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Go Find the Enemy!

Time Usage during the Movement-to-Contact Phase at JRTC

by MAJ Scott W. Heintzelman, Observer/Controller, Task Force 2

After only a few hours of constantly interrupted sleep, CPT Smith awoke to his third day in Cortina. First light, and it was already nearly 90 degrees and 90-percent humidity, with Cortina's dawn wrapping itself around him like a wet towel in a steam bath. Yesterday's long foot march had left CPT Smith's unit low on water. Even worse, the enemy had found his company's patrol base in the swampy low ground late last night, although it was well hidden. They harassed his patrol base with direct and indirect fires, causing numerous casualties, but always broke contact.

Despite the enemy contact, CPT Smith needed more time in the patrol base, at least until he got a new mission from battalion. In the interim, he needed to resupply and to finish evacuating his wounded. As he walked the perimeter, he noticed the First Sergeant and a security detail carrying wounded to a collection point at the nearest road. He hoped that the casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) vehicles, anticipated all night, would actually arrive. He also hoped they would bring some much needed water. CPT Smith noticed most of the men were busy eating, seeing to personal hygiene needs, or cleaning their weapons. Just then, shots rang out from the far side of the patrol base. The enemy had once again crawled up to the perimeter and opened fire. By the time CPT Smith reached the position, they had broken contact. However, the attack left half a dozen of CPT Smith's men wounded or dead. Before CPT Smith could collect his thoughts, a mortar round fell directly in front of him. Blown onto his back and bleeding, CPT Smith wondered how things had gone bad so quickly.

The purpose of movement to contact is to gain or re-establish contact with the enemy. However, rotational units at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) spend the majority of the time during the movement-to-contact phase conducting force protection tasks. They remain stationary far too long, relinquishing the initiative to the enemy. Remaining static allows the enemy to set the terms of battle. Naturally, the enemy only attacks when those terms are very favorable. The vast majority of direct fire contacts, therefore, end in his favor. The operative word in movement to contact is move, and units must understand that. Stationary units are targets and leaders must avoid that pitfall. There are measures that units can take to avoid that trap as they prepare for future JRTC rotations.

Because rotational units face a dispersed enemy, most choose the search-and-attack technique to locate the enemy during the movement-to-contact phase. Field Manual (FM) 7-20, The Infantry Battalion, states that the purpose of search and attack is focused into four primary areas; (1) Destruction of the enemy, (2) Area denial, (3) Force protection, and (4) Information collection. When rotational units start the movement-to-contact phase, observer/controllers (O/Cs) track how every maneuver platoon uses its time in each of these four primary areas. Using FM 7-20 as a guide, we have further defined the areas in greater detail (see Figure No. 1). We then use this information as a vehicle in after-action reviews (AARs) to facilitate discussion.

O/Cs routinely coach units to spend most of their available time actively searching for the enemy. This gives priority to the areas of destruction of enemy, area denial, and information collection. Protecting key facilities is a legitimate task, as is the requirement to conduct patrol base activities to allow soldiers the opportunity to sleep, eat and clean their weapons. In addition, planning and preparation for upcoming operations also frequently occurs during patrol base activities. However, these activities only support the mission of movement to contact. Spending the majority of time available in patrol bases surrenders the initiative to the enemy. That means rotational units lose freedom of action and are consequently reactive to the enemy. Units should spend more than 50-percent of available time on finding the enemy. That is the purpose of movement to contact. This will allow rotational units to maintain the initiative and set the tempo of battle.

Unfortunately, data collected at JRTC shows that units spend the majority of their time conducting force protection tasks. A study of six rotations (three light infantry, two air assault infantry, and one airborne infantry) revealed units spend an average of 8 percent of their time conducting destruction of the enemy, 27 percent conducting area denial, 60 percent conducting force protection, and 5 percent conducting information collection (see Figure No. 2). Additionally, units spend a significant portion of the force protection time in patrol bases, not guarding key facilities. Thus, units spend more time protecting themselves than they do searching for and attacking the enemy.

Stationary units allow the enemy to gain the initiative. He decides when and where to make contact and under what terms. The enemy only initiates an attack when all of the conditions are favorable. In these six rotations, the enemy initiated contact nearly 70 percent of the time (see Figure No. 3). Because the enemy initiated most contacts, rotational units were seldom prepared to use combined arms -- indirect fires, attack aviation, armor/mechanized infantry, and close air support - in response. Using direct fire plus one other system as the standard for combined arms, rotational units employed combined arms in just 23 percent of the contacts. This lack of combined arms also allowed almost 75 percent of the enemy encountered to escape. Furthermore, units only maneuvered against the enemy 21 percent of the time, another principal factor in allowing the enemy to escape. Lastly, since most of the contacts are infantry versus infantry fights, the enemy causes four friendly casualties for every one he sustains. The bottom line is that the enemy gains a tremendous advantage when units remain stationary.

There are two primary reasons why units spend so much time stationary. The first is that logistics often drives maneuver. The average rifle company spends much of each day waiting for supplies, especially water. In the summer, water often becomes critical to continued operations. Unit logisticians fail to anticipate resupply needs of rifle companies, and rifle companies seldom send logistical status reports to the logisticians. Units then run out of supplies and must cease operations while they wait for emergency resupply. CASEVAC also plays a similar role. Units often wait far too long for CASEVAC.

Anticipation and reporting are the two fixes for this recurring problem. The battalion S4 should be able to anticipate what the average rifle company needs daily. By establishing a standard daily requirements list (water, MREs, batteries, ammunition), the battalion S4 can, at least, ensure that each company gets enough supplies to continue to operate, whether they have requested it or not. Additionally, establishing a daily battle rhythm of logistical resupply, such as one resupply delivery every morning or evening, allows company commanders to consider daily resupply when planning their operations.

Even with accurate anticipation, reporting is still important. Companies must submit daily logistical status reports, with special emphasis on any supplies not included on the daily requirements list. Reporting is a dual responsibility. If the S4 is not receiving timely reports for whatever reason, such as lack of FM communications, he must retrieve them in person. Possibly the support platoon leader can collect the reports during the daily logistical package deliveries. In addition, the battalion executive officer should track the daily submission of reports as well as the status of supplies for each company. His oversight of the logistics system should prevent any company from ceasing operations.

The other reason units spend so much time in patrol bases is that they are waiting for missions from the battalion. After the initial insertion, most battalion staffs fail to plan operations 24 hours out. Instead, they wait for the enemy to act and then react to these events, sending rifle companies all over the battlefield without much planning or preparation. If there are no current enemy events, companies simply wait in patrol bases for the next mission. Retaining the initiative is a tenet of Army operations. It requires thinking ahead and planning past the initial operation.

Units need to establish a battle rhythm where the staff is able to deliver the next day's mission to the companies approximately 24 hours before execution. This will keep units from waiting for missions, and thus becoming lucrative targets for the enemy. It also allows the company commanders to complete their current operations and still have time to plan for the next day. A daily rhythm where the battalion commander delivers a fragmentary order during battlefield circulation for the next day's operations is a useful technique.

Rotational units at JRTC need to spend more time searching for the enemy and less time in patrol bases. Failure to do this gives the enemy a tremendous advantage. To maintain the initiative, units must anticipate and report logistical requirements and plan for operations in advance. The bottom line is that units that locate the enemy first will be successful.

CPT Smith quickly checked his watch. It was just 0500, but 3d platoon was already in their blocking position. Early the previous morning, a Low-Level Voice Intercept (LLVI) team had picked up enemy activity in the southern corner of the battalion's area of operations. The battalion S2 suspected the enemy was using a nearby clearing as a landing zone (LZ) for air resupply. Based on enemy tactics, he templated an enemy team of three to five men guarding a cache on the north side of the clearing. Using the S2's analysis, the battalion scouts had infiltrated to observation posts (OPs) near the suspected LZ that evening. They would attempt to confirm the enemy activity at first light.

The battalion commander ordered CPT Smith to destroy the enemy forces operating near the suspected LZ to disrupt their supply operations. The battalion would provide priority of 81mm mortar fires, as well as a pair of Kiowa Warriors under the company's operational control. CPT Smith used his time available wisely, planning the operation in detail. 3d platoon moved out first to a blocking position on the east side of the clearing. 1st and 2d platoon infiltrated to about 500 meters from the clearing before switching to bounding overwatch.

At first light, the scouts picked up enemy movement in the tree line just north of the clearing, just as suspected. Because of the thick vegetation, the Kiowa Warriors were unable to get a clear shot at the enemy so they moved to a planned battle position near the northwest corner of the clearing. As CPT Smith neared the clearing, sudden, heavy small arms fire from his front startled him. Nevertheless, his men were well prepared. They deliberately began firing and maneuvering forward. The three-to-five man team suspected by the S2 was larger than expected. Even with 10 to 12 men, they were no match for CPT Smith's deployed rifle platoons and they soon broke contact. Fleeing along the eastern edge of the clearing, they ran right into the waiting guns of the 3d platoon. Survivors from this engagement sprinted across the clearing as a last hope for survival. It was not to be as 81mm mortar rounds started to fall, joined by .50 caliber fire from the Kiowa Warriors. Within minutes, all of the enemy soldiers lay dead or dying.

As CPT Smith's company continued forward, a squad found a sizeable cache of mortar rounds and mines, never to be used against friendly soldiers. Consolidating and reorganizing his unit, the CPT watched as ambulances and resupply vehicles, led by a route clearance team of tanks and engineers, reached his position as dawn broke. He had dealt a deadly blow to the enemy in this area, all without suffering a single casualty.