Military

LOAD PLANS

ISSUE: Will the Bradley vehicle, when used as an engineer squad carrier, provide the hauling capability needed by a combat engineer squad?

OBSERVATION No. 1: An M3 was successfully modified to function as a squad-level E-BFV. See photographs 6-1 through 6-3.

DISCUSSION: One company made modifications to one M3. Their modifications included:

1. Removal of individual seats and installation of M2A2ODS bench seats and a squad box (used as a seat).

2. Retention of M3AO bustle rack (significant storage space increase over M2).

3. Installation of interior box in the left rear (squad used as their demo box).

4. Extended handholds on the left and right skirts for carrying wire and pickets.

5. Removal of all unnecessary interior bins and boxes.

6. Placement of cargo net on interior right side for A bags (duffels).

7. Placement of cargo net on exterior right rear for rucks.

The Engineer brigade S3's unofficial estimate of the cost for these modifications was approximately $5,000. The local Directorate of Logistics (DOL) can make all modifications. The unit welder can complete some of the modifications, further reducing their cost. By the conclusion of the rotation, the unit decided to store all rucks and duffel bags on the outside of the vehicle.

RECOMMENDATION: The modified M3A3 used in this rotation should be used as a base for additional modifications.

OBSERVATION No. 2: There is no reduction in carrying capacity. In fact, the M3, with modifications, can carry more than the M113.

DISCUSSION:

1. The base M2 BFV was more difficult to load than the modified E-BFV and M113. This is because the BFV is configured to carry an infantry squad and their basic load. This configuration difference is made up of numerous bins and boxes that occupy space that can be better utilized for engineer equipment. E-BFVs could hold mission-essential equipment.

2. The most noticeable difference between the M113 and the E-BFV is the loss of the M105 trailer. Elimination of the M105 trailer reduces the ability to haul Class IV and Class V supplies, both mission and basic loads, and specifically mines. With the Conservative Heavy Division (CHD), however, hauling capability is not as big a concern as before because the CHD is not designed to conduct a deliberate defense without significant assistance from Corps. On the ground, the emphasis of the divisional engineer's counter-mobility is shifted from conventional minefields to scatterable minefields. The Volcano systems in an engineer company can more than make up for this deficiency in a hasty defense, providing the control supply rate (CSR) for Volcano reloads supports it.

RECOMMENDATION: To provide the engineers with adequate carrying capacity, the E-BFV should be modified for carrying engineer equipment. Add one HEMTT cargo truck to the Force XXI mechanized platoon MTOE to carry pickets and wire for minefield fratricide prevention fences. This also requires two 12B10 soldiers.

OBSERVATION No. 3: At the end of their NTC rotation, one fourth of the engineer soldiers that were issued unmodified M2 Bradleys at the start of their NTC rotation said they would prefer the M113 as the engineer squad vehicle.

DISCUSSION: When the Test and Evaluation Coordination Office (TECO) first surveyed engineer soldiers, they were 100 percent in favor of the Bradley as the engineer squad vehicle. At the end of the rotation, a repeat survey indicated that 25 percent favored the M113. The primary reason given was lack of storage space in the unmodified Bradley. The soldiers in the modified M3 Bradley remained 100 percent in favor of the Bradley as the engineer squad vehicle.

RECOMMENDATION: Modifications for additional storage capacity are required to the interior and exterior of the M2 Bradley to make it more suitable to the engineers as an engineer vehicle.

OBSERVATION No. 4: There is no means for carrying the modular pack mine system (MOPMS) on or in the E-BFV.

DISCUSSION: Carrying MOPMS on or in the E-BFV, especially a squad vehicle, is a problem. If MOPMS is carried inside the E-BFV, on the floor, there is no room for the squad to ride.

RECOMMENDATION: A means to carry the MOPMS on the Bradley's exterior should be developed. A suggestion is to install a mounting bracket on the troop hatch. This bracket should not be used as a permanent storage location, but rather as a means for moving the MOPMS from the mine dump or Class IV/V point to the mission site.

OBSERVATION No. 5: Squad load plans and sets, kits, and outfits (SKOs) consisted of only mission-essential equipment based on missions expected in the theater of operations. The engineer squads did not carry or plan for the use of other equipment authorized to an engineer platoon.

DISCUSSION: The engineer squads mounted in E-BFVs did not load or bring all MTOE equipment. Essentially all that was loaded was equipment for expected mobility and counter-mobility tasks (demolition sets, minefield marking sets, mine detectors, picket pounders, and select pieces of the pioneer tool kits). Also loaded were general mission and life support items such as fuel cans, water cans, coolers, and cots. The modified M2 had sufficient space for this equipment plus five dismounts (potentially six dismounts with the extension of the squad box located right rear interior). There was not sufficient additional space for all of the other SKOs required by MTOE (sketch set, carpenter's tool kit, and full pioneer tool kit).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Mission-essential equipment should be clearly delineated based on the organizational concept and operating methods for the unit, and only mission-essential equipment should be carried on the E-BFV.

2. Consider two courses of action (COA) for the other equipment authorized to an engineer platoon:

PEARSON SURFACE MINE PLOW

ISSUE: What is the impact of the Pearson Surface Mine Plow (SMP) on the mobility and operational performance of the E-BFV?

NOTE: Recognizing a deficiency in capability due to reduced manpower (Force XXI strength) and lack of future enablers (Grizzly), Engr Bde, 4th ID, acquired four Pearson SMPs and deployed with them to their NTC rotation.

Bottom Line Up Front: The Pearson Plow is designed to skim the surface of a flat roadway or trail, not to defeat buried mines. The Canadian Army, its designer, use the SMP as a tool to reduce a lane in a surface scatterable minefield. Little statistical data is available on its capabilities. There are no results of any dynamic testing to measure its effectiveness and ability to remain functional after one or more mine detonations of varying types. The Pearson SMP is a developmental system that will undergo further testing next year. Observations made here are not based on true developmental or operational testing and should only be considered within this context. Beyond the brief description given here, little was known about the system before the rotation, and after the rotation more questions remain than answers. The unit had some success in using the plow during rehearsals, but was not successful at any other time during the rotation.

OBSERVATION No. 1: The Pearson SMP has generally about the same mobility affect on the E-BFV as the mine plow has on an M1.

DISCUSSION: The SMP causes some mobility restrictions to the E-BFV.

1. In the traveling configuration (see Photo 6-4 below), the E-BFV can maintain requisite speed but does suffer a reduction in acceleration. It is less capable of negotiating broken terrain (moguls and wadis), and must do so at a reduced speed.

2. The most significant mobility loss occurs when the SMP is placed into the plowing configuration (see Photos 6-5 and 6-6). In this configuration, the wing sections of the plow are lowered and the plow is not restrained, allowing it to pivot horizontally. The pivoting plow makes it necessary for the operator to negotiate terrain much more slowly. Ideally, the SMP is placed in the plowing configuration while in the assault position. As such, the route from the assault position to the minefield must be trafficable for the SMP in the plowing configuration. If the route is not trafficable, then the SMP must be moved to or near the minefield before being put into the plowing configuration.

3. Other considerations relative to the SMP are:

RECOMMENDATION: If the Pearson SMP is shown to be capable of reducing a lane in a scatterable minefield, it should be considered as a tool for divisional engineers to use in support of division maneuvers. Commanders, Bradley Commanders (BCs) and E-BFV drivers must be aware of, and plan for, the reduced mobility and other limitations that the SMP will impose on their engineer vehicles.

OBSERVATION No. 2: The blackout lights illuminate and white out on the SMP.

DISCUSSION: Drivers were forced to move without blackout drive to be able to see beyond the SMP.

RECOMMENDATION: If the SMP is employed, the blackout drive must be relocated to allow the driver to see at night.

OBSERVATION No. 3: The Pearson SMP will mount on an E-BFV without major modifications.

DISCUSSION:

1. Mounting bracket requires drilling holes in armor for A0 models. A2 models use existing applique armor holes. (See Photos 6-7 through 6-10).

2. The unit issued two SMPs per platoon. The SMPs were mounted on the platoon leader's and platoon sergeant's E-BFVs. The decision for two plows was based on the fact that one plow does not reduce a lane wide enough for an M1 to safely transit. The TTP calls for an initial pass to reduce the lane and a second pass with the nose of the plow on the track path of the first to widen the lane to allow for M1 traffic (see Figure 6-1).

The allocation of the plows to the platoon leader's and platoon sergeant's E-BFVs facilitated the marking of the lane by the squads. This appears to be a logical solution but other alternatives should be explored, such as both on squad E-BFVs or one on a leader E-BFV and one on a squad E-BFV.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The minor modifications needed to mount the Pearson SMP on the Bradley should be made with in-house resources.

2. Based on the lane width required for an M1 tank, two SMPs per platoon is a valid basis of issue.

OBSERVATION No. 4: Two of the Pearson SMPs were non-mission capable (NMC) for approximately 12-18 hours because of cracks in the A frame.

DISCUSSION: The SMPs began cracking and buckling at the A frame because of improper stowage of the SMP for movement (see Photos 6-11 and 6-12). The SMP is equipped with chains that prevent it from pivoting horizontally. When the chains were not used, the SMP pivoted wildly putting unintended stress on the A frame causing it to crack. The unit welder was able to fix the cracks and shore up the buckling (see Photo 6-13). Once the repairs were made, the unit followed its SOP for connecting the chains and also improvised an additional support chain to further secure the SMP during movement.

RECOMMENDATION: When not in use, the mounted SMP must be stowed properly for movement using the chains provided. Avoid excessive speeds during movement.

WEAPONS

ISSUE: Are engineer units able to effectively employ the combat capabilities of the E-BFV and fight as part of the maneuver force?

OBSERVATION: The engineer unit was unable to react to enemy contact and continually did not survive long enough to arrive at the point of penetration.

DISCUSSION:

1. The E-BFV provides considerably more firepower to the combat engineers, which is only beneficial when the system is properly and effectively employed. During the rotation, the engineer unit fired approximately 600 rounds of 25 mm, with a BDA of one HIND-D. Engineer units are not familiar with the task of developing and executing a direct fire plan. They are accustomed to traveling inside a company/team or task force formation and routinely leaving direct fire planning and execution to the tankers and infantrymen. With the firepower provided by the E-BFV, engineers must learn to react to enemy contact and engage the enemy as part of the maneuver force.

2. This is not an E-BFV-unique issue. Direct fire planning, movement techniques, and movement formations are equally applicable to M113s. The need for skill in conducting these basic combat tasks is compounded by the fact that engineers assume their own security in the Force XXI organization. With the loss of one company/team, task forces are no longer capable of protecting engineer movement while engaging the enemy. Mounting engineers in E-BFVs will help to fill the gap created by the missing company/team, but the engineers must be proficient in using the capability of the E-BFV if they are going to fight as engineers.

RECOMMENDATION: Regardless of their carrier, engineers must develop and execute a direct fire plan and use the appropriate movement techniques and formations. Engineers need to be trained along with combat arms soldiers in actions on contact drills.

ACCESS/EGRESS

ISSUE: Is access and egress of the troops through the hatches of the E-BFV impeded, or does it require any procedural changes?

OBSERVATION: The use of the Bradley as the squad engineer vehicle resulted in no modifications to access/egress procedures for the engineer squad.

DISCUSSION:

1. Part of the feasibility of the E-BFV for combat engineers is access and egress. Access and egress of the troops through the hatches of the Bradley are not impeded. It took an average of 15 seconds to upload the crew when the order to move was given. Egress took an average of 5 seconds. These are crew access and egress times only and do not include the time taken for loading or unloading the equipment.

2. Safety and rollover have not been affected. The platoons are conducting rollover drills just as they do with the M113.

RECOMMENDATION: Access and egress procedures for the E-BFV can remain essentially the same as they are for the M113.

FORCE PROTECTION

ISSUE: What is the impact of the E-BFV on force protection of the engineer unit?

OBSERVATION: When presented with M113s and E-BFVs as potential targets, the OPFOR chose to shoot at the E-BFV every time.

DISCUSSION:

1. Both combat and test data conclude that because of the increased armor protection, speed, and firepower, the Bradley can survive better on the battlefield. The increased speed enhances the ability to maneuver with the combat forces and increases survivability through protection from those weapons systems. The increased firepower of the TOW and 25mm cannon will increase the ability to defend the squad and, therefore, increase survivability.

2. Although the Bradley is more survivable than the M113, it is also a more valuable target. The engineer unit must be prepared to take appropriate action and protect itself. The Bradley Engineer crews must be trained to fight the Bradley as a weapons system. The crews must be trained in fire and maneuver as well as in marksmanship, direct fire planning, scanning, target acquisition, and operator maintenance.

3. Photos 6-14 and 6-15 were taken during the live-fire deliberate attack. The unit started the rotation with the typical "ducks in a row" formations, seen all too often. As the rotation continued, the unit became much better at movement formations and scan plan. The pictures show the combat engineer platoon moving in a wedge formation. The tank is the same vehicle in both photos. Notice the breakdown in the formation as they moved. These illustrations are typical of shortfalls of mechanized engineers as a whole. Engineers are accustomed to moving inside of someone else's maneuver formation, not being the formation. Engineers must relearn this basic combat skill.

RECOMMENDATION: With the increased capabilities of the Bradley comes an increase in the training requirements to enable the engineer crews to take advantage of those capabilities and learn the combat skills necessary to protect themselves. The officer and NCO education systems as well as the 12B AIT course should be modified to include training in fighting the Bradley.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of the focused rotation at NTC was to look at the feasibility of the Bradley as an engineer squad vehicle. This chapter discussed the equipment portion of this question. The significant findings are:

1. With some minor modifications, the Bradley will work well as an engineer vehicle.

2. The MTOE authorization of Sets, Kits, and Outfits for the engineer squad and platoon must be reassessed.

3. The developmental Pearson Surface Mine Plow (SMP), if fielded, has potential for divisional engineers to use in support of division maneuvers.

4. The E-BFV puts engineers back in the fight, so engineers must be trained and ready to fight as combat soldiers.

5. Access and egress of the troops through the hatches of the Bradley are not impeded.

6. The E-BFV is a higher value target than the M113; engineers must be trained in the skills necessary to protect themselves in close combat.

Chapter 5: The Engineer-Bradley Fighting Vehicle (E-BFV)

Chapter 7: Manning the Bradley Engineer Platoon