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Preempting the Enemy --
HUMINT's Role in Multidimensional Reconnaissance
Within the IBCT

by MAJ Brad C. Dostal, Military Analyst, CALL, and
CPT Christina McCormick, HUMINT Platoon Leader, IBCT

Part I - Introduction

Situational Understanding and HUMINT

To operate successfully as a full spectrum combat force, the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) maintains numerous key operational capabilities in its design. One of these is enhanced situational understanding (SU) and information superiority. In fact, the IBCT Organizational and Operational (O&O) concept states, "Situational understanding is the fundamental force enabler across all Interim Brigade Combat Team battlefield operating systems."1 With the importance of SU to the success of the IBCT paramount, all IBCT leaders must understand not only its definition, but also the enabling assets within the unit to achieve SU and its corresponding dominance of the battlefield.

This article studies one of the specific components of the IBCT's ability to conduct multidimensional reconnaissance to maintain critical SU, its robust human intelligence (HUMINT) capability. Within the conventional Army, commanders and staff have always been familiar with the traditional forms of reconnaissance: zone, area, and route. One unique characteristic of the IBCT is that it possesses the assets to conduct a fourth type of reconnaissance, known as multidimensional reconnaissance. Multidimensional reconnaissance (MDR) is defined as a directed effort to obtain specific information concerning the threat, populace, infrastructure, and terrain within an area. MDR expands on the traditional forms of reconnaissance by focusing soldiers on the local populace throughout the area of operations to assist in defeating or countering asymmetrical threats.2

Although the conduct of multidimensional reconnaissance within the IBCT includes all intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sensors in the IBCT, this article focuses on those that are unfamiliar to many leaders throughout the U.S. Army, and unique to the IBCT organization, the HUMINT assets of the unit. Since MDR is a significant contributor to SU for the IBCT during all operations, especially in Stability and Support Operations (SASO), as well as Smaller-Scale Contingencies (SSCs), methods of conducting MDR are important for all leaders within the IBCT to understand since they are critical to achieve mission success in the unit's operational environment. This article shares some of the basic operational capabilities of HUMINT assets within the IBCT and discusses TTPs for improved training and employment of the assets. This information will familiarize leaders with the HUMINT assets available to the IBCT and their methods of employment.

HUMINT Collection Agents in the IBCT

Reconnaissance Troop -- One IBCT organization manned and equipped to conduct HUMINT operations is the reconnaissance troops of the RSTA squadron. Within this organization, it is the presence of the 97B, Counterintelligence (CI) agent that provides it with a marked increase in HUMINT-gathering capability over any previous battalion- or brigade-level asset. The significance of these 97Bs at the tactical level cannot be overemphasized to those unfamiliar with the IBCT organization, since the CI asset organic to conventional units at the squad tactical level is a capability unique to the IBCT, and one that is atypical in the U.S. Army.

The effects on the RSTA squadron of the assignment of 97Bs are significant. Within the RSTA squadron's three reconnaissance troops, each six-man squad is assigned one 97B soldier (see Figure 1), with the troop and platoon headquarters each containing one 97B NCO. This radical addition of 97Bs to the unit's organic manning places over 36 CI agents forward deployed with the RSTA troops at the lowest tactical level. This permanent presence of trained intelligence-gathering agents in an organization that is most likely to be the farthest forward element of the IBCT at the tactical level provides an intelligence-gathering capability unmatched by any conventional force. With the presence of 97Bs in the RSTA troop, HUMINT-gathering operations are now a sustainable and routine aspect of every reconnaissance operation. This is a stark contrast to the days of past when HUMINT assets from division level would be tasked to provide support to tactical operations only when planned in advance and normally on infrequent occasions.

HUMINT Platoon -- The second source of HUMINT-gathering capability within the IBCT is the brigade's HUMINT platoon. The HUMINT platoon is an element of the brigade military intelligence company, and is not a part of the RSTA squadron. Since it frequently supports RSTA operations and maintains a command relationship of administrative control to the squadron, its leadership is currently rated by the RSTA squadron chain of command. The primary intelligence-gathering arm of the HUMINT platoon is maintained within its four tactical HUMINT teams, each consisting of three 97Es (HUMINT collector) and one 97B (CI agent). Once deployed, the teams report their information to an operational management team (OMT), which collates intelligence data gathered by the tactical teams. The information is then passed on to the brigade S2X section for further analysis and integration into the brigade's collection plan.3

C2-- Not only are the operational HUMINT forces unique to the IBCT, but their controlling agencies are as well. Within the RSTA squadron, information gathered in the field is shared with the squadron S2, through the operations and intelligence channels similar to communications traffic in current Army units (depicted in Figure 2). The dissimilar and noteworthy characteristic of the IBCT's communication network for HUMINT data flow is the transmission capability of the 97B at the reconnaissance squad level. The 97B with the reconnaissance squads passes HUMINT intelligence information to the S2X cell collocated with brigade through separate source data channels using the Individual Tactical Reporting Tool or CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set (discussed in the following section). This allows not only the RSTA squadron S2 to receive information directly from the deployed squad, but also the brigade's S2X, the primary staff agency responsible for all HUMINT collection operations in the brigade area of interest, to receive key HUMINT information as well.

S2X -- The presence of the S2X section is a notable design change possessed only within the IBCT force structure, and has significant positive impact on HUMINT operations throughout the IBCT. No longer does a small cell from division augment the brigade or battalion to conduct HUMINT operations. They are now controlled and maintained by a dedicated organic brigade staff section. The S2X cell maintains the primary role of developing a HUMINT collection plan that supports the overall intelligence collection plan of the brigade. The S2X cell works closely with the brigade S2 and operations staffs to ensure HUMINT operations are relevant, synchronized, and supportive of the overall operations plan of the IBCT. The S2X has a close working relationship with the HUMINT platoon because the S2X belongs to the same company in the brigade. The S2X also maintains staff supervision over the 97Bs in the reconnaissance troops, and integrates the information gathered by the reconnaissance squads during tactical operations into the overall HUMINT database at brigade for evaluation and dissemination.

HUMINT Collection Equipment in the IBCT

In addition to the unique manning which bolsters the HUMINT capabilities of the IBCT, the unit also maintains a large suite of HUMINT collection tools from squad to brigade level. The systems utilized are components of the CI/HUMINT Information Management System (CHIMS) architecture. One system used by the 97Bs in the reconnaissance troops is the Individual Tactical Reporting Tool (ITRT), or AN/PYQ-8.

The ITRT is designed to receive, process and store messages and digital imagery providing reconnaissance squad soldiers the capability to collect, process, and disseminate HUMINT information of immediate tactical value during operations. It is the entry-level device used at the lowest unit level to input HUMINT data into the CHIMS architecture.

The system most frequently used by the TAC HUMINT teams and the reconnaissance platoon and troop headquarters is the CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set (CHATS). This system is maintained by the HUMINT NCOs assigned to the troop headquarters in the RSTA Squadron, the TAC HUMINT teams, and the OMTs within the brigade's HUMINT platoon. The CHATS system allows these elements to receive, process, and edit information collected prior to sending it to the S2X. Both the ITRT and the CHATS are compatible with current and future IBCT communications systems. The systems communicate over the Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) Tactical Packet Network and Local Area Network (LAN), the Trojan Spirit Network,4 and the Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS). This provides soldiers the capability to send and receive intelligence data, even classified information if required, while deployed anywhere within the area of operations.

Another unique HUMINT tool, and one only in use in the IBCT, is the Counterintelligence and Interrogation Operations Workstation (CI&I Ops WS). This is the primary system used by the S2X to edit, integrate, and disseminate HUMINT data throughout the brigade. It is considered the "HUMINT All-Source Analysis System" of the brigade.5 The system is very dynamic in that it is not only able to communicate with all subordinate ITRTs and CHATS within the brigade, by sending and receiving information from them as required, but it can also share information with the remote workstations of the brigade's All-Source Analysis System (ASAS). This allows it to share overlays and information available to staff planners of conventional intelligence channels. The CI&I Ops WS provides the S2X cell the unique capability of organizing and tracking HUMINT data similar to the manner of local and federal criminal investigative agencies. The system allows users to build link diagrams of key individuals throughout the area of interest using the program "Crimelink." The Crimelink software allows the S2X to maintain a website of HUMINT data available to staff planners, commanders, and subordinate elements with access to any component of the CHIMS system.

Counterintelligence Agents and Scouts -- A Powerful Mix

During the development of the IBCT O&O concept, analysis indicated that the expected operational environment requires a robust HUMINT capability.6 This is due to the importance of understanding not only what is happening, but also why. To achieve this desired level of SU within the IBCT, the RSTA Squadron must see, know, and understand the operational environment in great detail. It is this required level of detail necessary to achieve operational success for the IBCT that led to the decision to the positioning of 97B/Counterintelligence soldiers in the RSTA troop at the squad level.

To prepare for their role within the RSTA troop, newly assigned 97Bs receive three months of cohort training at Fort Huachuca, AZ, in addition to their normal AIT course. During this training, the soldiers not only learn more about the specifics of HUMINT collection in the IBCT, but they also have the opportunity to sharpen their common soldier skills prior to assignment to a tactical element in a combat arms battalion. Upon arrival to the IBCT unit, the soldiers are integrated in to the RSTA troop platoons like all other soldiers, the only difference being their MOS of 97B instead of 19D/Scout.

HUMINT Integration Training within the RSTA Troop

Although the 97Bs assimilate quickly into the RSTA Troops, the need to better educate junior leaders within the troops on their functionality is evident. The 97Bs are more than willing to carry their "fair share" of the burden during conventional reconnaissance missions, and their ability to do so is not in doubt. What is in question is the ability of the junior leadership of the RSTA troops to effectively utilize the 97Bs assigned to them. This is an issue that cannot go unresolved, as the HUMINT-gathering skills of the 97Bs are key to the IBCT's ability to gain critical SU across the brigade. Even with the presence of first-rate leadership within the reconnaissance troops, platoons, and squads, many of these junior leaders with armored cavalry and scout backgrounds do not fully understand the 97B's capabilities. Because of this lack of sufficient HUMINT training present among RSTA junior leaders, critical opportunities to gather needed HUMINT at the tactical level is frequently missed.

Having recognized this training deficiency, outstanding company-grade leadership of the IBCT planned and executed a four-day HUMINT-focused exercise. The event furnished the needed training base on HUMINT operations within the RSTA troop. One objective of the event was to provide the leadership within the RSTA troops a basic understanding of HUMINT operations, and the capabilities of the 97Bs. Another objective was to provide the leaders and soldiers in the RSTA troop an opportunity to conduct a HUMINT exercise, putting into practice some of the skills of the 97B. The POI consisted of various HUMINT topics, and was prepared by the RSTA troop 97B NCOs, the brigade HUMINT platoon, and the brigade S2X section. To maintain maximum credibility of the 97Bs at the troop level, most of the classes were taught by the senior 97Bs assigned to the company and platoon headquarters of the troop. The training event began with classroom instruction, and progressed to a practical exercise (PE) in field conditions. The brigade HUMINT platoon officers and NCOs, as well as the S2X cell, provided oversight during all phases of the event, since leaders within these elements possessed deep backgrounds in HUMINT operations, and were able to provide a significant level of expertise and experience to the instruction.

The first two days of instruction focused on defining the capabilities and role of the 97Bs within the reconnaissance troop. The instruction began with a CIA case study on HUMINT operations in Somalia. The case was a classic "real-world" example of the value of CI personnel at the small unit level during combat operations. The case focused on CI agents supporting an infantry company tasked to locate weapons caches in a village outside of Mogadishu. Because of thorough analysis and good HUMINT collection techniques, the CI agents were able to provide the key information leading to discovery of one of the largest enemy weapons caches of the conflict. The case caused everyone to think about the value of the CI soldiers on the battlefield, and how they interact with ground tactical units.

Following the case study, soldiers began a class defining all aspects of CI operations. Detailed explanations of the skills learned by the 97Bs assigned to the troop were covered including intelligence/investigative law, doctrine, interpersonal skills, interviewing skills, terrorism analysis, surveillance/deception techniques, and report writing. After reviewing the training background of the 97Bs, the instruction explored various HUMINT collection operations that the soldiers were likely to conduct (see Figure 3). The POI also defined multidimensional reconnaissance (MDR) within the RSTA, discussed the criticality of its execution, and the role HUMINT assets played within MDR.

Once the members of the reconnaissance platoons gained an understanding of the training base and capabilities of the 97Bs assigned to their platoons as well as the importance of HUMINT gathering to IBCT success, they received instruction on the more specific roles of the 97B within their own tactical reconnaissance squads (see Figure 4). It was at this point in the instruction when all members of the RSTA troop learned the importance of "tactical questioning." Tactical questioning is defined as, "The abbreviated form of interrogation or debriefing used to collect PIR-related information from human sources."7 Tactical questioning is considered one of the 97B's most valuable skill sets, and is especially critical to these soldiers assigned to the reconnaissance squads, as it is their primary and most frequently used HUMINT-gathering method. The instruction covered far more than the definition of tactical questioning, detailing all types of questions, including direct, follow-up, repeat, non-pertinent, and prepared. Principles of good questioning and topics to be avoided were also covered. At the end of the session, experienced HUMINT soldiers conducted demonstrations of good tactical questioning, and soldiers rehearsed in preparation for the PEs conducted during the FTX.

Another reconnaissance HUMINT mission requiring extensive training during the POI was document exploitation and evacuation. In addition to tactical questioning, this is another key skill, as it will often be the forward elements of the RSTA troop who come into contact with pieces of recorded information. Through the proper actions of the members of the reconnaissance troops, data with intelligence value can be passed to higher headquarters for analysis and may provide critical input to IBCT situational understanding. Soldiers learned to appreciate the value of Document Evacuation and Exploitation (DOCEX) at the tactical unit level. DOCEX is defined as "Any piece of recorded information, regardless of form, obtained from the enemy, which subsequently comes into the hands of a friendly force."8During this portion of the POI, soldiers learned how to categorize, screen, summarize, and report documents of immediate tactical value.

One key aspect of HUMINT operations discussed throughout the training was "source operations," or relying on non-unit personnel to provide information of value to the unit. HUMINT collection is the use of human intelligence assets and methods to obtain information that answers the commander's PIRs, and source operations are the backbone of HUMINT collection operations in the IBCT. Source operations studied at the troop level include casual sources, official sources, and recruited sources.9 Soldiers of the reconnaissance platoons learned overt methods of eliciting information from potential sources, while maintaining security of the force and Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) as well. During the training, soldiers had the opportunity to practice these skills during tactical questioning scenarios supervised by the senior 97B NCOs and S2X personnel. The methods taught provoked thought, discussion, and ideas of conducting the MDR mission at the troop level in the most secure manner, minimizing exposure of intent, methods, and team makeup.

Following two days of classroom instruction, the RSTA troop personnel road marched to a field location to conduct the practical exercise portion of the HUMINT training event. The S2X and HUMINT platoon leadership wrote a scenario for a mock village which the RSTA troop used to conduct MDR. NCOs from the HUMINT platoon played the roles of the characters in the scenario. Roles ranged from members of the guerilla opposition who were running weapons to local farmers, to neutral villagers who were only a distraction. With the most trained HUMINT soldiers in the brigade as the role players, techniques of tactical questioning conducted by the reconnaissance squads were easily given positive or negative reinforcement.

Following an assessment of area security, and conventional tactical reconnaissance techniques, the RSTA troop moved into the HUMINT collection phase of their MDR collection plan. Elements of the reconnaissance troop moved into the village while maintaining communications with security elements outside the village. Soldiers had the opportunity to practice tactical questioning and rapport building techniques while in the village. Propaganda flyers were available to provide soldiers the opportunity to practice DOCEX skills learned during the classroom portion of the event. Upon completion of the HUMINT-gathering mission in the village, units moved to a secure location and collated information, wrote reports, and transmitted the data on a CHATS station to the S2X personnel. This portion of the exercise provided reconnaissance squads the opportunity to transmit HUMINT reports through the CHATS/SINCGARS interface in field conditions, a critical skill for success of the operation.

RSTA Troop HUMINT Training -- Lessons Learned

The HUMINT training conducted with the RSTA troop was a noteworthy success. Soldiers and leaders in the RSTA troop gained a better understanding of the capabilities of the 97Bs assigned to their unit, and were given the opportunity to utilize the CI personnel into operations beyond conventional tactical reconnaissance. The junior 97Bs in the squads appreciated the training, since it highlighted their skills, many previously unrecognized in the platoon. The overall structure of the training was well done. The case study at the beginning of the POI was interesting, and successfully sparked the chain of thought and questions in the unit on HUMINT operations. Using the S2X and HUMINT platoon leadership to oversee the exercise provided a solid base of experience, and ensured that the training remained focused on tactical HUMINT operations most applicable to the IBCT.

Following the classroom instruction with a two-day HUMINT FTX gave the soldiers in the RSTA troops the opportunity to practice their tactical questioning skills. Inexperienced soldiers were able to observe the 97Bs at work, and then later conduct the tactical questioning themselves. The presence of HUMINT-trained NCOs as the role players provided a realistic scenario. The NCOs were experienced at staying in character, and were able to "guide" the soldiers doing the questioning to provide a better training experience. The role players also had the skill to make the event more difficult for the experienced 97Bs, maintaining a quality training event for all involved. Ending the exercise with the transmission of collected data over tactical field communications provided a level of realism to the event and validated an important and perishable skill set for the squads.

The RSTA troop HUMINT training also exposed some areas needing more emphasis within the squadron. With the amount of new equipment training required in the IBCT to stand up digital systems, coupled with the normal requirements to maintain tactical proficiency, the 97Bs in the RSTA platoons have little time for their MOS sustainment training. Although these soldiers are trained in the basic skills of CI agents, they do not have the depth of experience of the NCOs assigned to the RSTA platoon or company headquarters, or to the brigade HUMINT platoon. Company-level leadership in the RSTA troop and brigade MI company devised some solutions to increase the capabilities of the junior 97Bs at squad level. CI training is now scheduled for the 97Bs two to three times per month, with the CI NCOs assigned to the platoon and company headquarters carrying out this additional training. The CI NCOs in the platoon headquarters are also taking a more active role in the development of the young CI soldiers assigned to the squads by conducting counseling of the 97Bs in addition to their direct chain of command. Additional mentoring is provided during training events as well. During the execution of "presence patrols" by the RSTA troop, CI NCOs frequently travel with the forward elements to assist the junior soldiers at the squad level in conducting HUMINT operations. Because of the common MOS of 97B, CI soldiers of the reconnaissance troops often conduct soldier common task training with the HUMINT platoon.

Of all aspects of the HUMINT training in the RSTA troops, the most apparent was the recognition by the 19D scouts at platoon and squad levels that the 97Bs are truly an added capability, and not just "MI guys" standing in the way of tactical operations. By providing a thorough understanding of the capabilities and roles of the 97B, and the overall importance of HUMINT operations to the success of the RSTA squadron, the 19D soldiers and NCOs of the troop grew to appreciate the presence of these soldiers. During the field portion of the training, the 19Ds gained respect for the 97Bs when they observed them very adeptly interacting with the local populace and completing quality HUMINT reports. Success was proven during a battalion-level FTX in Yakima two months later, when the HUMINT collection and the skills of the 97Bs became a routine part of planning and execution at the platoon and squad levels in the RSTA troops.

Part IV -- Building Capabilities in the HUMINT Platoon

Multidimensional Reconnaissance and the HUMINT Platoon

Although the reconnaissance squads of the RSTA troops conduct multidimensional reconnaissance (MDR), much of their work remains in the more conventional methods of reconnaissance based on the combat arms focus of their organization. The HUMINT platoon of the brigade's military intelligence company is an organization whose primary role is to conduct the more unconventional aspect of MDR for the brigade. The HUMINT platoon is primarily focused on "source operations," and spends the majority of its effort gathering HUMINT data against the HUMINT collection plan of the brigade S2X. While the brigade S2X section is busy integrating information sent to it by the OMTs of the deployed Tactical HUMINT (TAC HUMINT) teams and deconflicting efforts with outside sources, the TAC HUMINT teams continue to meet with sources to build the information required in the S2X's collection plan.

The TAC HUMINT teams of the platoon operate in one of two configurations as they carry out their mission of gathering HUMINT to build situational understanding in the IBCT. They operate in the general-support (GS) mode, remaining under the control of the brigade's S2X and the operational management teams (OMTs) of the HUMINT platoon. When configured in this manner, they will report directly to the OMTs and S2X who are most likely collocated at the brigade Main CP. The TAC HUMINT teams also operate in the direct-support (DS) mode, attached to subordinate battalions to provide an additional capability as they collect HUMINT against an Infantry battalion or RSTA battalion collection plan. While in the DS mode, the controlling OMT of the HUMINT platoon designated to gather the collected data from the TAC HUMINT team will most likely be collocated with the battalion or squadron S2 cell, and have the additional responsibility of passing information on the S2X section which is located in the brigade main CP (see Figure 5).

HUMINT Platoon STX

To prepare the TAC HUMINT teams for their challenging role within the brigades MDR effort, the leadership of the S2X and brigade HUMINT platoon developed a series of HUMINT platoon situational training exercises (STXs). One STX was conducted during the IBCT's first deployment of battalion-sized elements to the Yakima Training Center. The S2X and HUMINT platoon leadership developed a detailed scenario of a fictional country containing a militia movement that the brigade had been sent in to counter. Soldiers of the military intelligence company acted as role players, with HUMINT-trained soldiers acting in the more difficult roles. Collection missions were carried out over a two-day period on main post Yakima (known as Taylor City for the STX), and at a field site where a mock village was constructed.

Preparation for the event began prior to deployment to Yakima, with the S2X planners developing the scenario, and the TAC HUMINT teams of the platoon studying the "Road-to-War" materials to gain an understanding of the country and its corresponding environment. Once the STX began, the TAC HUMIT teams were each given a specific target to collect against, with the OMT of the platoon assisting in prioritizing the effort of the platoon as a whole, and ensuring the teams' collection efforts were supportive of each other and the overall plan. After one day to prepare the collection plan of the team, the team leader briefed the plan in detail. The level of detail expected of the teams was high, as they covered not only the basic five paragraph OPORD, but also went into great detail on contingency planning for the mission. During the brief, the platoon leadership and OMTs were present, as well as the brigade S2X section. Being the most-experienced HUMINT officers and NCOs in the brigade, this group was able to share good TTPs, and ensured the plan of the TAC HUMINT teams was sound.

Following the mission briefing to the leadership, the teams conducted rehearsals and pre-combat inspections of all members of the team. These included not only inspections of equipment, but also tests of critical communications devices as well. The teams then executed their mission as assigned, with some teams meeting with Taylor City locals previously identified as being potential sources of force protection information, while other teams built rapport hoping to find locals who might be supportive of U.S. forces in the area. Although the teams operated in a very unobtrusive and casual manner, they were carrying out specific plans rehearsed earlier to gather HUMINT in the area of operations. Since the role players knew the scenario well, they were able to converse with the TAC HUMINT teams for extended periods of time, often leading the teams to dead ends, but always, in character, maintaining a realistic training event.

Upon completion of the exercise, the teams returned to their garrison base, where they drafted reports of their findings and transmitted reports to the CI&I Ops WS located with the S2X section using the CHATS/SINCGARS interface available with the system. This portion of the exercise provided the OMTs of the HUMINT platoon a significant training event as well. The OMTs not only were responsible for screening the data of the TAC HUMINT teams, but they also had to find linkages and correlation between the data collected by the teams. The OMTs spent many hours sifting through the intelligence gathered by the tactical teams, and were able to find linkages in activity and contacts made. The OMTs then used this information to build a follow-on mission for the TAC HUMINT teams, which was executed during the next day's training.

While the OMTs were screening data from the TAC HUMINT missions, the brigade S2X was utilizing the CI&I Ops WS to assist in the overall collection effort of HUMINT in the brigade. The CI&I Ops WS brought new technology to the IBCT in managing the HUMINT collection effort. Using Crimelink software, the S2X was able to organize the data gathered by the TAC HUMINT teams into a manageable format to share with intelligence planners throughout the brigade. The system allowed the S2X personnel to take data from sub-unit Source Lead Development Reports (SLDRs) and develop useful and easily readable "link diagrams" (see Figure 6). These link diagrams allowed the S2X to build detailed diagrams of source leads within the brigade's area of interest and gain an understanding of relationships between HUMINT sources. This provided the brigade S2X section a direction to focus further HUMINT collection operations which led to overall better situational understanding for the brigade. The S2X can design the CI&I Ops WS to share this information with elements throughout the brigade by establishing a web page within the tactical local area network (TACLAN) if desired. This will allow not only intelligence personnel and reconnaissance troops with CHATS to view the information, but also those in the brigade with access to the Maneuver Control System (MCS) as well. Incident maps can also be shared on the system, as the CI&I Ops WS is capable of sharing MCS-driven graphics.

HUMINT Platoon STX -- Lessons Learned

The HUMINT platoon STX conducted in Yakima highlighted many lessons learned on the planning and execution of HUMINT operations. The importance of collocating data and methods to do so within the platoon is a significant issue. Once the TAC HUMINT teams deploy on their missions, they quickly gather large amounts of information, which is difficult for the OMTs to screen and integrate into a product to share with other teams in a short period of time. Since sharing intelligence between teams is key to synchronizing HUMINT operations, the platoon leadership developed a variety of techniques. One of these is training teams to highlight key events in their reports, making it easier for the OMT personnel to locate and identify critical data. Rather than relying only on "long format" intelligence reports, the TAC HUMINT teams are asked to provide more frequent, and shorter intelligence summaries (INTSUMS) during their missions as the tactical situation dictates. This method provides information more rapidly to the OMTs, and makes it available faster for other elements as well. If teams are collocated, and time allows, the platoon also conducts shift-change briefs each evening, giving the TAC HUMINT teams an opportunity to share information gathered during the day's activities.

The value of the CI&I Ops WS was realized during the execution of the STX. Although the S2X section had only recently fielded this new system, and had limited experience with it, all personnel anticipated its potential to facilitate information-sharing and HUMINT collection management throughout the brigade. The CI&I Ops WS provides the digital linkage needed between CHATS systems throughout the IBCT, and, with its Crimelink software and ability to share map graphics, it is a potent tool for HUMINT mission planning and information-sharing between elements located throughout the brigade's area of operations. Once the system software and hardware required for the CI&I Ops WS and CHATS to integrate with the tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios are fielded, the capabilities of the system will be further enhanced. ITRT, CHATS, and CI & I Op WS interface can then be executed from locations nearly anywhere on the battlefield. This will greatly enhance digital linkage and provide for near real-time situational understanding of HUMINT operations throughout the brigade.

One area of concern voiced by the leadership of the S2X and HUMINT platoon is that the TAC HUMINT teams only have one 97B CI agent per team, and that the OMTs only have a 97B10 assigned. This is recognized as a problem since significant portions of the activities of the TAC HUMINT teams require the 97B skill set. During the STX, the 97Bs, often junior to other NCOs on the team, led the teams during the missions, as they were most familiar with the details and requirements of the operations being conducted.10 Of greater concern is the lack of a senior 97B NCO on the OMTs of the HUMINT platoon. Although the OMTs do have a 97B10 each, both are limited in rank and experience compared with the 97Bs on the TAC HUMINT teams. When conducting CI operations, the HUMINT platoon reorganized and pulled a CI NCO from a TAC HUMINT team to assist the OMT in processing the CI reports of the deployed TAC HUMINT teams. Without this assistance from a 97B-trained NCO, the OMTs' ability to edit and process the information from its subordinate teams is limited.

After completion of the STX, the S2X and HUMINT platoon leadership found that although all soldiers understood the scenario, which was developed in great detail, shortfalls remained. Some aspects of the training are hindered when the leadership creates more information to fill voids as requests for information (RFIs) arrived from the TAC HUMINT teams conducting mission planning. To remedy this, the leadership decided to continue to build upon the same scenario for further training, rather than build another from scratch. This provides the leadership with more time to focus on required training events, rather than scenario writing. It also ensures soldiers of the TAC HUMINT teams spend more time training on other skills of HUMINT operations other than studying another scenario with difficult-to-remember names and places. Another option presented is to use areas of the world to which the platoon will likely deploy, so soldiers and leaders can gain familiarity with countries and governments to which they will likely be deployed with the IBCT. If handled appropriately, this could be an option, but the leadership must ensure that proper unit authorities clear any HUMINT collection training events using actual situations within real countries as the background scenario.

Part V -- Conclusions

After reviewing the HUMINT capabilities of the IBCT in detail, it is clear that the brigade's ability to successfully conduct multidimensional reconnaissance and maintain critical situational understanding is reliant upon these capabilities. By conducting successful training with these assets, and ensuring leaders throughout the brigade understand methods for their employment, the IBCT strengthens traditional forms of reconnaissance to more adeptly defeat and counter anticipated asymmetrical threats.

During interviews with officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers of the IBCT, all remain positive about the impact of the 97B soldiers in the units. Many are surprised at how quickly the soldiers learned the "hard" skill traits, such as combat reconnaissance required of the 19Ds, especially since the 97Bs receive limited training on these techniques at Fort Huachuca. It is not uncommon to observe 97Bs with M249 squad automatic weapons, and, in fact, it is nearly impossible to identify them during training. Training of HUMINT organizations and their assigned personnel within the IBCT must remain a priority. The assignment of 97Bs to the reconnaissance troops is a success, and has the potential for providing significant payoff during operations. To ensure that success is realized, these soldiers must be given frequent opportunities to train on their 97B skill set, to ensure their critical abilities to collect, format, and communicate HUMINT to controlling elements throughout the brigade are maintained.

Proper employment of the TAC HUMINT platoon elements in addition to their training is another issue that cannot be overlooked. With the close working relationship of the HUMINT platoon and the RSTA squadron, training is frequently conducted between these organizations. This is positive, since the TAC HUMINT teams will often conduct operations in support of the RSTA squadron. But this cannot be the only method of employment for the TAC HUMINT teams. The IBCT infantry battalions frequently conduct sustained operations in areas of heavy civilian populace and the presence of HUMINT collection assets with these organizations is critical to overall IBCT success. The RSTA currently has imbedded HUMINT capability, while the infantry battalions do not. Collective training conducted with the infantry battalions is critical to build understanding in the infantry battalion commander and staffs of the capabilities of the HUMINT platoon. Strong consideration must be given to frequent training and deployment of the TAC HUMINT teams with the infantry, field artillery, and support battalions as well as the RSTA, to build the capabilities for HUMINT operations throughout the depth of the brigade area of operations.

The value of the 97B at the forward point of contact became most clear while moving through the Yakima battlefield during a three-day RSTA maneuver exercise. The author was confronted by a forward element of a RSTA troop. The squad maneuvered aggressively in a LAV, quickly dismounted, and came forward to confront the potential threat. Once the threat was assessed as unarmed and neutral, the HUMINT collection effort of the squad commenced. Instead of simply permitting a potentially valuable source to pass through, the soldiers adeptly asked a variety of questions, all well-articulated and -focused to gather specific HUMINT. Multidimensional reconnaissance in the IBCT is truly an activity executed in depth. Not only are senior commanders and staff elements asking "why" events are taking place, and piecing them together to build situational understanding, but also soldiers at the lowest levels are as well. It is not difficult to grasp the significance of this benefit to the brigade, when a person realizes there are dozens of squads on the battlefield, probing beneath the surface of all activity, and collecting on sources that would have otherwise been overlooked. These demonstrated HUMINT capabilities of the IBCT contribute to better situational understanding and must continue to be emphasized at all levels to construct the skills necessary to successfully "preempt" enemy actions during future operations.

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Endnotes:

1. IBCT O&O Concept, Version 4.0, 30 June 2000, p. 15.
2. Draft FM 17-96, RSTA Squadron, 31 March 2000, p. 3-17.
3. The S2X section is a unique addition to the IBCT O&O not previously seen in other units. The S2X is responsible for the planning, tracking, and execution of all HUMINT-gathering operations throughout the brigade's area of interest. The section is made up of an intelligence officer (MAJ), a CI technician (CW2), a HUMINT technician (CW2), and interrogator (SGT), and a CI agent (SPC). The section normally is located in the brigade main CP, and not only coordinates all of the brigade's HUMINT collection activities, but also interfaces with external sources as well.
4. The Trojan Spirit, or AN/TSQ-190V, is a communications terminal used in the transmission of imagery, weather, and terrain products. SPIRIT is an acronym for Special-Purpose Intelligence Remote Integrated Terminal.
5. The All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) is an automated intelligence processing and dissemination system. It provides all-source intelligence fusion, allowing commanders and their staffs to gain timely and comprehensive understanding of enemy deployments, capabilities, and potential courses of action. It also provides operations security support, and aids in deception and counterintelligence operations.
6. IBCT O&O Concept, Version 4.0, 30 June 2000, p. 15.
7. Draft FM 17-98-2, Reconnaissance Platoon Operations, February 2000.
8. STANAG 2084, Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Documents.
9. A "casual source" is defined as someone who by social or professional position has access to information of intelligence interest, but has no obligation to communicate with our forces. An "official source" is a liaison with foreign/domestic intelligence, security, or law enforcement agencies, host-nation officials, allied forces, NCOs with no benefit. "Recruited sources" include personnel recruited by friendly forces to provide timely and accurate force protection information. The 97Bs at the troop level will not usually have contact with "recruited sources." If utilized, these sources will most likely interact with the brigade's tactical HUMINT teams of the HUMINT platoon.
10. During the HUMINT platoon STX, the 97Bs carried a large part of the planning, execution, and reporting of each mission. At one point, a Staff Sergeant (97E) on the team pulled security, while the Sergeant (97B) conducted the meeting with an identified source. One reason is that only a CI agent can conduct initial SAEDA (Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the U.S. Army) investigations and reports per AR 381-12. This highlights the importance of the 97B skill set during HUMINT operations.