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The platoon gathered for the assault on the objective. The platoon leader was already shaken by the experience; they had taken a wrong turn in moving to the assault positions. He was not the only one with problems. The machine gunners were tired and they had not even started the attack. Nevertheless, they moved into position. On signal, the support-by-fire position suppressed likely enemy positions to cover the initial breach. Their fire drew a response that surprised them as well as the platoon leader. A single-story house that had appeared relatively innocuous on the flat terrain model actually sat on a low hill dominating the assault position and the support-by-fire element. This attack was going nowhere.

Military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) are a tremendous challenge to all. The synchronization as a combined arms team is obviously paramount. That is easy to say and much harder to achieve. Problem solving and self-discovery in training for MOUT will always be challenging. But as is always the case, it is better to tackle those issues in training, using tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), than in combat.

Phase One: Planning and Rehearsals

As in any operation, planning and rehearsals are the keys to MOUT Live Fire at JRTC. Platoons that make the most of their planning and rehearsals do the best in the exercise. The effort to construct accurate terrain models is time well spent. All too often units use simple hasty sketches, and they fail as a result. Soldiers need the three-dimensional view that a terrain model offers to grasp the complexity of MOUT. Such models should be as close to scale as possible. These physical representations lead to better wargaming. They serve as an informal platoon-level intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). By seeing the problem in three dimensions, leaders are able to be more creative in solving it. But a simple model of the buildings in an area is not enough. Very few urban areas are built on flat ground, but many units at JRTC ignore the terrain when constructing their terrain models. A one-story building set on a hill may command a multi-story building on low ground, but such urban key terrain is not apparent on a flat terrain model.

TTP: Take the time to build a terrain model that shows not only the buildings and their relative positions, but also their positions in relation to the terrain.

Platoon rehearsals should be equally painstaking. Like any other mission, a key leader rehearsal should be done first before a platoon-level run-through. In most cases, the rehearsal site will not mirror that of the objective. That can be offset during multiple rehearsals by changing the direction of attack and the rooms used. This keeps the soldiers from fixating on the physical layout of the rehearsal site. Instead they are forced to concentrate on their actions and on TTPs. These variations increase the flexibility of the teams and squads if they have to fragmentary order (FRAGO) a plan. They also exercise and test the communications setup for the operation. Platoons using ICOM radio sets mounted in Kevlar helmets (K-Pots) were much easier to command and control.

TTP: If the rehearsal area is different from the actual objective, change the direction and rooms attacked between rehearsals. Concentrate on the methods (TTPs) versus the physical layout of the rehearsal site.

One of the keys to simplifying planning and rehearsals is the development, distribution, and use of effective platoon standing operating procedures (SOP). Many of the units at JRTC do not have established SOPs for the complex TTPs necessary in MOUT. Of those who do have SOPs, many were just published before the unit deployed. Soldiers have not had the opportunity to study, much less practice, those SOPs, rendering the platoon less effective than if it had no SOP at all. For the few units that do come to JRTC with established SOPs that have been exercised at Home Station, the problem is generally adhering to those procedures once they begin the MOUT Live Fire. That adherence becomes even more important when the SOP offers too much free reign to deviate at squad level in critical areas. This can lead to confusion when the team leader suddenly becomes the squad leader. Issues, such as sectors of fire in a room, use of infrared (IR), or hand and arm signals when stacking, must be worked out ahead of time and should be standardized. This standardization is absolutely critical when it comes to the use of night-vision goggles (NVG), IR, flashlights or Sure-Lights when clearing and searching.

TTP: A well-rehearsed and tested platoon SOP is a solid foundation for MOUT Live Fire. KNOW your SOP before you come to JRTC!

In planning for MOUT, platoons cannot overlook adjacent unit coordination, whether with a sister platoon or a company. Such coordination includes restricted fire lines, mutual support for direct fires, and smoke. All too often platoons neglect this vital coordination and approach the MOUT Live Fire as if they were fighting in a vacuum. This need for coordination also applies to support as well. Infantry and engineers need to have good working knowledge of each other's jobs in case of casualties. This cross-training will help sustain momentum.

TTP: Don't forget adjacent unit coordination! MOUT Live Fire is a platoon exercise set in a larger operational context.

Phase Two: Movement to the Objective

The next phase of the MOUT Live Fire is the movement to the objective. Generally overlooked in planning even by units that use IPB, terrain analysis of the route can prove critical to secure and speedy movement. Soldier loads can cripple a unit's effectiveness even before they reach the objective. That is especially true of machine gun teams that are not cross-leveled appropriately. Everyone needs to know who is carrying mission-essential equipment. Units exhibit inconsistent use of NVGs among personnel. Accidental triggering of PAQ-4s and mounted white lights on weapons happens all too often, disclosing the unit's movements. On the other hand, many units do not capitalize on multiple uses of their surveillance, target acquisition, and night observation (STANO) equipment. For instance, a PAQ-4 can be used to designate or identify a route, breach point, or position location for break in contact.

TTP: Movement to the objective should be planned. That means studying the route as part of IPB.

Phase Three: Assault to Clear the Objective

The assault to clear the objective is the culminating phase of the MOUT Live Fire. Platoons should consider the elements of maneuver as they enter this phase. These elements are commonly violated at JRTC. Soldiers and units should maintain awareness of their location in the built-up area. Situational awareness begins with knowing where you are. Reaction to enemy contact must be decisive and quick. Casualties need equally responsive buddy aid. They should be moved from open areas with proper covering fires.

TTP: Don't forget the basics -- overwatch, obscure, and maneuver!

The initial forced entry of a building is a critical step in the MOUT Live Fire. Platoons tend to focus on this and often fail to maintain internal security on location when conducting breach. Well-thought-out planning and SOPs will speed the process; techniques are only limited to the imagination of the leaders and on available resources. Breaching can be explosive, ballistic, or mechanical, depending on what the platoon has at hand. Platoon leaders need to exercise strong control over use of IR and white light discipline during initial entry. If too many members have IR on, they may blind each other. The same holds true for the use of white light, as too many members do not understand when white light goes on or when it is to be shut off.

TTP: Maintain local security during initial forced entry!

Room clearing is an intricate dance of death; the art of it is making sure the bad guys are the ones who die. First and foremost: Stay out of the fatal funnel! Do not get hung up. Team members need to follow through to support dynamic entries and clearing. This will limit congestion at this funnel. Room clearing is a team effort; one man should never attempt to clear a room by himself. Leaders should ensure teams adhere to assigned sectors in the rooms. As personnel and situation allow, drop security along the way in rooms. Soldiers pulling security should be on NVGs, which are commonly overlooked at JRTC. They must remain aware of where "friendlies" are as they cover doors and windows. The unit should avoid having a large group of soldiers in any room. Such congestion limits their effectiveness, wastes manpower, and offers a lucrative target. Units should maximize the use of attached engineers, especially for obstacles and booby traps. Such defenses should be neutralized, bypassed, or blown in place. Platoons should apply suppress, obscure, secure, and reduce (SOSR) on known obstacles and in-stride breaches for unknown obstacles.

TTP: Congestion is a killer! Move according to rehearsed roles!

Searching is a parallel operation to clearing. Understand that clearing a room or building of hostile threats must be done first prior to searching. Units should have a systematic approach for searching rooms. That system should be rehearsed, and leaders should make sure that the unit adheres to it. That may sound like common sense, but it is a common problem at JRTC. The same holds true with white light and NVGs with IR mode. There are various techniques and they need to be rehearsed.

TTP: Clear the room before you search it!

Cross-talk between squads and platoons is critical to success and safety. The standard is to paint a picture for others. The first encounter with obstacles and booby traps is something everyone needs to hear. Leaders should demand and pass situation reports (SITREPS) and ammunition, casualty and equipment (ACE) reports. Cross-talk can highlight the need for engineer support and describe the support needed. Information on enemy resistance should be shared. All such cross-talk will help the platoon leader formulate decisive FRAGOs as conditions change.

TTP: Disciplined cross-talk keeps everyone aware of what is happening and what is likely to occur next.

Soldiers in a support-by-fire (SBF) role or a weapons squad play a critical role. They should maximize their use of NVGs, ground commanders pointer, AIM-1 DLR laser, and any other targeting tool. Assistant gunners need to designate existing enemy threats and anticipate where other threats may appear. They must forecast ammo consumption and plans for ammo redistribution, or request squad automatic weapon (SAW) for backup as needed. The squad leader should exercise definite fire distribution and control using abbreviated fire commands and laser designating. Consideration should be given to illumination for the SBF role with the assaulting element in mind. If illumination is used, it should be coordinated.

TTP: Support by fire also means support by observation.

Preparing for the MOUT Live Fire at JTRC: A Summary

The following are some platoon-level recommendations for preparing for the JRTC MOUT Live Fire. First understand that a well-thought-out and exercise-validated platoon SOP will correct most challenges described above. All platoon members need to have a full understanding of what is negotiable or what may be deviated from in the platoon SOP. This provides positive and proactive platoon leadership. As simple as this sounds, it is a common problem at JRTC. A platoon MOUT-specific training program for reflexive and discriminating firing techniques is excellent preparation. The units that conduct this training -- dry and live fire -- do the best at JRTC. Communication and initiative at all levels in the platoon will "bubble up" fresh ideas on field expedient markings, breach techniques, gaining high entries, or any number of TTPs. Develop a MOUT leader course at brigade or battalion level covering rifleman duties to company-level TTPs to demonstrate the overall mechanics and challenges.

TTP: An SOP is not an SOP unless everyone in the unit understands it.

Make training as realistic as possible. Provide typical furniture and room clutter during room clearing training. Constant sterile rooms give a false sense of room clearing for soldiers (day and night) during trainup. If the scenario says the building is damaged, there should be obstacles to raise soldier awareness to potential problems. Troops and leaders should understand weapons' effects on buildings and rooms in the defense and the offense. That includes buildings of different material structures. This is especially true of anti-tank (AT) weapons in considering oblique firing as opposed to shooting perpendicular, overpressure, or density on corners of masonry buildings. Platoons should train to take maximum use of environment materials such as furniture, ladders, supplies, or makeshift litters during mission requirements. On building and room security, practiced SOPs work. Place men at critical doors, hallways, and windows. Ensure they have NVGs if night operations are expected. Recess weapons away from doors and windows, keeping in mind the effects on fields of fire. Use furniture or any other heavy items for cover inside the room or building. Strong point men at critical places if the element has sustained casualties or is undermanned.

TTP: The urban environment affects weapons dynamics just as it does movement, concealment, and cover.

There is no "correct way or straight answer" for room clearing as far as NVGs vs. white light vs. IR systems. It is all a question of what is practical, available in equipment resources, and useful for the platoon. Proficiency of the unit with equipment available is a factor as well. Do not rule out commercial items that units can purchase, such as Sure-Lights, pressure switches, or 600-round machine gun bandoleers. A few hundred dollars spent by the unit at Wal-Mart or Radio Shack can very well dictate a unit's success or save lives. Experiment with a few items, then justify their use through the S4/commander channels. STRICOM has a great program called ID/IQ (Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity) to help ease the pain of searching for commercial items. The same is true on the proper use of smoke. It is a recurrent problem, and there is no absolutely correct answer. Smoke is a doubled-edged weapon if not used correctly.

TTP: Get your STANO and special equipment procedures down BEFORE you arrive at JRTC.

The MOUT Live Fire demands specific marksmanship and safety measures. Machine gun teams should practice traverse and elevation (T&E) manipulation drills with a self-made "worm board" for target acquisition with laser mounted and NVG use. Close quarters marksmanship is critical. Apply a sound and realistic marksmanship program. Think "precision" MOUT, not "surgical" MOUT. Soldier protection is equally important. Hearing protection is mandatory and eyewear is at the unit's discretion. Soldiers need to wear gloves and pads for elbows and knees. Body armor at Level III is recommended. A Kevlar vest is the minimum. Soldiers should wear ballistic plates in front for combat (threat in front of soldier). Ballistic plates in back should be worn in training for threat of accidental discharge. Plates are not required for training using 5.56mm SRTA ammo during live fire.

TTP: MOUT is a precision drill, not a surgical operation.

The bottom line in preparing for the MOUT Live Fire is just that: preparation. Platoon SOPs, training, and rehearsals at Home Station are all necessary. Conducting these steps will allow the platoon to concentrate on the operational problems presented at the JRTC MOUT Live Fire using its established TTPs. Precision can only be achieved through practice.