support Force) Did the unit determine attack-by-fire positions (AFPs) or support-by-fire positions (SFPs), and routes to those positions, during planning?
4. (Support Force) Was the support force able to cover all enemy positions from their AFPs or SFPs?
5. (Support Force) Did the support force effectively adjust indirect fires?
6. (Breach Force) Did the staff incorporate expected losses and plan for redundancy when allocating breach assets?
7. (Breach Force) Did the staff allocate the breach force the necessary assets to provide local SOSRA at the breach site?
8. (Breach Force) Were the engineers ready to breach as soon as the enemy fires were suppressed?
9. (Breach Force) Did the breach force have priority of fires when conducting the breach?
10. (Breach Force) Were post breach tasks assigned to the breach force?
11. (Breach Force) How were the engineers incorporated into the CASEVAC plan?
12. (Assault Force) How was the assault force employed?
13. (Assault Force) What fire control measures were in place to allow the assault force to assume control of direct fires on the objective as support fires shifted or lifted?
14. (Assault Force) Did the assault force have sufficient combat power to achieve a 3:1 ratio to assault the objective?
Achieve Mass at the Breach Site.
1. Did friendly forces attempt to achieve mass by concentrating force at a single point in the enemy defense?
2. Did the breach force mass engineer assets to open enough lanes through the obstacle to permit rapid passage and build up on the far side, allowing the assault force to achieve necessary mass?
3. Did the staff engineer balance the need for simultaneous breaching with the need for assets required to breach subsequent obstacles?
Achieve Synchronization at the Breach Site.
1. Did the support, breach, and assault forces apply SOSRA (breaching fundamentals), in the correct proximity to the breach, in a timely and synchronized manner?
2. Did the task organization take effect in a timely manner?
3. Did attached units provide input to planning and participate in rehearsals?
4. Did the staff create an execution matrix during planning to relate sub-unit instructions to phases of the operation?
5. Were subordinate units able to use the matrix to track the battle and coordinate their own maneuver with adjacent units?
6. Did the commander position himself where he could best control the battle (usually the support force when breaching)?
7. Was the S-3 able to effectively track the battle from his location (usually with the breach force initially)?
8. Did the MP traffic control operations provide maximum use of traffic control posts and mobile patrols to assist the support force, breach force, assault force and follow-on forces to move along breach lanes?
9. (Rehearsals) Did the commander give his subordinate units time to rehearse?
10. (Rehearsals) Did the TF or BDE facilitate rehearsals by preparing a rehearsal site for subordinate commanders and managing its use?
11. (Rehearsals) Were breach rehearsals part of every rehearsal?
12. (Rehearsals) Did rehearsals focus on synchronizing the maneuver of support, breach, and assault forces to achieve the SOSRA breaching fundamentals?
13. (Rehearsals) Was a combined arms rehearsal conducted?
14. (Rehearsals) Were contingency plans rehearsed?
15. (Rehearsals) Was the rehearsal conducted under the same conditions as the planned breach, i.e., terrain, obscuration, darkness and weather?
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