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The Leesville Urban Group (LUG) had been using the meadow as a landing zone (LZ) for aerial resupply and staging area for several weeks. Bad weather and bad luck had hindered efforts to catch them in the area. Human intelligence (HUMINT) sources had reported that a new LUG advisor was due to arrive in the area, and that air was the most likely infiltration method to get the guerrilla leader into the area. But there were too many potential LZs to put eyes on everyone, and even using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to monitor high-priority targets, the reconnaissance and surveillance plan had too many gaps. The S2 needed another means of mounting 24-hour all-weather coverage on the less used LZs. He contacted the military intelligence (MI) company and asked to see the remote battlefield surveillance system (REMBASS) team leader as soon as possible.

Reporting to the S2, the REMBASS team leader received a warning order alerting him to the implant mission. He had several potential LZs to cover, so the mission would be by aerial insertion. The key consideration was to "get in and get out." The REMBASS leader would have a coverage plan ready to execute at each LZ. He talked through the concept, and then, with the S2 in tow, made the rounds of the battalion staff. Familiar faces and personalities, coupled with practiced procedures, helped to speed the planning.

The REMBASS is a hand-emplaced unattended ground sensor system that traces its roots to the Viet Nam war. The impetus for its development came from the North Vietnamese exploitation of the Ho Chi Minh Trail to supply their war in South Vietnam. Then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara sponsored the development of an electronic barrier to detect and help destroy those supplies before they reached the battlefield. As a high-tech solution to sealing off South Vietnam, the "McNamara Wall" failed. But it did introduce technology that improved the U.S. Army's ability to monitor the battlefield in all weather and light conditions.

REMBASS and I-REMBASS are the follow-on technologies from the sensors used in Vietnam. They are smaller, lighter, and more reliable. More importantly, they can now classify categories of targets like personnel, wheeled vehicles, or tracked vehicles. Like the early sensors, REMBASS and I-REMBASS still have limitations. They remain hand-placed and still require radio line of sight for monitoring. The improvements in weight and transmission links have, however, greatly reduced the effects of these limitations. Monitoring can be done concurrently at the team and platoon level, offering a seamless surveillance of the brigade area of operations. More importantly, new capabilities have been added that mesh well with the hand-placed sensors. The most notable is the UAV, which can be tipped off by sensor activity at a location not on the UAV's scheduled collection route.

However, the greatest problem employing sensors remains the same. The supported units do not understand the capabilities of the system, much like Defense Secretary McNamara. Sensors are not walls or barriers. They are not ideal as an early warning asset, often confused with the old platoon early warning sensor system (PEWS). REMBASS is a surveillance asset that can be used for targeting and tactical warning at ranges greater than 100 kilometers. A typical battalion or brigade commander would never tell his air cavalry scouts to circle over the unit position to warn of the enemy's approach. He would have them out farther, looking to develop the tactical situation before the enemy can affect his unit. All too often that is exactly what happens to REMBASS teams.

That raises the second major problem in employing REMBASS teams. As "technical" attachments, they are often looked at as another intelligence asset that requires an infantry "babysitter." REMBASS teams are "grunts with gadgets." Traditionally, the brigade combat team (BCT) commander is concerned about the safety and survivability of his irreplaceable assets. As a result, the four- to six-man REMBASS team that trains in field craft as a small element daily receives a "security platoon" for maneuver. For early infiltration, this is habitually the scout platoon headquarters. During defensive operations, a maneuver squad accompanies the team. Why attach a fire team or squad as security when the infantry's job is to close with and engage the enemy? The last thing a REMBASS team leader wants is any contact with the enemy, much less a firefight. His doctrinal movement rate opposed is approximately 1 km per hour. Like any patrol the REMBASS team goes through its own MDMP to prepare for these independent missions. The REMBASS team sergeant plans, coordinates, and executes the implant mission.

The REMBASS team wants to implant sensors and go into a "hide site" or "escape and evasion" (E&E) out to friendly lines. Commanders need to realize that a 96R is not an 11B, nor is he a tactically unsound, intelligence geek behind a computer. The life of a 96R mirrors that of most long-range surveillance (LRS) elements. The teams infiltrate deep, dig in their sensors vicinity enemy avenues of approach, and establish a sensor/monitoring site. The sensor's line-of-sight capability requires a hide site within range where the team can use its portable monitoring set to identify enemy actions. Scouts do not use a security platoon forward of friendly lines, nor does LRS. Commanders must understand that for the 96R, stealth is security. That means the REMBASS team sergeant must carefully plan and rehearse every stage of the implant mission.

Obviously, the commander will have concerns when a military intelligence team decides to go forward of friendly lines without security, as he would sending any unit forward. MI soldiers arriving at an infantry task force must build that confidence early. Like the Stinger team, civil affairs, or other attachments, the MI sergeant team leader must establish his credibility immediately. The commander must understand that due to equipment requirements, the REMBASS team's ALICE packs weigh from 80-100 pounds each. This will degrade maneuvering with a scout squad carrying butt packs and assault packs. The team trains for team-level maneuver. The SOPs are internal to the team, and the soldiers habitually work around the same team members. This develops an operational comfort zone for the team that the team leader must convey to the commander.

Education and training help develop that comfort zone in supported units. In Special Forces, an ODA (Operational Detachment A) is responsible for briefing by specialty and equipment to demonstrate their capabilities. Although a REMBASS team is not an ODA, the individual soldier has specialized skills that will contribute to the brigade's overall fight, not just to the battalion. Infantry leaders need exposure to these young soldiers, for they are the "Infantry of MI." Further demonstrations include a lane walk with sensors established to detect the commander's movement, later to be shown on the PMS display, or permitting the commander during a field training exercise (FTX) to attempt to find the team's hide site when placed within 400m of the team's monitoring site. All these tangible examples provide tangible results for the REMBASS team during employment.

Such a demonstration would highlight why REMBASS teams need to deploy forward of friendly lines. A REMBASS sensor does not differentiate between friendly or enemy movement. A dismounted person or a wheeled vehicle is the detection parameter, in many cases. REMBASS teams intermixed with friendly forces waste the capability of the system. The REMBASS team needs to work in an area outside the limit of friendly forces maneuver. Then, every activation will be enemy. Yet commanders, concerned about soldiers forward of friendly lines, tend to deploy what is a deep reconnaissance capability around their brigade support area (BSA). REMBASS cannot confirm which heavy-wheeled vehicle just moved over grid 12345678 vicinity the BSA. The vehicle could be friendly or it could be enemy. Friendly patrols will activate the sensors as well. REMBASS should help clarify the situation for the commander, not confuse it. Would the division commander employ long-range surveillance (LRS) teams to cover the division rear command post (CP)?

Deep and early infiltration is key to REMBASS success. Infiltration should be accomplished as early as D-3 and as deep as 15-30 kilometers by airborne insertion, HELO insertion, or fast rope. A divisional LRS team has a doctrinal depth of 25-50 kilometers. Many REMBASS teams conduct habitual training with LRS teams. They have some of the same standing operating procedures (SOP) and use the same tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). By using the same infiltration platform as LRS, the REMBASS team gets in simultaneously, and can either cover named areas of interest (NAIs) in the deep collection plan or serve as a trigger for LRS eyes-on validation and spot reporting.

Commanders receive real-time intelligence from deep REMBASS. Transmissions of sensor activations are one nano-second (one-one thousandth of a second). The sensor signal is boosted through the use of repeaters. You could send one sensor activation around the world by use of multiple repeaters. With the correct communications platform, the REMBASS team leader could easily relay this intelligence to any airborne C2 platform or the en route satellite communications (SATCOM) package used by the 82nd Abn Div, SECOMPS. This setup provides the commander with a picture of the enemy maneuver in his sector prior to a forced entry and allows him to react in a timely manner.

Exfiltration for the REMBASS team is as critical as infiltration. Keep in mind that the team is a four- to six-man element moving forward of friendly lines. Fratricide often occurs at JRTC when the team comes in contact with friendly forces. The preferred method for extraction is by helicopter, although this is often impossible. Passage of lines is one of the most difficult tasks under the best of situations, and REMBASS teams habitually move at night along unlikely enemy avenues of approach. The stationary and moving element must ensure they have current frequencies and call signs. The passage must be coordinated at the lowest tactical level possible. While the MI company commander at the brigade TOC should be aware of the passage, the line unit must also be informed. Units that habitually work with REMBASS teams forward must develop the proficiency needed in this delicate operation.

One might think the team could remain in place during the entire battle, but that would waste this asset. A single portable monitoring set can receive ten identification (ID) codes simultaneously, painting an electronic picture of the entire security zone on one small, portable display easily located with the commander. Teams carry a basic load of sensors. Due to weight, however, they must resupply sensors, batteries, water, and other equipment after 5-6 days. The teams require early exfiltration after sensor emplacement in order to prepare their additional equipment for follow-on operations. REMBASS equipment also requires extensive pre-combat inspections to ensure it operates properly and the team is ready to deploy immediately following the warning order of the next implant mission.

REMBASS offers the supported commander constant all-weather deep surveillance of the battalion. To capitalize on that asset, the commander needs to know what it can do and how REMBASS teams operate. This knowledge is founded on habitual relationships. REMBASS teams should know not only the S2s in their habitually supported battalions, but they should know the S3s, the fire support coordinators, and the maneuver leaders. You should never go to war with a stranger at your shoulder. REMBASS teams that are not integrated into a unit before a rotation at JRTC will remain strangers to that unit. Let's go back to our tactical scenario.

The LUG guerrilla leader was happy to be on the ground as the HIP lifted off behind him. He had a raid to plan, and the target was a local village leader who had not been cooperating. Wasting no time, he and a small escort moved off to a rally point on a knoll just north of the meadow. As the squad-sized element moved out, a small electronic device had already alerted the U.S. battalion headquarters 20 kilometers away that there was human activity on the suspected LZ. The guerrillas headed to the rally point and established a small perimeter there while the newly arrived advisor issued a warning order for the coming raid. Even as he began speaking, a seismic sensor told the Americans that the knoll had indeed been occupied as a natural rally point near the LZ. Minutes later hot American steel put an end to the LUG orders group.