CLOSE COMBAT ATTACK (CCA)
by
LTC Tony Crutchfield, CPT William T. Golden IV, and CPT Thomas Throne Jr.,
1st
Battalion, 2d Aviation Brigade, 2d Infantry Division
| FRIDAY, 2100, ABF 22: During the air mission brief, it all seemed so clear to me. My team was to occupy an attack-by-fire (ABF) position in support of a battalion air assault. Our task was to destroy all enemy forces near the landing zone (LZ) that could prevent a successful landing or prevent the Infantry Task Force (TF) from moving to its objective. As I watched the formation of UH-60s approach, my heart began to race. I knew that lives depended on my ability to find and destroy the enemy. The Blackhawks touched down in a cloud of dust as 100 or more soldiers dismounted, ready for battle. Radios crackled as commanders begin shouting out orders. The Hawks lifted off at once as if part of a synchronized ballet. I increased my scan of the tree line. I wanted to be ready for a call from the infantrymen on the ground. Then it came. "Apache 23, this is Avenger 06, contact Maverick 06 on this frequency for a CCA, over." I was ready. I moved my tactical acquisition data system (TADS) to the grid Maverick 06 gave me and saw nothing. Soon, another call from the warriors on the ground. "I need suppressive fires now! All my soldiers are marked with bud lights." What is he talking about? What is a bud light and can I see it under the forward looking infrared (FLIR)? I think I see troops on the ground in front of me. Are they friendly or enemy? What do I do? |
CCA can be defined as attack helicopter maneuver/fires in direct support of a ground force which is in anticipated or direct contact with the enemy. The 2d Infantry Division (2ID) fights in brigade combat teams (BCTs) and typically operationally controls one AH-64 company to each brigade. To facilitate CCA operations in Korea's restrictive terrain, the attack companies organize into teams of two using the "lead-wingman" concept. For planning purposes, there are usually three teams planned for each mission. CCA in the 2 ID is conducted using two methods: 1) CCA with a light task force (TF) that has been air-assaulted into an area of operation and given the mission to protect another brigade's (main effort) attack. For this scenario, aircraft station time is critical. The teams of AH-64s are typically phased into the fight to allow continuous coverage of the air assault force with two teams on station during the actual air assault phase. Auxiliary fuel tanks are employed on the lead team to provide maximum station time. This ensures continuity and maximum combat power forward during the early stages of the air assault when CCA is most likely and the ground commander is building his combat power. 2) CCA in support of a mechanized/armor TF in the offense or defense. In this scenario, the AH-64 company can be used as part of the main or supporting effort. These tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) allow the AH-64 Company and the armor TF to simultaneously destroy the enemy force in the same engagement area (EA) or in separate armor/ aviation EAs.
The key to successful aerial and ground maneuver relies on detailed planning, standing operating procedures (SOPs), and training. For a light TF air assault/CCA mission, a 96-hour planning cycle is used. A warning order should be issued as soon as possible by the air assault task force headquarters. This allows the attack commander to develop his task organization that best supports the mission. The first coordination/planning event is the initial planning conference (IPC). This is the first meeting between the ground maneuver unit and the aviation task force. The IPC takes place when the air assault task force commander (AATFC) has a general idea of his intent and ground tactical plan scheme of maneuver. During the IPC, each unit involved in the air assault back-briefs task and purpose, general scheme of maneuver, and task organization. This crucial meeting synchronizes all battlefield operating systems (BOSs), thereby ensuring that the AATFC's intent is met. Next is the air mission brief (AMB). It is held 72 hours out and is the initial Go/No Go brief to the AATFC. Additionally, it is the final coordination meeting for air and ground maneuver units. Each unit briefs its task and purpose, refined scheme of maneuver, and detailed task organization. At H-26+00, the initial conditions check is conducted on the pickup zone (PZ). Each BOS is reviewed to determine if the conditions are set to conduct the Air Assault. A Go/No Go decision is made. At H-24+00, reconnaissance insertions are conducted if the decision is a Go. At H-2+00 hours, the final conditions check is made. The reconnaissance force must have met the AATFC's priority information requirements (PIRs) at the final condition check. If the PIR is met and the AATFC gives the "green light," the first AH-64 team will set the conditions on the LZ by searching for and destroying enemy forces affecting the LZ. This is when detailed SOPs are most important and are put to the test.
SOPs are an important part in synchronizing aerial and ground maneuver. Three key reports form the foundation of 2ID SOPs for conducting air assault/ CCA. They are the CCA fragmentary order (FRAGO), the attack inbound summary, and the target handover. The CCA FRAGO is especially critical if the planning process was hasty. The CCA FRAGO is issued to the attack company commander when he is inbound to the LZ by the AATFC. It should contain all the information needed to complete the mission and should paint a clear picture of the current friendly and enemy situation, assign a clear task and purpose, and communicate the identification, friend or foe (IFF) signals utilized. It can be issued as "no change" or contain any changes that occurred since the final conditions check. The CCA FRAGO includes:
1. Situation.
2. Mission.
3. Coordinating Instructions.
The CCA FRAGO gives the first AH-64 team on station great situational awareness as well as last-minute changes to the mission.
The next report is the attack inbound summary. It is transmitted by the aircraft team leader and includes:
1. (INF CO CDR) This is (AH-64 Team).
2. Number of aircraft in the team.
3. Ammunition on aircraft.
4. Optical capability.
5. Station time.
The attack inbound summary is used any time a new team of AH-64s arrive on station. It gives the ground commander information on the new team's restrictions or limitations. It is especially useful when conducting CCA if the new team arrives with a different task organization, ammunition configuration, station time or optical capability than was previously briefed. These two reports set the stage for successful air and ground coordination. Both the air and ground maneuver unit must have a clear understanding of the situation, capabilities and scheme of maneuver.
The final report is the target handover request. It was developed after executing several air assault/CCA exercises in the ID, and has proven to be very effective if communicated clearly and concisely. It includes:
INF CO CDR
1. (AH-64) This is (INF CO CDR).
2. My location is _______. Visual recognition signal is ________.
3. Target description.
4. Target location.
- From my location, target is ____ degrees, ____meters.
- Grid of target.
- Reference a known point (major terrain feature) to give location of target.
- From my location, target is ____ degrees, ____meters.
5. Marking target with (type of signal depending on conditions).
6. Ready to mark target at your command, over.
AH-64 TM LDR
1. (INF CO CDR) This is (AH-64).
2. Observer location is ________. Visual recognition is __________.
3. Verify target is ________ located at ___________.
4. MANEUVERING TO ENGAGE.
5. (INF CO CDR) This is AH-64, give friendly recognition signal.
6. AH-64 confirms friendly recognition signal or continues to maneuver to confirm friendly location.
7. Observer, this is AH-64, target located grid _______.
8. Mark target with __________.
9. Target will be engaged with ______(30mm/ Rockets/Hellfire).
10. BDA follows__________(pilot gives BDA to ground unit).
The target handover request is crucial in the prevention of fratricide and destruction of the enemy. The target handover request allows the ground maneuver forces to communicate to the AH-64 team the exact location of friendly and enemy forces. Marking techniques are like any other technique; use what works. MRE heaters, infrared chemlights, body posture, infrared strobes will work well depending on terrain, foliage, and relative locations of the AH-64 teams to the ground forces.
The final key to success is training between aerial and ground maneuver units. Conducted regularly, it gives our ground warriors a better understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the AH-64 battalion. Although helicopters operate in the third dimension, they are restricted by terrain. Unlike fixed-wing jet aircraft, attack helicopters have neither the speed nor the altitude that will reduce exposure to enemy air defense weapons. Units must use the terrain to conceal their movement. Just as it takes time for a tank, Bradley, or infantryman to plan their next move, it takes time for an AH-64 team/platoon to plan its maneuver to engage a target. Attack helicopters are also constrained by lines of intervisibility and proper concealment to ensure survivability. This important aspect of employment of the AH-64 must be understood and recognized by all units on the ground.
Additionally, whether AH-64s are used in the light or mechanized/armor CCA role, success depends on a clear task and purpose from the ground task force commander. Task and purpose define how the tactical commander wants to use a maneuver force to accomplish his intent. All subordinate units need a clear task and purpose to be successful. A task is defined as the result or effect the commander wishes to achieve. Tasks need to be clearly understood and feasible. Too often, tasks are given to the AH-64 teams that cannot be completed because of aircraft limitations or lack of definition. It is the job of the AH-64 commander to educate ground tactical commanders on the capabilities and limitations of his crews and the airframe. This ensures that appropriate tasks are given to the Apache teams on the battlefield. The commander must look at his unit's ability to perform numerous tasks during CCA missions as well. Too many tasks can lead to forces being spread too thin across the battlefield and an inability to mass fires in accordance with attack helicopter doctrine. Purpose is also important. It gives the attack commander the flexibility to use initiative to meet the commander's intent if things are not going as planned on the battlefield. Overall, a clear task and purpose results in well-defined objectives and increased probability of mission accomplishment.
Finally, CCA is a difficult mission to perform without prior coordination, detailed planning and training. In the 2ID where the immediate threat exists for combat, it is extremely important that the ground and air maneuver units conduct frequent training to guarantee success. If detailed planning is not possible, units should revert to lessons learned during past training opportunities and SOPs developed as a result. The development of new ways to mark targets, such as air commander pointers and day visual lasers, will further reduce the difficulties of integrating air and ground assets. The establishment of a habitual relationship between air and ground units and frequent training is critical. It is this synergy that has made CCA an effective and lethal method of delivering destructive fires against any enemy on the Korean Peninsula.
Foreword
Dixie
Thunder Across the Desert: Meeting the Challenge of the NTC
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