TA.5 INTELLIGENCE BOS
(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)
Positive Performance
SUBJECT: Positioning of field artillery assets to support the defense
OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Field artillery battalions are using the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process to identify critical movement triggers and future firing battery positions.
DISCUSSION: The enemy's division/brigade reconnaissance elements are unable to locate and attrit friendly forces.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Task force commanders and staffs should conduct IPB exercises at Home Station to give the S-2 and staff experience in the process and products needed.
(TA.5.2.1
Collect Information on Situation)
SUBJECT: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), Step A: Evaluate the threat
OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Brigade and battalion S-2s and intelligence analysts in the military intelligence (MI) company analysis and control teams (ACT) came to the rotations thoroughly prepared with adequate knowledge of the threat they would face.
DISCUSSION: This knowledge was effectively converted into doctrinal templates, databases on threat tactics, and options and high-value target lists.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Home Station training, the JRTC Leader's Training Program, and Mobile Training Teams appear to be working and must be sustained.
(TA.5.3.1
Evaluate Threat Information)
SUBJECT: S-2 section operations
OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): A majority of units came to their rotation with full or nearly full S-2 shops. These sections had useful SOPs, and for the most part followed efficient, effective procedures.
DISCUSSION: Units that routinely use their enlisted analysts tended to handle the stress of the CTC rotation better for a number of reasons: (1) the work load seemed to be distributed better; (2) the young soldiers had more situational awareness; and (3) the more experienced NCOs and officers were able to spend more time conducting predictive analysis and visualizing the big picture.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Home Station training, the JRTC Leader's Training Program, and Mobile Training Teams appear to be working and must be sustained.
2. Task force commanders and staffs should conduct IPB exercises at Home Station to give the S-2 and staff experience in the process and products needed.
(TA.5.4.4
Prepare Reports on Enemy Situation)
Needs Emphasis
SUBJECT: Collection planning and reconnaissance and security operations and planning
OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Brigade and battalion S-2s consistently failed to plan effective operations to collect the information needed to win.
DISCUSSION: A majority of the units used well-developed matrices as planning tools, thus indicating that they knew what needed to be done. However, not one unit was able to plan and execute a successful reconnaissance plan in any phase of the rotations. Three commonalties characterized intelligence collection failures: lack of focus, timeliness, and supervision. First, reconnaissance missions were unfocused and not linked to the commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) or Decision Points (DP). Second, missions were initiated late, they were often uncoordinated, and they were usually not tracked by higher headquarters. Third, units did not have a system to double-check when a named area of interest (NAI) was or was not covered and could not identify gaps in their coverage.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Collection/reconnaissance and security planning must start with receipt of the warning order so that intelligence or reconnaissance teams can begin collection operations while the staff is conducting the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Although this is not possible during initial entry missions, early reconnaissance would allow the staff and commander to make a plan based on current intelligence, not just templated enemy situations. Commanders must strive to ensure they have a well-focused collection effort. This includes limiting the number of tasks given to collection assets, ensuring tasks are tied to PIR or DPs, and ensuring the plan uses all assets available. Example: A scout platoon can only pinpoint an objective and then observe it. Reconnaissance operations should pull maneuver units toward enemy weaknesses or vulnerabilities. Too often units force reconnaissance down one axis to support an inflexible friendly course of action.
1. Small maneuver elements can conduct aggressive patrolling operations to help the reconnaissance plan. For example, the JRTC OPFOR often probes defenses; likewise, infantry platoons can probe the OPFOR's defense. They just need to be trained to do so prior to deployment.
2. There is no hard and fast rule on the number of NAIs that a unit can handle. However, the brigade staff must recognize that each NAI tasked to a subordinate unit becomes a specified task to them during the mission analysis.
3. S-2s and S-3s must have a combined method of tracking the collection/reconnaissance and security operation. Although planned by the S-2, the S-3 must maintain visibility over this set of combat assets maneuvering on the battlefield. One technique is to post an NAI chart next to the map that shows when an NAI is active, what is being reported, and when it should go inactive. This must be a staff battle drill practiced by all members of the S-2 and S-3 sections.
4. When combining assets from different units for reconnaissance missions, such as Marine FCTs, LLVI teams, and scouts, sufficient command, control and communications must be built in. These missions must be well coordinated and rehearsed routinely at Home Station prior to deployment. A rule of thumb is that when two like-sized units join to form a reconnaissance team, a headquarters from the next higher unit is probably needed.
5. Collection plans must be tied to the commander's key decision points. If a valuable asset is placed in a risky situation for no reason to support the tactical operation, then that asset is potentially wasted.
6. Reconnaissance is everyone's business. Every combat leader must conduct a reconnaissance as part of routine troop-leading procedures and be involved with running the entire TOC.
(TA.5
Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)
SUBJECT: Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)
OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): IBP is a weak point for most aviation units.
DISCUSSION: The modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO), normally developed at Home Station, is usually not updated and used during a unit's rotation. Additionally, units habitually do not refine the doctrinal and situational templates provided by brigade, nor do they develop event templates other than for the defense phase.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
1. Units must develop a decision support template.
2. Review FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.
(TA.5.2
Collect Information)
SUBJECT: Reconnaissance and security collection
OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Brigade and battalion S-2s consistently failed to plan effective operations to collect the information needed to win.
DISCUSSION: Same as TREND 1.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Same as TREND 1.
(TA.5.2
Collect Information)
SUBJECT: Aviation units conducting search and attack operations
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Aviation units conduct search and attack operations using either a zone reconnaissance, an area reconnaissance, or hasty attacks as a finishing force. The commander may specify other reconnaissance objectives in his intent, but finding the enemy should be the focus.
DISCUSSION: Adherence to the critical tasks associated with a zone/area reconnaissance and the commander's PIR will help define the purpose of the reconnaissance for aircrews. Flight techniques are important while conducting the zone reconnaissance.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Units that plan a zone/area reconnaissance with supporting graphics and control measures have greater success in thoroughly searching a zone. For a zone reconnaissance, the graphics break a zone up into logical segments that can be systematically executed; i.e., phase line to phase line.
2. Due to the nature of the terrain, it is imperative that aircrews fly slow enough to search down into the trees. A common trend is for the aircrews to fly at speeds between 50-80 knots, which is too fast! Crews that slow down to speeds from ETL to 30 knots are more successful in finding the enemy, cache sites, and other targets.
(TA.5.2.1
Collect Information on Situation)
SUBJECT: Reconnaissance/security and counterreconnaissance
OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Units are generally showing sound tactical logic in the organization and command and control of security and reconnaissance forces. However, the actual tactical employment usually does not rise to the potential of the concept.
DISCUSSION: A significant factor contributing to this is that the planning effort is not commensurate with the concept. Units should always conduct parallel planning. If any mission guidance goes out before the base order, it is frequently verbal or in the form of a sketchy WARNO.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The security/reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance operation, therefore, tends to get executed based almost entirely on this type mission guidance.
2. The security/reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance effort of any operation should have its own mission analysis. This would also tend to be dictated by, and in accordance with, the troop- leading procedures where "initiate reconnaissance" follows the first four steps. The step "form a tentative plan," refers to the overall operation, not to tentative security/reconnaissance/ counterreconnaissance plans.
3. This plan must be thoroughly developed and analyzed prior to committing forces to the security zone. The "initiate movement" step does not mean that forces occupy the security zone absent anything but a verbal FRAGO or initial WARNO. Yet this is exactly what most units do, deferring full development of the security zone fight to simultaneous/parallel development along with the main operational plan. By the time that order is issued, forces in the security zone are usually already committed and with insufficient troop-leading procedures under their belts.
4. The solution is to execute a separate set of TLP steps for the security/reconnaissance/ counterreconnaissance fight and thoroughly develop a plan/order for this fight. One of the most significant purposes of the security effort is to assist refining the main COA.
(TA.5.2.1
Collect Information on Situation)
SUBJECT: Leader training in light/heavy tactics
OBSERVATION (TF 2): Leader training in light/heavy tactics needs to emphasize combined arms and intelligence issues.
DISCUSSION: FOCUS LEADER TRAINING. Leaders need to be able to conduct a detailed intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) of their sector, understanding the threat to heavy vs light forces. They need to know how to develop a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) to identify restricted and unrestricted terrain. They must be able to build an engagement area, and command and control tanks and Bradley's in the offense and in MOUT.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Review FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.
2. Read CALL Newsletter No. 96-12, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.
3. Read CALL Newsletter No. 95-12, Military Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning."
4. Read CALL Newsletter No. 98-10, Fighting Light/Heavy in a Restricted Terrain.
(TA.5.2.1
Collect Information on Situation)
SUBJECT: Using the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)
OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Some units do quite well developing and using the priority intelligence requirements (PIR) portion of CCIR. Many do not. Additionally, the overall trend to date is that units frequently misuse or do not use the elements of CCIR at all. The PIR do not answer the few specific items the commander needs to know to execute his plan. All too frequently the PIR are questions the S-2 may need answered; however, these answers are usually the last elements required to form an intelligence estimate, which, in turn, allows the commander's PIR to be addressed. Friendly force information requirements (FFIR) and essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) are likewise not used effectively. EEFI are probably the enemy commander's PIR, but are almost never developed with this in mind.
DISCUSSION: Commanders must better articulate their vision of how the battle will be fought and why it will be fought that way. Doing this will assist the staff in making PIR recommendations that are pertinent to the essence of what the commander really needs to know (his decisions!).
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. S-2s need to put themselves in their commanders' place and recognize that the intelligence officers' requirements are not necessarily PIR, but rather are IR that need to be analyzed, processed, and packaged for the commander.
2. The importance of FFIR goes well beyond listing them on a chart in the TOC. FFIR should include items that are critical to the success of the operation and relate directly to the PIR/commander's decisions from a BLUFOR perspective. For example, is the status of M1 tanks an FFIR that needs to be tracked because the loss of a portion of this asset may render the selected COA infeasible?
(TA.5.2.1
Collect Information on Situation)
SUBJECT: Prepare and check overlay graphics
OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Once the overlay is complete, units are not rechecking the information depicted to ensure the essential information is posted.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Once the overlay is complete, double-check the information to ensure the following items are identified and clearly depicted:
1. Enemy overall mission.
2. Task and purpose of each unit tracked.
3. Boundaries for all units two levels down.
4. Templated locations of assets and systems two levels down (e.g., battalion logistics points, company supply points, platoon caches, and so on).
5. Main and supporting efforts.
6. Time phase lines for those elements that will move.
7. Annotations of operational times or patterns for those elements that will not make significant movement (e.g., minelaying operations between 0400-0630 each day).
8. Key and decisive terrain.
9. Population status as appropriate.
Remember, neatness counts. If you plan to reproduce the overlay on a black and white field copier, make sure it is legible. This product can be a decisive factor in your victory or defeat.
(TA.5.2.1.1
Collect Threat Information)
SUBJECT: The targeting process
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): Too often chemical personnel are left out of the daily brigade and battalion targeting and synchronization meetings.
DISCUSSION: As a result, input from chemical personnel is lacking. Meetings that exclude the chemical officers and their NCOs renders the assets they oversee ineffective. The targeting and synchronization process allows the brigade to ensure the effective servicing of targets as well as ensuring the integration and synchronization of all the brigade's battlefield operating systems, to include NBC.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. One of the major products from a meeting of this nature is a daily FRAGO addressing operations 48-72 hours out. The chemical officer must be involved in this process if his work is to be coordinated with the battle staff and have timely influence on the brigade fight.
2. FM 6-30-10, The Targeting Process, and FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, provide the chemical officer a good starting point for understanding the process.
(TA.5.2.2
Collect Target Information)
SUBJECT: Using unit intelligence indicators for targeting
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Many units do not use intelligence indicators for targeting.
DISCUSSION: Units do not suffer from a lack of intelligence concerning enemy activity, but from the lack of an established methodology for turning enemy intelligence into friendly action. For example, an enemy mortar is located within two to three hundred meters of the S-2's templated location. Over a period of days, the mortar is acquired by the Q36 on one or more occasions (displacing prior to counter-battery fires), is heard by scouts or infantry, is resupplied by enemy aircraft, and fires on friendly units on multiple occasions. Despite the number of events, the targeting team is unable to analyze the numerous indicators, arrive at a decision about the mortar's likely location, and mass combat power against a high-payoff target.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Techniques for targeting are discussed in CALL Newsletter No. 97-8, Search and Attack! Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Feb 97.
2. Review the JRTC video, "How to Conduct Targeting Meetings," available from CALL on line or by mail.
(TA.5.2.2.4
Identify Targets)
SUBJECT: Use of analysis control teams (ACTs)
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Aerial scouts employed with only a single aircraft have minimal survivability, which also jeopardizes continuous operations.
DISCUSSION:
1. The two analysis control teams (ACTs) of a divisional cavalry squadron do not facilitate continuous operations for more than a 24-hour period before starting to experience resource issues.
2. Many units, in an effort to maintain continuous operations, are conducting "single ship" reconnaissance missions rather than scout/weapon team operations. A single aircraft without a wingman or overwatch element is at exceptional risk on the battlefield. Not only is the aircraft much more likely to be engaged, but if it is shot down there is no one to assist in its security or recovery.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. A proper IPB, along with a good reconnaissance and security plan that uses redundant collectors arrayed in depth, will provide a good read on the enemy's timeline and scheme of maneuver. The intelligence read should be good enough to allow a surge of aerial reconnaissance assets to meet the threat as needed. This would conserve the limited availability of aerial reconnaissance assets based on crews and maintenance.
2. Units should focus OH-58Ds for use at night (when they are the most effective and least vulnerable) for critical events such as security operations and movement of the enemy's main body.
(TA.5.2.1
Collect Information on Situation)
SUBJECT: Developing an integrated threat picture
OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Brigade intelligence officers are not developing integrated threat plans.
DISCUSSION: Brigade S-2s tend to focus excessively on squads, mortars, SA14s, caches, etc., without relating the enemy's employment of these to an integrated enemy plan. In other words, S-2s are not answering the questions: (1) "Why is the enemy doing what he is doing?" and (2) "Why is the enemy commander synchronizing his operations in this way?" The main reason that this integrated picture is not being developed is that brigade XOs, brigade S-3s, and intelligence staff sections are not requiring the other operating systems/combat multipliers to give input to the intelligence officer. Brigade commanders are accepting less than a fully integrated enemy COA which relates and explains how and WHY the enemy will employ each of his capabilities in the given COA. Just like BLUFOR, the enemy commander has limited resources with which to work. He must strive to synchronize his effort to maintain the twin options of economy of force and mass at the decisive points. BLUFOR units tend to attack/chase/seek enemy "things" rather than attack the enemy plan.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The fix is to have commanders be more demanding of their S-2s and not accept one-dimensional analysis. They must learn to ask the tougher "WHY" questions of the intelligence officer.
2. Brigade XOs must ensure that during mission analysis, all staff sections put on their "red hats" and perform an IPB. Brigade S-3s must ensure that prior to the mission analysis briefing the S-2 has had sufficient time to integrate input from the other operating systems/combat multipliers into his IPB.
3. Brigade S-2s must mature beyond being battalion S-2s to recognize that they will never have an integrated threat picture unless they integrate information from other operating systems/combat multipliers into their IPB.
4. These fixes outline some good Home Station training objectives for S-2/"slice" integrated training.
(TA.5.3.4.
Integrate Intelligence Information)
SUBJECT: Analysis of time in the defense
OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Units are doing much better at developing a detailed timeline analysis for the defense. The residual problem is one of integration.
DISCUSSION: Typically, the XO or S-3 develops this plan independently of the rest of the staff. If the staff does have input, it is in the form of a checklist of actions without sufficient analysis of time needed, time necessary, and status of resources. As a result, the timeline briefs well but seldom gets executed. Immediately, the lack of analysis shows through friction in preparation.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The staff working on the defense must look at the time available, the current status of resources (people and equipment/supplies), the critical tasks that must be accomplished, the important tasks that may have to receive lower priority, and the places where modifications to tasks have to be made (i.e., when the results of the enemy's reconnaissance shows that the staff is building the wrong defense).
2. An SOP for an infantry squad, platoon, or company, usually has four priorities of work and is a good starting point on a brigade timeline.
(TA.5.3.4.1
Develop Enemy Intentions)
SUBJECT: Identify risk in a tactical operation
OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Most units do an adequate or better job of identifying risk in a tactical operation. Typically this is to "the rear." However, units do nothing to mitigate risk. Risk doctrine requires identification of mitigating factors to reduce the risk and make it manageable.
DISCUSSION: In Cortina, rear units get hit hard. This example can be extended to any number of other areas of risk. The rear is often considered an area of risk.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units must commit resources in some way to mitigate risk, otherwise it is not risk they are accepting. (Seldom is anything that is identified as risk shows up as PIR, EEFI or FFIR.think about that!) Where the units are willing to accept risk is probably exactly what the enemy would like to know. There are at least two ways this can be addressed.
1. Risk must be incorporated into the COA analysis (and wargamed as a branch or sequel).
2. If units are doing predictive analysis and are "looking ahead 48 hours," they can exercise economy of force by committing resources tomorrow to shape the area where they anticipate risk the day after tomorrow.
(TA.5.3.4.1
Develop Enemy Intentions)
SUBJECT: Enemy threat templating
OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Brigade and battalion S-2s consistently fail to accurately portray their predicted enemy courses of action in a graphic enemy event template.
DISCUSSION: The event template is the culmination of the IPB process. As such, it is vitally important, arguably the most important analytical product, to support the MDMP and the targeting process, and to fight the close battle. Without a clearly drawn event template, it is almost impossible for the S-2 to integrate his prediction of the enemy into the commander's and battle staff's decision cycle. Unfortunately, most S-2s were not able to produce an event template for a majority of the battles.
1. S-2s did not adequately delegate the workload required during the MDMP to their subordinates. This is especially true in regard to their enlisted 96B Intelligence Analysts, who were nothing more than well-trained radio operators and map plotters. Instead, the trend was for S-2s and assistant S-2s to do all of the IPB themselves. As a consequence, the S-2s generally ran out of time and energy just when they started their event template and usually presented a woefully inadequate product.
2. Brigade and battalion XOs do not have a complete understanding of what products to expect from their S-2s at each stage of the MDMP and the time it takes to prepare those products. Often at the JRTC, XOs established planning timelines that gave their staff less than an hour from the completion of the division operation order to the mission analysis brief. In those cases where S-2s were not able to start the IPB prior to the division order, their IPB products suffered in quality from the beginning. Since IPB is a process whereby each product builds upon the analysis of the last product, it is critical that the early products are done well. In most cases, the S-2s generally fell behind from the beginning, were forced to sacrifice the quality of early products to adhere to an arbitrary time schedule, and, as a consequence, were unable to produce accurate event templates later.
3. MI doctrine is not clear on how to complete event templates for every mission. IPB was designed for defensive operations, and most S-2s have a clear understanding of how to complete the event template while in the defense. However, few have the knowledge or experience to adequately portray the enemy in space and time during movement-to-contact missions, deliberate attacks, or other offensive operations. The S-2 must step away from doing the detailed work of IPB and take a few minutes to think about how to portray his prediction of the enemy course of action.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, addresses the enemy event template in detail. However, it treats it as another equal step in the analytical process. In fact, the first step to fixing this trend is for S-2s, commanders, and XOs to accept that the event template is a goal of the process, vital to the success of the unit's mission.
(TA.5.3.4.1
Develop Enemy Intentions)
SUBJECT: Use of intelligence overlays
OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Units' use of overlays in course-of-action (COA) planning is a management problem.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Consider stacking intelligence overlays on the map in the following order: MCOO, operations graphics, enemy COAs. Next, place a blank drop over these and combine the different COAs into one overall template. Ensure it is clear where the COAs merge and diverge. Where they diverge, look for where the enemy commander would have to make a decision on a particular COA and place a symbol for a decision point there.
2. In those places where the enemy's presence would indicate he has adopted a particular COA, place a symbol for a named area of interest. Based on the enemy's mission and the task and purpose of each element, show where the enemy wants to move and how long it will take him to get there using time phase lines.
3. Finally, add any other details necessary to show how the enemy is expected to operate in the future. If it is important to show his entire logistical system, then do so. Keep it simple and legible, but make it as detailed as necessary.
(TA.5.3.4.1
Develop Enemy Intentions)
SUBJECT: Gathering the products necessary for the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process
OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): The initial steps for conducting the IPB process are hampered by the lack of products necessary in following the procedures.
DISCUSSION: The first step in the IPB process is to gather the necessary products completed early and to check to see that they are complete. The first product needed is the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO). At a minimum it should display the critical factors of observation, concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA), especially key and decisive terrain, and the effects of weather. The product does not need to show every nuance of the terrain, just the results of the analysis. The next group of products is the enemy course-of-action overlays developed early in the IPB process.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Each overlay should have at least the following: enemy mission and potential task organization, enemy decisive point, task and purpose of each unit, main effort, supporting effort, unit boundaries, and objectives as appropriate.
2. In this TTP, brigade and battalion S-2s should concentrate on analyzing the enemy in the above detail two levels below the senior enemy unit (i.e., if you are fighting a battalion, then you would track two levels below that [platoons]). The S-2 should not try to template down to every team and weapon system.
(TA.5.4
Prepare and Disseminate Intelligence Reports)
SUBJECT: Templating the chemical threat
OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): S-2s at brigade and battalion often fail to produce a template of where, based on analysis, they suspect the possible employment of chemical agents on the battlefield.
DISCUSSION: S-2s at the tactical level do a poor job of templating a potential chemical threat. Chemical personnel at both brigade and battatlion often fail to produce a template of where, based upon their analysis, they suspect the possible employment of chemical agents on the battlefield. A sound template will drive the NBC decontamination and reconnaissance effort.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The chemical officer must possess an understanding of how the enemy is organized to fight, and this can be found in the enemy order of battle. Once the chemical officer understands the enemy order of battle, he need only conduct reverse analysis to ascertain where he thinks the enemy will employ agents and then depict these locations on his template.
2. The chemical officer must design a decontamination and reconnaissance plan that covers the depth and width of his battlespace, and allows him to focus his limited resources with respect to location on the ground and times of enemy use of agents.
3. The chemical officer must coordinate with the S-2 to ensure that they are presenting the identical picture for their respective commanders, and then publish the results to the subordinate units as per FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.
(TA.5.4.3 Prepare Tactical Intelligence Reports)
TA.1
Maneuver BOS
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
