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SUBJECT: Supply Management

Observation frequency:3-4QFY971-2QFY983-4QFY981-2QFY993-4QFY99


OBSERVATION 1: Drivers departing the division support area (DSA) on ressupply convoys to the brigade support area (BSA) are not properly equipped or trained to conduct safe convoys at night or during hours of limited visibility. (TA.


1. Night convoys are experiencing the following challenges:

a. Misorentation of convoys, resulting in excessive time periods for resupply missions.

b. Vehicle accidents, resulting in costly fuel spills and vehicle damage.

c. Deviation from the main supply route (MSR), resulting in the need for extensive recovery operations.

2. Standards are not being enforced concerning proper techniques for wearing and operating night-vision devices.

3. Convoys are relying on the use of chemical lights rather than blackout markers and blackout drive.

4. Leadership is placing soldiers at undue risk as a result of improper supervision during night operations.

OBSERVATION 2: Field artillery battalion staffs usually identify rearm, refuel, resupply, and survey point (R3SP) requirements but often do not integrate or synchronize the operation with the tactical plan. (TA.7.5.2)


1. A lack of discussion of R3SPs during the planning process causes poor site selection and unsynchronized execution within the battalion movement plan and logistics plan.

2. The S3s give poor or untimely ammunition guidance, which impedes the S4's effort to consolidate the necessary R3SP assets (CL III [B], V, survey, and LOGPAC if available) at the correct time and location.

3. There is often no effective timeline and/or trigger. The R3SP site often turns into a refuel operation or unit distribution effort because of inadequate triggers.

4. The required equipment and assets, although available, are not postured forward to execute an R3SP.

5. A typical R3SP location is along the brigade MSR in an open field with no concealment and poor dispersion.

6. There is poor coordination between unit advance parties and the R3SP site OIC. This causes delays and confusion during the operation.


OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of 3-4QFY98 Observation 2)

OBSERVATION 2: Class V resupply of the mortar platoons is consistently inadequate. (TA.7.5.2)


1. During force-on-force missions, the mortar platoon sergeant is frequently unable to integrate CSS into rehearsals or fully develop Paragraph 4 of the OPORD. These shortfalls have a direct impact on the platoon's ability to execute.

2. Platoon sergeants usually coordinate for support through the supply system, but requests are often cut due to the lack of support vehicles.

OBSERVATION 3: The FTCP does not track on-hand and requested supplies down to the company level. (TA.7.5.2)

DISCUSSION: The inability to track classes of supply down to company level results in a failure to request mission critical supplies and an inability to deliver supplies during LOGPAC to the appropriate place on the battlefield.

OBSERVATION 4: LOGPAC timeliness established in the unit SOP and OPORDs are rarely met. (TA.7.5.2)


1. Units are not meeting their established logistics release point (LRP) times. LRPs are established late, and 1SGs return their LOGPACs to the LRP site long after the published return time.

2. The impacts of LOGPACs returning late are:

a. Support platoons are unable to meet scheduled bulk resupply of Classes I, III, and V in the brigade support area (BSA).

b. The HHC commander and support platoon leader are unable to establish a timeline that includes pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs) and an adequate rest plan for their soldiers.

OBSERVATION 5: The brigade Class VIII resupply system is often inadequate. (TA.7.5.2)


1. A push-package system via LOGPAC is sometimes planned but seldom used.

2. There is no periodic resupply plan.

3. Ambulance back-haul capability is seldom used.

OBSERVATION 6: Units do a poor job managing Class IV/V material and often do not incorporate it at all. (TA.7.5.2)


1. This is the most pervasive CSS issue that directly impacts the engineer force at the NTC. Brigade combat teams (BCTs) continue to demonstrate that they are not able to construct a defense unless the engineer force on the battlefield assumes responsibility for Class IV/V material. Engineers have an interest in assuming the Class IV/V plan because they do not want to fail, and because they need the material in order for their soldiers to get some training.

2. During the brigade CSS rehearsal, movement of Class IV/V barrier material is almost never discussed, and if it is mentioned, it is not discussed in any detail.

3. Under the current Army of Excellence force structure, engineer battalions can take the responsibility for Class IV/V transportation into sector, management, security, distribution, and emplacement because they have the equipment and soldiers to do the job. In the Force XXI design, however, the engineer battalion troop strength is reduced by almost half and it loses most of its transportation assets as well. Force XXI engineer battalions will not be able to manage Class IV/V barrier equipment for their brigades; they simply will not have the resources. As a result, TFs may not ever see Class IV/V barrier material that corps' assets push into their sector according to the brigade plan.


OBSERVATION 1: Most engineer battalions are seldom able to execute an integrated Class IV/V plan. (TA.7.5.2)

DISCUSSION: The engineer battalion tactical SOP (TACSOP) typically outlines the doctrinal combined arms responsibilities for packaging and moving Class IV/V barrier materials and for operating Class IV/V supply points, but these responsibilities are rarely addressed specifically in brigade and task force orders. As a result, most engineer battalions end up as the sole executors of the planning, preparation, and execution phases of Class IV/V logistical operations. This lack of participation by other members of the brigade combat team in the execution of Class IV/V operations detracts from the engineer battalion's primary missions of countermobility and survivability during the brigade's defense.

OBSERVATION 2: The tactical operations center (TOC) staff does not accurately track ammunition to facilitate current and future operations. (TA.7.5.2)

DISCUSSION: The TOC is responsible for planning, coordinating, and executing the FA portion of the fire support plan for the supported maneuver unit. As such, the S3 is responsible for supervising ammunition management for the battalion and overseeing the activities of the battalion fire direction officer and ammunition officer. Improper ammunition tracking undermines ammunition management, causing unforeseen ammunition shortages, missed resupply triggers, improper ammunition configuration, and untimely resupply.

OBSERVATION 3: Ammunition planning, management, and triggers continue to be a systemic weakness for firing batteries. (TA.7.5.2)


1. Firing batteries struggle with the process of identifying ammunition requirements based on battery essential field artillery tasks (EFATs) and the battalion scheme of maneuver. Without a clear picture of requirements, commanders are unable to fully develop their ammunition plan during their mission analysis and orders development.

2. Commanders, unsure of where they will move and occupy, cannot determine which charges and munitions they will need, and poorly addressed EFATs leave commanders without the specifics needed for planning. For example, during the planning process in a recent rotation, the type of propellant to use to employ the FASCAM minefield was not properly wargamed. As a result, a battery used red bag to shoot the FASCAM when they were short that propellant. The commander did not participate in the planning process and did not provide the battalion the necessary battlefield calculus to execute EFATs for the fight. Because the commander could not and did not identify his ammunition requirements, he could not inform the battalion that they were short on required munitions.

3. Commanders have difficulty tracking and managing the ammunition used and remaining on their guns, FAASVs, and PLS. Once firing begins, platoons quickly lose track of ammunition quantities on hand, and the platoon operations centers (POCs) are often at a loss tracking ammunition expenditures. Without a firm grasp of ammunition expenditures, the batteries cannot trigger ammunition resupply at appropriate times.

OBSERVATION 4: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99 Observation 2)

OBSERVATION 5: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99 Observation 3)

OBSERVATION 6: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99 Observation 4)

OBSERVATION 7: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99 Observation 5)

for Supply Management


1. Night-vision training must be incorporated into field training exercises (FTXs) and lane training plans at Home Station, and must be implemented prior to deploying to the National Training Center.

2. Training lanes should incorporate the proper use of such navigational devices as ground positioning systems (GPSs), maps, and compasses.

3. Resupply convoys must be executed predominately during hours of darkness or limited visibility to increase the training level and confidence of soldiers and leaders.

4. Main and corps support battalions (MSBs/CSBs) deploying to the National Training Center must deploy with an ample amount of qualified night drivers and equipment to support night operations.


1. The R3SP's principle mission is to rearm and refuel the battalion with secondary missions of providing survey update for the M109A6 and linking up LOGPAC vehicles (if possible) or required unit supplies. The R3SP is not the only resupply technique. It is, however, the most efficient method to rearm, refuel, and resupply a battalion conducting a deliberate movement. A properly planned, prepared, and executed R3SP is the combat multiplier necessary to allow the battalion to continue the fight uninterrupted.

2. The S4 integrates and synchronizes the execution of the R3SP with the battalion's tactical plan.

3. The S4 should position the R3SP site central to the Paladin position areas to facilitate rapid execution. It must be tactically positioned with good concealment, as survivability is a primary consideration for site selection. Maximize terrain for cover and concealment and ensure good dispersion of assets.

4. The S3 provides guidance (ammunition types and powders) to the S4 with sufficient time for the battalion logisticians to execute the plan.

5. The S4, considering battery ammunition status, remaining mission requirements (estimate), and the battalion's on-hand ammunition, gives guidance to the battalion ammunition officer (BAO) who, in turn, begins configuring ammunition.

a. The BAO should focus on configuring pure PLS loads of killer ammunition with the correct powders.

b. Special munitions (i.e., FASCAM or smoke) can be linked up with the appropriate unit at the R3SP or in the unit location.

c. The BAO notifies the S3 and units what is available at the R3SP to include ammunition types.

6. The ammunition PSG configures the R3SP in the field trains and possibly stages it in a forward location.

7. Combat trains assets are for emergency resupply during the battle and should not be used; if they are used, they must be resupplied, reconfigured, or replaced immediately.

8. Ensure all assets are assembled early enough to conduct a rehearsal.

9. The R3SP site layout should facilitate rapid execution.

a. Establish an entry point, track plan, multiple ammunition upload lanes, by-pass lanes for vehicles not requiring ammunition, refuel points with survey control points, and a LOGPAC/supply linkup point at the exit.

b. Each element within the R3SP should maintain tactical dispersion.

c. The R3SP site should be set up to maximize the use of the multiple assets and be able to conduct multiple operations simultaneously.

10. The S4, CAT CDR, or BAO should be the R3SP site OIC and be responsible for site reconnaissance, conduct communications checks, and establish the R3SP prior to units arriving.

a. The R3SP OIC ensures the site layout facilitates rapid execution of R3SP.

b. Batteries should upload howitzers from battery ammunition vehicles prior to arrival, thus minimizing vehicles that rearm at the R3SP.

c. Batteries should transload ammunition from battery ammunition resupply vehicles (PLS) to section FAASVs, again minimizing R3SP execution time.

d. This also will reduce the ammunition burden on the R3SP assets.

11. The R3SP site OIC positions the refuel point after the rearm point, allowing simultaneous operations, e.g., refueling howitzers while rearming ammunition vehicles.

12. The recon survey officer establishes the survey control points at the refuel sites to facilitate simultaneous operations.

13. The S4 should position LOGPAC vehicles (if available) near the R3SP exit to link up with their unit as they depart the R3SP site.

14. Inclusion of the R3SP in the battalion TACSOP is the key to success. The TACSOP must establish responsibilities, timelines, a pre-R3SP advance party link-up checklist, security responsibilities, and a site layout diagram.

15. The R3SP is not the only resupply technique. It is, however, the most efficient method to rearm, refuel, and resupply a battalion conducting a deliberate movement. A properly planned, prepared, and executed R3SP is the combat multiplier necessary to allow the battalion to continue the fight uninterrupted. By determining possible conflicts early, a commander can find solutions or work with the battalion to modify the plan.


1. Mortar platoons must develop a working relationship with their support element prior to deployment.

2. SOPs must be established, standardized, and designed to push packages of Class V forward.

3. Consideration must be given to ammunition requirements during fire support planning. It is therefore essential for the mortar platoon leaders or platoon sergeants to be present during planning to advise on the types and quantities of ammunition that will be required. For example, in a defense mission (day or night), sufficient HE and WP rounds must be on site. As such, the mortar platoon leader and platoon sergeant must maintain contact with the supporting element to advise of any ammunition constraints. The platoon sergeant must facilitate this process over the A/L net.

4. Include rehearsals of battlefield resupply of Class V at platoon level.

a. Use triggers to help determine when and where Class V resupply will occur.

b. Push forward the necessary resupply trucks that are to be under the control of the platoon sergeant prior to crossing the line of departure (LD).


1. Ensure the field trains command post (FTCP) tracks on-hand and requisitioned supplies at the company level to ensure the proper quantities of supplies are being requisitioned and also to ensure that when these supplies are received, they can be distributed to the end user in a timely manner.

2. Units should establish a realistic and attainable LOGPAC turnaround time. This will facilitate planning and proper execution of resupply operations in the BSA.

3. Ensure that subordinate units in the task force treat LOGPACs as a critical event and have enough command involvement to guarantee the timely return of the LOGPACs to the LRP.

4. The forward brigade/division medical supply officer (brigade/DMSO) must establish clear guidance and policy for medical resupply.

5. When the LOGPAC system is used, the higher medical treatment facility (MTF) must track Class VIII flow and verify receipt to customer units.

6. Medical resupply packages must be clearly marked.

7. Class VIII coordination/requests can be conducted directly by the medical platoon leader and ambulance platoon leader during mission planning and CSS/CHS rehearsals. Between missions, recommend supply point distribution with the MTF.

8. Company and slice element medics and combat lifesavers must be considered in the overall concept of support.

9. The maneuver TFs must manage the material required to construct the defense. The engineer force for the BCT can take measures to ensure that this happens.

a. Procedures. Outline responsibilities clearly and in great detail in the brigade tactical SOP (TACSOP). Make sure that each TF's TACSOP mirrors that of the brigade. This improves the TF's chances that they will be prepared to assume the mission.

b. Plans. When the BCT is planning for the defense, write detailed instructions in the main body of the order, Paragraph 3 ("Specified tasks to subordinate units"). The instructions will not be read if they are only in the engineer annex. By including them in the body of the order, the TFs are more likely to execute the mission. It is up to the brigade engineer to make sure the BCT commander knows what he expects from his TFs as far as the Class IV/V plan in order to communicate this aspect of his intent clearly.

c. Rehearsals. The XO of the engineer battalion supporting the BCT has the opportunity at the CSS rehearsal to make sure that maneuver TFs understand and acknowledge their responsibilities to coordinate with, move, control, secure, and manage their IV/V point. If it did not get into the order, this is the time to give clear instructions. The XO has the opportunity here to look into the eyes of the SPO, brigade S4, TF S4s and ensure they look back with confidence and understanding.

d. Execution. The engineer battalion S4 tracks the progress of the Class IV/V mission from the time it leaves the corps or division support area until it reaches the Class IV/V point or obstacle site. He has knowledge of both the tactical plan and the scheme of support. He can provide oversight of FSB support operations and coordinate transportation assets in sector to ensure that the right stuff in the right amounts goes to the right place. He should also act as a coordinator, contacting TF S4s to ensure they know what is coming into their sector and to verify that they have a plan to assume responsibility for the materiel. The key to the S4's success is communications. The engineer battalion S4 must be able to talk to the key players.

10. There is one key to success that may not be part of any doctrinal manual or formal tactic, technique, or procedure (TTP), but seems to be shared by most units who conduct a successful defense. The engineer battalion S4 and the maneuver TF S4s are on a first-name basis. The engineer S4 knows the brigade S4 as well as the SPO, and they have already established a close working relationship long before their arrival at the NTC. During defensive planning for these units the brigade S4, SPO, and the engineer S4 develop the Class IV/V barrier plan together (from information provided by the ABE), and execution follows easily from a sound plan that all key players understand.

11. Engineer planners at all levels should campaign for the active support of other members of the combined arms team in support of Class IV/V operations, and the specifics of this support should be addressed in the maneuver order.

12. Class IV/V operations and responsibilities should be addressed in the scheme of maneuver, sub-unit mission, and service support subparagraphs, not relegated to the engineer annex.

13. In addition to the engineer battalion TACSOP, the task force and brigade combat team TACSOPs should also specify responsibilities for Class IV/V operations.


1. Develop and enforce an ammunition management SOP.

2. Assign responsibilities and reporting procedures. Key considerations are:

a. Manage special munitions/square weights/powder lots.

b. Standardize ammunition report required (SOP).

c. Start with a true base count.

d. Force FDCs to maintain records of fire.

e. Track special ammunition by round.

f. Batteries track by round - report by red/amber/green status.

g. Forecast battalion ammunition needs.

h. Develop and implement an ammunition distribution plan.

i. Maintain quality control.

j. Fix responsibility for reporting and tracking ammunition.

3. Ammunition management begins with the receipt of the battalion field artillery support plan (FASP). Based on the briefed scheme of fires and EFATs, the commander must begin identifying his ammunition requirements.

STEP 1. Analyze the scheme of fires.

By looking at the missions that the battalion expects him to shoot, the commander can determine a quick figure on the type and number of rounds he will probably need. An example of this process follows. Assume the following are missions that battalion plans to shoot:

AE 7118NK 414973Battery 6DPICM:36 DPICM
AE 7120NK 385952Battery 12DPICM:72 DPICM
AE 7125NK 417928Battery 1SMC:6 SMC (Build only)
AE 7130NK 367954Battery 12DPICM:72 DPICM
AE 7133NK 387962Battery 6DPICM36 DPICM
AE 7137NK 390942Battery 6DPICM36 DPICM
AE 7147NK 371918Battery 12HEA72 HEA

By quickly adding up the mission totals based on the scheme of fires, the commander finds that he will need 252 DPICM, 6 SMC, and 72 HEA. Experience shows that most battalions require twice the planned ammunition for each target. Target location error, requests for additional fires, and missed triggers often result in repeat missions. One technique is to determine the numbers required by the scheme of fires and then double them. Thus the battery commander could interpolate a requirement for 504 DPICM, 12 SMC, and 144 HEA. This gives him a minimum number for planning. It can also focus him in planning for contingencies. The majority of the munitions are DPICM (dual-purpose improved conventional munition). This can key him to go heavy on DPICM for additional targets of opportunity. EFATs will also influence his planning numbers for anticipated requirements. EFATs such as smoke, Copperhead, and FASCAM will generate additional ammunition requirements. A thorough examination of what battalion intends his battery to shoot will generate a fairly accurate ammunition planning number.

STEP 2. Identify the charges needed to shoot the required missions.

With a detailed execution matrix, the commander can easily identify where he will be when shooting each mission. The battery fire direction officers (FDOs) should determine which charges they need. The commander can then determine the powder requirements and take into account any supply or ammunition restrictions that will influence the powders available. With these two steps accomplished, the battery commander will have a sound analysis of his ammunition requirements for the upcoming fight. He must then examine what ammunition he has available and identify any shortfalls or requirements. The earlier he identifies his requirements to battalion, the more likely the ammunition will be there for the fight.

STEP 3. Develop a standardized turret and FAASV load.

A standardized load ensures that each platoon is ready to fire the anticipated missions. However, platoon-specific EFATs, such as Copperhead raids can affect platoon ammunition loads. The commander should determine how the battery will shoot. Based on his mission analysis, the commander will decide if the guns will shoot off their turrets, FAASVs, or off of the ground. Based on a high-ground threat, the commander may have his FAASVs in overwatch away from the guns. This will require a turret load tailored to shooting the missions without FAASV resupply. A low ground threat may have the guns mated with their FAASVs. Here a turret load may focus on requirements during emergency missions or during EFATs planned for later in the fight. The bottom line on developing a turret load is that it should allow the gun to accomplish specific EFATs without need of resupply or when the FAASVs or PLS are not available. Once the commander has identified what munitions to carry on the gun and FAASV, he can address the PLS load. His requirements may mean sending the current PLS back to battalion to get a different configuration or to pick up additional projectiles and powders.

STEP 4. Develop the triggers needed to stay in the fight.

The commander should base the triggers on EFATs and anticipated ammunition expenditures. Develop specific triggers by numbers and type of rounds. Percentages are confusing and lead to misunderstandings. For triggers to be effective, the entire chain of command must understand them. For example, if the trigger to resupply the gun from the FAASV is the use of 10 DPICM, the chief of section (COS) and the ammunition team chief (ATC) must both know that the trigger is 10 expended DPICM. During the fight, the COS can call the FAASV forward without waiting

for the command once he reaches his trigger. Likewise, develop specific triggers for the FAASVs to resupply at the PLS. Ensure inclusion of these triggers in the battery OPORD.

STEP 5. Track ammunition during the fight.

There is no one person who tracks all the ammunition. Leaders throughout the platoons and battery must be aware of what ammunition is on hand and what has been expended. This allows for quick response when meeting triggers and little confusion during resupply. COS and ATC track what they have and report to the POCs. POCs track ammunition expenditures and keep the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants informed. Platoon sergeants monitor the guns and FAASVs to ensure proper response to ammunition triggers. The battery commander tracks the overall status to determine when he needs additional ammunition from battalion. The end result will be a battery that does not fail during its essential field artillery tasks due to a lack of the proper ammunition.

SUBJECT: Logistics Estimates/CSS Planning and Integration

Observation frequency:3-4QFY971-2QFY983-4QFY981-2QFY993-4QFY99


OBSERVATION 1: Task forces often do not complete logistics status (LOGSTAT) reports IAW their SOP. (TA.7.5.2)


1. Reporting of on-hand quantities for classes of supply is poor.

2. The logistics package (LOGPAC) composition in the field trains is affected, preventing the field trains command post (FTCP) from tracking the exact quantities of supply on hand in the task force.

3. The FTCP is not able to anticipate needs and request supplies IAW unit requirements.

4. The lack of proper accountability of on-hand quantities prevents the supply system from distributing the on-hand supplies IAW unit priorities.

OBSERVATION 2: Too often field artillery units are deploying with no developed or published unit basic loads (UBLs). (TA.7.5.2)


1. The battalion leaders are not aware of what they need and have not divided the required classes of supply into battery amounts.

2. The requirements are not part of the battalion SOP; batteries cannot properly develop their load plans.

3. Distribution plans are not developed; units have not identified what host nation support they may need.

OBSERVATION 3: Brigade combat team (BCT) S4s do not adequately coordinate logistics status (LOGSTAT) requirements with forward support battalion (FSB) security, plans, and operations (SPO) officers. (TA.4.2.2)


1. BCT S4s do not routinely scrub daily LOGSTATs with FSB SPOs. Due to this lack of coordination, the FSBSPO is not able to accurately forecast supply requirements for the BCT.

2. FSB SPOs usually determine future supply requirements based on what they "think" the BCT requires, rather than using LOGSTAT requirements balanced with an analysis of historical supply usage.

3. Poor analysis of unit LOGSTATS results in the inability to cross-level supplies between maneuver task forces (TFs) because both the BCT S4 and the FSB SPO are not situationally aware regarding the status of TF stocks.


OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of 3-4QFY98 Observation 2)


OBSERVATION 1: Brigades have difficulty conducting logistical operations over long distances.(TA.7)

DISCUSSION: Brigade staffs do not train over long distances, becoming accustomed to shorter lines of communication. They routinely fail to conduct a time-distance analysis or allocate enough time to execute logistical operations.

OBSERVATION 2: CSS requirements are not being developed or briefed to standard. (TA.7.5.2)


1. Units are not forecasting resupply requirements during wargaming.

2. S4s are not identifying triggers for movement of elements or mobile prepositioning.

3. Planning for tactical resupply is not completed; all requirements while in contact become emergency requirements.

for Logistics Estimates/CSS Planning and Integration


1. Task forces need to improve LOGSTAT reporting to reflect the on-hand quantity of the unit's classes of supply.

2. Place chain of command emphasis on proper reporting from subordinate elements.

3. To develop an accurate BCT logistic forecast, enforce the timely submission of unit LOGSTAT reports to the BCT S4.

4. The BCT S4 must fix responsibility for an individual in the brigade S4 section to manage unit LOGSTATs.

5. A method to provide both the BCT S4 and FSB SPO visibility of unit on-hand balances/forecasts by class of supply is through the use of spreadsheets, with one class of supply per page. Using this method, the BCT S4 and the FSB SPO can view each TF and the BCT roll-up at one glance, rather than sorting through each LOGSTAT.

6. The FSB SPO must also look at historical usage, expecially early in the campaign. By day five of the rotation, the SPO will be able to analyze what units are requesting, compare this to what they actually are receiving, and adjust daily forecasts accordingly.


1. Refer to FM 101-10-1/2, Staff Officers' Field Manual Organization, Technical, and Logistical Data Planning Factors; historical data; supply usage requirements; operations logistics planner software; FM 8-10-5, Brigade and Division Surgeon's Handbook Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures; FORSCOM Reg 700-3; and SB 8-75 for guidance on UBLs.

2. Units need to have a clear understanding of all classes of supply.

3. Include classes of supply in the unit tactical SOP (TACSOP).

4. Appoint an OIC/NCOIC for each class of supply.

5. Deploy a robust advance party that can open all accounts and begin drawing supplies.


1. Brigade combat teams (BCTs) should include TOCEX, orders drills, and FTXs at Home Station to establish a structure within the brigade that replicates doctrinal distances for the conduct of logistical operations.

2. Integrate S4s with the rest of the staff.

3. The S4 must examine all classes of supply/logistical function for each phase of the operation during wargaming for both task force and company/team level.

SUBJECT: Materiel Readiness

Observation frequency:3-4QFY971-2QFY983-4QFY981-2QFY993-4QFY99


OBSERVATION 1: Attendance at the daily brigade maintenance meeting is inconsistent, and unit representatives are seldom prepared to provide specific requirements. (TA.7.3.2)


1. Forward support battalion (FSB) support operations officers rarely synchronize the efforts of transportation and maintenance officers and representatives prior to the meeting with the brigade units.

2. Shop officers are routinely unable to brief the current status of direct support (DS) jobs with maintenance support teams (MSTs) at the unit maintenance collection points (UMCPs).

3. Units do not focus on combat critical systems for the next mission. Generally, no firm commitments are made to expedite parts identified as available within the theater of operations to the unit maintenance collection points (UMCPs).

4. Brigade leadership and maintenance managers do not receive a clear picture of the brigade's current and projected maintenance posture (combat power).

5. Brigade Class IX and maintenance managers do not receive requirements in time to allow the supply system to respond to a unit's needs.

6. DS maintenance and Class IX managers provide conflicting information and inaccurate statuses, and drag out the meeting time trying to synchronize their efforts. The supported units lose faith in the FSB's ability to support the customer.

7. DS repairs by MSTs are delayed due to lack of management oversight and emphasis. Shop officers are unaware of potential requirements to dispatch mobile maintenance teams (MMTs) from the base shop to assist an MST.

8. Unit representatives depart the meeting without a clear picture of who, how, where, and when critical parts will arrive to build combat power prior to the next fight.

OBSERVATION 2: Maintenance and Class IX management above the company level is reactive and significantly hampers the development of a maintenance battle rhythm to sustain the brigade. (TA.7.3.2)


1. Maintenance managers routinely do not know:

a. The production backlog status in the maintenance support teams (MSTs) and base shop sections.

b. The Direct Support Electrical Systems Test Set (DSESTS) utilization and production status.

c. The ability of the shop office to effectively manage the brigade's direct support (DS) maintenance operations (e.g., staff oversight).

2. Class IX managers routinely do not know:

a. The availability of critical parts/assemblies within the brigade area.

b. Requisition volume.

c. The status of Class IX distribution to customer units.

d. The workload and effectiveness of the Class IX supply support activity (SSA).

e. The status/location of critical repair parts for combat systems.

3. Although the SAMS-2 AHO-026 printout is consistently used, brigade maintenance managers routinely take no action on the feedback it provides them regarding the effectiveness of their unit level logistics system-ground (ULLS-G), SAMS, and SARSS automation systems.

a. SAMS-1 production and management reports are rarely used/reviewed by any individual outside the shop office section.

b. SARSS-1 management reports are rarely used/reviewed by any individual outside of the SSA's technical supply office.

4. Repair times for combat systems are significantly increased because there is no focused and synchronized effort between organizational and DS maintenance assets during the execution of brigade missions. Task forces and separate companies rely only on their organic assets, while DS assets sit idle until the conclusion of a brigade mission. Generally, requests for backup support are not surfaced until the brigade maintenance meeting, two to three hours after continuing the mission.

5. Shop office officers, transportation supply officers (TSOs), mobile maintenance team (MMT) chiefs, and security, plans and operations (SPO) maintenance officers routinely do not know:

a. When the brigade plans to cross the LD.

b. Where unit maintenance collection points (UMCPs) are located in order to throughput critical parts from the division support area (DSA).

c. The effectiveness of their maintenance efforts.

6. Brigade units are confused by conflicting guidance/directives on maintenance procedures, meeting times, and unit level logistics system (ULLS) disk synchronization plans.

7. During brigade CSS rehearsals, units rarely cover any aspects of maintenance and Class IX operations to support the fight and provide backup support to organizational maintenance sections.

8. Tactical situation and friendly unit dispositions are not routinely tracked and updated.

9. Forward support battalion (FSB) SPO and brigade S4 maintenance managers routinely do not coordinate and synchronize their efforts in the brigade administrative/logistics operations center (ALOC)/FSB tactical operations center (TOC).

OBSERVATION 3: A majority of engineer units deploy to NTC with non-mission capable (NMC) VOLCANO and MICLIC systems. (TA.


1. Units too often arrive at the NTC with the wrong PMCS -10 manual and no change updates. Common excuses are that they are unable to get the manual or did not know a change was published.

2. Units do not know what seemingly minor mechanical faults will deadline their key weapons systems. Units arrive at the NTC thinking their systems are fully mission capable (FMC) and are surprised when the system is deadlined because of improper conduct of -10 PMCS.

3. Most leaders do not take the time to understand the specific mechanical requirements of the VOLCANO and MICLIC warfighting systems, and PMCS is not enforced to standard during Home Station training.


OBSERVATION 1: Soldiers do not perform PMCS on their protective masks as outlined in the technical manual and are improperly maintaining their protective masks. (TA.


1. Protective masks are dirty.

2. Soldiers are storing items other than their mask in the mask carrier.

3. No PMCS is being conducted.

4. Most protective masks do have DA Form 2404/Form 5988E stored inside the carriers with maintenance checks conducted prior to their deployment.

OBSERVATION 2: (Repeat of 3-4QFY98 Observation 3)


OBSERVATION 1: Brigades/regiments and forward support battalions/regimental support squadrons (FSBs/RSSs) do not adequately conduct maintenance management or synchronize the supply and maintenance disk drops. (TA.7.3.2)

DISCUSSION: The daily brigade/regimental maintenance meeting rarely achieves the desired end state of providing a clear picture on:

1. Current and projected combat power.

2. The delivery of critical Class IX parts.

3. The resolution of such logistics issues as enforcement of disk drops and meeting attendance.

OBSERVATION 2: Forms 5988E are not reaching the Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS) boxes in a timely manner and are not filled out to standard. (TA.


1. Company/teams do not enforce an SOP for completion of preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) and turn-in of Forms 5899E.

2. Task force maintenance meetings are too often omitted, which further prevents the unit from "seeing themselves."

for Materiel Readiness


1. Use butcher paper or a dry erase board to record all commitments for critical combat systems and who is responsible for completing the action. Review commitments at the end of the meeting to ensure everyone clearly understands their roles. At the next maintenance meeting, review all previous commitments and their current status.

2. The brigade XO must ensure that all units have representation at the daily maintenance meeting and must ensure that the established meeting agenda is followed. This is when all organizational and DS maintenance managers coordinate and synchronize their efforts to enable the brigade commander to accomplish his next mission.

3. During battle days, use an abbreviated meeting format that solely focuses all assets and efforts on the brigade commander's maintenance priority for the next fight.

4. Prior to the maintenance meeting, the support operations officer should conduct a coordination meeting with the transportation supply officer (TSO), shop officer, MMC representative, logistics assistance representatives, and the FSB materiel officer (MATO). The focus of the coordination meeting is to review critical combat systems (parts status, shop status, technical assistance requirements, disk turn-in status, Class IX issues). The goal is to have all maintenance information ready for the customers and ensure that the DS effort is focused and synchronized to sustain combat power.

5. The maintenance meetings conducted by a brigade/regiment must follow a set agenda that:

a. Addresses key logistics issues (aside from maintenance).

b. Provides visibility on current/projected combat power.

c. Enforces strict disk drop procedures.

d. Identifies critical Class IX requirements.


1. Refer to Chapters 1, 3, and 4 of FM 9-43-1, Maintenance Operations and Procedures. Conduct a daily review of the SAMS-1 006 printout and the SARSS-1 AJT-017 daily performance report. The security, plans and operations (SPO) maintenance section should visit the shop office and TSO at least twice per day (preferably during scheduled unit level logistics system [ULLS] disk drop times).

2. Conduct a daily analysis of the SAMS-2 026 printout. Look for trend indicators such as status of requisitions, number of write-ins by unit during the maintenance meeting, and the date equipment became non-mission capable (NMC), with the corresponding date parts were ordered.

3. The forward support battalion (FSB) SPO or representative and the brigade S4 must coordinate before and during the brigade planning process to produce:

a. Evacuation/recovery routes and procedures.

b. Location of maintenance collection points.

c. Current and proposed unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) locations.

d. Maintenance priorities by system and task force.

e. Changes to locations of Class IX and direct support (DS) maintenance support.

f. Communications infrastructure for CSS automation systems during offensive and retrograde operations.

4. The brigade S4 should brief these areas by phase so that all units clearly understand how and where to request backup support. Endstate is a brigade operation in which maintenance actions are immediate, rather than backlogged. This information must be annotated on the brigade CSS overlay, disseminated in brigade OPORDs/FRAGOs, and posted on a map in the brigade and battalion ALOCs, the SPO van, and shop office.

5. The use of a "red ball" system to deliver critical Class IX repairs to both the BSA/RSA and UMCPs needs to be identified and executed to generate combat power before the next battle.

6. Units need to develop a system that will confirm/deny shipment of and receipt of critical Class IX parts. When air assets are used to execute a "red ball," the support unit must ensure that the aviation support element has knowledge of the high priority Class IX plan and has worked out all coordination issues prior to executing the mission.

7. Brigades/regiments need to establish a disk drop plan with disk drop times and procedures that they are willing to enforce (example: drop supply disk before maintenance disk). Subordinate units must rehearse the disk drop plan, and the brigade/regimental XO or commander must ensure/enforce compliance. The plan must be centered around the brigade's/regiment's maintenance effort (the maintenance meeting).


1. Ensure a solid system exists for the flow of Forms 5988E.

2. Develop a tracking system that allows the battalion maintenance officer (BMO) to shift priorities.

3. The BMO should brief the maintenance estimate during mission analysis and at OPORDs.

4. The majority of these problems would be solved if leaders would enforce "by the book" PMCS for their weapons systems.

5. In preparation for their NTC rotation, units should establish maintenance "hot pits" that focus on the proper analysis of -10-level maintenance for the VOLCANO system, to include the prime mover (HEMTT/M548) and the MICLIC system. Ensure the operator conducts the proper PMCS and then verify it through company/battalion hot pit programs.

6. The battalion must have an aggressive publications program that keeps up with the latest publications and their changes. Revitalize technical manuals with all the latest changes.

7. Establish a graphic training aid (GTA) card that focuses on specific VOLCANO/MICLIC maintenance checks.

8. Refer to:

a. STP 21-1-SMCT, page 425, Task Number: 031-503-1026 (Maintain Your M40 Series Protective Mask With Hood)

b. TM 3-4240-339-10, Operators Manual For Chemical-Biological Mask.

9. Have soldiers do weekly checks of their protective masks when deployed to a combat environment as outlined in TM 3-4240-339-10, and identify what day these results must be turned in to the battalion to ensure protective masks are serviceable.

10. Identify soldiers that do not have -10 TMs and order replacements.

11. Ensure that protective masks are properly entered into the ULLS to ensure that prescribed unit level maintenance is accomplished.

12. In the tactical SOP (TACSOP), address pre-combat check/pre-combat inspection (PCC/PCI) procedures to be conducted at different levels of command to ensure protective masks are being properly maintained based on enemy NBC threat and mission.

SUBJECT: Medical Support Planning and Execution

Observation frequency:3-4QFY971-2QFY983-4QFY981-2QFY993-4QFY99


OBSERVATION 1: Forward support battalion (FSB) medical companies are often not prepared to provide a fully functional Level 2 health care facility. (TA.7.4.4)


1. Medical companies seldom validate critical Level 2 functions during reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSO&I).

2. Medical equipment sets (MES) are packed in MILVANS and are not given priority on the train.

3. Chemicals required for the x-ray processor are expired, not present in sufficient quantity, or have exceeded required temperatures. Film is often exposed prior to arrival.

4. X-ray technicians have difficulty setting up equipment in a field environment.

5. Power requirements for the medical and dental x-ray machines are unclear.

6. Critical repair parts are not on hand.

7. Laboratory reagents and test strips are expired or damaged.

8. Quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) programs are left at Home Station.

9. Combat lifesaver bags and medics' personal aid bags are packed in MILVANs and not carried.

OBSERVATION 2: CHS planners seldom establish clearly defined triggers for movement and commitment of CHS assets based on scheme of maneuver, decision points, or casualty loads. (TA.4.4.1)


1. Maneuver forces typically outrun their CHS assets during offensive operations.

2. The medical company commander loses communications with his forward elements at the battalion aid station (BAS) and ambulance exchange points (AXPs).

3. Medical company treatment teams are rarely used in a reinforcing role to allow BAS treatment teams to remain mobile. Treatment teams which are pushed forward seldom have a clear task and purpose.

4. Non-standard evacuation platforms are seldom massed in sufficient quantity and are not forward prior to crossing of the line of departure (LD).

5. In an offensive mission, CHS elements are either left behind or stop and set up for operation with minimal casualties as the maneuver task force continues to fight far forward. 6. Situational awareness and command and control are poor due to inadequate communications planning.

for Medical Support Planning and Execution


1. Develop a plan at Home Station for set-up and validation of dental, lab, and x-ray operations during RSO&I.

2. Place critical Level 2 equipment on a priority train which will arrive early enough to ensure all equipment is fully mission capable (FMC) prior to roll out.

3. Develop a list of medical equipment sets (MES) critical repair parts, which the operator can replace.

4. Deploy with and maintain an ongoing QA/QC program with a valid document register maintained by the treatment platoon.

5. Develop standard load plans.

6. Aid bags and combat lifesaver bags should be carried as to-accompany-troops (TAT) baggage.

7. Use a refrigerated van to maintain temperature-sensitive Class VIII supplies.


1. Position an ambulance exchange point (AXP) with the trail battalion aid station (BAS) treatment team. Move the AXP with the BAS and drop it off when the battalion sustains its first casualties to allow the BAS to remain mobile.

2. Position non-standard ground evacuation platforms far forward in sufficient quantity to support the casualty estimate.

3. Have the ambulance platoon leader and platoon sergeant attend the battalion/task force rehearsals.

4. Establish a CSS C2 cell composed of the medical company commander, brigade S4, FSB security, plans, and operations officer (SPO), and brigade chaplain. This cell can see the battle, communicate through the depth of the battle space, make timely decisions regarding reallocation of resources, and maintain good situational awareness. All graphics are posted and maintained on a common map.

Depiction of a common map

Depiction of a common map

5. Develop CHS decision points based on maneuver decision points.

6. Use air evacuation early to allow ground platforms to remain.

7. Translate equipment losses into casualty reports.

SUBJECT: Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)

Observation frequency:3-4QFY971-2QFY983-4QFY981-2QFY993-4QFY99


OBSERVATION 1: Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) of scouts from the battlefield is an ongoing problem. (TA.


1. Coordination between the scout platoon sergeant and the company 1SG seldom takes place.

2. The respective roles of the platoon sergeant and the company 1SG in the mission are often not understood.

3. Scout platoon sergeants try to evacuate their casualties to the battalion aid station (BAS) themselves, which takes them out of the battle for a considerable amount of time.

OBSERVATION 2: The task force (TF) order is often issued with no pre-planned BAS locations or "triggers" for movement to subsequent CASEVAC positions. (TA.


1. Normally, the battalion's forward aid station (FAS) follows the main-assault company while the main aid station (MAS) remains in the vicinity of the combat trains command post (CTCP). This is satisfactory until one of the aid stations stops and sets for casualty treatment or the main assault shifts to another unit; the TF continues to progress while the FAS or MAS quickly falls behind and out of range for effective CASEVAC.

2. Scout and mortar platoons are typically not accounted for in the combat health support (CHS) plan.

OBSERVATION 3: Unit casualty reporting is not to standard. (TA.


1. Casualty types/categories, method of transportation, and estimated time of arrival are often not reported before evacuation to the battalion aid station (BAS). Consequently, the BAS may jump to a subsequent location without realizing casualties are en route. This markedly increases the task force's died-of-wounds (DOW) rate due to excessive evacuation time.

2. Casualties often arrive without DA Forms 1155 and 1156, which hinders unit patient tracking and replacement capabilities.

OBSERVATION 4: Aircraft are rarely dedicated for non-standard CASEVAC in the brigade CHS plan. (TA.


1. If aircraft are dedicated for evacuation, they are not effective because an aviation representative is not involved in the development of the CHS plan.

2. Brigade ground and air evacuation plans are not mutually supporting.

3. Brigades have difficulty developing an efficient missioning and launch process for non-standard CASEVAC. The missioning and launch process is unclear and, when executed, is either too late or shuts down artillery fires due to insufficient coordination. Location of the aircraft is also a major concern.

4. Typically, brigades arrive at the National Training Center having trained with a forward support MEDEVAC team (FSMT) at Home Station, but the FSMT does not deploy to the NTC.


OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of 3-4QFY98 Observation 3)


OBSERVATION 1: CASEVAC operations are not synchronized. (TA.


1. Task force CASEVAC plans are too often developed by the medical platoon leader without detailed knowledge of either the task force scheme of maneuver or the S4's support plan.

2. Poor linkage with the forward support medical company (FSMC) denies the medical platoon leader understanding of the brigade's CASEVAC plan.

OBSERVATION 2: Casualty types/categories, method of transportation, and estimated time of arrival are often not reported before evacuation to the battalion aid station (BAS). (TA.


1. Inadequate reporting often results in the BAS displacing to a subsequent location without realizing casualties are en route. This markedly increases task force died-of-wounds (DOW) rates due to excessive evacuation time.

2. Casualties often arrive without DA Forms 1155 and 1156, which hinders unit patient tracking and replacement capabilities.

for Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)


1. During the combat service support (CSS) rehearsal, the scout platoon sergeant should get a commitment for support from the company 1SG and help him develop a plan for scout evacuation.

2. Rehearse the plan on the actual terrain where the battle will take place by talking to the supporting company via FM as the platoon moves into its position.

3. Verify routes and collection points. The scout platoon is responsible for getting its casualties from the OPs to a collection point.

4. Discuss the plan in detail when conducting the platoon rehearsal.


1. Incorporate pre-positioned FAS and MAS locations into the maneuver plan concept of support during all phases, to include the reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance fight.

2. Have the medical platoon leader brief the entire combat health support (CHS) plan during maneuver and CSS rehearsals. The briefing should include FAS/MAS movement triggers based on phase lines, events, number of wounded, and so forth. Also show where the medical assets will most likely be during each phase of the battle.

3. Include company 1SGs in the CSS rehearsal when possible.

4. Effective use of nonstandard CASEVAC assets proves to be a combat multiplier.


1. Incorporate casualty reporting procedures into the unit tactical SOP (TACSOP).

2. Exercise the procedures during platoon and company lane training.

3. Standardize MILES cards, DA Form 1155, and DA Form 1156 throughout the task force (e.g., complete name data and cards placed in the first aid dressing pouch).

4. Line company medics and designated non-standard ambulance crews must report pertinent casualty information to the BAS prior to evacuation.


1. Use the flow-chart on the next page as a guide.

2. Dedicate aircraft based on the casualty estimate and when these casualties are expected. Position the aircraft at a location that facilitates the crew's situational awareness as well as launch and missioning.

3. Rehearse the entire process in detail at the brigade combat team (BCT) CSS rehearsal.

4. Post CHS graphics, both air and ground, on consolidated brigade graphics.

Depiction of consolidated brigade graphics


1. Involve the medical platoon leader in task force wargaming.

2. Ensure that communications exist to the FSMC commander.

3. The medical platoon leader must know the brigade's CASEVAC plan prior to the task force wargame.

4. Distribute the CASEVAC plan with the rest of the CSS plan.


1. Casualty reporting must be incorporated into the unit tactical SOP (TACSOP) and exercised during platoon and company lane training.

2. Uniformity of MILES casualty cards, DA Forms 1155 and 1156, must be standardized throughout each task force, such as having name data completed and placing cards in the first aid dressing pouch.

3. Line company medics and designated non-standard ambulance crews must report pertinent casualty information to the BAS prior to evacuation.

SUBJECT: Tactical Unit and Personnel Training

Observation frequency:3-4QFY971-2QFY983-4QFY981-2QFY993-4QFY99


OBSERVATION 1: Too many engineer units do not understand basic preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) procedures or operating procedures for their MICLIC and ACE systems. (TA.7.4.5)


1. Many units arrive at the NTC with ACEs and MICLICs in a poor state of repair. The operators do not understand how to conduct PMCS to standard on these specific pieces of equipment. Units often neglect the MICLICs, assuming that when they arrive at the NTC the OCs will conduct a PMCS with them to standard, identify all the faults for them, and show them how to rectify the faults.

2. Units are not trained on the equipment and how to properly employ it. ACE operators are usually new and do not understand the standards of digging a vehicle fighting position or breaching a berm or anti-tank (AT) ditch.

OBSERVATION 2: Units are arriving at the NTC with soldiers who are inadequately trained in 12B MOS-specific and common Skill Level 1 tasks. (TA.7.4.5)

DISCUSSION: Skill Level 1 tasks include common tasks such as navigation, reaction to chemical attack, first aid/buddy aid, and 12B combat engineering tasks, such as mine arming and emplacement. The impact of these skills on collective training is considerable.


OBSERVATION 1: Attack helicopter battalion and cavalry squadron gunnery skills continue to erode. (TA.7.4.5)

DISCUSSION: Skill erosion is evident during force-on-force (MILES/AGES) and live-fire operations. Recent crews employing the Hellfire point target weapon system have tallied probability of hit statistics of less than 60. This appears to be caused by a lack of Home Station gunnery training.

OBSERVATION 2: Individual soldier skills at the lowest level need improvement. (TA.7.4.5)

DISCUSSION: Individual soldier skills often become the difference between success and failure on the battlefield.

for Tactical Unit and Personnel Training


1. Units must train at Home Station on how to conduct a proper PMCS on the MICLIC and the ACE. Units must also ensure that they have the most recent TMs and changes for the equipment. It will also help to cross-train soldiers within the company on these pieces of equipment. Having additional operators will build flexibility into the employment capabilities of the systems.

2. Units should not bring newly licensed operators on the ACE to the NTC and expect them to dig to standard vehicle fighting positions. Unit licensing programs at Home Station should also include proficiency training on the equipment for the various tasks which they may be required to execute in support of the task force (TF). OCs at the NTC have developed the following chart to assist units and operators in understanding the standards for survivability operations. These cards are passed out upon the unit's arrival to NTC.

Survivability Hull and Turret Defilade Vehicle Fighting Positions


1. Units should ensure the train up conducted prior to an NTC rotation includes basic skills training and not just collective task training. Tasks should include those that support collective task training and those individual tasks that help the soldier survive on today's battlefield.

2. Commanders at all levels should be willing to give up maneuver time, if needed, to improve the single soldier or crew at bottom level. Although maneuver training is essential, each soldier must be able to do their job to provide the needed killing power.

3. Stick lanes are a good place to train individual skills. NCOs should study FM 25-100, Training the Force, and FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training, and should understand this line of training better than anyone else in the force.


Attack and cavalry units must make gunnery training a priority. These units must standardize their gunnery evaluations per FM 1-140, Helicopter Gunnery. Tables V through VIII must receive objective evaluation.

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