TA.2 FIRE SUPPORT BOS
(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)
Positive Performance
SUBJECT: Company and platoon-level fire support drills
OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Company and platoon-level fire support drills are consistently well done.
DISCUSSION: At the platoon and company level, battle drills are being executed and synchronized which enable successful fires to be executed on obstacles and engagement areas (EA).
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Review CALL Newsletter No. 97-11, Fighting with Fires III, Apr 93.
2. View CALL Video Tape No. 3, Direct Fire Execution.
(TA.2.2.1.1
Conduct Surface Attack)
Needs Emphasis
SUBJECT: Use of Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR)
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): During the low-intensity conflict (LIC) and deliberate attack phases, most forward observers (FO) do not have their PLGRs on or in the continuous mode while moving.
DISCUSSION: More often than not, the lead element of the platoon makes contact and the FO has lost his ability to use the PLGR to immediately and accurately determine the target location.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Keep the PLGR on and in the continuous mode, and upon a chance contact use it to send the FO's present location and initiate a fire mission using the polar plot call for fire.
2. Read and review TM 11-5825-29-13.
3. Implement the techniques described in the article "The PLGR: Techniques and Procedures Forward Observers Can Use To Bring Rapid, Accurate Indirect Fires to the Close Fight," CTC Quarterly Bulletin No. 96-10, 4th Qtr, FY 96, Oct 96.
(TA.2.1
Process Ground Targets)
SUBJECT: Q36 operations
OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Field artillery planners/decision-makers fail to adequately plan target acquisition assets due to a basic lack of general radar knowledge. Field artillery planners do not understand the basic requirements of the firefinder radar system.
DISCUSSION: This lack of knowledge becomes apparent when units plan for future operations. The targeting technician assigned to the radar is the resident expert. Unfortunately, units tend to limit the targeting technician's input to only site selection and after-the-fact recommendations. Units lose critical time and miss key opportunities trying to execute unrealistic plans. Field artillery tactical operations centers (TOCs) tend to expect more from the radar than is physically possible.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Understand and accept the system's capabilities and limitations.
2. Conduct extensive professional development classes for both officers and NCOs at Home Station. Gauge the level of detail to the target audience.
3. Conduct tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) terrain walks to highlight the unique requirements of the system; i.e., optimum mask angles, positioning considerations, and the effects of vegetation and the terrain.
4. The targeting technician must be an integral member of the FA battalion staff. Bring the targeting technician into the planning process early to surface potential problems.
5. Conduct realistic radar training at Home Station; i.e., limited friendly fire and more hostile fire operations.
(TA.2.1.2.1
Determine System Capability)
SUBJECT: Howitzer range cards
OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Firing batteries continue to not complete or partially complete howitzer range cards.
DISCUSSION: Often howitzer range cards do not contain direct-fire targets or data for APERS or killer junior. Many units come to the JRTC and never use range cards at all.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Battery leadership should review FM 6-50, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery, and howitzer range cards should be the focus of continued training.
2. Every soldier must understand that the range card is invaluable in orienting the howitzer when engaging direct-fire targets. The battery leadership must provide checks and balances. See FM 6-50, Chapter 3, pp. 3-12.
(TA.2.1.3 Integrate Fire Support)
SUBJECT: Out-of-traverse/6400-mil operations
OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Firing units often display difficulty in conducting out-of-traverse missions.
DISCUSSION: The XO fails to derive the minimum QE for each octant; the fire direction center (FDC) fails to compute terrain gun position correction (TGPCs) for each octant; the howitzer sections have equipment (usually the prime mover or camouflage net) that prohibits true 6400-mil capability. Additionally, howitzer sections routinely do not emplace their aiming posts correctly which results in the inability to have an aiming reference point and pick-up displacement for all possible azimuths. Gunners and section chiefs are not comfortable with using aiming posts to pick up displacement. In many instances, units are not using distant aiming points (DAP) despite them being available. The result is terribly slow fire mission response times, particularly when responding to counter-fire missions.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Read and review FM 6-40, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery, FM 6-50, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery, and the appropriate howitzer -10.
2. Ensure the XO/CFB and FDC understand the requirements necessary for the conduct of out-of-traverse missions to include properly setting up the chart in the FDC to facilitate 6400-mils.
3. Ensure howitzer sections are trained on how to position their alternate aiming reference points and are completely proficient at picking up displacement.
4. Frequently rehearse out-of-traverse dry-fire missions in each octant to ensure the firing unit is capable of providing fast, accurate fires.
5. Ensure all unit equipment is positioned to facilitate and not hinder 6400-mil operations.
(TA.2.1.3
Integrate Fire Support)
SUBJECT: Mortar employment in close contact
OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Few units are using mortars when contact with the enemy is established.
DISCUSSION: Maneuver unit leaders (platoon and company) are not exercising "tactical patience" and allowing their observers and fire support officers (FSOs) to fight with fires prior to maneuvering on the enemy. Company FSOs and platoon FOs are not establishing priority targets with 60-mm and 81-mm mortars along the unit's route.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. FOs and FSOs should establish targets along the unit's route on templated enemy positions and likely ambush sites.
2. As the unit moves along the route, the FO should cancel one target and establish the next. The FO uses the minimum safe distance of the weapon system designated to fire the target as the trigger to shift to the new target.
3. When the unit comes in contact with the enemy, the FO can initiate his priority target or shift from his priority target, placing his fires on or behind the enemy. See "Fast, Accurate Fires in the Close Fight" in the FA Journal, March-April 1996.
(TA.2.2.1
Conduct Lethal Engagement)
SUBJECT: Accuracy of mortars
OBSERVATION (FS DIV): FSOs are not providing timely meteorological data (MET) or coordinating for survey (declination) support for the task force's organic mortars.
DISCUSSION: Mortar platoons and sections are not aggressively conducting registrations as a means to improve their accuracy.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The battalion FSO should coordinate with the FA battalion S-3 to get MET messages (computer MET if the unit is using the mortar ballistic computer) and survey support. The maneuver task force should be included in the FA battalion's priorities of survey support (with the priority going to the main effort task force).
2. The FSO, in concert with the maneuver task force S-3, should establish which units will conduct the registrations for the mortars and ensure that this tasking is included in the OPORD.
(TA.2.2.1.1
Conduct Surface Attack)
SUBJECT: LTACFIRE operations
OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Although rotational units consistently maintain digital communications, they rarely exploit the capabilities of the Light Tactical Fire Direction System/Initial Fire Support Automated System (LTACFIRE/IFSAS).
DISCUSSION: Few units use the LTACFIRE/IFSAS to manage targets, conduct fire planning, and conduct tactical fire direction. The common results are fire plans that are not disseminated or fired, inefficient use of resources, and failure to meet the commander's attack criteria. Inexperienced operators, along with the failure of the chain of command to force the use of the system, are the primary reasons. While units often have excellent LTACFIRE standing operating procedures, they are rarely used. Digital fire control systems greatly facilitate and ease target management, fire planning, tactical fire direction, and the dissemination of information.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. To exploit the system, both operators and leaders must fully understand its capabilities. Effective LTACFIRE/IFSAS sustainment training, using realistic and demanding operational scenarios, should be established and enforced to instill confidence.
2. Incorporate and enforce the use of LTACFIRE/IFSAS during all Home Station training events to ensure that it becomes the primary means of fire control and planning.
(TA.2.3
Integrate Fire Support)
SUBJECT: Survey operations
OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Survey support is not maximizing the use of all assets. Initial field artillery support plans (FASP) have done a good job in directing survey support in order of priority to all assets requiring survey control.
DISCUSSION: Unfortunately, the trend is for survey support to cease after the firing batteries and radar are complete. Units exert minimum effort or consideration to assets in the task force; i.e., 81-mm mortars, OH-58D, COLTS, targets, routes, and obstacles.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Ensure planning in the survey annex in the field artillery support plan (FASP) encompasses all assets in the task force that require survey.
2. Review FM 6-2, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Field Artillery Survey, specifically Chapters 14 and 15, and figure 15-1 (FSCOORD checklist).
3. Conduct extensive officer and NCO professional development at Home Station focusing on the importance of effective survey.
(TA.2.3
Integrate Fire Support)
SUBJECT: Integration of indirect fire during small unit contacts
OBSERVATION (TF 2): Infantry platoon leaders and forward observers are reluctant to employ indirect fires during chance contact.
DISCUSSION: Platoon leaders maneuver their squads into their own indirect fire or cancel the mission prior to it being fired. Squad leaders and platoon leaders are not aware or comfortable with call-for-fire and its employment. The result is that units fail to integrate indirect fires into contact, thus reducing the combat power ratio. This allows the enemy to break contact on their own terms.
Units are not trained or aware of FO react-to-contact battle drill. Poor situational awareness by maneuver units causes slow clearance of fires in the company sector. Mortar sections are not ready to fire in a timely manner because they have been lulled into complacency from inactivity.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Cross-train leaders at TSFO and during 60-mm mortar live fires.
2. Incorporate indirect fire into all training. (Do not always task the mortar section to be OPFOR at Home Station training.)
3. Educate leaders on the use of minimum safe distances and clearance of fires while conducting tactical movements.
4. Use 60-mm mortars to cover the direction the OPFOR is most likely to break contact.
(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)
TA.1
Maneuver BOS
TA.3
Air Defense BOS
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