TA.6
MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY BOS &
NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL
(NBC)
(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)
Positive Performance
SUBJECT: Fratricide prevention
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Units have made an improvement in air and ground integration resulting in a reduction in fratricides.
DISCUSSION: Units continue to appreciate the importance of the rules of engagement (ROE) and have taken significant measures to ensure all members understand and follow them.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Aviation units must continue to ensure this trend is sustained. A good starting point is to develop unit fratricide prevention standing operating procedures (SOPs).
2. Review CALL Newsletter No. 92-4, A Fratricide: Reducing Self-Inflicted Losses.
(TA.6.3.1
Provide Battlespace Hazard Protection)
SUBJECT: Survivability
OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Careful management, planning and utilization of engineer resources, Class IV planning, and improved threat analysis and awareness have contributed to improved survivability.
DISCUSSION: None.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Plan for the use of engineers for unit survivability.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
SUBJECT: Aircraft maintenance
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Aircraft maintenance continues to be one of the strong points of assault/heavy lift units.
DISCUSSION: Units routinely average an operational ready (OR) rate of 85 percent during a rotation.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Continue operational maintenance throughout the deployment.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
SUBJECT: Plotting chemical attacks
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): Brigade and battalion NBC personnel continually display a firm understanding of the necessary skills required to plot chemical attacks.
DISCUSSION: These staff officers and NCOs possess a keen understanding of manuals and doctrine.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Review FM 3-3, Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance.
2. Review FM 3-7, NBC Field Handbook.
(TA.6.3.2
Employ Operations Security)
Needs Emphasis
SUBJECT: Route clearance and combined arms breaching
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ENG): Consistently, brigade staffs have difficulty in developing detailed route clearance plans.
DISCUSSION: The heavy team's mobility, organic countermine equipment (CME), and dependence on ground supply lines make it a likely candidate to conduct route clearance. Once obstacles are encountered and a bypass is not found, the heavy team (and the brigade) has been impeded for up to 12 hours in successfully breaching an obstacle.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Before a heavy team is employed to conduct a combined arms breach, it must be task-organized with sufficient dismounted infantry and engineers to conduct the mission.
2. The heavy team must have sufficient time to plan and rehearse the breaches.
3. Review FM 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, for detailed information on the employment of CME in mechanical breaching.
(TA.6.1.1
Overcome Obstacles)
SUBJECT: Mine usage
OBSERVATION (TF 1): During the defense units do not effectively use available mine assets.
DISCUSSION: The execution of the obstacle plan typically begins to unravel when the quantity of mines planned for exceeds, often by two-thirds, what is actually available to the unit. Competing priorities of work, distribution, and time management difficulties prevent units from emplacing those mines that they do have. Over the past two quarters, an average of 64 percent of available mines distributed to companies were never emplaced prior to the no-later-than defend time.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Conventional mine laying is labor, resource, and transport intensive. Detailed planning is a requirement for successful execution.
2. Review FM 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations.
(TA.6.2.2.1
Emplace Mines)
SUBJECT: Positioning of crew-served weapons
OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Firing batteries/platoons routinely do a poor job of positioning their crew-served weapons.
DISCUSSION: Sectors of fire are not interlocking, fields of fire are not cleared, weapons are emplaced without considering the characteristics of terrain (dead space, trees, avenues of approach, hills, etc.). Additionally, soldiers do not understand how to fill out a range card or how the T&E mechanism functions. NCOs do not proactively supervise and train their soldiers on crew-served weapons proficiency. The end result is that despite the enormous firepower available to a battery, the unit is unable to defend itself against a dismounted attack of three to five men.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Read and review FM 6-50, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery, Chapter 3, and STP 6-13Bl4-SM-TG, pg. 3-6.
2. Ensure all soldiers and leaders are trained on crew-served weapons' emplacement, range card construction, clearing fields of fire, and, most importantly, positioning all crew-served weapons in a manner that maximizes their effectiveness given the constraints of the terrain.
3. Consider identifying the positions of crew-served weapons prior to the howitzer positions. This technique can greatly facilitate battery defense without affecting the battery's subsequent occupation.
4. Crew-served weapons' positions should be inspected/checked by a senior leader (BC or 1SG) to ensure the weapon is being used effectively. This check should be conducted by actually getting behind the weapon and ensuring it is set up correctly.
(TA.6.3.1
Provide Battlefield Hazard Protection)
SUBJECT: Protecting the force
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Aviation units fail to effectively defend their assembly areas with organic personnel.
DISCUSSION: The primary shortcomings are training and command emphasis. The average aviation officer and NCO are poorly trained in basic soldiering skills. Common soldier tasks such as "Prepare a Fighting Position" and "Prepare a Sector Sketch" are not well understood by aviation leaders and, as a result, are not performed to standard by soldiers. Engineer assets must be used to compensate for the lack of manpower.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Leaders at all levels must read and understand FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, for techniques and standards for defensive measures.
2. Review FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
SUBJECT: Conduct CSS by air
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): There is very little usage of air assets for CSS.
DISCUSSION: There are many elements to conducting CSS by air that have not been discussed: pickup zones (PZs) and landing (LZs), primary and alternate routes in and out, security, load rigging, and inspection. Also, other factors that must be considered include Army airspace command and control (A2C2), ADA, and the ever-present threat of the opposing forces (OPFOR).
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Same as trend 4 above.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
SUBJECT: Force protection
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Force protection continues to challenge units.
DISCUSSION: Units often fall back on the belief that they do not have the assets available to conduct adequate force protection. However, rotations frequently do not use Class IV and ignore recommendations set forth in appropriate field manuals and consequently fail to achieve acceptable levels of force protection.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Review force protection in FM 7-10, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad.
2. Review force protection in FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
SUBJECT: Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) and Disabled Aircraft Repair and Recovery (DARRT)
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Commanders at battalion level and below do not realize that Combat Search and Rescue and Disabled Aircraft Repair and Recovery are two separate missions.
DISCUSSION: Each mission is required by doctrine to be included in operations orders (OPORDs) and standing operating procedures (SOPs). CSAR is designed to recover crews, assess the aircraft, and provide security for the disabled aircraft. DARRT is a separate mission used to recover the aircraft from the battlefield.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Review CSAR and DARRT procedures in FM 3-04.500, Army Aviation Maintenance; FM 3-04.513, Battlefield Recovery and Evacuation of Aircraft; FM 90-18, (CSAR) Multiservice Procedures for Combat Search and Rescue; and FM 1-101, Aviation Battlefield Survivability.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
SUBJECT: Survivability
OBSERVATION (ADA): Battery leadership does not enforce fighting position standards through their tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP).
DISCUSSION: Survivability is not sufficiently emphasized at each leadership level to ensure teams survive on the battlefield.
1. Team chiefs procrastinate in executing their priorities of work.
2. Fire units remain in the same position for days without improving their fighting and/or firing positions.
3. Supplementary positions are seldom selected or movements to them rehearsed.
4. Caches are not dug in.
Results:
1. Fire units are destroyed through either direct or indirect ground contact or by rotary-wing aircraft.
2. ADOs at brigade or battalion level do not recommend air defense assets as a priority for engineer survivability effort.
3. Although teams are aggressive in seeking engineer support, there is no synchronization of engineer effort.
4. Batteries have no tracking tools to ensure survivability awareness.
5. BDE/TF ADOs do not disseminate obstacle plans or friendly mine caches to fire units during the defense. This results in teams being destroyed by reseeded minefields.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Leaders must enforce survivability standards by checking team positions.
2. Leaders must plan survivability as part of every mission.
3. Units should develop a TACSOP standard.
4. Review FM 44-18-1, Stinger Team Operations, and FM 5-103, Survivability.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
SUBJECT: Perimeter defense
OBSERVATION (CSS EAD): Basic soldier skills are often lacking in the preparation and execution of defensive measures.
DISCUSSION:
1. Marksmanship is routinely poor.
2. Fighting positions seldom meet common task training (CTT) standards even after several days of occupation in the same area.
3. Commanders often delegate the force protection to a junior officer with little experience in how to lay out defensive positions with overlapping fires, obstacle placement and preparation, use of LP/OPs, use of early warning devices, use of QRF, and so on.
4. Junior leaders, especially at the NCO level, lack collective force protection skills and often rely on the attitude that "someone else will take care of them."
5. Few units understand the concepts and coordination required for use of a tactical combat force in the corps rear. Over time, units tend to improve their reaction to OPFOR, but only after suffering numerous casualties.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Soldiers must learn all common tasks appropriate for their grade.
2. Leaders must understand the fundamentals of defense and use appropriate measures.
3. A review of STP 21-1 would enhance a medical unit's ability to protect itself.
4. Review basic defensive perimeter techniques in FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data (preparation of obstacles and fighting positions and the effective use of limited engineer assets).
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
SUBJECT: Competing priorities
OBSERVATION (CSS EAD): A CSS soldier has to provide support while simultaneously working on base defense.
DISCUSSION: This requires a careful balance, and normally support gets more attention at the expense of base defense.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. CSS commanders need to realize that a good solid base defense is a force multiplier. Initially, base defense is going to require lots of manpower, but after the site has been completed, it will take fewer soldiers to maintain.
2. The base defense must be factored in to the service support equation. CSS units must have a plan and aggressively execute it shortly after occupation and prior to getting totally immersed in providing support. NCOs must ensure maximum use of available time prior to getting involved in mission support.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
SUBJECT: Reaction to NBC threats
OBSERVATION (CSS EAD): Most units lack a well-thought-out NBC plan.
DISCUSSION: When presented with an NBC threat, the chain of command falls apart and chaos ensues. A common problem is the lack of basic NBC knowledge and a plan that delineates actions to take on and after the attack (to include unmasking procedures).
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Review FM 3-4, NBC Protection, for specific information on NBC protection.
2. Chapters 2 and 3 of FM 3-4 provide outstanding basic information to help thought and planning processes.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
SUBJECT: Force protection security
OBSERVATION (TF2): Leader involvement in the planning and execution of both offensive and defensive operations usually results in the failure of a company security plan.
DISCUSSION: Lack of application of a security plan during the movement-to-contact phase results in the unit being surprised in their patrol base and suffering numerous casualties. Lack of application of a security plan in the defense results in the unit being overwhelmed by a much smaller force.
1. Leaders often fail to clearly articulate the specific active and passive measures they want their company to undertake. Those that are published are usually not supervised to ensure enforcement.
2. Leaders fail to conduct company- or platoon-level IPB. Active measures, such as LP/OPs, stand-tos, and patrols, are not often enforced or conducted. When done, they are rarely executed as a result of the leader's IPB. The result is that LP/OPs are only 50 meters out and do not cover a likely avenue of approach, or patrols that are not dispatched to known areas of activity but rather areas of the least restrictive terrain.
3. Passive measures, such as the deployment of early warning systems, night-vision device usage (especially attached TOW assets) in the surveillance plan, and the siting of the company position, are rarely given much thought.
4. Units rarely dig hasty fighting positions in the offense (patrol bases).
5. Leaders often fail to site-in key weapons systems.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Leaders must conduct IPB at their level.
2. Unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) should give junior leaders direction in the application of appropriate security measures, and leader supervision/enforcement will ensure proper execution.
3. Review FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, Chapters 4 and 5.
4. Reference CALL Handbook No. 96-3, Own the Night.
(TA.6.3.2 Employ Operations Security)
TA.3
Air Defense BOS
TA.7
Combat Service Support BOS
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